The Truth About Anthrax And Biological Weapons

By Gary Krasner

"The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed-and
hence clamorous to be led to safety-by menacing it with an endless series
of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary." -H.L. Mencken

Infectious disease experts were among those hardest hit by the September
11th terrorist attack. Prior to the attack, many will recall that these
experts had been warning us to prepare for biological terrorism and new
exotic microbial epidemics. Their credibility may have seemed tarnished
after 6 thousand people perished from "mere" explosives, instead of
biological agents. However, they seem to have made a quick recovery.

Ironically, their past success in instilling inordinate fear of
infectious diseases has hampered even their own attempts to mitigate
public alarm about anthrax. Their cohorts in the media have had similar
difficulties. Except that the media's struggle to put the threat in
proper perspective has been hindered by their desire for high ratings and
selling newspapers. They also don't know enough to distinguish the
genuine killing potential of chemical agents, from the dubious threat of
biological agents.

Here's the truth of the matter. Anthrax is a livestock pathogen. The
spores survive for about twenty years in the ground in rural areas. They
normally have no effect upon humans, because a few anthrax spores cannot
create an infection, and they do not come up from the ground in large
quantities. A human must inhale about 10,000 spores to get sick. And such
concentrations are never found in nature. Wool sorters inhale anthrax
spores in small quantities continually (150-700 per hour), and only if
they get a large dose will an infection begin. Some anthrax researchers
who were interviewed in the media said that they often don't even wear
protective masks; they just make sure not to draw close to it and breathe
in the stuff.

Anthrax is what's called a "gram positive" bacterium. This means it has
the type of cell walls which are harmless, unlike the cell walls of "gram
negative" bacteria, which attack tissue. Therefore, anthrax can only
attack tissue by producing a special toxin which it excretes as a waste
product. One cell or spore does not produce enough toxin to start an
infection. Epidemiologically, anthrax more closely resembles a chemical
toxin for humans: it is dose-dependent and not contagious. Fatal human
cases show almost no bacteremia at all. Yet for some animals, there is
such a heavy bacteremia that it was once supposed that death occurred
through capillary blockade.

The reports of office or postal workers "testing positive" for anthrax
are totally useless without comparing them to the normal background
incidence of either asymptomatic carriers of the bacteria, or antibody
positive individuals. A guess would be that there may be 10% of the
population that are either carrying the numerous common wild strains, or
who have residual antibodies from exposure to any strain of anthrax that
occurred sometime during their lives, or from perinatal transmission, or
even genetic inheritance. In New York City, for example, at one point,
out of 1300 people who had been tested, only 4 people were found to have
antibodies to anthrax. Without comparing that ratio to what would be
found during normal times, one cannot claim that the immune response to
anthrax among those 4 people was the result of exposure from the recent
mailings. (Excluding cutaneous cases, of course.)

Increased surveillance in detection of anthrax spores in the environment
is also creating something of a paradox. But only because we have no data
on the normal presence of stray anthrax bacilli (virulent or not)-a
microbe that appears naturally in certain environments. Some anthrax
spores detected in very small quantities in "low profile" locations may
not necessarily be coming from terrorists. Confirmation that the spores
were processed in some fashion-electrostatic charge removed or coated
with an anti-caking agent to help them remain suspended in the air-would
rule out that they're naturally derived. But non-medical journalists do
not know to ask officials such questions.

Among those tested, the few with symptoms (fever, cough, muscle weakness)
may really just have the flu or a bad cold. Certainly, that infant with
the rash wasn't unusual, particularly if he had recently received routine
infant vaccinations. And anthrax wasn't even found at the ABC building
where his mother brought him. It was all assumptions: (baby rash) +
(network headquarters) = anthrax. The first man that had died came from a
farming region where anthrax was common.

But more likely he died from the antibiotics that were administered to
him. About a year ago, the NY Times reported that antibiotics could be
leading to the deaths of 98,000 Americans each year. A month later,
researchers revised that number down to 36,000, partly by eliminating
antibody-resistant infections from the total. Nevertheless, fully 10% of
our own body weight consists of bacteria. Bacterial cells outnumber total
body cells by ten to one. And only about 1% of all known bacterial
strains are pathogenic to humans. The other 99% are beneficial to us, and
indeed, vital to all life on earth. Therefore, the disruption in the
vital equilibrium of normal bacterial colonies in our bodies adversely
affects our biochemistry so extensively as to make such estimates
impossible to make. Thousands die from the flu alone each year-in
actuality, from complications from the anti-catarrhal effects of taking
antipyretics and antibiotics to suppress the symptoms.

The disequilibrium may even be the cause of major diseases. The epidemic
of Crohn's disease in the last fifty years, for example, started with the
introduction of antibiotics, and progressed in parallel with the increase
in antibiotic consumption. One hypothesis is that a mutated form of
normal bacterial flora morph into genetically super-resistant bacteria
under constant selection pressure from antibiotic usage. A British study
that tested 3545 subjects showed that the relative risk of developing
Crohn's disease was threefold, and 2.5 fold for developing ulcerative
colitis, after receiving live measles vaccination (vaccines contain
antibiotics and other agents that have a germicidal effect).

Adding to this, is the fact that drug effects are rarely cited as
official "cause of death", even when the cause is know to be a drug. And
no comprehensive records are kept of medication-related deaths. Doctors
and hospitals rarely report such deaths. That was the basis for a major
study published in The Journal of American Medical Association (JAMA),
April 14th, 1998. The paper analyzed 39 studies of ADRs (Adverse Drug
Reactions) in the United States to estimate the incidence of serious and
fatal adverse drug reactions in hospital patients. The authors estimated
that on average, 2,216,000 hospital patients experienced a serious ADR,
and 106,000 deaths were caused by ADRs annually in the United
States-making these reactions the sixth, and possibly (at most) the
fourth leading cause of death. Furthermore, these figures were NOT due to
mistakes by doctors in prescribing drugs or by patients in using them.
They were solely from the effects of drugs that were properly

Some health officials have been quietly acknowledging that detection
methods that would absolutely establish exposure or infection do not
exist. No cultural or biochemical characteristics serve to differentiate
the pathogenic strain of anthrax from the many non-pathogenic saprophytic
sporulating bacilli. And applying multiple antibiotics to a
culture-particularly in the absence of immune antibodies in the blood-to
see if it stops the growth, is too general and provides insufficient
identifying information about the strain of anthrax-only one of which is
pathogenic. Therefore, the invitro testing of blood cultures or nasal
swabs is unreliable. Other medical technologies used by microbiologists
have their own unique limitations. Gene testing-involving the
amplification of a molecular signal many thousand times-inevitably
introduces quantitation errors, and was never intended to distinguish
different strains of bacteria.

Electron photomicrographs have also been somewhat overstated as a
diagnostic tool. First, as with stained cultures, what you see is a
static picture of the tissue sample while it's being bombarded with
billions of electrons in a vaccum-which is obviously in the absence of
normal immune system effects. What happened before and after is not
observed. Were the cells invaded, or did they eat the virus as food?
Also, the long and arduous preparation in making the sample "electron
dense" introduces numerous artifacts, to the extent that it's hard to be
sure what you started out with. If that's not enough, a computer graphic
artist adds colors to the photo-image, because electron microscopes "see"
in black & white only.

Noble Laureate, Kary Mullis, Ph.D., invented the PCR test for
retroviruses. In his newly released documentary, "Deconstructing The Myth
Of Aids", journalist Gary Null asked Mullis to explain the apparent
growing HIV epidemic. Dr. Mullis replied that what we were actually
seeing was an "epidemic of HIV testing": In the beginning of the crisis
very few tests were given. But as the scope of testing dramatically
increased, we started to see more positive results. This was not proof of
a growing epidemic.

Likewise, medical surveillance for anthrax toxicity-the symptoms of which
merely mimic the flu-increased dramatically in recent weeks.
Consequently, and not surprisingly, investigators found a handful of sick
people that they attribute to anthrax. In the absence of the anthrax
scare, cases with these symptoms would be hardly noticeable. As such,
doctors wouldn't have bothered to test them for anthrax, and these cases
would have therefore been recorded as an acute cold or flu, and treated
with common antipyretics or antibiotics.

The latest contrivance is that terrorists might weaponize anthrax by
drying a slurry and grinding it to particles 1-5 microns in size. (The
bacteria are 1 by 3 microns.) The first problem is that the gunk would
dry like glue; and after grinding, it would still be glue. Even if it
were washed first, the bacteria would be sticky and would dry like glue.
The second problem is that bacteria do not tolerate grinding. They are as
fragile as egg shells. Grinding is how they are broken apart for
biochemical tests. Even if only 1% were broken, the result would be a
sticky gum, not a powder; and more like 99% would be broken before
getting 5 micron particles.

On eight separate occasions between 1990 and 1993, Japan's Aum Shinrikyo
cult tried to spray anthrax and botulinum toxins from trucks and rooftops
in Tokyo, and each time it failed. No one was infected, or at least no
one died. Main reason: The terrorists had problems developing effective
spray nozzles for aerosolizing the agents in the 1 to 5 micron range
necessary for them to lodge in the lungs.

The lethality of such airborne attacks depends largely on the size of the
particle dispersed. Particles in the 1 to 5 micron diameter deposit
efficiently in the lungs, while submicron particles tend to be exhaled.
Particles above 5 microns tend to become trapped in the upper respiratory
tract, where higher doses are required to start an infection. Those above
20 microns in diameter tend to settle to the ground quickly and, as a
result, do not travel far downwind.

Anthrax bugs can also be delivered in the form of liquid slurries.
Gastrointestinal anthrax is rapidly fatal in many cases. But experts say
reservoirs aren't an attractive target for terrorists, because they'd
have to dump large amounts of biological agents to overcome dilution.
Also, water supplies are filtered and chlorinated to kill naturally
occurring microorganisms, which would neutralize anthrax and other
bacteria. In fact, terrorist contamination of water supplies is extremely
rare, according to a study of such cases by Jessica E. Stern, author of
"Would Terrorists Turn to Poison?"

Aum Shinrikyo is the only example of a terrorist group that tried a
biological weapon for mass murder. The cult ended up turning to a
chemical-sarin gas-to attack Tokyo subway commuters, killing 12 and
hospitalizing about 1,000. In fact, threats or actual use of chemical or
biological weapons account for only 52 cases out of more than 8,000 in
the RAND Chronology of International Terrorism since 1968. Many are just
scares. Wilkening counts more than 120 anthrax hoaxes alone which have
been reported in the media nationwide since October 1998.

Biological warfare generally, is a flawed concept. The only route usually
considered is airborne, because bombs and missiles create the delivery
system. There is no natural disease in existence which is propagated in
that manner. Even the airborne diseases require close contact with the
source (infected person). The reason is because wind disperses the agents
too thinly, and gravity brings them down too rapidly. Increasing the
quantities massively will get a few persons, but only a few.

And then, very few of the diseases which are mentioned as biowarfare
agents are suitable for airborne dissemination. Brucellosis is not. It is
disseminated through body fluids. Plague is not. It is carried by insects
from the blood of one animal to another. The insects do not pick it up
from the ground. Government scientists even released airborn cholera in
the NYC subway system, with no effects. The only way biological warfare
agents can be used in a significant manner to create disease is to inject
them into the victims.

And even then, mortalities are not likely caused by the biological agents
themselves. Biological pathogens used in serums on test animals, for
example, contain toxic preservatives and adjuvants that are injected
directly into their bloodstreams-bypassing normal immune system barriers.
These injected agents also contain protein growth mediums that supports
the pathogenic cultures. In the absence of digestive juices in the
bloodstream, they immediately start decomposing and yielding known
endotoxins from normal protein putrefaction. Consequently, animals often
succumb to blood toxemia or septicemia and die. Their deaths are
erroneously attributed to the pathogen being tested.

Volumes have also been written showing that animals make poor medical
models for human diseases. Animals also react to drugs, vaccines, and
chemicals very differently than humans, and also to other species of
animals. Guinea pigs die from penicillin, but they can safely eat
strychnine-a deadly poison for humans, but not for monkeys. Aspirin kills
cats and sheep can swallow enormous quantities of arsenic. It's the main
reason drugs are recalled from the marketplace, but only after a high
enough death toll among humans is finally noticed. It all amounts to a
waste of human and animal life.

There's also evidence indicating how easily stressed lab animals succumb
to illnesses and die, from the poor conditions of their captivity, and
the artificial food and environment they're subjected to. All of these
additional factors contribute to faulty conclusions about the risk from
biological pathogens.

Pathogenicity is also a function of the general state of health of the
host, or target group. For example, the U.S. Government Bulletin,
Hygienic Laboratory, No. 123, February 1921, is a series of telling
experiments that were conducted by U.S. Government doctors to determine
the true "contagious" character of "influenza." To achieve their
objective, the experimenters subjected great numbers of volunteer Navy
personnel to "exposure" by various "known methods of transmission": Ten
volunteers were inoculated with secretions from the nose and throat and
with blood from typical cases of influenza. Thirty men were inoculated by
spray, swab or both of the nose and throat. Ten volunteers were placed
close to selected patients who had the flu and were then exposed by being
coughed in the face. The exposure continued for thirty minutes. Fifty
volunteers were subjected to the same procedure at another location. One
hundred were sprayed and dosed with cultures of the most virulent strains
of flu possible to obtain and observed for seven days. The results were:
"no appreciable reactions".

In nature, under normal conditions, maintaining health depends on keeping
the host and the pathogenic microbe in equilibrium. It does not merely
involve the total elimination of the latter. Yet it is this simplistic
approach that influences conventional medicine today.

Famed bacteriologist, Rene Dubös (inventor of streptomycin; 1968 Pulitzer
Prize winner) wrote a great deal on the limitations of the conventional
Germ Theory, and the aforementioned artifactual outcomes from laboratory
experiments. In his classic, Mirage Of Health (1959), page 89, he wrote:

"The ease and predictability with which Pasteur, Koch, and their
followers produced disease at will in experimental animals seem
miraculous in view of the difficulties that have so often been
encountered in subsequent attempts to produce disease in man. Their
success seems incompatible with the course of natural events. The fact of
the matter is that Pasteur and Koch did not deal with natural events, but
with experimental artifacts. The experimenter does not produce nature in
the laboratory. He could not if he tried, for the experiment imposes
limiting conditions on nature; its aims are to force nature to give
answers to questions devised by man. Every answer from nature is
therefore more or less influenced by the kind of questions asked."

"The art of the experimenter is to create models in which he can observe
some properties and activities of a factor in which he happens to be
interested. Koch and Pasteur wanted to show that microorganisms could
cause certain manifestations of disease. Their genius was to devise
experimental situations that lent themselves to an unequivocal
illustration of their hypothesis-situations in which it was sufficient to
bring the host and the parasite together to reproduce the disease. By
trial and error, they selected the species of animals, the dose of the
infectious agent, and the route of inoculation, which permitted the
infection to evolve without fail into progressive disease. Guinea pigs
always develop tuberculosis if tubercle bacilli are injected into them
under the proper conditions; introduction of sufficient rabies virus
under the dura of dogs always gives rise to paralytic symptoms. Thus, by
the skillful selection of experimental systems, Pasteur, Koch, and their
followers succeeded in minimizing in their tests the influence of factors
that might have obscured the activity of the infectious agents they
wanted to study. This experimental approach has been extremely effective
for the discovery of agents of disease and for the study of some of their
properties. But it has led by necessity to the neglect, and indeed has
often delayed the recognition, of the many other factors that play a part
in the causation of disease under conditions prevailing in the natural
world-for example, the physiological status of the infected individual
and the impact of the environment in which he lives."

Since allopathic trained people run the health bureaucracies, every
inflammatory (catarrhal) symptom of bodily elimination is assumed to be
an infectious disease. All evidence of malnourishment, toxemia, or a
toxicological agent is dismissed in favor of a microbiological
agent-which are plentiful and are readily available candidates to blame.
For the public health investigator, obscurity comes with the former. But
the latter will accompany research grants, a published article in a
leading journal, medical awards, recognition and prestige, and profits
from patentable test kits, treatments or vaccines. And of course, blaming
a microbial agent for a disease will always engender importance to the
institutions of infectious disease, and make the public feel dependant
upon their expertise, products and services.

The appendix contains a list of this historic bias, and the tragic
consequences of it.

While anthrax spores are resistant to heat and dryness, they're no match
for rain. A downpour would wash most of them out of the air, where they'd
become relatively harmless. Also, humidity and ultraviolet light decay
the bugs. So does oxygen. Anthrax and botulinum spores multiply only in
the absence of oxygen.

All these problems and more ranks anthrax and other biological agents as
very poor battlefield weapons. Uncontrolled variables as wind direction,
lengthy duration between infection and death, and all the rest makes
biologicals much more inferior as weapons than are chemical agents, which
can at least kill immediately and are more resilient to weather and
decompose more slowly. It is therefore rank stupidity to subject soldiers
heading to the battlefield with the debilitating and crippling effects of
vaccines for small pox, or anti-toxins for botulism, anthrax, and all the
rest. Those who can make onto the battlefield after all that are not left
in optimum health to deal with the rigors of fighting in a war.

Another aspect beyond normal biodegradability, is the "problem" of
bacterial Pleomorphism. Rod-shaped anthrax bacillus, for example, can
literally transform into the spherical coccus from exposure to
ultraviolet light. Pleomorphism refers to the transformation of one
distinct strain of bacteria into other strains within a single life
cycle. For example, the virulent tubercle bacillus could be made to
degenerate into harmless non "acid-fast" cocci, and then into
"diphtheroid" coccobacilli, just by altering their food or environment.
This bacteriological phenomenon was observed throughout history by the
noted microbiologists Antone Bechamp, Altman, Cohn, DeBarry, Dienkowski,
Fremy, Galippe, Lankester, Koch, Kurth, Manwaring, Nagelli, Portier,
Rosenow, Serval, Zops, Metchnikoff, J.Tissot, Raymond Rife, and
currently, Gaston Nessons.

Since all strains of bacteria can potentially share all bacterial genes,
then strictly speaking, there are no fixed species in the bacterial
world. According to Canadian bacteriologists, Sorin Sonea and Maurice
Panisset (The New Bacteriology. Boston:Jones & Bartlett, 1983), all
bacteria are one organism, one entity capable of genetic engineering
themselves on a planetary scale.

Obviously, fixed species of bacteria is the central part of the
biomedical model of specific etiology of disease (classifying a specific
germ as the singular causative agent of a specific disease). Stability of
the strain is also essential for it is to be effective bio weapon. But
Pleomorphism implies that conventional infectious disease theory is based
upon a faulty construct. Indeed, highly processed and concentrated
biological pathogens aside, in the natural environment, the prior state
of health of the host will usually determine the virulence of any natural

The threat of biowarfare is exaggerated through a combination of
ignorance, propaganda, and inordinate fears of infectious disease.
Researchers, who should know better and often do, are getting paid to
produce the agents, so they don't admit the futility of it. People
without medical backgrounds cannot realistically evaluate the claims.
Recently, some biowarfare experts have been candid about the low level of
threat that anthrax poses. However, CDC and other health officials have
grossly overstated the threat. They want the public to be frightened
enough of microbial pathogens to: (1) acquiesce to increased public
funding for basic medical research, treatments and prophylactics, (2)
value the role of infectious disease "experts" and elevate their status
in society, and (3) validate the disease paradigm-germ=disease;
drug=cure; vaccine=prevention-into which the medical profession has
invested so much in, and relies upon to sustain public perception of
their importance. A fearful public dependant on medical salvation is what
sustains the biomedical complex. In the distant past, it sustained
religious institutions.

The terrorists had to have planned the anthrax mailings prior to
September 11th. They knew that targeting the major news outlets would
have the maximum media effect, regardless of the actual ineffectiveness
of anthrax to kill many people. So, while federal agents are busy sorting
through the mails, they can load rental trucks full of explosives, with
perhaps radioactive waste. If Westsiders complain about available parking
near Zabars today, tomorrow they might find their streets empty for the
next 2000 years.


The NY Times of Wednesday, October 30, 2002 carried an article by
Dr.Lawrence K Altman, MD on the follow up study of the Center for Disease
Control on last year's anthrax scare in news media offices, the US Senate
and the Postal Service. The study found that 56% of personnel advised to
take a regimen of antibiotics to prevent the consequences of exposure to
inhalation Anthrax, did NOT complete the full course of therapy advised.
Despite this, no cases of anthrax had developed, including some people
who took absolutely no medication.

Federal Health officials recommended 60 days of antobiotic therapy to
over 9,300 workers exposed to anthrax spores in 4 states and Washington,
DC. Of these, 6,178 participated in the study. The group that did not
take any antibiotics was 13%, or 787. They didn't even fill the original
prescription for the antibiotic. Moreover, the study did not include
people who were told to stop taking antibiotics after laboratory tests
determined they had NOT been exposed to anthrax,

The irony is that the conclusion drawn by public health officials was
that there must be "improved compliance" in the future. "It undercored
the importance of communicating risks to individuals and of counselling
them." Instead, genuine scientists would have understood that a
controlled experiment had just taken place, and should have allowed for
the hypothesis that the antibiotic therapy has no efficacy.

[In December 2002, Dr. Anthony Fauci of HHS maintained that prophylactic
antibiotic therapy was what stemmed any outbreaks of anthrax symptoms
during the anonymous anthrax mailings. But he cited no studies to support
that contention.]


Thousands of lives have been sacrificed due to the bias in favor
infectious disease theory. The following are some examples:

-Scurvy was thought to be a microbial disease in the 19th Century, before
it was found to be a Vitamin C deficiency.
-The high mortality of the Spanish Flu pandemic of 1918-19 was thought to
be a contagious disease. Dr. Roger Cunningham isolated the gene fragment,
hemophilus Influenza from secretions the sick. Instead of being
contagious, this microbe is a normal inhabitant of our upper respiratory
tract that flourishes after we get ill; not before.
-The U.S. Public Health Service insisted for over 10 years in the 1920s
that pellagra was infectious, rather than a vitamin B deficiency as had
been proposed by Joseph Goldberger (Bailey, 1968).
-Tertiary syphilis is commonly blamed on treponemes, but is probably due
to a combination of treponemes and long-term mercury and arsenic
treatments used prior to penicillin, or merely to these treatments alone
(Brandt, 1988; Fry, 1989).
-"Unconventional" viruses were blamed for neurological diseases like
Kreutzfeld-Jacob's disease, Alzheimer's disease and kuru (Gajdusek,
1977). The now extinct kuru was probably a genetic disorder that affected
just one tribe of natives from New Guinea (Duesberg and Schwartz, 1992).
Although a Nobel Prize was given for this theory, the viruses never
materialized and an unconventional protein, termed "prion," is now blamed
for some of these diseases (Evans, 1989c; Duesberg and Schwartz, 1992).
-Shortly after this incident, a virus was also blamed for a fatal
epidemic-the SMON epidemic-of neuropathy, including blinding, that
started in the 1960s in Japan, but it turned out later to be caused by
the prescription drug clioquinol (Enterovioform, Ciba-Geigy) (Kono, 1975;
Shigematsu et al., 1975).
-In 1976 the CDC blamed an outbreak of pneumonia at a convention of
Legionnaires on a "new" microbe, without giving consideration to toxins.
Since the "Legionnaire's disease" did not spread after the convention and
the "Legionnaires bacillus" proved to be ubiquitous, it was later
concluded that "CDC epidemiologists must in the future take toxins into
account from the start" (Culliton, 1976). The Legionnaire's disease
fiasco is in fact the probable reason that the CDC initially took toxins
into account as the cause of AIDS (Oppenheimer; 1992)."
-"The pursuit of harmless viruses as causes of human cancer, supported
since 1971 by the Virus-Cancer Program of the National Cancer Institute's
War On Cancer, was also inspired by indiscouragable faith in the germ
theory (Greenberg, 1986; Duesberg, 1987; Shorter, 1987; Anderson, '99';
Editorial, '99'; Duesberg and Schwartz, 1992).
-For example, it was claimed in the 1960s that the rare Burkitt's
lymphoma was caused by the ubiquitous Epstein-Barr virus, 15 years after
infection (Evans, 1989c). But the lymphoma is now accepted to be
non-viral and attributed to a chromosome rearrangement (Duesberg and
Schwartz, 1992).
-Further, it was claimed that noncontagious cervical cancer is caused by
the widespread herpes virus in the 1970s, and by the widespread papilloma
virus in the 1980s-but in each case cancer would occur only 30 to 40
years after infection (Evans, 1989c). Noninfectious causes like
chromosome abnormalities, possibly induced by smoking, have since been
considered or reconsidered (Duesberg and Schwartz, 1992).
-In addition, Ubiquitous hepatitis virus was proposed in the 1960s to
cause regional adult hepatomas 50 years (!) after infection (Evans,
1989c). In the 1980s the rare, but widely distributed, human retrovirus
HTLV-I was claimed to cause regional adult T-cell leukemias (Blattner,
1990). Yet the leukemias would only appear at advanced age, after "latent
periods" of up to 55 years, the age when these "adult" leukemias appear
spontaneously (Evans, 1989c; Blattner; 1990; Duesberg and Schwartz,

Written by Gary Krasner, Jan. 2002. Portions of this article were taken
from Paul Sperry's article, and Gary Novak's website,

    "If you don't know where you're goin,
     chances are you're not gonna get there."  ...Yogi Berra