An International Guide to CIA Death Squads


The information below is from CIABASE files on Death Squads supported by the CIA.

Also given below are details on Watch Lists prepared by the CIA to facilitate the actions of Death Squads. This list is being provided to assist the CIA to obey the order to give Congrees sensitive secrets–as reported today in the Washington Post: "Fifteen years after Congress ordered the CIA to share all of its important secrets, the spy agency has finally established rigorous internal procedures....As a result Congress recently has been notified for the first time about some serious human rights abuses..." Washington Post 10/11/95, p. 7.

Hopefully details of the reported human rights abuses given below will be included in CIA submissions to Congress.

Worldwide, 1960-65. AID’s Joseph Wolf testified: it important to seek to control communists at the earliest possible stage....function of police in combating these activities lies in fields of identifying and controlling criminal and subversive individuals and groups. Black, J.K. (1977). United States Penetration of Brazil, p. 9

Worldwide and Indonesia, 1965. CIA role in providing name lists for assassination teams. The Nation, 9/24/1990, p. 296-7

After 1969 FBI submitted names of citizens engaged in domestic protest to CIA for investigation abroad and for placement on watch list of CIA’s mail opening project. Similar lists to NSA for communications monitoring operations. Ameringer, C.D. (1990). U.S. Foreign Intelligence, p. 326

Berkeley scholars developed computerized international mug file on elites in communist countries, potential revolutionary elites in the Third World. Trojan Parallel, 3/1979, p. 2

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20 (Low Intensity Conflict) provides guidance on military support to civilian law enforcement. Missions have three phases:
(1) Assault: detain suspects, seize evidence; (2) Secure: establish entry control points; and (3) Sustain: improve quality of life. Use intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW). Police collect and analyze major portion of intelligence. Get intelligence on gangs, families, criminal organizations, etc. Electronic technical data: analyze use of cellular phones, beepers, hand-held radios, and fax machines. Compile physical descriptions of targets. Disseminate names and descriptions of targets. Unify police and [military] efforts. Military Intelligence, March 1995, pp. 5-11

Death Squads: Miscellaneous
CIA set up Ansesal and other networks of terror in El Salvador, Guatemala (Ansegat) and pre-Sandinista Nicaragua (Ansenic). The CIA created, structured and trained secret police in South Korea, Iran, Chile and Uruguay, and elsewhere - organizations responsible for untold thousands of tortures, disappearances, and deaths. Spark, 4/1985, pp. 2-4

1953-94 Sponsorship by CIA of death squad activity covered in summary form. Notes that in Haiti CIA admitted Lt. General Raoul Cedras and other high-ranking officials "were" on its payroll and are helping organize violent repression in Haiti. Luis Moreno, an employee of State Department, has bragged he helped Colombian army create a database of subversives, terrorists and drug dealers." His superior in overseeing INS for Southeastern U.S., is Gunther Wagner, former Nazi soldier and a key member of now-defunct Office of Public Safety (OPS), an AID project which helped train counterinsurgents and terrorism in dozens of countries. Wagner worked in Vietnam as part of Operation Phoenix and in Nicaragua where he helped train National Guard. Article also details massacres in Indonesia. Haiti Information, 4/23/1994, pp. 3,4

CIA officials who in Vietnam have been strongly opposed to use of hit squads because of the corrosive effect on CIA morale. Washington Post, 2/22/1987, A10

CIA personnel requested transfers 1960-7 in protest of CIA officer Nestor Sanchez’s working so closely with death squads. Marshall, J., Scott P.D., and Hunter, J. (1987). The Iran-Contra Connection, p. 294

CIA. 1994. Mary McGrory op-ed, "Clinton’s CIA Chance." Excoriates CIA over Aldrich Ames, support for right-wing killers in El Salvador, Nicaraguan Contras and Haiti’s FRAPH and Cedras. Washington Post, 10/16/1994, C1,2

Angola, 1988. Amnesty International reported that Unita, backed by the U.S., engaged in extra-judicial executions of high-ranking political rivals and ill-treatment of prisoners. Washington Post, 3/14/1989, A20

Argentina. Carlos Guillermo Suarez Mason: Argentine general and P2 member who oversaw Argentine death squads and drug-financed activities that were coordinated through CAL. Scott, P. and Marshall, J. (1991). Cocaine Politics, p. 262
Argentina, 1976-95. Gen. Martin Balza, head of army, and president, Carlos Menem, admit role of military in killing and disappearances of thousands of suspected guerrillas in "dirty war" of 1970s. Washington Times, 4/27/1995, A17

Bolivia, 1975. CIA hatched plot with interior ministry to harass progressive bishops, and to arrest and expel foreign priests and nuns. CIA was particularly helpful in supplying names of U.S. and other foreign missionaries. The Nation, 5/22/1976, p. 624

Bolivia, 1975. CIA provided government data on priests who progressive. Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten History, p. 259

Bolivia. Between October 1966-68 Amnesty International reported between 3,000 and 8,000 people killed by death squads. Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten History, p. 264
Bolivia, 1991. A group known as "Black Hand" shot twelve people on 24 November 1991. Killings were part of group’s aim to eliminate "undesirable" elements from society. Victims included police officers, prostitutes and homosexuals. 11/25/1991, A2

Brazil, 1962-64. Institute of Research and Social Studies (IPES) with assistance from U.S. sources published booklets and pamphlets and distributed hundreds of articles to newspapers. In 1963 alone it distributed 182,144 books. It underwrote lectures, financed students’ trips to the U.S., sponsored leadership training programs for 2,600 businessmen, students, and workers, and subsidized organizations of women, students, and workers. In late 1962 IPES member Siekman in Sao Paulo organized vigilante cells to counter leftists. The vigilantes armed themselves, made hand-grenades. IPES hired retired military to exert influence on those in active service. From 1962-64 IPES, by its own estimate, spent between $200,000 and $300,000 on an intelligence net of retired military. The "research group" of retired military circulated a chart that identified communist groups and leaders. Black, J.K. (1977). United States Penetration of Brazil, p. 85

Brazil, circa 1965. Death squads formed to bolster Brazil’s national intelligence service and counterinsurgency efforts. Many death squad members were merely off-duty police officers. U.S. AID (and presumably the CIA) knew of and supported police participation in death squad activity. Counterspy 5/6 1979, p. 10
Brazil. Death squads began appear after 1964 coup. Langguth, A.J. (1978). Hidden Terrors, p. 121

Brazilian and Uruguayan death squads closely linked and have shared training. CIA on at least two occasions co-ordinated meetings between countries’ death squads. Counterspy 5/6 1979, p. 11

Brazil, torture. After CIA-backed coup, military used death squads and torture. Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten History, p. 190

Cambodia, 1970. Aided by CIA, Cambodian secret police fed blacklists of targeted Vietnamese to Khmer Serai and Khmer Kampuchea Krom. Mass killings of Vietnamese. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, p. 328

Cambodia, 1980-90. U.S. indirect support for Khmer Rouge–U.S. comforting mass murderers. Washington Post, 5/7/1990, A10 editorial

Central America, circa 1979-87. According to Americas Watch, civilian non combatant deaths attributable to government forces in Nicaragua might reach 300, most Miskito Indians in comparison 40-50,000 Salvadoran citizens killed by death squads and government forces during same years, along with similar number during last year of Somoza and still higher numbers in Guatemala. Chomsky, N. (1988). The Culture of Terrorism, p. 101

Central America, 1981-87. Death toll under Reagan in El Salvador passed 50,000 and in Guatemala it may approach 100,000. In Nicaragua 11,000 civilians killed by 1968. Death toll in region 150,000 or more. Chomsky, N. (1988). The Culture of Terrorism, p. 29

Central America. See debate carried in Harpers "Why Are We in Central America? On Dominoes, Death Squads, and Democracy. Can We Live With Latin Revolution? The Dilemmas of National Security." Harpers, 6/1984, p35

Central America, 1982-84. Admiral Bobby Inman, former head of NSA, had deep distaste for covert operations. Inman complained that the CIA was hiring murderers to conduct operations in Central America and the middle East - eventually Inman resigned. Toohey, B., and Pinwill, W. (1990). Oyster: the Story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, pp. 215-6

Chile, 1970-73. By late 1971 the CIA in near daily contact with military. The station collecting the kind of information that would be essential for a military dictatorship after a coup: lists of civilians to be arrested, those to be protected and government installations occupied at once. Atlantic, 12/1982, p. 58

Chile, 1970-73. CIA compiled lists of persons who would have to be arrested and a roster of civilian and government installations that would need protection in case of military coup against government. Corn, D. (1994). Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA’s Crusades, p. 251

Chile, 1972-73. Drew up lists those to be arrested immediately, or protected after a coup by military. Sergeyev, F.F. (1981). Chile, CIA Big Business, p. 163
Chile late 1971-72. CIA adopted more active stance re military penetration program including effort to subsidize anti-government news pamphlet directed
at armed services, compilation arrest lists and its deception operation. CIA
received intelligence reports on coup planning throughout July, August and
September 73. U.S. Congress, Church Committee Report. (1976) v 7, p. 39
Chile. Chilean graduates of AIFLD, as well as CIA-created unions, organized
CIA-financed strikes which participated in Allende’s overthrow. In 1973
AIFLD graduates provided DINA, Chile’s secret police, with thousands of
names of fellow unionists who were subsequently imprisoned and tortured and
executed. Counterspy 4/1981, p. 13
Chile. Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten History, 240
Chile, 1973-74. After 1973 coup, U.S. Embassy intelligence types gave their
files on the Chilean and foreign left to the junta’s military intelligence
service (SIM). NACLA (magazine re Latin America) 8/74, p. 28.
Chile, 1973. The military prepared lists of nearly 20,000 middle-level
leaders of people’s organizations, scheduled to be assassinated from the
morning of the coup on. The list of some 3,000 high-level directors to be
arrested. Lists detailed: name, address, age, profession, marital status,
and closest personal friends. It alleged U.S. military mission and the CIA
involved in their preparation. Moa 186. From late June on plotters began to
finalize lists of extremists, political leaders, Marxist journalists, agents
of international communism, and any and all persons participating with any
vigor in neighborhood, communal, union, or national organization. The
Pentagon had been asked to get the CIA to give the Chilean army lists of
Chileans linked to socialist countries. Names sorted into two groups:
persons not publicly known but who important in leftist organizations; and,
well-known people in important positions. 20,000 in first group and 3,000 in
second. Second group to be jailed, the first to be killed. Sandford, R.R.
(1975). The Murder of Allende, pp. 195-6
CIA provided intelligence on "subversives" regularly compiled by CIA for use
in such circumstances. Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten History, p. 194
Colombia. Luis Moreno, an employee of State Department, bragged he helped
Colombian army create a database of subversives, terrorists and drug
dealers. Haiti Information, 4/23/94, pp. 3,4
Colombia. MAS (Muerte A Secuestradores): "Death to Kidnappers," Colombian
antiguerrilla death squad founded in December 1981 by members of Medellin
cartel, Cali cartel, and Colombian military. Scott, P. and Marshall, J.
(1991). Cocaine Politics, p. 261.
Colombia, 1993-94. Amnesty International called Colombia one of worst
"killing fields." U.S. is an accomplice. William F. Schultz, human rights
group’s newly appointed Executive Director for the U.S., told a news
conference that using fight against drugs as a pretext - Colombian
government doesn’t reign in [its forces]. About 20,000 people killed since
1986 in one of Latin America’s most "stable democracies." only 2% political
killings related to drug trafficking and 70% by paramilitary or military.
U.S. probably a collaborator and much of U.S. aid for counternarcotics
diverted to "killing fields." AI report said human meat is sold on black
market and politicians gunned down along with children, homosexuals, and
drug addicts. U.S. support because of Colombia’s strategic position. No one
is safe, people killed for body parts. Washington Times, 3/16/1994, p. a15
Costa Rica, 1955. Ambassador Woodward reported the government should be
urged to maintain closer surveillance over communists and prosecute them
more vigorously, and the government should be influenced to amend the
constitution to limit the travel of communists, increase penalties for
subversive activities and enact proposed legislation eliminating communists
from union leadership. Meanwhile USIA aka USIS programs "to continue to
condition the public to the communist menace" should be maintained. Z
Magazine, 11/1988, p. 20
Cuba, 1955-57. Allen Dulles pressed Batista to establish with CIA help, a
bureau for the repression of communist activities. Grose, P. (1994).
Gentleman Spy: the Life of Allen Dulles, p. 412
Cuba, 1956-95 CIA’s war against Cuba and Cuba’s response. In 1956, CIA
established in Cuba the infamous Bureau for the Repression of Communist
Activities, BRAC–secret police that became well known for torture and
assassination of Batista’s political opponents. Unclassified W/1994-1995
Dominican Republic, 1965. CIA composed list of 55 communist ringleaders of
projected takeover of government. Crozier, b. (1993). Free Agent, p. 58
Dominican Republic, cover, 1965. 18 public safety program advisers, 6 of
whom CIA. Police organized La Banda, a death squad. Lernoux, P. (1982). Cry
of the People, p. 187
East Europe, USSR, 1952-93. Radio Free Europe researchers have hundreds of
thousands of file cards on prominent east bloc citizens and a staff of 160
researchers. Washington Post, 4/4/1993, p. A19
East Timor, 1975-76. Role of U.S. Government, CIA/NSA, and their Australian
collaborators in East Timor is another example of support for genocide which
joins a long list of similar cases. Carter and Ford administrations have
been accomplices in the massacre of anywhere between one-in-ten (Indonesian
foreign minister Mochtar’s latest figure) and one-in-two Timorese.
Counterspy, Spring 1980, p. 19
Ecuador, 1962. Subversive control watch list. With agent from Social
Christian party CIA will form five squads composed of five men for
investigative work on subversive control watch list. Agee, P. (1975). Inside
the Company: CIA Diary, pp. 240, 247
Ecuador, 1963. The CIA maintained what was called the lynx list, aka the
subversive control watch list. This a file that might have 50 to 500 names.
People on the list were supposed to be the most important left-wing
activists whose arrest we might effect through the local government. Would
include place and date of birth, wife’s name, where they worked, and
biological data on the whole family, including schools the children
attended, etc. In Ecuador the CIA paid teams to collect and maintain this
type information. Agee, (1981). White Paper Whitewash, p. 55
Egypt, Pakistan, 1993. 4/16/1993 2 teams from CIA and FBI to Peshawar to
check information given them by Egyptian intelligence services. Egyptians
reported terrorist groups based in Peshawar belong to "Arab Afghans" with
ties to fundamentalist Muslims in U.S. CIA specialists met with officers of
Mukhabarat Al-Amat who had list of 300 Egyptians believed to be hard inner
core of Jihad led by Mohammed Sahwky Islambuli. Names of various terrorists.
On request by CIA and others, 100 expulsions on 4/10. Intelligence
Newsletter, 4/29/1993, pp. 1,5
El Salvador, 1980-89. On TV D’Aubuisson, using military intelligence files,
denounced teachers, labor leaders, union organizers and politicians. Within
days their mutilated bodies found. Washington had identified most leaders of
death squads as members Salvadoran security forces with ties to D’Aubuisson.
Washington Post op-ed by Douglas Farah, 2/23/1992, p. C4
El Salvador, 1982-84. Significant political violence associated with
Salvadoran security services including National police, National Guard, and
Treasury Police. U.S. Government agencies maintained official relationships
with Salvadoran security establishment appearing to acquiesce in these
activities. No evidence U.S. personnel participated in forcible
interrogations. U.S. Did pass "tactical" information to alert services of
action by insurgent forces. Information on persons passed only in highly
unusual cases. Senate Intelligence Committee, October 5, 1984, pp. 11-13
El Salvador, 1961-79. Vigilante organization called Democratic National
Organization (Orden) created early 1960s to further control countryside.
Created in 1961 but abolished in 1979. But quickly regained and even
surpassed former vicious role. Today its members form the core of civil
defense corps. White, R.A. (1984). The Morass, p. 133
El Salvador, 1961-84. During the Kennedy administration, agents of the U.S.
government set up 2 security organizations that killed thousands of peasants
and suspected leftists over the next 15 years. Guided by Americans, these
organizations into the paramilitary units that were the death squads: in
1984 the CIA, in violation U.S. law, continued to provide training, support,
and intelligence to security forces involved in death squads. Over the
years the CIA and U.S. military organized Orden, the rural paramilitary and
intelligence net designed to use terror. Mano Blanco grew out of Orden,
which a U.S. ambassador called the "birth of the death squads;" conceived
and organized Ansesal, the elite presidential intelligence service that
gathered files on Salvadoran dissidents and gave that information to the
death squads; recruited General Medrano, the founder of Orden and Ansesal as
a CIA agent; supplied Ansesal, the security forces, and the General Staff
with electronic, photographic, and personal surveillance of individuals who
later assassinated by death squads; and, trained security forces in the use
of investigative techniques, weapons, explosives, and interrogation with
"instruction in methods of physical and psychological torture. The
Progressive, 5/1984, pp. 20-29
El Salvador, 1963. U.S. government sent 10 special forces personnel to El
Salvador to help General Jose Alberto Medrano set up Organizacion
Democratica Nacionalist (Orden)--first paramilitary death squad in that
country. These green berets assisted in organization and indoctrination of
rural "civic" squads which gathered intelligence and carried out political
assassinations in coordination with Salvadoran military. Now there is
compelling evidence to show that for over 30 years, members of U.S. military
and CIA have helped organize, train, and fund death squad activity in El
Salvador. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Summer 1990, p. 51
El Salvador, 1963. National Democratic Organization (Orden) formed as
pro-government organization with assistance from CIA, U.S. military
advisers, AID’s police training program. Orden supervised by Salvadoran
national security agency, intelligence organization of military. CIA chose
"right hand man," Jose Medrano, to direct Orden. Orden served as base for
death squad operations and sanctioned in 1970-79 all "above ground" unions.
Barry, T., and Preusch, D. (1986). AIFLD in Central America, p. 33
El Salvador, 1965-85. For a report of CIA supporting death squad activities
in El Salvador see "Spark," 4/1985, pp. 2-4
El Salvador, 1966. Developed death squads with help of green berets.
Campaign used vigilantes to employ terror. Later called civil defense corps.
White, R.A. (1984). The Morass, pp. 101-3
El Salvador, 1968. AIFLD creates Salvadoran Communal Union (UCS) which
emphasized self help for rural farmers and not peasant organizing.
Initially, UCS had support military government. By 1973 UCS seen as too
progressive and AIFLD officially expelled. U.S. funding UCS continued
through training programs and private foundations. UCS charged with ties to
Orden, organization which carried out death squad activity. With failing
pro-government union efforts, AIFLD called back to control UCS in 1979.
Barry, T., and Preusch, D. (1986). AIFLD in Central America, p. 34
El Salvador, 1976-85. Attended conferences of World Anti-Communist League:
Roberto D’Aubuisson, El Salvador. Former major in military intelligence;
charged with being responsible for coordinating nation’s rightist death
squads. Established Arena political party with assistance of U.S. new right
leaders. Anderson, J. L.. and Anderson, S. (1986). Inside the League
El Salvador, 1979-84. House Intelligence Committee investigation of U.S.
intelligence connections with death squad activities concluded U.S.
intelligence agencies "have not conducted any of their activities in such a
way as to directly encourage or support death squad acts." House
Intelligence Committee, annual report, 1/2/1985, pp. 16-19
El Salvador, 1979-88. Death squads recruited under cover of boy scouts. Boys
operated as a death squad known as Regalados Armed Forces (FAR). They
murdered union officials, student leaders and teachers accused of being
guerrilla sympathizers. Herman Torres, a death squad member, learned that
the scouts part of nationwide net based on the paramilitary organization
known as Orden and coordinated from the main military intelligence unit
known as Ansesal run by D’Aubuisson. After coup of 1979, Orden and Ansesal
officially disbanded. In 1982, when Arena won control of the constituent
assembly, the top legislative body was turned into a center for death
squads. Another death squad called the secret anti-communist army (ESA).
Bush and North in 12/11/1983 were sent to make it clear U.S. would not
tolerate death squads. Perez Linares boasted he killed Archbishop Romero on
3/24/1980. Catholic Church’s human rights office reports 1991 death squad
and government killings in first half of 1988 double the number of 1987.
Mother Jones, 1/1989, pp. 10-16
El Salvador, 1980-84. Colonel Roberto Santivanez, former chief of the
Salvadoran Army’s special military intelligence unit, testified before U.S.
Senators and Congressmen. He charged that Roberto D’Aubuisson was the
principal organizer of the death squads, along with Colonel Nicolas
Carranza, the head of the country’s Treasury Police. He said Carranza also
serves as a paid CIA informer. Other reports said Carranza received $90,000
a year for providing intelligence to the CIA. Washington Post, 4/1/1984
El Salvador, 1980-84. Former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, Robert White,
said the Reagan administration covered up information that Salvadoran
rightist Roberto D’Aubuisson ordered the killing of Archbishop Romero.
Washington Post, 2/3/1984, 2/7/1984
El Salvador, 1980. Former U.S. Ambassador Robert White, said D’Aubuisson
presided over a lottery to select which Salvadoran military officer would
assassinate Archbishop Romero, gunned down on 3/24/1980. White said the U.S.
Embassy received an eyewitness account of the 3/22 meeting that plotted
Romero’s murder. Washington Post from Associated Press, 3/1984
El Salvador, 1981-83. Colonel Carranza, leader of Salvador’s infamous
Treasury Police, oversaw the government reign of terror in which 800 people
were killed each month. Carranza received $90,000 a year from the CIA from
1979-84 Reportedly living in Kentucky. The Nation, 6/5/1988, p. 780
El Salvador, 1981-84. House Intelligence Committee concluded "CIA did not
directly encourage or support death squad killings. Report added that "some
intelligence relationships with individuals connected with death squads" may
have given the impression that the CIA condoned, because it was aware of,
some death squad killings." Washington Post, 1/14/1985, A20
El Salvador, 1981-84. Senate Intelligence Committee reported several
Salvadoran security and military officials have engaged in death squads
acts. Large numbers of low-level personnel also involved. Death squads have
originated from the Treasury Police and the National Guard and police.
Washington Post, 10/12/1984
El Salvador, 1981-84. The CIA and military advisers have helped organize,
trained, financed and advised Salvadoran army and intelligence units engaged
in death squad activities and torture. Information from two well-informed
sources in Salvadoran government. Christian Science Monitor, 5/8/1984, p. 1
El Salvador, 1981-88. Discussion of the use of death squads in El Salvador
(No indication of direct CIA participation). The Nation, 5/8/1989, p. 625
El Salvador, 1986. Despite extensive government labor clamp down (including
National Guard raid of hospital workers strike), Irving Brown, known CIA and
head AFL-CIO’s Department of International Affairs, issues report claiming
"a shift away from violent repression and an improvement in human rights."
Statement incredible in light of death squad attacks on unionists. Barry,
T., and Preusch, D. (1986). AIFLD in Central America, p. 35
El Salvador, 1987. Central American death squads reported operating in the
Los Angeles area. NACLA (magazine re Latin America), 6/1987, pp. 4-5
El Salvador, 1988. Americas Watch in September said the military killed 52
civilians in first 6 months, compared with 72 in all of 1987. In 1988 the
Salvadoran rebels have stepped up the war. Washington Post, 11/26/1988,
El Salvador. AID public safety advisors created the national police
intelligence archive and helped organize Ansesal, an elite presidential
intelligence service. Dossiers these agencies collected on anti-government
activity, compiled with CIA surveillance reports, provided targets for death
squads. Many of 50,000 Salvadorans killed in 1981-85 Attributable to death
squad activity. National Reporter, Winter 1986, p. 19
El Salvador. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly)
El Salvador. Medrano "the father of the death squads, the chief assassin of
them all," according to Jose N. Duarte. On 23 March 1985, Medrano was
assassinated. Medrano in 1984 admitted he had worked for the CIA in 1960-69.
The Progressive, 6/1985, p. 11
El Salvador. Administration sources said at height of rightist death squad
activity, Reagan administration depended on commanders of right wing death
squads. The U.S. shared some intelligence with them. U.S. intelligence
officers developed close ties to chief death squad suspects while death
squads killed several hundred a month and totaling tens of thousands.
Washington Post, 10/6/1988, A 39 and 43
El Salvador. Article contrasting results of Senate Committee 1984 news
accounts of official cooperation between CIA and Salvadoran security
officers said to be involved in death squad activities. First Principles,
12/1984, pp. 2-4
El Salvador. CIA supplied surveillance information to security agencies for
death squads. Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten History, pp. 321, 327
El Salvador. Falange mysterious death squad comprising both active and
retired members security forces. Conducts death squad activities. Covert
Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), 4/1981, p. 14
El Salvador. Formation of Organisation Democratica Nacionalista Orden Formed
in 1968 by Medrano. Forces between 50,000 and 100,000. From 1968-79, Orden
official branch of government. First junta attempted to abolish, but group
reorganized as National Democratic Front. Example of Orden death squad acts.
Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), 4/1981, p. 14
El Salvador. See Dickey article re slaughter in El Salvador in New Republic,
12/13/1983, entitled "The Truth Behind the Death Squads." fn Dickey, C.
(1985). With the Contras, p. 286
El Salvador. The CIA and U.S. Armed forces conceived and organized Orden,
the rural paramilitary and spy net designed to use terror against government
opponents. Conceived and organized Ansesal, the presidential intelligence
service that gathered dossiers on dissidents which then passed on to death
squads. Kept key security officers with known links to death squads on the
CIA payroll. Instructed Salvadoran intelligence operatives "in methods of
physical and psychological torture." Briarpatch, 8/1984 p. 30 from the
5/1984 Progressive
El Salvador. UGB (Union Guerrilla Blanca) (white warriors union). Headed by
D’Aubuisson, who trained at International Police Academy. D’Aubuisson claims
close ties CIA. Former ambassador White called D’Aubuisson a "psychopathic
killer." Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), 4/1981, p. 14
El Salvador, 1979-88. See "Confessions of an Assassin," article. Herman
Torres Cortez is the assassin who was interviewed and tells of death squad
operations in El Salvador. Mother Jones, 1/1989, p. 10
El Salvador, 1983. Vice President Bush delivered an ultimatum to Salvadoran
military to stop death squad murders. Mother Jones, 8/1986, p. 64
El Salvador, 1987. Assassins, certainly sponsored by and probably members of
Salvadoran security forces, murder Herbert Ernesto Anaya, head of Salvadoran
civil rights commission and last survivor of commission’s eight founders.
Prior harassment of Anaya solicited neither protest nor protection from
Duarte or U.S. administration. Contrary to popular opinion, death squad
activity has not waned. "Selective killings of community leaders, labor
organizers, human rights workers, rural activists and others have replaced
wholesale massacres" since signing of Arias plan. Los Angeles organization
"El Rescate" has compiled chronology of human rights abuses. The Nation,
11/14/1987, p. 546
El Salvador. CIA took more than two years 1980-83 begin seriously analyzing
papers captured from D’Aubuisson. ICC 242. Papers said reveal death squad
supporters, atrocities. Marshall, J., Scott P.D., and Hunter, J. (1987). The
Iran-Contra Connection, p. 22
El Salvador, 1988. Death squad activity surged in El Salvador in 1988 after
a period of relative decline. Amnesty International report "El Salvador:
Death Squads–A Government Strategy," noted in NACLA (magazine re Latin
America) 3/1989, p. 11
El Salvador, 1989. Although human rights monitors consistently link death
squad acts to the Salvadoran government, many U.S. media report on death
squads as if they an independent or uncontrollable force. Extra, Summer,
1989, p. 28
El Salvador, 1989 Member of Salvadoran army said first brigade intelligence
unit army troops routinely kill and torture suspected leftists. First
brigade day-to-day army operations carried out with knowledge of U.S.
military advisers. CIA routinely pays expenses for intelligence operations
in the brigades. U.S. has about 55 advisers in Salvador. Washington Post,
10/27/1989, A1,26
El Salvador, circa 1982-84. Ricardo Castro, a 35 year old Salvadoran army
officer, a West Point graduate, said he worked for the CIA and served as
translator for a U.S. official who advised the military on torture
techniques and overseas assassinations. Castro personally led death squad
operations. The Progressive, 3/1986, pp. 26-30
El Salvador, domestic, 1986-87. Article "The Death Squads Hit Home." For
decades they terrorized civilians in El Salvador, now they are terrorizing
civilians in the U.S. The FBI shared intelligence about Salvadoran activists
in the U.S. with Salvador’s notorious security services. The Progressive,
10/1987, pp. 15-19
El Salvador. Office of Public Safety graduate Colonel Roberto Mauricio
Staben was, according to journalist Charles Dickey "responsible for
patrolling–if not contributing to–the famous death squad dumping ground at
El Payton a few miles from its headquarters." also, Alberto Medrano, founder
of El Salvador’s counterinsurgency force Orden, was an operations graduate.
Finally, Jose Castillo, who was trained in 1969 at the U.S. International
Police School, later became head of National Guard’s section of special
investigations which helped organize the death squads. The Nation, 6/7/1986,
p. 793
El Salvador. Former death squad member Joya Martinez admitted death squad
operations carried out with knowledge and approval 2 U.S. military advisers.
LA Weekly, 1/25/1990
El Salvador. DCI report to House Intelligence Committee re CIA connections
with death squads. National security archives listing.
El Salvador. FBI’s contacts with the Salvadoran National Guard. Information
in Senate Intelligence Committee Report, 7/1989, pp. 104-5
El Salvador. Former San Francisco police officer accused of illegal spying
said he worked for CIA and will expose CIA’s support of death squads if he
prosecuted. Tom Gerard said he began working for CIA in 1982 and quit in
1985 because he could not tolerate what he saw. He and Roy Bullock are
suspected of gathering information from police and government files on
thousands of individuals and groups. Information probably ended up with
B’nai B’rith and ADL. CIA refused to confirm Gerard’s claim. Gerard said
there is proof CIA directly involved in training and support of torture and
death squads in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala during mid 1980s. Proof
in his briefcase San Francisco police seized. Gerard said several photos
seized by police show CIA agents attending interrogations, or posing with
death squad members. Washington Times, 4/28/1993, A 6
El Salvador, 1963-90. In 1963 U.S. sent 10 Special Forces to help General
Madrano set up Organizacion Democratica Nacionalista (Orden), a death squad.
Evidence this sort activity going on for 30 years. Martinez, a soldier in
First infantry brigade’s department 2, admitted death squad acts. Said he
worked with two U.S. Advisers. Castro, another soldier, talks about death
squads and U.S. contacts. Rene Hurtado, former agent with Treasury Police,
gives his story. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly) Summer 1990,
pp. 51-53
El Salvador, 1973-89. El Salvador’s ruling party, Arena, closed off fifth
floor of National Assembly building to serve as HQ for national network of
death squads following Arena’s 20 March 1988 electoral victory. Hernan
Torres Cortez, a former Arena security guard and death squad member, said he
was trained and recruited by Dr. Antonio Regalado under orders of Roberto
D’Abuisson intelligence service, Ansesal, in 1973. Official network was
broken up in 1984 following Vice President Bush’s visit, but was reinstated
in 1988. Intelligence Newsletter, 1/18/1991, p. 5
El Salvador, 1979-90. A detailed discussion of Salvador’s death squads.
Schwarz, B. (1991). American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador, pp.
El Salvador, 1980-84. Expatriate Salvadorans in U.S. have provided funds for
political violence and have been directly involved in assisting and
directing their operations. Senate Intelligence Committee, October 5, 1984,
p. 15
El Salvador, 1980-84. Numerous Salvadoran officials involved in death squad
activities - most done by security services - especially the Treasury Police
and National Guard. Some military death squad activity. Senate Intelligence
Committee, October 5, 1984, 15
El Salvador, 1980-89. D’Aubuisson kept U.S. on its guard. Hundreds of
released declassified documents re relationship. Washington Post, 1/4/1994,
El Salvador, 1980-89. Declassified documents re 32 cases investigated by
United Nations appointed Truth Commission on El Salvador reveal U.S.
officials were fully aware of Salvadoran military and political leaders’
complicity in crimes ranging from massacre of more than 700 peasants at El
Mozote in 1981 to murder of 6 Jesuit priests in 1989, and thousands of
atrocities in between. Lies of our Time 3/1994, pp. 6-9
El Salvador, 1980-89. President Reagan and Vice President Bush instituted
polices re fighting communists rather than human rights concerns. From
11/1980 through 1/1991 a large number of assassinations - 11/27, 5 respected
politicians; 12/4, rape and murder of 3 American nuns and a lay workers; 2
American land reform advisers on 1/4/1981. Archbishop Romero killed 3/1980.
There clear evidence D’Aubuisson’s involvement but Reagan administration
ignored. On TV, D’Aubuisson, using military intelligence files, denounced
teachers, labor leaders, union organizers and politicians. Within days their
mutilated bodies found. Washington had identified most leaders of death
squads as members Salvadoran security forces with ties to D’Aubuisson. With
U.S. outrage at bloodshed, U.S., via Bush, advised government slaughter
must stop. Article discusses torture techniques used by security forces.
Washington Post op-ed by Douglas Farah, 2/23/1992, C4
El Salvador, 1980-90. COL Nicolas Carranza, head of Treasury Police, on CIA
payroll. Minnick, W. (1992). Spies and Provocateurs, p. 32
El Salvador, 1980-90. State panel found that mistakes by U.S. diplomats,
particularly in probing 1981 massacre of civilians at El Mozote, undercut
policy during Salvador’s civil war. Findings in 67-page study ordered by
Secretary of State Christopher. Sen. Leahy said report "glosses over...the
lies, half-truths and evasions that we came to expect from the State
Department during that period." Sen. Dodd said "report is sloppy, anemic and
basically a whitewash..." Washington Times, 7/16/1993, A12 and Washington
Post, 7/16/1993, A16
El Salvador, 1980-91. Truth Commission report says 19 of 27 Salvadoran
officers implicated in 6 Jesuit murders were graduates of U.S. Army’s School
of Americas in Fort Benning, Ga. Almost three quarters of Salvadoran
officers accused in 7 other massacres were trained at Fort Benning. It
called school for dictators. Since 46 it has trained more than 56,000 Latin
soldiers. Graduates include some of region’s most despicable military
strongmen. Now, when U.S. wants to build democracy, school an obstacle.
Newsweek investigation turned up hundreds of less than honorable grads. At
least 6 Peruvian officers linked to a military death squad that killed 9
students and a professor were graduates. Four of five senior Honduran
officers accused in Americas Watch report of organizing a death squad,
Battalion 316, were trained there. A coalition charged 246 Colombian
officers with human rights violations; 105 were school alumni. Honored
graduates include General Suarez, a brutal dictator of Bolivia; General
Callejas Ycallejas, chief of Guatemalan intelligence in late 1970s and early
1980s, when thousands political opponents were assassinated; and Honduran
General Garcia, a corrupt person; and, Hernandez, armed forces chief of
Colombia suspected of aiding Colombian drug traffickers. Newsweek, 8/9/1993,
pp. 36-7
El Salvador, 1980-92. "Secret of the Skeletons: Uncovering America’s Hidden
Role in El Salvador." Pathologists uncovered 38 small skeletons in El
Mozote. In 1981 soldiers of ACRE, immediate reaction infantry battalion
created by U.S., herded children into basement and blew up building. U.S.
officials denied any massacre had taken place and kept on denying for years.
About 800 residents killed. Armed service leaders said they conducted war
on part of Reagan and Bush administrations with bi-partisan support
Congress since 1984; received daily assistance from State Department, DOD
and CIA. Truth Commission investigating via U.S. Government interagency
committee. State and CIA not cooperating with commission. CIA not giving one
document on formation of death squads, prepared in 1983 for congressional
intelligence committees. Kidnap-for-profit ring against Salvadoran business
community. With U.S. Encouragement, Salvadoran government arrested several
members of ring. One was a death squad assassin, Rudolfo Isidro Lopez
Sibrian, who implicated in deaths of 2 American labor advisers. Washington
Post, 11/15/1992, C1,2
El Salvador, 1980-93. 11/5/1993 release of thousands pages of intelligence
reports shows every U.S. diplomat, military officer, and intelligence
operative who worked with El Salvador’s military and political leaders in
1980s knew most of those involved in organizing death squads. State
Department officials lied to Congress. Intelligence reports detailed precise
information on murder, kidnapping, and coup plots, and death squad funding,
involving people like VP Francisco Merino and current Arena candidate
Armando Calderon Sol. At least 63,000 Salvadoran civilians - equivalent of 3
million Americans were killed - most by government supported by U.S. The
Nation, 11/29/1993, p. 645
El Salvador, 1980-93. Approximately 50-page article on the massacres at El
Mozote. Article by Mark Danner. New Yorker, 12/6/1993
El Salvador, 1980-93. Article by Jared Toller, "Death Squads Past, Present &
Future." discusses recent cases of FMLN members being murdered by resurgent
death squads. Only left is calling for full implementation of UN Truth
Commission’s recommendations - purging armed forces, full investigation into
death squads, etc. Truth Commission had recommended U.S. make it files
available. U.S. Had refused to turn over 1983 FBI report on death squads
organization in Miami. Salvadoran government is the death squads. Member of
a death squad now imprisoned and seeking amnesty, Lopez Sibrian, explained
participation of Arena luminaries in kidnappings, bombings and attacks on
National University. He implicated the mayor of San Salvador in various
acts. Link between phone service, Antel, and national intelligence police.
Antel records calls of left and passes them to police. (The secret
anti-communist Army, a former death squad, were regulars of now-disbanded
Treasury Police). Upcoming elections may have generated increase in death
squad activity. Z magazine, 1/1994, pp. 14-5
El Salvador, 1980-93. Colman McCarthy comments of UN’s Truth Commission
report and the Reagan-Abrams "fabulous achievement." Washington Post,
4/6/1993, D22
El Salvador, 1980-93. Letter to editor by Thomas Buergenthal of law school
at George Washington U., who was a member of the Truth Commission for El
Salvador. He denies news story that there was a chapter in the report that
dealt with the structure and finances of the groups was withheld. He bemoans
the ability of the commission to thoroughly investigate all aspects.
Washington Post, 11/30/1993, A24
El Salvador, 1980-93. Report of UN’s Truth Commission re enormous crime of a
government that killed upwards of 70,000 civilians between 1980-92. Report
refutes official statements made by Reagan and Bush administrations - when
officials denied leaders of Salvadoran armed forces were using execution,
rape and torture to sustain their power - reports says they were. We need a
truth report on our own government per Rep. Moakley. Truth report adds
growing body evidence U.S. Government officials may have participated in
perpetuation of atrocities in El Salvador. In 1960s, CIA advisers helped
create a nationwide informant net. In 1981, team of military advisers led by
Brig. Gen. Frederick Woener sent to determine "rightist terrorism and
institutional violence." Salvadorans generally dismissed notion that terror
was a bad idea. One of Colonels, Oscar Edgardo Casanova Vejar, was one
covering up rape and murder of four churchwomen. Woener recommended U.S.
proceed and give $300-400 million aid. U.S. officials claimed churchwomen
had run a roadblock and there was no massacre at El Mozote. Neil
Livingstone, a consultant who worked with Oliver North at NSC concluded,
"death squads are an extremely effective tool, however odious, in combating
terrorism and revolutionary challenges." op-ed by Jefferson Morley, an
Outlook editor. Washington Post, 3/28/1993, C1,5
El Salvador, 1980-93. Salvador’s ruling party moved to declare amnesty for
those named in United Nations.-sponsored Truth Commission. Investigators
said 85% of complaints laid to government death squads. Discusses
D’Aubuisson’s implication in Archbishop Romero’s assassination. Washington
Post 3/17/1993 a25
El Salvador, 1980. Ten former death squad members were ordered killed in
Santiago de Maria on 27 December 1980 by Hector Antonio Regalado, who felt
they knew too much. Intelligence Newsletter, 10/4/1988, p. 6
El Salvador, 1981-84. There are two versions of first page of a CIA report,
"El Salvador: Dealing With Death Squads," 1/20/1984. CIA released first
version in 1987, among congressional debate over aid to El Salvador. Second
version, which contradicts first, declassified by CIA in 11/1993. As
recently as 10/1992, CIA continued to release censored version in response
to FOIA requests. Redacted version implies death squad problem overcome -
non censored version show this is not true. New York Times, 12/17/1993, A19
El Salvador, 1981-89. Salvadoran atrocity posed agonizing choice for U.S.
COL Rene Ponce, chief of staff of Salvador’s armed forces, has been accused
of ordering murder of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter
at Central American University. Newly available U.S. documents show U.S.
knowingly and repeatedly aligned themselves with unsavory characters during
1980s while defending them to U.S. Public. Diplomatic cables found among
more than 10,000 recently declassified State, Pentagon and CIA documents,
reveal extent U.S. policy makers chose to overlook Ponce’s brutality. U.S.
officials long labeled Ponce a right-wing extremist tied to death squads.
But documents make clear U.S. played down unsavory side of Ponce. Details
from correspondence between Ambassador Walker and Baker. In 10/1983, CIA
prepared a "briefing paper on right-wing terrorism in El Salvador" that
described Ponce as a supporter of death squads. Impact Bush’s visit in 1984
to push for human rights was minimal. By 7/1989, CIA reported that Ponce
"espouses moderate political views." Ponce refused repeated requests to
pursue those responsible for deaths of Jesuits. Washington Post, 4/5/1994,
El Salvador, 1981-90. Government operation at El Mozote consisted of Army,
National Guard and the Treasury Police in operation rescue. By early 1992,
U.S. spent more than 4 billion in civil war lasting 12 years and that left
75,000 dead. New Yorker, 12/6/1993, p. 53
El Salvador, 1981-90. In 1981 over 10,000 political murders committed by
Salvadoran military and its death squads. In 1990 there were 108 such
murders. Schwarz, B. (1991). American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El
Salvador, p. 23
El Salvador, 1981-92. Article "Death-Squad Refugees," discusses case of
Cesar Vielman Joya Martinez, extradited by Bush to El Salvador to face
murder charges for being part of a death squad that he claims operated with
knowledge of defense minister Ponce and other top officials. FOIA documents
show U.S. helping prepare extradition request for Salvadoran government.
Truth Commission’s report vindicates Joya. Texas Observer (magazine),
3/26/1993, pp. 9-10
El Salvador, 1981-92. Some U.S. special operations soldiers in El Salvador
during civil war want Pentagon to admit they more than advisers. They say
they also fought. Army memo given Newsweek says, "most personnel serving in
an advisory capacity were directly engaged in hostile action." Newsweek,
El Salvador, 1981-92. Truth Commission report implicates top Salvadoran
officials in ordering or covering up murders of four U.S. churchwomen and
six Jesuit priests; and Salvadoran troops massacred many hundreds at El
Mozote. Four Dutch journalists killed 3/17/1982 were deliberately ambushed
by Salvadoran army. Denials by then top U.S. government officials now
exposed. U.S. government supported war with $6 billion. The Nation,
4/12/1993, p. 475
El Salvador, 1981-93. 12 years of tortured truth on El Salvador - U.S.
declarations undercut by United Nations. Commission report. For 12 years,
opponents of U.S. policy in Central America accused Reagan and Bush
administrations of ignoring widespread human rights abuses by the Salvadoran
government and of systematically deceiving or even lying to Congress and
people about the nature of an ally that would receive $6 billion in economic
and military aid. A three-man United Nations.-sponsored Truth Commission
released a long-awaited report on 12 years of murder, torture and
disappearance in El Salvador’s civil war. Commission examined 22,000
complaints of atrocities and attributed 85 percent of a representative
group of them to Salvadoran security forces or right-wing death squads. It
blamed remainder on guerrilla Farabundo Marti National Liberation front
(FMLN). In May 1980, for instance, when Carter was still President, security
forces seized documents implicating rightist leader D’Aubuisson in the
murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero. In Fall of 1981, Army Brig. Gen. Fred
Woerner supervised preparation of a joint U.S.-Salvadoran internal military
"Report of the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team," which noted
that "the (Salvadoran) armed forces are reluctant to implement vigorous
corrective actions for abuses in the use of force." One reason so many
people found it hard to believe U.S. officials could not have known more
about rights abuses and acted more aggressively to curb them is that the
U.S. was deeply involved in running the war, from intelligence gathering to
strategy planning to training of everyone from officers to foot soldiers. By
1982, U.S.. military advisers were assigned to each of the six Salvadoran
brigades, as well as each of 10 smaller detachments. The U.S. put tens of
millions of dollars into developing the ultra-modern national intelligence
directorate to coordinate intelligence gathering and dissemination. U.S.
military and CIA officials participated in almost every important meeting.
Most brigades had a U.S. intelligence officer assigned to them, as well as a
U.S. liaison officer. U.S. advisers regularly doled out small amounts of
money, usually less than $1,000 at a time, for intelligence work. The U.S.
was not informed of arrests or captures Unless they specifically asked.
"They never asked unless there was a specific request because someone in
Washington was getting telegrams." El Mozote, the report said, was work of
U.S.-trained Atlacatl battalion, part of a days-long search-and-destroy
sweep known as "Operation Rescue." In fact, the report said, the soldiers
massacred more than 500 people in six villages. In El Mozote, where the
identified victims exceeded 200, "the men were tortured and executed, then
women were executed and finally, the children" Washington Post, 3/21/1993
El Salvador, 1981-93. A discussion of the media’s treatment of the El Mozote
massacres and the U.S. media’s treatment of that story. Lies of our Time,
6/1993, pp. 3-4
El Salvador, 1981-93. Thomas Enders, former Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs from 1981-83, writes op-ed defending U.S. officials’
testimony re massacre at El Mozote as now confirmed by UN’s Truth Commission
report. Washington Post, op-ed 3/29/1993, A19
El Salvador, 1981-93. United Nations. Commission on Truth to release report
on crimes committed against civilians in Salvador’s 12-year civil war.
Defense Minister Ponce already resigned. Washington Post Outlook, 3/14/1993,
El Salvador, 1981-94. Armando Calderon Sol considered shoo-in to win
Presidency in impending elections. Calderon began his political career as a
member of a seven-man, neo-fascist group under D’Aubuisson’s guidance that
supported death squad operations. Calderon has all worst elements of
D’Abuisson without any redeeming qualities. When D’Abuisson running death
squads out of his office, Calderon was his private secretary and a loyal
soldier in a terrorist cell - Salvadoran National Movement (MNS). In 1981,
D’Abuisson unified MNS into Arena party. Washington Post, Outlook,
4/17/1994, C1,3
El Salvador, 1981. Detailed article on "The Truth of El Mozote," by Mark
Danner. New Yorker, 12/6/1993, pages 51 and ending on page 103
El Salvador, 1981. Skeletons verify killing of Salvadoran children of El
Mozote, El Salvador. Washington Times, 10/21/1992, A9 and Washington Post,
10/22/1992, A18
El Salvador, 1982-84. Significant political violence associated with
Salvadoran security services including National police, National Guard, and
Treasury Police. U.S. government agencies maintained official relationships
with Salvadoran security establishment appearing to acquiesce in these
activities. No evidence U.S. personnel participated in forcible
interrogations. U.S. did pass "tactical" information to alert services of
action by insurgent forces. Information on persons passed only in highly
unusual cases. Senate Intelligence Committee, October 5, 1984, pp. 11-13.
El Salvador, 1982-84. "Recent Political Violence in El Salvador," Report of
Senate Intelligence Committee. Committee found ample evidence that U.S.
policy was to oppose political violence. U.S. government accorded high
priority to gathering intelligence on political violence. President Bush and
his demarche in 1983. P8. U.S. government Relationship with Robert
D’Aubuisson - bio on him. U.S. Government contact with him limited. Roberto
Santivanez, director of Ansesal 1978-79. He claimed he himself had engaged
in death squad activity and had a relationship with U.S. through CIA and
that COL Carranza had ties to CIA. Colonel Nicolas Carranza had extensive
ties to Arena and National Conciliation (PCN) parties. He involved in
various activities of interest to U.S. in various positions. Senate
Intelligence Committee, October 5, 1984, pp. 1-11
El Salvador, 1983-90. Former Salvadoran army intelligence agent who applied
for political asylum in U.S. convicted in court of entering country
illegally. Joya-Martinez’s request for political asylum still pending.
Washington Post, 9/19/1990, A5
El Salvador, 1985. In 2/1985, CIA reported that behind Arena’s legitimate
exterior lies a terrorist network led by D’Aubuisson using both active-duty
and retired military personnel..." main death squad was "the Secret
Anti-communist Army," described by CIA as the paramilitary organization of
Arena - from the National Police and other security organizations. These
were funded directly from Washington. Death squads became more active as
1994, election approached. Columbia, possibly leading terrorist state in
Latin America, has become leading recipient of U.S. military aid. Since
1986, more than 20,000 people have been killed for political reasons, most
by Colombian authorities. More than 1,500 leaders, members and supporters of
the Labor Party (UP) have been assassinated since party established in 1985.
Pretext for terror operations is war against guerrillas and
narcotraffickers. Former a partial truth, latter a myth concocted to replace
the "communist threat." Pmers works hand-in-hand with drug lords, organized
crime, and landlords. National Police took over as leading official killers
while U.S. aid shifted to them. Targets include community leaders, human
rights and health workers, union activists, students, members of religious
youth organizations, and young people in shanty towns. Sale of human organs.
Case of Guatemala. Shift of 1962, under Kennedy administration from
hemispheric defense to "internal security:" war against the internal enemy.
Doctrines expounded in counterinsurgency manuals. Internal enemy extends to
labor organizations, popular movements, indigenous organizations, opposition
political parties, peasant movements, intellectual sectors, religious
currents, youth and student groups, neighborhood organizations, etc. From
1984 through 1992, 6,844 Colombian soldiers trained under U.S. International
Military Education and Training Program (MET). Z Magazine, 5/1994, 14 pages
El Salvador, 1986-87. See article "Death Squad Update, Investigating L.A.’s
Salvadoran Connection." Los Angeles Weekly, 8/7/1987
El Salvador, 1986-89. Joya Martinez, former death squad member, who said two
U.S. advisers attached to his unit and gave funds of 9500 month. Article
names other Salvadoran death squad members. Unclassified, 7/1990
El Salvador, 1986. In 1986, Salvadoran authorities, with help of FBI,
cracked a kidnap-for-hire ring in which death squads posing as leftist
rebels kidnapped some of nation’s wealthiest businessmen. Schwarz, B.
(1991). American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador, p. 28
El Salvador, 1987-89. Jesuit labeled ardent communist two years before by
Salvadoran, U.S. officials. Religious News Service, 5/9/1990, p. 1
El Salvador, 1987-89. Salvadoran woman defecting to U.S. said she worked for
death squad and provided information on six people who killed. Her claims
back up those of her supervisor, Cesar Joya Martinez, who linked death squad
acts to U.S. funding. Boston Globe, 3/16/1990, in First Principles, 4/1990,
p. 10
El Salvador, 1988-89. Joya Martinez, former member intelligence department
1st army Brigade of Salvador’s army. Said U.S. advisers funded their
activity, but unaware of death squad. Washington Post, 11/19/1989, F2
El Salvador, 1988. Amnesty International report of 26 October 1988 noted
"black list" are supplied to Salvadoran media by Salvadoran intelligence
services. During first six months of 1988, number of murders by death squads
tripled over same period of previous year. Most prominent victim was Judge
Jorge Alberto Serrano Panameno who was shot in May 1988. Increase reflects
rise to power of 1966 class from national military school. Class members
include Colonel Rene Emilio Ponce, new chief of staff of armed forces as
well as director of Treasury Police. They command five of country’s six
brigades, five of seven military detachments, three security forces as well
as intelligence, personnel and operations posts in high command.
El Salvador, 1989-91. According to confidential Salvadoran military sources,
decision to murder six Jesuit priests was made at a 15 November 1989 meeting
of senior commanders (CO) at the Salvadoran military school. Those allegedly
present were: Colonel Benavides, CO of the school; General Juan Rafael
Bustillo, then CO of Salvadoran Air Force - in 1991 assigned to embassy in
Israel; General Emilio Ponce, then chief of staff - in 1991 minister of
defense; and Colonel Elena Fuentes, CO of 1st brigade. Initiative for
murders came from Colonel Bustillo. For a listing of direct and
circumstantial evidence supporting allegation, see statement of Rep. Joe
El Salvador, 1989. CIA officer visited bodies of dead priests. Officer was
senior liaison with (DNI) the national intelligence directorate. U.S.
probably knew Salvadoran military behind assassinations but did not say
anything for seven weeks. State Department panel did not review actions of
El Salvador, 1989. Congressman criticized a 11/ 1987 report in which Latin
American and U.S. military leaders accused Rev. Ignacio Ellacuria and
several other theologians of supporting objectives of communist revolution.
Father Ellacuria, Rector of Jesuit university in San Salvador, was murdered
on 11/16/ 1989. Religious News Service, 5/11/1990, p. 1
El Salvador, 1989. Joya Martinez and Jesuit murders. Martinez says his unit
which played major role in 12/1989 murder of Jesuit priests had U.S.
government advisors. INS trying to deport Martinez. Unclassified, 9/1990, p.
El Salvador, 1989. Salvadoran Archbishop Rivera accused U.S. officials of
subjecting a witness to the slaying of 6 Jesuit intellectuals to
brainwashing and psychological torment. Washington Post, 12/11/1989, A23,24
El Salvador, 1989. U.S. military adviser Benavides told FBI, later recanted,
that Salvadoran army chief of staff and others knew of plan to kill six
Jesuit priests. Washington Post, 10/29/1990, A17,21
El Salvador, 1990. Amnesty International reported a significant surge in
number of killings by army-supported death squads this year. 45 people
killed between January and August this year, compared with 40 reported in
1989. WASHINGTON POST, 10/24/1990, A14
El Salvador, 1990. Cesar Vielman Joya-Martinez, former member Salvadoran
First brigade death squad, sentenced to 6 months in jail for illegally
reentering U.S. 6 years after he deported. Washington Post, 12/8/1990, A22
El Salvador, 1991. Salvadoran minister of defense and other top generals
attended 1989 meeting where decision was made to murder six Jesuit priests,
according to confidential sources. Allegation was made by an attorney
working for Rep. Moakley (D-MA), whose task force released a six page
statement directly linking Salvadoran high command to slayings. Washington
Times, 11/18/1991, A2
El Salvador, 1991. Summary executions continued in El Salvador despite the
presence of Onusal, the UN observer mission monitoring human rights
violations. In a 1991 report, Onusal noted government made few attempts to
investigate slayings. Report also accused FMLN for recruiting
fifteen-year-olds. Washington Times, 12/3/1991, A8
El Salvador, 1992. Cesar Vielman Joya Martinez, former Salvadoran death
squad member, to be deported. Washington Post editorial, 10/23/1992, A20
El Salvador, 1993. Right-wing death squads undermining fragile peace per UN
chief in campaign for March 1994 elections. Washington Times, 11/25/1993,
El Salvador, Central America, 1981-1993. Salvadoran death squads set up as a
consequence of Kennedy administration decisions. Killers were Treasury
Police and the military who were trained in intelligence and torture by
U.S. U.S. personnel staffed military and intelligence apparatus. Generals
selected and trained by U.S. were most notorious killers. 1984 FBI report on
death squads never released. For savage expose of School of Americas’
killers, see Father Roy Bourgeois’s School of the Americas Watch, Box 3330,
Columbus Ga. 31903; (706) 682-5369. The Nation, 12/27/1993, p. 791
El Salvador, 1989-1990. Joya Martinez testified role played by U.S.
officials in death squad killings carried out by U.S. trained first infantry
Brigade’s intelligence unit. Two U.S. military advisers controlled
intelligence department and paid for unit’s operating expenses. His unit
performed 74 executions between April and July 1989. Washington Post
confirmed U.S. advisers work in liaison with First brigade and CIA pays
expenses for intelligence operations in the brigades. Martinez said his
first brigade unit attached to U.S.-trained Atlacatl battalion, which
slaughtered the Jesuit priests. Member of his unit, Oscar Mariano Amaya
Grimaldi has confessed to slayings. In These Times, 8/14/1990, p. 17
Europe, 1945-92. Operation Gladio. First scandal was discovery of
assassination teams in 1952 linked to Bundes Deutscher Judged - a right-wing
political organization in Hesse, Germany. They prepared list of German
politicians who [might cooperate with Soviets]. BBC (1992). Gladio -
Georgia, 1993. Woodruff worked for 2 months as CIA’s Tbilisi station chief
posing as a State Department regional-affairs officer. He to help Guguladze
upgrade Georgian intelligence service and to monitor factional struggle.
Newsweek 8/23/1993, p. 18
Germany, 1950-54. In about 1950 pacifist ideas to be eradicated. U.S. formed
German youth league (Bund Deutscher Jurgend (BDJ)) in Frankfurt.
Psychological indoctrination given by Paul Luth. BDJ was a militant
organization, a counterweight to communist-run free German youth (FDJ) run
from East Berlin to infiltrate w. German youth. BDJ passed letters and
brochures through Iron Curtain and pasted slogans on walls. Chancellor
Adenauer wanted cold war and wanted to use the BDJ. Otto John told by State
official Zinn that it had uncovered neo-Nazi unit BDJ run by Peters, that
was organizing secret firing exercises and training for partisan warfare in
the Odelwald. BDJ had drawn up a blacklist of left-wing socialists who were
to be arrested or even murdered in event of attack from east. [early version
of Gladio political and staybehind operation]. John, O. (1969). Twice
Through the Lines: the Autobiography of Otto John, pp. 210-15
Germany, 1950-90. Bonn officials said government to disband secret
resistance net Operation Gladio. Section consisted of former Nazi SS and
Waffen-SS officers as well as members of an extreme right-wing youth group
that drew up plans to assassinate leading members of Socialist Democratic
Party in event of USSR-invasion. "Statewatch" compilation filed June 1994,
p. 11
Germany, 1952-91. CIA’s stay-behind program caused scandal in 1952 when West
German police discovered CIA working with a 2,000-member fascist youth group
led by former Nazis. Group had a black list of people to be liquidated in
case of conflict with the USSR. Makeup of lists. Lembke case. The Nation,
4/6/1992, p. 446
Germany, 1953. (Stay-behind operation Gladio?). In 1953 mass arrests of
neo-Nazi militant organization within ranks of German youth fellowship (BDJ)
discovered. Group held secret night maneuvers in Odenwald with CIA
instructors. They preparing for war with East Germany and prepared lists of
communists, left-wing sympathizers and pacifists who were to be arrested in
case of emergency. Members encouraged to infiltrate East German youth league
(FDJ). Operation exposed in press and scores of youths arrested in East
Germany as spies, propagandists or provocateurs, and sentenced to terms of
up to nine years of hard labor. Hagan, l. (1969). The Secret War for Europe,
p. 78
Germany, 1953. U.S. Intelligence officer told Otto John, head of BFV, one of
its agents in East Germany to defect with a list of East German agents in
West. 35 Communist spies arrested after Easter. Later it found many of those
arrested were innocent. Arrests followed with apologies. Disaster caused by
over-zealous U.S. intelligence officer. West German businessmen as
consequence afraid to do business with east. This a goal of U.S. Policy -
was this a deliberate "mistake?" Hagan, l. (1969). The Secret War for
Europe, p. 81
Greece, 1967. After CIA-backed coup, the army and police seized almost
10,000 prisoners, mostly left-wing militants, though political leaders of
all shades taken including prime minister Kanelopoulos and members of his
Cabinet, trade union members, journalists, writers, etc. The lists had been
provided by the sympathizers in the police and the secret service. Final
lists kept up to date by COL George Ladas. Details of fate of the
arrestees. Tompkins, P. (Unpublished manuscript). Strategy of Terror, pp.
Guatemala, 1954. Death squads and target lists. Schlesinger, S., & Kinzer,
S. (1983). Bitter Fruit 197, pp. 207-8, 221
Guatemala, 1954. Goal of CIA was apprehension of suspected communists and
sympathizers. At CIA behest, Castillo Armas created committee and issued
decree that established death penalty for crimes including labor union
activities. Committee given authority declare anyone communist with no right
of defense or appeal. By 11/21/1954 committee had some 72,000 persons on
file and aiming to list 200,000. Schlesinger, S., & Kinzer, S. (1983).
Bitter Fruit, p. 221
Guatemala, 1954. The U.S. Ambassador, after overthrow of Arbenz government,
gave lists of radical opponents to be eliminated to Armas’s government.
NACLA 2/1983, p 4. The military continued up to at least 1979 to use a list
of 72,000 proscribed opponents, drawn up first in 1954. NACLA (magazine re
Latin America) 2/1983, p. 13
Guatemala, 1954. After Armas made president, labor code forgotten and worker
organizers began disappearing from united fruit plantations. Hersh, B.
(1992). The Old Boys, p. 353
Guatemala, 1954. Department of State Secretary Dulles told Ambassador
Peurifoy to have the government scour the countryside for communists and to
slap them with criminal charges. A few months later the government began to
persecute hundreds for vague communist crimes. The Nation, 10/28/1978, p.
Guatemala, 1954 U.S. Ambassador Peurifoy, after Arbenz resigned, gave
Guatemalan army’s chief of staff a list of "communists" to be shot. The
chief of staff declined. The Nation 6/5/1995, pp. 792-5
Guatemala, 1981-89. Israeli Knesset member General Peled said in Central
America Israel is ‘dirty work’ contractor for U.S. Helped Guatemala regime
when Congress blocked Reagan administration. Israeli firm Tadiran (then
partly U.S.-owned) supplied Guatemalan military with computerized
intelligence system to track potential subversives. Those on computer list
had an excellent chance of being "disappeared." It was "an archive and
computer file on journalists, students, leaders, leftists, politicians and
so on." Computer system making up death lists. Cockburn, A. & Cockburn, L.
(1991). Dangerous Liaison, p. 219
Guatemala, 1985-93. CIA collected intelligence re ties between Guatemalan
insurgents and Cuba. CIA passed the information to U.S. military, which was
assisting Guatemalan army extinguish opposition. Washington Post, 3/30/1995,
Guatemala, 1988-91. CIA station chief in Guatemala from 1988 to 1991 was a
Cuban American. He had about 20 officers with a budget of about $5 million
a year and an equal or greater sum for "liaison" with Guatemalan military.
His job included placing and keeping senior Guatemalan officers on his
payroll. Among them was Alpirez, who recruited for CIA. Alpirez’s
intelligence unit spied on Guatemalans and is accused by human rights groups
of assassi nations. CIA also gave Guatemalan army information on guerrillas.
New York Times, 4/2/1995, A11
Guatemala, 1953-84. For 30 years the CIA has been bankrolling a man reported
to be behind right-wing terror in Central America. The CIA’s protigi, Mario
Sandoval Alarcon, former Vice President Of Guatemala, now heads the National
Liberation Movement (NLM) founded in 1953 by CIA as a paramilitary force to
overthrow Arbenz. By mid-1960s Sandoval emerged as head of the organization.
The White Hand or La Mano Blanco with close ties to the NLM was responsible
for as many as 8000 deaths in the 1960s plus more in the 1970s. Sandoval a
pillar of the World Anti-communist League. The CIA still funds Sandoval.
Guatemala, 1954-76. Effect of CIA coup organized labor all but wiped out.
Union membership dropped 100,000 to 27,000 immediately and continued decline
thereafter, in part due to death squad activity. Barry, T., and Preusch, D.
Guatemala. Police trained by AID public safety program murdered or
disappeared 15,000 people. Lernoux, P. (1982). Cry of the People, p. 186
Guatemala, 1954-84. See Jack Anderson column "Links Reported Among Latin
Death Squads." Washington Post, 1/12/1984, N. VA., p. 15
Guatemala, 1970-72. Under Arana presidency, with Mario Sandoval Alarcon and
others involved in right-wing terrorism, Arana unleashed one of the most
gruesome slaughters in recent Latin American history (only in Chile,
following the coup against Allende was the degree of violence greater). The
New York Times reported in June 1971 that at least 2000 Guatemalans were
assassinated between 11/1970 and 5/1971; most corpses showed signs of
torture. Most of killing attributed to the officially supported terrorist
organizations Ojo Por Ojo (an eye for an eye) and Mano Blanca. Jones, S.,
and Tobis, D. (Eds.). (1974). Guatemala, pp. 202-3
Guatemala, 1970-87. Violence by security forces organized by CIA, trained in
torture by advisors from Argentina, Chile. Supported by weapon, computer
experts from Israel. Marshall, J., Scott P.D., and Hunter, J. (1987). The
Iran-Contra Connection, p. 133
Guatemala. 1960-82. Trained military death squads who used "terror tactics"
from killing to indiscriminate napalming of villages. Special Forces almost
certainly participated in operations despite Congressional prohibition.
Marshall, J., Scott P.D., and Hunter, J. (1987). The Iran-Contra Connection,
p. 193
Guatemala, 1954. The U.S. ambassador, after overthrow of Arbenz government,
gave lists to Armas of radical opponents to be eliminated. NACLA (magazine
re Latin America) 2/1983, p. 4
Guatemala, 1985. The World Anti-communist League’s point man, Mario Sandoval
Alarcon, remains a League member even after exposed as a death squad
patriarch who was on the CIA payroll. Jack Anderson, Washington Post,
Guatemala, 1989. Climate of terror grips Guatemala. Killers, bombers said to
target civilian rule. Washington Post, 9/29/1989, A 45
Guatemala, circa 1968-70. U.S. counterinsurgency program turned area into
bloody war zone taking the lives of thousands of peasants. Formed Mano
Blanca or White Hand. Plan used through out country in 1970. NACLA (magazine
re Latin America), 3/74, p. 19
Guatemala. Article by Gary Bass and Babette Grunow on the Guatemalan
counterinsurgency forces. Lies of our Time, 6/1993, pp. 11-13
Guatemala. At least three of recent G-2 chiefs were paid by CIA. Crimes are
merely examples of a vast, systematic pattern; [the guilty] are only cogs in
a large U.S. government apparatus. Colonel Hooker, former DIA chief for
Guatemala, says, "it would be an embarrassing situation if you ever had a
roll call of everybody in Guatemalan army who ever collected a CIA
paycheck." Hooker says CIA payroll is so large that it encompasses most of
Army’s top decision-makers. Top commanders paid by CIA include General
Roberto Matta Galvez, former army chief of staff, head of presidential
General Staff and commander of massacres in El Quiche department; and
General Gramajo, defense minister during the armed forces’ abduction, rape
and torture of Dianna Ortiz, an American nun. Hooker says he once brought
Gramajo on a tour of U.S. Three recent Guatemalan heads of state confirm CIA
works closely with G-2. Gen. Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores (military
dictator from 1983 to 1986) how death squads had originated, he said they
started "in the 1960s by CIA." General Efrain Rios Montt (dictator from 1982
to 1983 and the current congress president), who ordered main high-land
massacres (662 villages destroyed, by army’s own count), said CIA had agents
in the G-2. CIA death squads by Allan Nairn. The Nation, 4/17/1995
Guatemala. CIA works inside a Guatemalan army unit that maintains a network
of torture centers and has killed thousands of Guatemalan civilians. G-2,
since at least 60s, has been advised, trained, armed and equipped by U.S.
undercover agents. One of American agents who works with G-2, is Randy
Capister. He has been involved in similar operations with army of
neighboring El Salvador. A weapons expert known as Joe Jacarino, has
operated through out Caribbean, and has accompanied G-2 units on missions
into rural zones. Jacarino [possibly a CIA officer]. Celerino Castillo, a
former agent of DEA who dealt with G-2 and CIA in Guatemala, says he worked
with Capister as well as with Jacarino. Colonel Alpirez at La Aurora base in
Guatemala Denied involvement in deaths of Bamaca and Devine. He said CIA
advises and helps run G-2. He praised CIA for "professionalism" and close
rapport with Guatemalan officers. He said that agency operatives often come
to Guatemala on temporary duty, and train G-2. CIA gives sessions at G-2
bases on "contra-subversion" tactics and "how to manage factors of power" to
"fortify democracy." During mid-1980s G-2 officers were paid by Jack
McCavitt, then CIA station chief. CIA "technical assistance" includes
communications gear, computers and special firearms, as well as
collaborative use of CIA-owned helicopters that are flown out of piper
hangar at La Aurora civilian airport and from a separate U.S. Air facility.
Guatemalan army has, since 1978, killed more than 110,000 civilians. G-2 and
a smaller, affiliated unit called Archivo have long been openly known in
Guatemala as the brain of the terror state. With a contingent of more than
2,000 agents and with sub-units in local army bases, G-2 coordinates
torture, assassination and disappearance of dissidents. CIA Death Squads by
Allan Nairn. The Nation, 4/17/1995
Guatemala, 1954-95. For at least five years, Colonel Alpirez was also a
well-paid agent for CIA and a murderer, a U.S. Congressman says. Alpirez has
been linked to the murder of Michael Devine, an American innkeeper who lived
and worked in the Guatemalan jungle, and the torture and killing of Efrain
Bamaca Velasquez, a leftist guerrilla who was the husband of Jennifer
Harbury. CIA ties began in 1954, when Alpirez was about five years old. The
CIA engineered a coup in Guatemala that overthrew a leftist president and
installed a right-wing military regime. CIA’s station in Guatemala began
recruiting young and promising military officers who would provide
information on the left-wing guerrillas, the internal workings of
Guatemala’s intertwined military and political leadership, union members,
opposition politicians and others. Alpirez was sent in 1970 to School of the
Americas (SOA), an elite and recently much-criticized U.S. Army academy at
Fort Benning, Ga. Human-rights groups and members of congress point out that
SOA’s graduates include Roberto D’Aubuisson, leader of death squads in El
Salvador; 19 Salvadoran soldiers named in the 1989 assassination of six
Jesuit priests and three soldiers accused of the 1980 rape and murder of
four U.S. church workers; Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedars and other leaders of the
military junta that ran Haiti from 1991 to 1994; General Hugo Banzer,
dictator of Bolivia from 1971 to 1978, and General Manuel Antonio Noriega of
Panama, now imprisoned in U.S. In 1970s Alpirez was an officer in a
counterinsurgency unit known as Kaibiles. Kaibiles became notorious in the
early 1980s, known as scorched earth years, when tens of thousands of
Indians were killed as military swept across rural Guatemala, systematically
destroying villages. Guatemalan government’s own count, campaign left 40,000
widows and 150,000 orphans. In late 1980s, Alpirez served as a senior
official of an intelligence unit hidden within the general staff and became
a paid agent of CIA who paid him tens of thousands of dollars a year.
Intelligence unit, known as "Archivo," or archives, stands accused of
assassination, infiltration of civilian agencies and spying on Guatemalans
in violation of the nation’s Constitution. Archivo works like the CIA. "It
was also working as a death squad." New York Times, 3/25/1995
Guatemala, 1954-95. U.S. Undercover agents have worked for decades inside a
Guatemalan army unit that has tortured and killed thousands of Guatemalan
citizens, per the Nation weekly magazine. "working out of the U.S. Embassy
and living in safe houses and hotels, agents work through an elite group of
Guatemalan officers who are secretly paid by CIA and implicated personally
in numerous political crimes and assassinations "unit known as G-2 and its
secret collaboration with CIA were described by U.S. and Guatemalan
operatives and confirmed by three former Guatemalan heads of state. Colonel
Julio Roberto Alpirez, Guatemalan officer implicated in murders of guerrilla
leader Efrain Bamaca Velasquez–husband of an American lawyer–and
rancher Michael Devine discussed in an interview how intelligence agency
advises and helps run G-2. He said agents came to Central American country
often to train G-2 men and he described attending CIA sessions at G-2 bases
on "contra-subversion" tactics and "how to manage factors of power" to
"fortify democracy" the Nation quoted U.S. and Guatemalan intelligence
sources as saying at least three recent G-2 chiefs have been on CIA payroll
ß General Edgar Godoy Gatan, Colonel Otto Perez Molina and General
Francisco Ortega Menaldo. ‘It would be embarrassing if you ever had a roll
call of everybody in Guatemalan army who ever collected a CIA paycheck,"
report quoted Colonel George Hooker, U.S. DIA chief in Guatemala from 1985
to 1989, as saying. Human rights group Amnesty International has said
Guatemalan army killed more than 110,000 civilians since 1978 with G-2 and
another unit called Archivo known as main death squads. Reuters, 3/30/1995
Guatemala, 1960-90. Human rights groups say at least 40,000 Guatemalans
"disappeared" in last 3 decades. Most were poor Indians. Anthropologists,
led by Clyde snow, dug away at a village site. Maria Lopez had a husband and
a son in one grave. She said on morning of valentine’s day 1982, members of
anti-guerrilla militia took her husband and others. They had refused to join
militias known as civil self-defense patrols and were killed. Six unknown
clandestine graves in San Jose Pacho. Human rights groups blame most
disappearances on army-run civil self-defense patrols set up under
presidencies of General Lucas Garcia and brig. Gen. Rios Montt. There are
hundreds of clandestine graves filled with victims of the militias,
right-wing death squads and brutal counterinsurgency campaigns. Washington
Times, 8/5/1992, p. A9
Guatemala, 1970-95. Jennifer Harbury’s story. Time, 4/3/1995, p. 48
Guatemala, 1981-95. DIA reports re MLN particularly disturbing, as they
raise grave questions about extent of U.S. knowledge of MLN activities in
earlier years when MLN leader Mario Sandoval Alarcon was tied to Reagan
Administration’s efforts to support Contras. Having come to power in 1954
with the CIA-backed overthrow of Colonel Jacobo Arbenze, MLN leader Sandoval
was accused in 1980 by Elias Barahona, former press secretary to the
Guatemalan Interior Minister, of having worked for CIA. Head of National
Congress from 1970 to 1974, at which time he was made vice president, a
position he kept until his term expired in 1978, Sandoval is widely
regarded as father of Latin America’s "death squads." In 1970’s, he had a
close relationship with Roberto D’Aubuisson, deputy chief of El Salvador’s
national security agency (Anseal). D’Aubuisson reportedly was behind El
Salvador’s death squads. Sandoval was so close to Reagan administration that
he was one of only two Guatemalans invited to attend Reagan’s inauguration.
Intelligence - a computerized intelligence newsletter published in France,
4/24/1995, p. 1
Guatemala, 1984-95. Article, "Murder as Policy." Washington was supporting
Guatemalan army in a number of ways: green berets trained Kaibul massacre
force, the army’s self-proclaimed "messengers of death." U.S. openly sold
weapons to Guatemala - used in massacre in Santiago Atitlan. Hundreds of
U.S. troops (mostly National Guard) helped civic action and road building in
massacre zones. The Nation, 4/24/1995, pp. 547-8
Guatemala, 1985-93. CIA collected intelligence re ties between Guatemalan
insurgents and Cuba - CIA passed the information to U.S. military, which was
assisting Guatemalan army extinguish opposition. Washington Post, 3/30/1995,
Guatemala, 1985-95. Bombings against military-reformist Christian Democratic
Party (DCG) of then President Vinicio Cerezo to topple Cerezo, who perceived
as being too soft on rebels. A 10/1988 DIA intelligence report alerted
American authorities that MLN, which was involved in "plotting a coup
against Cerezo in the past," is "now apparently prepared to use violent
tactics to undermine DCG government." MLN "is reportedly planning a bombing
campaign directed against members of ruling DCG. MLN intends to use recently
obtained explosives to target personal vehicles of DCG Congressional
representatives in order to frighten them. After assessing their impact, MLN
will consider initiating a second stage of its anti-DCG campaign that will
include killing of various individuals. MLN has selected potential targets
in Guatemala city. U.S. Army and DIA, getting regular, high-level
intelligence from senior Guatemalan army officers and other sources about
crimes, notably murder, being committed by Guatemalan army personnel. Source
and depth of intelligence raises questions about what U.S. Government
actually knew about Guatemalan army complicity in civilian murders in that
country throughout the 1980s, including alleged involvement of Guatemalan
Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, then a CIA agent, in 1990 and 1992 murders of
American innkeeper Michael Devine and guerrilla fighter Efrain Bamaco
Velazquez, husband of an American, Jennifer Harbury. Intelligence - a
computerized intelligence newsletter published in France, 4/24/1995, p. 1
Guatemala, 1988-91. CIA station chief in Guatemala from 1988 to 1991 was a
Cuban American. He had about 20 officers with a budget of about $5 million a
year and an equal or greater sum for "liaison" with Guatemalan military. His
job included placing and keeping senior Guatemalan officers on his payroll.
Among them was Alpirez, who recruited others for CIA. Alpirez’s intelligence
unit spied on Guatemalans and is accused by human rights groups of
assassinations. CIA also gave Guatemalan army information on the guerrillas.
New York Times, 4/2/1995, A11
Guatemala, 1989. 25 students in two years killed by squads. Entire
university student association has been silenced. U.S. backed governments in
virtual genocide have more than 150,000 victims. AI called this genocide a
"government program of political murder." The Nation, 3/5/1990, cover, p.
Guatemala, 1990-95. Member of House Intelligence Committee, Robert G.
Torricelli (D- NJ.) said, in letter to President Clinton, that a Guatemalan
military officer who ordered killings of an American citizen and a guerrilla
leader married to a North American lawyer was a paid agent of CIA. CIA knew
of killings, but concealed its knowledge for years. Another member of House
Intelligence Committee confirmed Torricelli’s claims. Torricelli wrote in
letter to President that the "Direct involvement of CIA in the murder of
these individuals leads me to the extraordinary conclusion that the agency
is simply out of control and that it contains what can only be labeled a
criminal element." Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, Bamaca, and Michael
Guatemala, 1990-95. Article, El Buki’s Tale - Murder of Michael Devine.
Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Summer 1995, pp. 32-37
Guatemala, 1990-95. Article, The Agency, Off Target. Two Deaths, a Rogue CIA
Informant and a Big Pot of Trouble. Re deaths of Michael Devine and Efrain
Bamaca Velasquez - Harbury’s husband. CIA paid Colonel Alpirez $43,000 after
it learned of cover up of deaths. U.S. News & World Report, 4/10/1995, p. 46
Guatemala, 1990-95. Assassin of Michael Devine and of the husband of
Jennifer Harbury, Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, was on CIA’s payroll and
had attended School of Americas (SOA) on two separate occasions. In January
1995 when State and NSC pieced together what CIA knew, the ambassador
demanded removal of CIA’s station chief. CIA fought to stop disclosure of
its relationship with the Colonel. Administration officials began to
mistrust what CIA was saying about the case. The Colonel first came to U.S.
In 1970 as an army cadet at SOA. He returned to SOA in 1989, to take year
long Command and General Staff course when he was already on CIA payroll. In
1990, Michael Devine, who ran a hotel, apparently stumbled on a smuggling
operation involving Guatemalan military. He was killed. New York Times,
3/24/1995, A3
Guatemala, 1990-95. CIA last month removed its station chief in Guatemala
for failing to report promptly information linking a paid CIA informer to
the slaying of a Guatemalan guerrilla fighter married to Jennifer Harbury.
Guatemalan army Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, was paid $44,000 by CIA in
1992 for secretly supplying intelligence on the civil war. At time of
payment CIA had evidence linking him to the slaying of U.S. citizen Michael
Devine (after he found about a military smuggling operation or because he
had a weapon). Washington Post, 3/25/1995, A1,20
Guatemala, 1990-95. Clinton has threatened to fire anyone in CIA who
withheld information from him about activities of its informant in
Guatemala, Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez. What is more likely to be agency’s
undoing is its failure to tell congress that only six months after he
graduated from command-level courses at School of Americas Colonel Alpirez,
a member of military intelligence on agency’s payroll, ordered murder of a
U.S. citizen, William Devine, and then torture-murder of husband of an
American woman. White House officials, and President Clinton in particular,
were very angry about Guatemalan affair but NSC Anthony lake was arguing
that there is no evidence that CIA tried to deceive president. Los Angeles
Times reported that late last year State Department found information about
Devine murder in its files that appeared to have originated with CIA and had
not been passed on to White House. This discovery prompted State Department
and White House to ask CIA for more information. State initially asked CIA
for information on rebel Commandante Efrain Bamaca Velasquez and received a
few modest files. Several weeks later, State again asked CIA for information
but this time on "Commandante Everardo," which was Commandante Bamaca’s
well-known nom de guerre. Only then did CIA produced incriminating data
that it held solely under that name. CIA has tried to ease situation with a
rare "leak" about itself to press. On 3/24, Los Angeles Times quoted "CIA
sources" as saying Agency was only told after the fact that its Guatemalan
informant, Colonel Alpirez, was present at killing in 1990 of Devine, a U.S.
citizen who ran a popular tourist resort in Guatemala. CIA insisted to the
paper that it cut ties with Colonel at that point, but, significantly,
sources did not put a date on rupture. That gave it "wiggle room" to say it
didn’t find out about Colonel’s involvement in March 1992 torture-murder of
Bamaca until early this year. CIA gave Colonel Alpirez a "final payment" of
$44,000 at about time of Bamaca’s murder. Per National public radio
commentator Daniel Schorr, CIA station chief in Guatemala has been fired for
failing to relay information. But New York Times says he was reassigned to
Langley in January, after U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala accused him of
withholding information. CIA has assigned its inspector General, Fred Hitz,
to investigate. CIA station chief in Switzerland, who held a top position at
Department of Operations (DO) Latin American Division from 1990 to 1992, is
now being questioned, as is Jack Devine, who headed division from January
1983 until last October. He was appointed Associate Deputy Director of
Operations in October after John MacGaffin was removed from that post for
secretly giving an award to a senior operative who had just been disciplined
in Ames case. Devine’s successor is a woman, first to direct a DO division.
She is in her 50s, was previously station chief in El Salvador, and is said
by officials outside CIA to be very forthcoming about case. Intelligence - a
computerized intelligence newsletter published in France, 3/27/1995, p. 30
Guatemala, 1990-95. Guatemalan soldiers killed Michael Devine under orders
from Colonel Mario Garcia Catalan, per convicted soldier, Solbal. He killed
as the army convinced he had bought a stolen rifle. They tortured him before
killing him. Solbal says Colonel Alpirez gave food and shelter to the
killers. Washington Times, 5/15/1995, A13
Guatemala, 1990-95. Letter from Congressman Torricelli to President Clinton
about involvement of CIA in two murders in Guatemala. 3/22/1995
Guatemala, 1990-95. Rep. Robert Torricelli, D-NJ., who is on the HPSCI, has
requested an investigation from the Justice Department on role of the CIA in
the murder of Michael Devine and Efrain Bamaca Velasquez. Request was made
in a letter to President Clinton. Guatemalan intelligence officer who
ordered the murders, Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, was a paid agent of the
CIA. Torricelli claims that the NSA, CIA, State Department., and NSC covered
up the involvement of a paid agent in the murders. Devine, who was killed in
1990, was an American citizen and Velasquez, who was killed in 1992, was
married to an U.S. Citizen. CNN Headline News, 3/23/1995 and AP, 3/23/1995
Guatemala, 1990-95. Revelations about a CIA informer linked to two murders
(Devine and Bamaca) in Guatemala helped exhume embarrassing relationship
between U.S. military and intelligence personnel and a Central American
regime notorious for human rights violations. Washington Post, 4/2/1995, A29
Guatemala, 1990-95. Tim Weiner article "A Guatemalan Officer and the CIA."
Colonel is recalled as a "good soldier" and a murdering spy. New York Times,
Guatemala, 1990-95. Two colonels suspended in Guatemala for covering up 1990
killing of Michael Devine. One was a paid CIA informant at time of killing.
Colonel Mario Garcia Catalan also suspended. Washington Post, 4/27/1995, A29
Guatemala, 1990-95. Wife of Michael Devine discusses slaying of her husband.
New York Times, 3/28/1995, A1,6
Guatemala, 1991-94. State Department reported in 1991, that "military, civil
patrols and police continued to commit a majority of major human rights
abuses, including extrajuridicial killings torture and disappearances."
Guatemalan counterinsurgency campaign devised by U.S. counterinsurgency
experts Caesar Sereseres and Colonel George Minas. Former served as a
consultant to RAND Corporation and State Department’s Office of Policy
Planning. Minas served as military attache in Guatemala in early 1980s. Both
encouraged population control such as Vietnam-style military-controlled
strategic hamlets and civilian defense patrols. Today Guatemala is largest
warehouse for cocaine transshipments to U.S. Drug trade run by military
which tries to blame the leftists. Covert Action Information Bulletin
(Quarterly), Spring 1994, pp. 28-33
Guatemala, 1991-95. U.S. Had information in 10/1991 linking a paid CIA
informer in slaying of a U.S. citizen. Colonel Roberto Alpirez was dropped
from CIA’s payroll but remained a contact through 7/1992 -- when he
allegedly ordered another killing of Efrain Bamaca Velasquez - husband of
Jennifer Harbury. Washington Post, 3/24/1995, A1,27
Guatemala, 1992. Rights abuses in Guatemala continue, paramilitary civilian
patrols - self defense patrols - accused of campaign of terror, control
rural areas. Patrols answer to military. Washington Post, 10/4/1992, A35
Guatemala, 1995. President Clinton said he would dismiss any CIA official
who withheld information on death of Jennifer Harbury’s husband. Rep
Torricelli said CIA withheld information for years. Washington Times,
3/25/1995, A3
Guatemala, 1970-95. Discussion of Torricelli, Harbury, Devine, Bamaco, etc.
The death of husband of Harbury not a rogue operation. This was standard
operating procedure in El Salvador and Guatemala and elsewhere around the
globe. CIA organized death squads, financed them, equipped them, trained
them, etc. That’s what the CIA does. Once in a decade the U.S. public hears
about this. CIA should be abolished. The CIA mislead Congress about the
Devine case. Getting rid of CIA is not enough - the CIA did not act alone.
The National Security Agency and the Army may have been involved in
Haiti, 1986-93. In 1986 the CIA funded the national intelligence service
(SIN) under guise of fighting narcotics - but SIN never produced drug
intelligence and used CIA money for political operations. Sin involved in
spying on so-called subversive groups...they doing nothing but political
repression...they targeted people who were for change. CIA used distorted
data to discredit Aristide. NACLA (Magazine re Latin America), 2/1994, p. 35
Haiti, 1990-94. Emannuel Constant, leader of Haiti’s FRAPH hit squad, worked
for CIA and U.S. intelligence helped launch FRAPH. Haiti’s dreaded attaches
paid for by a U.S. Government-funded project that maintains sensitive files
on Haiti’s poor. The Nation, 10/24/1994, 458
Haiti, 1990-94. U.S. officials involved in refugee policy have backgrounds
suggestive of Phoenix-like program activities. Luis Moreno, State
Department, has background in counterterrorism. Gunther Wagner, senior
intelligence officer at INS’s southwest regional office, assigned to
investigate repression against repatriated refugees. Wagner had served as
public safety adviser to Vietnamese National Special Branch for 5 years and
later advised Somoza’s National Guard. INS database on all asylum interviews
at Guantanamo. INS, on demand, gave State Department unrestricted access to
all interview files. U.S. Officers hand Haitian authorities computer
print-outs of names of all Haitians being repatriated. CIA funded service
intelligence nacionale (SIN), who’s de facto primary function was a war
against popular movement - including torture and assassination - a fact
admitted by a CIA officer to an official in Aristide’s government. U.S.
shares "anti-narcotics intelligence" with Haitian military. The Progressive,
4/1994, p. 21
Haiti, 1991-94. Asylum-promoting project gets family information that fed
into a computer project that could be used to target for repression. The
Progressive, 9/1994, pp. 19-26
Haiti, 1991-94. Seven chief attaches arranged killings and brought victims
to houses. Four of the seven worked for Centers for Development and Health
(CDS), funded by U.S. AID. One was Gros Sergo, and other was Fritz Joseph
who chief FRAPH recruiter in Cite Soleil. Two others are Marc Arthur and
Gors Fanfan. CDS files track every family in Cite Soleil. The Nation,
10/24/1994, p. 461
Haiti, 1994. AID programs for Haitian popular groups; Immigration and
Naturalization service, with computerized files on 58,000 political-asylum
applicants and army intelligence S-2 section of 96th Civil Affairs Battalion
assigned to monitor refugees at Guantanamo Bay. Per Capt. James Vick, unit
develops networks of informants and works with marine corps
counterintelligence in "identifying ringleaders of unrest and in weeding out
troublemakers." 96th’s files enter military intelligence system. Gunther
Wagner, a former Nazi, served with U.S. In Phoenix operation in Vietnam, and
in Nicaragua - now heads State Department’s Cuba-Haiti task force.
Pentagon’s Atlantic command commissioned Booz, Allen, Hamilton, to devise a
computer model of Haitian society. Results of study given. Priority of study
to build an "organized information bank...." no change expected in ruling
clique of Haiti. Article by Allan Nairn. The Nation, 10/3/1994, pp. 344-48
Haiti. CIA officer assigned 1973-75 Coordination with Ton-Ton Macoute, "Baby
Doc" Duvalier’s private death squad. Covert Action Information Bulletin
(Quarterly), 9/1980, p. 16
Haiti, 1985-93. CIA created an intelligence service in Haiti: National
Intelligence Service, (SIN) from its initials in French, to fight cocaine
trade, but unit became instrument of political terror whose officers engaged
in drug traffic, killings and torture. Unit produced little drug
intelligence. U.S. cut ties to group after 1991 military coup. New York
Times, 11/14/1993 pp. 1,12
Haiti, 1986-93. INS database on all asylum interviews at Guantanamo. INS, on
demand, gave State Department unrestricted access to all interview files.
U.S. officers hand Haitian authorities computer print-outs of names of all
Haitians being repatriated. CIA funded service intelligence nacionale (SIN),
who’s de facto primary function was a war against popular movement -
including torture and assassination - a fact admitted by a CIA officer to an
official in Aristide’s government. U.S. shares "anti-narcotics intelligence"
with Haitian military. The Progressive, 4/1994, p. 21
Haiti, 1990-94. Clinton administration denied report CIA helped set up
Haiti’s pro-army Militia - FRAPH. Officials refused to comment whether
FRAPH leader Emmanuel Constant was a paid CIA informant. "Nation" article
said Constant worked for both the CIA and the DIA. Colonel Collins of DIA
and Donald Terry of CIA were his contacts. Collins urged Constant to set up
FRAPH. Mr. Constant, per Washington Times, was a paid U.S. Informant on
Haitian political activities and assisting anti-drug efforts. Relationship
broken off early this year. FRAPH has been linked to murders, public
beatings and arson. CIA officers in past worked with Haiti’s national
intelligence service. Washington Times, 10/7/1994, A16
Haiti, 1990-94. Emannuel Constant, leader of Haiti’s FRAPH hit squad, worked
for CIA and U.S. Intelligence helped launch FRAPH. Haiti’s dreaded attaches
paid for by a U.S. Government-funded project that maintains sensitive files
on Haiti’s poor. In 10/3/1994, issue of Nation carried Nairn’s article "The
Eagle is Landing," he quoted a U.S. official praising Constant as a young
republican that U.S. Intelligence had encouraged to form FRAPH. Constant
confirmed that account. He first said his handler was Colonel Patrick
Collins, DIA attache in Haiti, and later claimed another U. S. official
urged him to form FRAPH. Collins first approached Constant while he taught a
course at HQs of CIA-run national intelligence service (SIN) and built up a
computer data base at Bureau of Information and Coordination. FRAPH
originally was called Haitian Resistance League. Constant was working for
the CIA at SIN while it attacked the poor. The Nation, 10/24/1994, p. 458
Haiti, 1991-94. Emmanuel Constant (son of a Duvalier general), who had been
on the CIA payroll since the mid-‘1980s. With U.S. intelligence advice,
formed FRAPH, a political front and paramilitary death squad offshoot of the
Haitian army, that began to systematically target democratic militants and
hold the country hostage with several armed strikes. On 10/11/1993, day
U.S.S. Harlan County and U.S. and Canadian soldiers were to land, even
though CIA had been tipped off, FRAPH organized a dockside demonstration of
several dozen armed thugs. Ship turned around. U.S. asylum processing
program hand-picked and exported almost 2,000 grassroots leaders. In three
years after coup, 7,000-man army and its paramilitary assistants killed at
least 3,000 and probably over 4,000 people, tortured thousands, and created
tens of thousands of refugees and 300,000 internally displaced people.
Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Winter 1994/1995, pp. 7-13
Haiti, 1991-94. Haitian paramilitary chief spied for CIA. Emmanuel "Toto"
Constant, head of Haiti’s notorious FRAPH, secretly provided information to
U.S. intelligence while his group killed people. Constant paid by CIA for
giving intelligence officers information about Aristide beginning shortly
after Aristide ousted in 9/1991 coup. CIA dropped him last Spring.
Constant’s organization blamed for killing hundreds of supporters of
Aristide - and organizing demonstration that drove off U.S. troop-carrying
Harlan County last October. In "Nation" article, U.S. Defense Attache,
Colonel Patrick Collins, had encouraged Constant to form FRAPH. U.S.
intelligence agencies had extensive penetration of Haitian military and
paramilitary groups. Using Constant as source may explain why CIA’s
reporting on Aristide was skewed. FRAPH not formed until 8/1993, 9 months
after Collins left Haiti. Washington Post, 10/9/1994, A1,30
Haiti, 1993. Young men kidnapped by armed thugs seldom reappear. Under de
facto government, as many as 3000 may have been killed. Aristide negotiating
his return with UN. The Nation, 5/3/1993, p. 580
Haiti, 1995. Interview with Allan Nairn, April 1995 "Criminal Habits." Z
Magazine 6/1995, pp. 22-9
Honduras, 1981-87. Florencio Caballero, who served as a torturer and a
member of a death squad, said he was trained in Texas by the CIA. He said he
was responsible for the torture and slaying of 120 Honduran and other Latin
American citizens. The CIA taught him and 24 other people in a army
intelligence unit for 6 months in interrogation. psychological methods–to
study fears and weaknesses of a prisoner, make him stand up, don’t let him
sleep, keep him naked and isolated, put rats and cockroaches in his cell,
give him bad food, throw cold water on him, change the temperature.
Honduras, circa 1982-87. Army Battalion 3/16, a special counterinsurgency
force which many considered a kind of death squad, was formed in 1980.
Florencio Caballero, a former battalion member, described a clandestine
paramilitary structure for repressing leftists. Caballero, who studied
interrogation techniques in Houston, said the CIA was extensively involved
in training squad members. NACLA 2/1988, p. 15, from New York Times,
Honduras, March 1986. Apart from CIA training of a battalion implicated in
death squad activities and torture, Honduran army defector said CIA arranged
a fabricated forced "confession" by kidnapped prisoner that he headed a
guerrilla front and had planned attacks against U.S. installations. This in
operation truth. Chomsky, N. (1988). The Culture of Terrorism, p. 239
Honduras. General G. Alvarez Martinez, CIA-Contra point man in Honduras, had
death squad operation run by Ricardo Lau. Alvarez godfather to new CIA Chief
of Station’s daughter. Marshall, J., Scott P.D., and Hunter, J. (1987). The
Iran-Contra Connection, pp. 78-9
Honduras, 1982-86. Zuniga told congressional staffers about the 316
Battalion established with the knowledge and assistance of the U.S. Embassy.
By 1984 more than 200 Honduran teachers, students, labor leaders, and
opposition politicians had been murdered. The CIA had knowledge of the
killings. Zuniga killed in 9/1985. Mother Jones, 4/1987, p. 48
Honduras. Capt. Alexander Hernandez, a graduate of U.S. International Police
services training program, has played a central role in Honduran death squad
activities and the war in Nicaragua. Early 1986 New York Times reports that
CIA was providing "training and advice in intelligence collection" to
Hernandez’ unit "as part of a program to cut off arms shipments from
Nicaragua to leftist rebels in Honduras and El Salvador." New York Times
also says that CIA knew of the assassinations but "looked the other way."
The Nation, 6/7/1986, p. 793
Honduras, circa 1981-84. Honduran government established a secret unit that
seized, interrogated, tortured, and murdered more than 130 people between
1981-84. Unit named Battalion 316. Unit operated with CIA supervision and
training and received U.S. instruction in interrogation, surveillance and
hostage rescue. Commander of unit in first years was a graduate of
International Police Academy. NA, 2/20/1988, pp. 224-5 The clandestine
houses and command post of 316 were visited by CIA agents. NA, 1/23/1988, p.
Honduras, Nicaragua, 1982. A Contra commander with the FDN admitted he
helped organize a death squad in Honduras with the approval and cooperation
of the CIA. Honduran government agreed to host the death squad and provide
it with cover, since the group would kill Honduran dissidents at the
government’s request. The commander admitted he participated in
assassinations. CIA "Colonel Raymond" congratulated the squad. The
Progressive, 8/1986, p. 25
Honduras, Nicaragua, 1984-85. Honduran army investigators report that
Contras have been involved in death-squad killings in Honduras. At least 18
Hondurans and an unknown number of Salvadorans and Nicaraguans have been
killed by the Contras. Washington Post, 1/15/1985, A12
Honduras, 1980-83. Agents of Battalion 316, a Honduran death squad, received
interrogation training in Texas from CIA in 1980. CIA agents maintained
contact with unit in early 1980’s, visiting detention centers during
interrogation and obtaining intelligence gleaned from torture victims. See
Americas Watch "Human Rights in Honduras" (May 1987). Dillon, S. (1991).
Commandos, p. 101
Honduras, 1980-83. Gustavo Alvarez, formerly head of police, in 1981 a
general running entire armed forces. Worked closely with U.S. on Contras.
Alvarez had organized military intelligence Battalion 316 - first Honduran
death squad. Argentines sent 15-20 officers to work with Alvarez on Contras.
Senior officer Osvaldo Riveiro. Garvin, G. (1992). Everybody Has His Own
Gringo, p. 41
Honduras, 1980-89. CIA and State Department worked with a Honduran military
unit called Battalion 316 during the 1980s. Unit was responsible for
cracking down on dissidents. AP, 6/12/1995. Honduran special prosecutor for
human rights asking the U.S. to turn over classified information on
Ambassadors John Negroponte and Chris Arcos and several CIA agents connected
to the disappearance of dissidents in the 1980s. AP, 6/13/1995
Honduras, 1980-89. Colonel Gustavo Alvarez Martinez shot to death in 1989.
Alvarez spent years networking with fascists and ultra right terrorists who
in World Anti-communist League and its sister organization, the Latin
American Anti-communist Confederation, or CAL. He most famous for
streamlining Honduras’s death squads and uniting them under his control.
Alvarez gathered together the National Front for the Defense of Democracy,
the Honduran Anti-communist Movement (MACHO), and the Anti-communist Combat
Army–death squads all–and combined them with several governmental
forces, including the Fuerzas de Seguridad Publica (FUSEP), Departmento
Nacional de Investigaciones (DIN), and Tropas Especiales Para Selva y
Nocturnas (TESON). With Director of Central Intelligence Casey, Alvarez and
Negroponte turned Honduras into a staging ground for Contra incursions into
Nicaragua. Honduran Congress issued Decree 33, which declared terrorist
anyone who distributed political literature, associated with foreigners,
joined groups deemed subversive by the government, damaged property, or
destroyed documents. Alvarez’s forces murdered upwards of 500 people. He
ousted as Honduras’s dictator in 1984 and became special consultant to RAND
Honduras, 1980-89. Eleven senior officers who are believed to have been
involved with Battalion 316 have been convicted on charges of kidnapping,
torturing and attempting to murder six students in 1982. Officers include
one general, nine colonels, and one captain. AP, 7/25/1995
Honduras, 1980-89. See entry in Liaison from Baltimore Sun, 6/11-18/1995
Honduras, 1980-93. CIA-trained death squad issue in presidential campaign.
In early 1980s, Battalion 3-16, of Honduran military whose members
instructed by and worked with CIA "disappeared" scores of activists. Both
candidates accusing other of connections to Battalion 3-16. In 1980
25-Honduran officers to U.S. for training per sworn testimony in
International Court by Honduran intelligence officer who participated -
Florencio Caballero. Group trained in interrogation by a team from FBI and
CIA. Training continued in Honduras. U.S. Trainers joined by instructors
from Argentina and Chile - sessions focused on surveillance and rescuing
kidnap victims. Battalion 3-16 engaged in a program of systematic
disappearances and murder from 1981 to 1984. By March 1984, 100-150
students, teachers, unionists and travelers picked up and secretly executed.
Squads, according to Inter-American Court of Human Rights, belonged to 3-16.
Squads modus operandi included weeks of surveillance of suspects followed by
capture by disguised agents using vehicles with stolen license plates,
interrogation, torture in secret jails followed by execution and secret
burial. CIA’s connection to 3-16 confirmed by General Alvarez, who created
and commanded squad from 1980 through 1984. He later became chief of police
and then head of the armed forces. Alvarez said CIA "gave good training, lie
detectors, phone-tapping devices and electronic equipment to analyze
intelligence." CIA men informed when 3-16 abducted suspected leftists. When
bodies found, 3-16 put out story they killed by guerrillas. CIA looked
other way. Ambassador Negroponte in 1982 denied existence of death squads.
State Department was attacking as communist, anti-democratic and a terrorist
group, Committee for Defense of Human Rights in Honduras that was exposing
3-16. In a barracks coup, Alvarez forced into exile in Miami and became paid
consultant to Pentagon writing study on low-intensity conflict. Members of
3-16 still in positions of power in government. Congressional intelligence
committee in 1988 looked into CIA’s role with 3-16, but findings never
published. Op-ed by Anne Manuel. Washington Post, 11/28/1993, C5
Honduras, 1982-83. Ex-guard Benito "Mack" Bravo reportedly killed dozens of
Contra recruits at his La Ladosa training base near El Paraiso. Mack
suspected many were Sandinista infiltrators. In one case, FDN ordered four
ex-guardsmen executed for insubordination and allegedly selling arms to El
Salvador’s FMLN. They also had been accused of killing recruits. Honduran
military participated in the execution. Dillon, S. (1991). Commandos, pp.
Honduras, 1988. Director human rights commission in Honduras and associate
killed by assassins. The Progressive, 2/1990, p. 46
Honduras, 1988. Honduran human rights leader Ramon Custodio Lopez accused
Battalion 3-16 of murdering a politician and a teacher on 14 January 1988.
Custodio relied on testimony by former battalion member sergeant Fausto
Caballero. In 11/30/1988. Honduras was condemned by Inter-American Court of
Human Rights in 1988 for disappearance of Angel Manfredo Velazquez.
Battalion 3-16, along with DNI (Directorate of National Intelligence), and
FUSEP (National Police) were implicated, all of which have received training
from CIA. Intelligence Parapolitics, 9/1988, p. 8
Honduras, 1988. Jose Isaias Vilorio, an intelligence officer and former
death squad member, was shot dead on 1 January 1988. Isaias was to testify
before Inter-American Court on Human Rights (New York Times, 20 January
1988). Human rights leader and legislator Miguel Pavon was killed on 14
January 1988 after testifying before Inter-American Court. Also killed was
Moises Landaverde, a teacher who was riding in Pavon’s car at the time of
attack. Intelligence Parapolitics, 3/1988, p. 12
Honduras, Argentina, 1980-89. A survivor tells her story: treatment for a
leftist - kicks and freezing water and electric shocks. In between, a
visitor from CIA. CIA worked closely with the Honduran military while the
military tortured and killed dissidents during the 1980s, human rights
groups said. A government official also said Argentine military advisers,
with U.S. support, were brought in to help monitor leftist activism. "At
least nine Argentine military (officers), supported by the CIA, trained many
Honduran officers to prevent communism from entering Honduras," said Leo
Valladares of the government’s human rights commission. Bertha Oliva, head
of committee of relatives of the disappeared, claimed CIA knew of
disappearances by Honduran security forces and that "the U.S. Embassy had
absolute power in this country." in the first of a series of four articles,
the Baltimore Sun reported Sunday that CIA and the State Department
collaborated with a secret Honduran military unit known as Battalion 316 in
the 1980s in cracking down on Honduras dissidents. Following a 14-month
investigation. In order to keep up public support for Reagan
administration’s war efforts in Central America, U.S. officials misled
congress and the public about Honduran military abuses. Collaboration was
revealed in classified documents and in interviews with U.S. and Honduran
participants. Among those interviewed by the Sun were three former
Battalion 316 torturers who acknowledged their crimes and detailed the
battalion’s close relationship with CIA. Ramon Custodio, president of
non-government human rights commission, said a former member of Battalion
316, Florencio Caballero, disclosed that CIA in early 1980s took 24 soldiers
to the U.S. for training in anti-subversive techniques. At the time,
Custodio said, "Honduras’ policy was oriented to detaining and summarily
executing those who did not please the government or the military."
Battalion 316 was created in 1984 and its first commander was General Luis
Alonso Discua, current armed forces chief. A government report subsequently
blamed it in the cases of 184 missing people. Baltimore Sun, 6/15/1995
Honduras, Israel. During Contra war Honduran military intelligence officers
on double salary from CIA and Colombian drug cartels, who saw advantage of
using Honduran airstrips for transiting cocaine under cover of war effort.
Israelis also trained Honduran death squads. Cockburn, A. and Cockburn, L.
(1991). Dangerous Liaison, p. 225
Honduras, Assassinations, 1980-84. CIA and Contras accused of running
Honduran death squads, killing over 200. CIA officials "looked the other
way" when people disappeared. Violence tapered off after ouster of CIA
backed military commander Alvarez. Ricardo Lau running Contra intelligence,
also death squads. Accused arranging assassination Archbishop Romero in El
Salvador. Marshall, J., Scott P.D., and Hunter, J. (1987). The Iran-Contra
Connection, pp. 132-3
Indonesia, 1963-65. U.S. trained unionist spies laid groundwork for post
1965 coup gestapu massacre of leftists by gathering intelligence on leftist
unionists. Counterspy, Winter 1979, p. 27
Indonesia, 1965-66. "U.S. officials’ lists aided Indonesian blood bath in
‘60s." U.S. officials supplied the names of thousands of members of
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) to the army that was hunting them down and
killing them in a crackdown branded as one of the century’s worst massacres,
former U.S. Diplomats and CIA officials say. Robert J. Martens, Former
member of embassy’s political section said, "it really was a big help to the
army.... They probably killed a lot of people..." Martens said. He headed an
embassy group of state Department and CIA officials that spent two years
compiling the lists. He said he delivered them to an army intermediary. The
lists were a detailed who’s who of the leadership of the PKI that included
names of provincial, city and other local PKI members and leaders of mass
organizations. Ambassador Marshall Green, his deputy Jack Lydman, and
political section chief Edward Masters admitted approving the release of the
names. Army intermediary was an aide to Adam Malik. The aide, Tirta Kentjana
Adhyatman, confirmed that he had met with Martens and received lists of
thousands of names...given to Sukarno’s HQs. Information on who captured and
killed came to Americans from Suharto’s HQs, according to former CIA deputy
chief of station Joseph Lazarsky. Lazarsky said "we were getting a good
account in Jakarta of who was being picked up,"..."the army had a ‘shooting
list’ of about 4,000 to 5,000 people." Lazarsky said the check-off work was
also carried out at CIA’s intelligence directorate in D.C. By end of January
1966, "the checked off names were so numerous the CIA analysts in Washington
concluded the PKI leadership had been destroyed." Washington Post,
5/21/1990, A5
Indonesia, 1965-66. In response to Kathy Kadane’s May 21 article in
Washington Post, Robert J. Martens responds "it is true I passed names of
PKI leaders and senior cadre system to non-communist forces during the six
months of chaos between the so-called coup and the ultimate downfall of
Sukarno. The names I gave were based entirely on Indonesian communist press
and were available to everyone. This was senior cadre system of the PKI few
thousand at most out of the 3.5 millions claimed party members. I
categorically deny that I headed an embassy group that spent two years
compiling the lists." Washington Post, 6/2/1990, A18
Indonesia, 1985. Indonesia: years of living dangerously. CIA’s role in
bloody coup in Indonesia in 1965. Utne Reader. 2/1991, p. 38, two pages
Indonesia: Death Squads Indonesia, 1965-66. Indonesian generals
approached U.S. for equipment "to arm Moslem and nationalist youths for use
in central Java against the PKI." Washington responded by supplying covert
aid, dispatched as "medicines." Washington Post, 6/13/1990, A 22
Indonesia, 1965-66. Kathy Kadane’s story for States News Service disclosed
part played by CIA and State Department officials in 1965-66 blood bath in
Indonesia. Kadane reported that U.S. officials in Jakarta furnished names of
about 5,000 communist activists to the Indonesian army and then checked off
the names as the army reported the individuals had been killed or captured.
The Nation, 7/9/1990, p. 43
Indonesia, 1965. CIA and State Department officials provided name lists to
Indonesian army that killed 250,000. The Progressive, 7/10/1990, p. 9
Indonesia, 1965. Ex-agents say CIA compiled death lists for Indonesians. San
Francisco Examiner, 5/20/1990
Indonesia, 1965-66. Article by Michael Vatikiotis and Mike Fonte; Rustle of
Ghosts. (1965 Indonesian coup). Far Eastern Economic Review, 8/2/1990, 2
Indonesia, 1965-85. Death squads roam at will, killing subversives,
suspected criminals by thousands. Blum, W. (1986). The CIA A Forgotten
History, p. 221
Iran, 1953-54. CIA gave Shah intelligence on Tudeh party facilitate
anti-Tudeh Campaign. Gasiorowski, M.J. (1990). "Security Relations Between
the United States and Iran, 1953-1978," p. 150
Iran, 1953-64. CIA station chiefs in regular contact with Shah and working
level liaison relationship with SAVAK established by 5-man training team and
smaller unit in SAVAK HQs for several years after training team left. CIA
and SAVAK exchanged intelligence including information on Tudeh party.
Gasiorowski, M.J. (1990). "Security relations between the United States and
Iran, 1953-1978," pp. 255-56
Iran, 1953. CIA prepared an arrest list for the overthrow operation.
Copeland, M. (1989). The Game Player, p. 190
Iran, 1953. U.S. Army colonel working for CIA under cover of military
attache worked to organize and train intelligence organization for Shah.
Trained on domestic security, interrogation. Primary purpose of (Bakhtiar’s
intelligence unit later to become SAVAK) to eliminate threats to Shah.
Gasiorowski, M.J. (1990). "Security Relations Between the United States and
Iran, 1953-1978" p. 150
Iran, 1954. Year after coup American cryptographic experts and CIA agent
played important part in rooting out conspiracy army officers linked to
Tudeh Party. Kwitny, J. (1984). Endless Enemies, p. 165
Iran. During Shah’s reign, thousands people killed. Many killed at Shah’s
directive. Rafizadeh, M. (1987). Witness, p. 134
Iran, 1983. CIA identifies to Iranian government 200 leftists who were then
executed. The Nation, 12/13/1986, p. 660
Iran, 1983. In 1983, when the Tudeh party was closed down, the CIA gave the
Khomeni government a list of USSR KGB agents operating in Iran. Two hundred
suspects were executed, 18 USSR diplomats expelled and Tudeh party leaders
imprisoned. Washington Post, 1/13/1987, A1,8
Iran, 1983. To curry favor with Khomeni, the CIA gave his government a list
of USSR KGB agents and collaborators operating in Iran. The Khomeni regime
then executed 200 suspects and closed down the communist Tudeh party.
Khomeni then expelled 18 USSR diplomats, and imprisoned the Tudeh leaders.
Washington Post, 11/19/1986, A28
Iraq, 1963. CIA supplied lists of communists to Baath party group that led
coup so that communists could be rounded up and eliminated. Cockburn, A. and
Cockburn, L. (1991). Dangerous Liaison, p. 130
Israel. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir headed a special hit squad during his
ten years in Mossad. Shamir headed the assassination unit from 1955-64 that
carried out attacks on perceived enemies and suspected Nazi war criminals.
Shamir recruited former members of the Stern Gang. Washington Times,
7/4/1992, A8
Israel, 1992. Article, "How Israeli Commandos Are Waging an Undercover War
In Occupied Territories." In January 1992, Israeli army launched all-out
offensive to end "Red Intifadeh." Undercover units "Arabized" produced a
rash of deaths under controversial circumstances leading to claims commando
units are death squads. Since Intifadeh began in 1987, 775 Palestinians
killed; 680 more slain by their brethren mostly for collaboration.
Human-rights organizations contend Sayarot shoot first and ask questions
later. Time 8/31/1992, pp. 49-50
Israel, 1992. Israel’s assassination squad, Duvdevan or Cherry has killed
one of its own by mistake. Intelligence Newsletter, 7/23/1992, p. 5
Israel, 1992. Israeli army had discharged commander of undercover unit for
issuing orders to shoot at Palestine activists. Unit code-named Samson has
had three commanders fired or placed on trial within three years. More than
30 Palestinians killed this year by undercover troops, who usually dress as
Arabs. Washington Post, 8/26/1992, A14
Israel, Honduras, 1981-89. In 1981 Leo Gleser, "co-owner" of International
Security and Defense Systems (ISDS) -- a leading Israeli "security" firm
(Israeli Foreign Affairs 2/1987, 5/1987, /1987, 2/1988, 3/1989) identified
repeatedly as an Israeli entity–began building Battalion 316, a unit of
Honduran military intelligence which disappeared, tortured, then killed its
victims. Honduran General Walter Lopez Reyes who C-I-C Honduran armed forces
1984-86, said "we had Israeli advisers in Special Forces. They seconded to
Special Forces by Israeli mod, although they came officially as
"non-governmental." Their front they training security groups but [they
really] special operations courses on how take over bldgs, planes,
hostages...Contras also taking courses...there coordination between them and
Israel, South Africa, 1986-91. Israel trained members of Inkatha hit squads
aimed at African National Congress, a disillusioned former leader of Zulu
organization has revealed. Israeli Foreign Affairs, 2/20/1992, p. 3
Israel. Ranks as fifth largest exporter of arms in world, according CIA
estimates, and has become essential element global counterinsurgency
business. "Hit lists" used by death squads in Guatemala have been
computerized with Israeli assistance and Uzi machine guns the standard
weapon of death squads. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly),
Summer 1988, p. 5
Italy, 1950-59. All Italian "SIFAR" counterespionage officers collected
biographies on every deputy and senator. List increased to include
Ecclesiastics: 45,000 dossiers on them alone, 157,000 altogether, 30,000
dealing with Italians in world of business and industry. Drop copies went to
CIA. De Lorenzo’s outfit to become a tool for CIA. Tompkins, P. (Unpublished
manuscript). Strategy of Terror, pp. 8-12
Italy, 1959-67. Carabinieri drew up plan Piano Solo - for paramilitary to
intervene in order to restore public order. Secret services had massive
program of surveillance of Italian political and business figures. This
partly intended to identify left-wing suspects who would be rounded up and
imprisoned in concentration camps on Sardinia. Investigation revealed
creation of personal intelligence dossiers began in 1959 and 157,000 files
amassed. SIFAR (military intelligence) dossiers emphasized unfavorable
significance. SIFAR dossiers routinely deposited at CIA HQs. SIFAR planed
microphones in Papal apartments and President’s Rome residence. Operation
ordered by de Lorenzo at request of CIA station chief Colby. Some years
earlier Rome CIA station chief Thomas Karamessines had asked General de
Lorenzo, then head of SIFAR, for dossiers on [left-leaning] politicians and
in particular for Moro’s circle of collaborators. Willan, P. (1991).
Puppetmasters, pp. 35-7
Italy, 1960-70. General de Lorenzo, whose SIFAR became SID, implemented new
Gladio project to neutralize subversive elements. Known as parallel SID, it
reached into nearly every institution. Group set up at request of Americans
and NATO. Knights of Malta, as well as freemasonry, and its most notorious
lodge - Propaganda Due, or P-2, far more influential. Licio Gelli, a knight.
Joined U.S. Army’s CIC. To ferret out dissidents, they prepared watch lists
on thousands. 157,000 files found in Ministry of Interior. CIA obtained
duplicates. Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Summer 1994, p.
Italy, 1960-70. Operation Solo - a planned coup against a leftist government
did not occur - but it was based on Operation Gladio. Giovanni de Lorenzo,
as chief of secret services, compiled dossiers, including tapes and photos,
on some 150,000 people - priests, politicians and unionists. He drew up plan
to arrest many politicians, take over radio and TV, seize offices and
newspapers of left-wing parties. De Lorenzo was organizing a duplicate of
Operation Gladio in case left gained too much power. "Statewatch"
compilation, filed June 1994
Latin America, labor. AIFLD collected detailed information about Latin
American labor leaders under pretext surveys necessary for AID-financed
worker’s housing projects. AIFLD able obtain personal and political history
union members, with address and photos. Given CIA role in Chile, Uruguay and
Brazil coups, among others, it probable this information passed to military
regimes and their secret police. DL p. 238 from Lernoux, P. (1982). Cry of
the People. pp. 212, 220
Liaison, 1960. Target lists maintained by all Western Hemisphere division
stations. Maintain in case local government asks for assistance in
preventive detention of dangerous persons. Agee, P. (1975). Inside the
Company: CIA Diary, p. 114
Latin America. CIA organizes right wing terrorist organizations that attack
and assassinate leftist politicians and others without implicating foreign
governments. Groups include "La Mano Blanco" and "Ojo Por Ojo" (Guatemala),
"La Banda" (Dominican republic), and "Death Squad" (Brazil). Counterspy,
3/1973, p. 4
Latin America. CIA trained assassination groups such as Halcones in Mexico,
the Mano Blanca in Guatemala, and the Escuadron de la Muerte in Brazil.
NACLA (magazine re Latin America) 8/1974, p. 11
Latin America, 1953-84. The activities of the death squads, formed under CIA
sponsorship in 1954 Are loosely controlled by an international organization
known as La Mano Blanco (the White Hand). The front group is the CAL, Latin
American Anti-communist Federation, the Latin American affiliate of the
World Anti-communist League. Jack Anderson, Washington Post, 1/13/1984
Latin America. Terrorist groups created in most countries. Groups such as
"La Mano Blanco" attack and assassinate leftist politicians and others
feared by military governments, doing so without implicating police or
military. CIA implicated in attempts to organize the right into terrorist
organizations. Counterspy, __/1973, p. 4
Latin America, 1960-95. Colonel Alpirez accused killer of American innkeeper
and guerrilla leader, graduated from School of Americas in 1989. Other
notable alumni include: Manuel Noriega and Omar Torrijos, former Panamanian
strongmen; Roberto D’Aubuisson, leader of Salvadoran death squads; Roberto
Viola and Leopoldo Galtieri, leaders of argentine dirty war; Michael
Francois, former Haitian police chief; 19 of 27 Salvadoran officers cited
for murder of six Jesuit priests; 10 of 12 Salvadoran officers involved in
El Mozote massacre; 105 of 247 Colombian officers cited for human rights
violations in 1992; and, former dictators of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru.
Time. 4/10/1995, p. 20
Latin America, 1976. An Argentinean told Scherrer, legal attache (FBI)
Santiago, that Operation Condor, a nascent program among military
intelligence services of some Latin American countries designed to locate
and eliminate one another’s fugitive terrorists and exiled dissidents.
Ambitious leader of Chilean DINA trying to institutionalize process. Branch,
T. and Proper, E. (1983). Labyrinth, p. 123
Latin America, Operation Condor, Paraguay, 1970-92. 12/1992 a Paraguayan
judge in a police station found documentary history of decades of repression
and U.S. intelligence cooperation with Paraguay and other regional
dictatorships. Archives detail fates of hundreds, possibly thousands, of
Latin Americans secretly kidnapped by right-wing regimes of the 1970s. Paper
trail revealing elusive conspiracy among security services of Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay to eliminate foes without
regard to borders. Sketchy outlines of Operation Condor, can be partially
filled in. Some of documents already disappeared. Finders had unearthed
jumbled mountain of papers outlining police and military intelligence
activities during recently overthrown Stroessner regime. HQs of Paraguayan
technical police revealed more documents. 4 tons records. Data confirmed
arrest and killing of politicians and exchange of prisoners with Argentina,
Chile and Uruguay. Discovered documents a bombshell that led to arrest of
some of Stroessner’s old regime. Southern Cone repression killed 50,000,
disappeared 30,000 - the majority in Argentina and 400,000 imprisoned. U.S.
gave inspiration, financing and technical assistance for repression. CIA’s
technical services division (TSD), provided electrical torture equipment.
Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Fall 1994, pp. 7-13
Lain America, 1993. James Carroll wrote editorial about U.S. Army’s School
of Americas in Fort Benning. It is "the U.S. school that teaches militaries
how to torture." Among renowned alumni are various Latin American strongmen,
including dictators in Bolivia, Argentina, El Salvador and Panama. In Peru 6
of army officers charged with recent murders of 9 students were School of
Americas alumni. In Honduras, 4 of the high-ranking officers who helped
create "Battalion 316" death squad graduated from the school. In Columbia,
the list of officers designated by human rights organizations as worst
offenders reads like an honor roll from Fort Benning. In El Salvador, 2 of 3
officers cited for the assassination of Archbishop Romero, 3 of 5 convicted
of killing 3 Maryknoll nuns and their lay associate, and 19 of the 26
officers implicated by United Nations. "Truth Commission" investigation of
murder of Jesuits, were graduates. "For decades alumni of the School of
Americas have helped fill morgues and mass graves of an entire continent."
Colonel Louis Michel Francois has been most closely linked to Haiti death
squads, and he is an alumni of the school just as is General Raoul Cedars
one of those CIA agents. Z Magazine, 2/1994, p. 24
Mexico, 1957-89. The Mexican DFS (Federal Security Directorate) like many
Western-hemisphere intelligence organizations was creation of CIA. DFS has
state of the art computer and records systems. Through DFS CIA able to keep
tabs on all embassies in Mexico City. DFS works closely with U.S. In the
suppression of leftists and political parties. In early 1970s, Nazar created
the Brigada Blanca, a right-wing death squad that killed hundreds, probably
thousands of Mexican students and political activists. Zacaris Osorio Cruz,
a member of death squad, testified in Canada that, between 1977-82, he part
of team that killed between 60-150 people. Penthouse, 12/1989
Mexico, 1977-89. U.S. looked the other way when Nazar, head of DFS used his
infallible (interrogation) techniques on behalf American agencies while he
carried out hundreds, perhaps thousands of political executions of Mexican
leftists and political dissidents. DFS (Federal Security Directorate)
administering drug traffic. Penthouse, 12/1989
Joseph Adams, a former Marine intelligence officer, who served as chief of
security for Aldolfo Calero, helped maintain a list of civilians marked for
assassination when Contra forces entered Nicaragua. The Progressive, 3/1987,
p. 24
Nicaragua, 1983-89. Enrique Bermudez, a Contra leader, said in Contra raids
on economic targets in northern Nicaragua, particularly coffee plantations
and farming cooperatives, any resistance brought brutal retribution.
Commandantes in field authorized to select those to die. Bermudez ordered
prisoners to have throats cut rather than waste bullets. Terrell, J., and
Martz, R. (1992). Disposable Patriot, p. 149
Nicaragua, 1985-89. "Death squad" reports re Sandinistas first circulated by
the CIA-funded Puebla Institute in 1991 as coming from the UN and OAS. When
checked out, this proved to be not true. Unclassified, 9/1992, p. 14
Nicaragua, circa 1940-79. Under name Anti-Communist League Nicaragua.
Conservative estimates say 30,000 died four decades prior 1978-79 civil war.
LERNOUX, P. (1982). CRY OF THE PEOPLE. PP. 81, 94
Norway, 1947-90. Operation Gladio, formed in 1947, kept track of communists
and became part of intelligence service in 1948. Norwegian branch exposed in
1978, when an arms cache discovered. "Statewatch" compilation filed June
1994, p. 12
Panama, 1989-90. U.S. says 90 prisoners now held in Panama. Most of those
detained had been picked up by U.S. Forces based on wanted lists compiled by
U.S. and Panamanian authorities. Washington Post, 1/19/1990, A16
Panama, 1989. Several hundred people on list Endarra government seeks to
detain. They arrested by U.S. troops. Most political activists and labor
leaders were wanted. The Nation, 1/29/1990, p. 115
Paraguay, 1972-83. The Paraguayan government expelled an author and released
a document supplied by the U.S. Embassy. The document, marked secret,
includes the author among a list of Paraguayans said to have visited the
USSR bloc. Washington Post 2/5/1983, A1,21
Philippines. Article "Death Squads in the Philippines," by Doug Cunningham.
Covert Action Information Bulletin (Quarterly), Winter 1988 pp. 22-3
Philippines. Military used hunter killer unit called scout rangers to find
enemy and either attack or report back to battalion combat teams. Blaufarb,
D.S. (1977). The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 28
Philippines. Probable U.S. support for vigilante death squads in the
Philippines. Used in coordination with other programs making up a total low
intensity conflict profile. National Reporter, Fall 1987, pp. 24-30
Philippines, 1950-54. Military man who helped Lansdale was Charles Bohannan
and Lansdale’s chief Filipino associate was Colonel Napoleon Valeriano whose
"skull squadrons" beheaded suspected Huks. Karnow, S. (1989). In Our Image,
p. 350
Philippines, 1969-83. Marcos’ land reform failed and he approved creation of
"Monkees" a group used to intimidate and even murder Marcos’ rivals. Karnow,
S. (1989). In Our Image. p.378
Philippines, 1973-83. In Philippines 1,166 persons were killed from 1972-83.
Human rights groups say most of victims were opponents of President Marcos.
Washington Post, 4/12/1984, A21
Philippines, 1986-87. "Vigilante Terror" a report of CIA-inspired death
squads in the Philippines. National Reporter, Fall 1987, pp. 24-31
Philippines, 1986. See chapter "Direct U.S. Role in Counterinsurgency."
includes psywar operations, vigilante and death squads. USIA anti-communist
campaign of distributing films and written materials. Film "Amerika" shown.
Use of Asian-American Free Labor Institute Operations. In 1985, AAFLI spent
up to $4 million on organizational efforts, the money coming from the
National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Bello, W. (1987). U.S. Sponsored Low
Intensity Conflict in the Philippines
Philippines, March 1986. Reagan signs finding increasing CIA involvement in
Philippine counterinsurgency operations. New Aquino government is allegedly
perpetrating a purge of opposition, carried out by more than 50 death
squads. Ramsey Clark, who investigated death squad activity in 1987, wrote
in June that "the victims of vigilante violence are overwhelmingly poor
farmers, workers, slum dwellers, and others who are pushing for significant
land reform, wage increases and protection workers’ rights, as well as those
who oppose U.S. military bases." Upsurge in death squad activities are
coincident with increased CIA aid and was preceded by visit to Philippines
by Maj. Gen. John Singlaub. The Nation, 9/19/1987, pp. 259-60
Puerto Rico. FBI has institutionalized repression. It created "subversive"
lists with names of more than 150,000 "independentistas" who often find
themselves thrown out of work. FBI agents organized and trained death squads
within the Puerto Rican police department NACLA (magazine re Latin America),
8/1990, p. 5
Puerto Rico, 1978. "Puerto Rico’s Death Squad Requiem on Cerro Maravilla:
the Police Murders in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Government Cover-up." A book
by Manuel Suarez reviewed in the Progressive, 12/1988, pp. 40-42
Russia, 1994. FBI to open Moscow office with an eye on nuclear trafficking.
FBI has about 20 posts abroad at U.S. Embassies with its agents serving as
legal attaches. They range in size from one agent to as many as eight, plus
support staff. FBI director Freeh said the FBI working to set up joint
police/intelligence data base with authorities in Russia and Germany.
Washington Times, 5/26/1994, A3
South Africa, 1962. A tip from a paid CIA informant led to 1962 arrest of
Nelson Mandela leader of the African National Congress. A CIA officer
claimed "we have turned Mandela over to the South African security branch."
Washington Post, 6/11/1990, A18
South Africa. Article, "South African Death Squad Plot: A Missing Piece to a
Puzzle the Media Won’t Solve," by Jane Hunter. Extra, 11/1992, p. 26 South
Africa. See article "South African Death Squads." Covert Action Information
bulletin (Quarterly) Summer 1990, pp. 63-66
South Africa, 1980-89. Details of South Africa’s death squads by a former
police Captain Dirk Coetzee. Group tracked and killed ANC activists in
Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho. Newsweek, 11/27/1989, p. 56
South Africa, 1980-90. Apartheid’s fiercest warriors in 1980s were South
Africa’s army special forces, police force known as Koevoet (crowbar), and
Portuguese-speaking "buffalo" battalion who ran a campaign of assassination
and sabotage against the African National Congress. Newsweek, 9/14/1992, p.
South Africa, 1991-92. 75 COSATU (labor union) members killed during past
two years by security forces. Many other attacks. Briarpatch magazine
(Canada), 10/1992, pp. 55-6
South Africa, 1992. Slaughter in South Africa. Newsweek 9/21/1992, p. 57
South America, 1970-79. U.S. Legal attache Buenos Aires, FBI agent Robert
Scherrer, sent cable to D.C. Describing operation. Operation Condor the
code-name for collection, exchange and storage intelligence re leftists,
communists and Marxists. Established between cooperating intelligence
services in South America to eliminate Marxist activities. Operation
provided for joint operation against targets in member countries...third and
secret phase of operation involves formation of special teams from member
countries who travel anywhere in world to carry out sanctions up to
assassination against terrorists from member countries. Special team from
Operation Condor could be sent to locate and surveil target. When located, a
second team would be sent to carry out sanction. 1979 Senate Report, based
on CIA files, says "such a phase three operation planned in 1974 and planned
on killing 3 European leftists" - one Carlos. Plot foiled when CIA
discovered it and warned host countries - France and Portugal. U.S. military
officers sent under auspices of AID oversaw formation of technical police.
One folder of archives has correspondence between Paraguayan ministers and
U.S. Army Colonel Robert Thierry, who was serving as "public administration
adviser," who supervised formation of the technical police. Letters from FBI
agent Scherrer advising Paraguayan police re targets. CIA also worked with
Paraguayans. Deputy DCI, Vernon Walters, visited country in 1976 who
apparently approved abortive effort to get false passports for 2 Chilean
DINA agents - Armando Fernandez and Michael Townley - who en route to U.S.
To assassinate Orlando Letelier. The case of Eugenio Berios. Covert Action
South America, 1976. Letelier killed by right wing Cuban exiles called
"Gusanos" who are paid and trained by CIA and "Chilean Gestapo" DINA.
Gusanos regularly engage in terrorism against Cuba and Latin American and
Caribbean countries. Tactics include blowing up airplanes, embassies,
fishing boats, and kidnappings. Gusanos connected with police of other right
wing governments such as Venezuela. Certain gusano operations directed by
CIA; Other unilateral operations of DINA. Counterspy, 12/1976, p. 10
Syria, 1949. Following CIA coup of March 1949 CIA officer reported over "400
Syria, 1949. The Husni Za’im coup of 30 March result of guarantee CIA that
once firmly in power, the U.S. would give de facto recognition with de jure
to follow in a few days and pointed out targets to be seized. Gave him a
list of all politicians who might be able to rally resistance. Copeland, M.
(1989). The Game Player, p. 94
Thailand, 1965. Death squads. Lobe, T. (1977). United States national
security policy and aid to the Thailand police 67-70
Thailand, 1973-76. General Saiyut Koedphon, deputy head of CSOC and close
ally of CIA, admitted that CIA was collaborating with a variety of Thai
security agencies, including CSOC. Similarly, deputy director of police,
Withun Yasawat, said he was receiving CIA advice and reports as late as
1974. American indoctrination of CSOC and border patrol police during 1960’s
produced U.S. desired objectives. "Nawaophon" created ISOC officers who in
turn has close contacts with CIA, employed covert tactics to search out
"subversive elements" within the Thai population. Counterspy, Summer 1980,
p. 14
Thailand, 1973-76. The Krathin Daeng (Red Guars), were groups of rightist
students with police support that had over 100,000 members including
government employees, soldiers, policemen, etc. Group received support and
assistance from the internal security command (where CIA had a presence) and
the Thai Santiban aka Special Branch. The Red Guars implicated in numerous
bombings, killings, shooting and harassment of labor leaders, peasant
leaders, etc. Indochina Resource Center Study, 1/1977
Thailand, 1976. A high-ranking official of Seni Pramoj government told a
foreign visitor few weeks before October 6 coup, both Nawapon and the Red
Gaurs were being financed by CIA. Counterspy, 12/1976, p. 52
Thailand, 1976. Over 10,000 students, professors, political figures, labor
and farm leaders arrested since coup. U.S. military aid increased. New junta
used CIA-trained forces to crush student demonstrators during coup. 2
right-wing terrorist squads suspected for assassinations tied directly to
CIA operations. Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, v9 #3, 9/1977, p. 2
Thailand, 1976. Red Gaurs, an organization of the extreme right, staged
provocations against progressive students and assassinations of activists of
farmers’ federation of Thailand. The number of assassinations by right
wingers soared in April 1976 during parliamentary elections. Defense
minister Pramarn Adireksan, leader of right wing Thai National party, openly
proclaimed the slogan "the right kill the left." Syrokonski. (1983).
Thailand, 1976. Thai border police, element of police most involved in
counterinsurgency and which CIA concentrated most of its efforts, carried
out an assault by fire against essentially unarmed students, killing at
least 100. Counterspy, 12/1976, p. 52
Turkey, 1971. Coup carried out by counter-guerrilla, the CIA, the Turkey
military and Turkish military intelligence (MIT). CIA solely interested in
protecting American interests. CIA assisted MIT in 1960-69 in drafting plans
for mass arrests of opposition figures similar to the pattern followed in
Thailand, Indonesia and Greece. In single night generals ordered 4000
professors, students, teachers and retired officers arrested. They tortured.
Counterspy, 4/1982, p. 25
Uruguay. CIA agent associated with death squads. Every CIA station
maintained subversive control watch list of most important left wing
activists. Gave names families and friends. Frankovich, A. (1980). On
Company Business. TV transcript, 5/9/1980, pp. 51-3
Uruguay, liaison, 1964. Biographical data and photos. Uruguay has national
voter registration that effective identity card system. From liaison service
CIA station gets full name, date and place of birth, parents names, address,
place of work, etc. and id photos. Information invaluable for surveillance
operations, for subversive control watch list and for a variety of other
purposes. CID-361
Uruguay, 1970-72. CIA operations officer used cover of AID public safety
advisor to help set up Department of Information and Intelligence (DII). DII
served as a cover for death squad. Counterspy, 5/1979, p. 10
USSR, 1990 KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov said KGB to protect against
anti-Communist forces. Said western intelligence exploiting current
instability in USSR. "Certain radical movements being masterminded by
foreign support. Certain groups had written "blacklists" of people who must
be neutralized. Washington Post, 12/12/1990, A18,20
USSR, 1990. KGB’s Kryuchkov accuses CIA and other western intelligence
agencies of gathering information on workers’ movements. Washington Post,
12/23/1990, A1,22
USSR, East Germany, 1949-57. League of Free Jurists (UFJ) kept a blacklist
of offenders against justice - particularly lawyers and police - and
published their activities. Named were marked men, whether they came to West
as refugees or as accredited representatives of East Germans. Hagan, L.
(1969). The Secret War for Europe, p. 200
USSR, Iran, 1982. Vladimir Kuzichkin, a senior KGB officer in Tehran,
defected to the British. CIA had a sharing agreement with MI6 and became
privy to contents of two trunks full of documents. From those documents CIA
prepared name lists of more than one hundred people, mostly Iranians,
working as secret agents in Iran for the USSR. Casey allowed this list be
handed to the Iranians - who executed them. Persico, J. (1991). Casey, p.
Vietnam, 1965-68. U.S./Government of Vietnam create list of active NLF for
assassination. After 1968 Tet offensive, names centralized to Phoenix
coordinators. Collect names of tens of thousands NLF suspects. Military
operations such as My Lai use Phoenix intelligence. By 1973, Phoenix
generates 300,000 political prisoners in South Vietnam. Counterspy, May
1973, p. 22
Vietnam, 1965-70. Details re Vietnam. From 1965-68 U.S. and Saigon
intelligence services maintained an active list of Viet Cong cadre marked
for assassination. Phoenix program for 1969 called for "neutralizing" 1800 a
month. About one third of Viet Cong targeted for arrest had been summarily
killed. Security committees established in provincial interrogation centers
to determine fate of Viet Cong suspects, outside of judicial controls. Green
Berets and Navy Seals most common recruits for Phoenix program. Green Beret
Detachment B-57 provided administrative cover for other intelligence units.
One was Project Cherry, tasked to assassinate Cambodian officials suspected
of collaborating with North Vietnamese, KGB. Another was Project Oak
targeted against South Vietnamese suspected collaborators. They controlled
by Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, which
worked with CIA outside of General Abrams’s control. Stein. J. (1992). A
Murder In Wartime, pp. 360-1
Vietnam, 1967-73 CIA developed Phoenix program in 1967 to neutralize: kill,
capture or make defect Viet Cong infrastructure. Viet Cong infrastructure
means civilians suspected of supporting Communists. Targeted civilians not
soldiers. Phoenix also called Phung Hoang by Vietnamese. Due process totally
nonexistent. South Vietnamese who appeared on black lists could be tortured,
detained for 2 years without trial or killed. Valentine, D. (1990). The
Phoenix Program, p. 13
Vietnam, 1967-73 District Intelligence Operations Coordination Center
(DIOCC). Dien Ban center a model for all of Phoenix. Bldg 10’ x 40’. Manned
by two U.S. Soldiers, 2 Census Grievance, one Rural Development cadre, and
one Special Branch. DIOCC intelligence clearinghouse to review, collate, and
disseminate information. Immediate local reaction. Americans kept files of
sources, Viet Cong infrastructure and order of battle. Reaction forces 100
police, 1 PRU unit, guides from census grievance. Marines screened civilian
detainees using informants and DIOCC’s blacklist. Valentine, D. (1990). The
Phoenix Program, p.126
Vietnam, 1968-69. Until late 1968, Saigon had run a program under which
500,000 ID cards were issued. Viet Cong made fake ones and many stolen. Viet
Cong during Tet assigned teams to go door-to-door to collect them. Saigon
reissued cards in 10/1968. By 1 May 1969, number of cards issued was 1.5
million. Adams, S. (1994). War of Numbers, p. 181
Vietnam, 1968. Phoenix program quota of 1800 neutralizations per month. Viet
Cong Infrastructure System (VCIS) fed 3000 names Viet Cong infrastructure
into computer at Combined Intelligence Center political order of battle
section. Beginning of computerized blacklist. In Saigon DIA, FBI and CIA
used computers. Until 1970 computerized blacklist a unilateral American
operation. Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, 259
Vietnam, 1968. U.S. advisors worked with Government of Vietnam counterparts
to establish a list of those who were active with the NLF and who were
vulnerable to assassination. Counterspy, 5/1973, p. 21
Vietnam. Counterterror teams aka Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU). Six
or dozen men carried out carefully planned forays, capturing or killing
identified communists. Blaufarb, D.S. (1977). The Counterinsurgency Era, pp.
Vietnam, 1960-93. Montagnards recruited in early 1960s by Special Forces to
fight Viet Cong. Did not surrender until 1992, when they yielded weapons to
UN forces in Cambodia and brought to U.S. About 600 live in North Carolina.
Paul Campbell, former SF who first American to recruit them. Kay Reibold
head of Vietnam highlands assistance project. Montagnards live in small
apartments around Raleigh with low-paying jobs. In 10/1961 Campbell, then a
SF Sergeant, sent by CIA to recruit Montagnards. They to form village
security, but soon being used for long-range reconnaissance and in highly
mobile strike forces that hunted Viet Cong for weeks at a time. "We killed
many Vietnamese." Article by W. Booth. Washington Post, 12/27/1993
Vietnam, 1965. CIA station helped create census grievance units. CIA funded,
trained and guided counter terror teams who per Chief of Station de Silva,
were "to bring danger and death to Viet Cong functionaries." Corn, D.
(1994). Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA’s Crusades, p. 175
Vietnam, 1966-71. Phoenix operation designed to help U.S. military reach
crossover point, where dead and wounded exceeded Viet Cong’s ability to
field replacements. In April 1967, President Johnson announced formation of
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) for
pacification. Robert Komer as deputy commander of MACV-CORDS. CORDS budget
about $4 billion from 1968-71. CORDS the management structure for
pacification programs. Personnel both military and civilian. By 1971, 3000
servicemen, advisers to ARVN, placed under CORDS. 1200 civilians by 1971.
U.S. AID responsible for material aid. State and USIA also provided
personnel. But CIA played the crucial role. CORDS reinstated civic action
teams under name Revolutionary Development cadre. RD program formed teams of
59 South Vietnamese, divided into 3 11-man security squads and 25 civic
action cadres. Teams to spend 6 months in a village to fulfill "Eleven
criteria and 98 works for pacification." 1. Annihilation of ...cadre; 2.
Annihilation of wicked village dignitaries; etc. System placed 40,000
two-way radios in villages. Land reform failed. (Photos of Phoenix
propaganda material). Teams helped create Regional and Popular Forces
(RF/PFs). Ruff-puffs, suffered high casualties. They represented half of
South Vietnamese government forces, they had 55-66% of casualties. They
inflicted 30% of Communist casualties. Underground paramilitary effort
called Phoenix, which included a "census grievance," stay-behind. He
actually a spy. All information fed into intelligence coordination and
exploitation program. Vietnamese at Komer’s request set up staff that, with
CIA, was responsible for coordinating intelligence reports on Viet Cong
Infrastructure. Information from census grievance, military, police reports.
paramilitary units, including CIA’s Provincial Reconnaissance Units and
ruff-puffs. Arrestees - those not killed when captured - taken to Provincial
Interrogation Centers (PIC). Also regional prisons and a national center.
All financed by CIA. Problems of coordination and jealousy. Numerical quotas
created saying how many VCI to be eliminated each month. Torture used in
questioning. Manning, R., (ed), (1988). War in the Shadows: the Vietnam
Experience, pp. 55-65
Vietnam, 1966. In 1966 recycled counter terrorists called Provincial
Reconnaissance Units (PRU) and managed by CIA officer in CORDS RDC/O Office.
Valentine, D. (1990). The Phoenix Program, p. 117
Vietnam, 1968. CIA issued two handbooks in June 1968. One "the Viet Cong Key
Organization From Central Level Down to Village and Hamlet Levels." Second a
manual of procedures from Saigon to DIOCCs. One report said "as DIOCCs and
PIOCCs have refined data bases, gained experience, and mounted more
operations against targeted individuals, the neutralization rate... over
1000 per month for last 4 months." Gia Dinh "has more than quadrupled
monthly rate of killed, captured and rallied." Valentine, D. (1990). The
Phoenix Program, p. 190
Vietnam, 1971. William E. Colby on July 19, 1971, before Senate Subcommittee
testified that CIA’s Operation Phoenix had killed 21,587 Vietnamese citizens
between January 1968 and May 1971. Counterspy, December 1978, p. 6

© 2000 Alex Constantine. All rights reserved.