DEATH BY GOVERNMENT 20th Century Democide
By R.J. Rummel
Power kills, absolute Power kills absolutely. This new Power Principle is the
message emerging from my previous work on the causes of war1 and this book on
genocide and government mass murder--what I call democide--in this century. The
more power a government has, the more it can act arbitrarily according to the
whims and desires of the elite, the more it will
make war on others and murder its foreign and domestic subjects. The more
constrained the power of governments, the more it is diffused, checked and
balanced, the less it will aggress on others and commit democide. At the
extremes of Power2, totalitarian communist governments slaughter their people by
the tens of millions, while many democracies can barely bring themselves to
execute even serial murderers.
These assertions are extreme and categorical, but so is the evidence accumulated
in this book, Death By Government, and its complement Statistics of Democide.
Consider first war. Table 1.1 shows the occurrence of war between nations since
1816. In no case has there been a war involving violent military action between
stable democracies3, although they have fought, as everyone knows,
non-democracies. Most wars are between nondemocracies. Indeed, we have here a
general principle that is gaining acceptance among students of international
relations and war. That is that democracies don't make war on each other. To
this I would add that the less democratic two states the more likely that they
will fight each other.
This belligerence of unrestrained Power is not an artifact of either a small
number of democracies nor of our era. For one thing the number of democratic
states in 1993 number around seventy-five, or also taking into account
forty-eight related territories, about one-fourth of the world's population.4
Yet we have had no war--none--among them. Nor is there any threat of war. They
create an oasis of peace.
Moreover, this is historically true of democracies as well. If one relaxes the
definition of democracy to mean simply the restraint on Power by the
participation of middle and lower classes in the determination of power holders
and policy making, then there have been many democracies throughout history. And
whether considering the classical Greek democracies, the forest democracies of
medieval Switzerland, or modern democracies, they did or do not fight each other
(depending on how war and democracy is defined, some might prefer to say that
they rarely fought or fight each other).5 Moreover, once those states that had
been mortal enemies, that had frequently gone to war (as have France and Germany
in recent centuries), became democratic, war ceased between them.6 Paradigmatic
of this is Western Europe since 1945. The cauldron of our most disastrous wars
for many centuries, in 1945 one would not find an expert so foolhardy as to
predict not only forty-five years of peace, but that at the end of that time
there would be a European community with central government institutions, moves
toward a joint European military force by France and Germany, and zero
expectation of violence between any of these formerly hostile states. Yet such
has happened. All because they are all democracies. Even among primitive tribes,
it seems, where Power is divided and limited, war is less likely.7 Were all to
be said about absolute and arbitrary Power is that it causes war and the
attendant slaughter of the young and most capable of our species, this would be
enough. But much worse, as the case studies in this book will more than attest,
even without the excuse of combat Power also massacres in cold blood those
helpless people it controls. Several times more of them. Consider table 1.2 and
figure 1.1, the list and its graph of this century's megamurderers--those states
killing in cold blood, aside from warfare, 1,000,000 or more men, women, and
children. These fifteen megamurderers have wiped out over 151,000,000 people,
almost four times the almost 38,500,000 battle-dead for all this century's
international and civil wars up to 1987.8 The most absolute Power, that is the
communist U.S.S.R., China and preceding Mao guerrillas, Khmer Rouge Cambodia,
Vietnam, and Yugoslavia, as well fascist Nazi Germany, account for near
128,000,000 of them, or 84 percent.
Table 1.2 also shows the annual percentage democide rate (the percent of its
population that a regime murders per year) for each megamurderer and figure 1.1
graphically overlays the plot of this on the total murdered. However, such
massive megamurderers as the Soviet Union and communist China had huge
populations with a resulting small annual democide rate. For their populations
as a whole some less than megamurderers were far more lethal.
Table 1.3 lists the fifteen most lethal regimes and figure 1.2 bar graphs them.
As can be seen, no other megamurderer comes even close to the lethality of the
communist Khmer Rouge in Cambodia during 1975 through 1978. As described in
Chapter 9 of Death By Government, in less than four years of governing they
exterminated over 31 percent of their men, women, and children; the odds of any
Cambodian surviving these four long years was only about 2.2 to 1.
Then there are the kilomurderers, or those states that have killed innocents by
the tens or hundreds of thousands, such as the top five listed in table 1.2:
China Warlords (1917-1949), AtatŸrk's Turkey (1919-1923), the United Kingdom
(primarily due to the 1914-1919 food blockade of the Central Powers in and after
World War I, and the 1940-45 indiscriminate bombing of German cities), Portugal
(1926-1982), and Indonesia (1965-87). Some lesser kilomurderers were communist
Afghanistan, Angola, Albania, Rumania, and Ethiopia, as well as authoritarian
Hungary, Burundi, Croatia (1941-44), Czechoslovakia (1945-46), Indonesia, Iraq,
Russia, and Uganda. For its indiscriminate bombing of German and Japanese
civilians, the United States must also be added to this list (see Statistics of
Democide). These and other kilomurderers add almost 15,000,000 people killed to
the democide for this century, as shown in table 1.2.
Of course, saying that a state or regime is a murderer is a convenient
personification of an abstraction. Regimes are in reality people with the power
to command a whole society. It is these people that have committed the kilo and
megamurders of our century and we must not lose their identity under the
abstraction of "state," "regime," "government," or "communist." Table 1.4 lists
those men most notorious and singularly responsible for the megamurders of this
century. Stalin, by far, leads the list. He ordered the death of millions,
knowingly set in train events leading to the death of millions of others, and as
the ultimate dictator, was responsible for the death of still millions more
killed by his henchman. It may come as a surprise to find Mao Tse-tung is next
in line as this century's greatest murderers, but this would only be because the
full extent of communist killing in China under his leadership has not been
widely known in the West. Hitler and Pol Pot are of course among these bloody
tyrants and as for the others whose names may appear strange, their megamurders
are described in detail in Death By Governments. The monstrous bloodletting of
at least these nine men should be entered into a Hall of Infamy. Their names
should forever warn us of the deadly potential of Power.
The major and better known episodes and institutions for which these and other
murderers were responsible are listed in table 1.5. Far above all is gulag--the
Soviet slave--labor system created by Lenin and built up under Stalin. In some
70 years it likely chewed up almost 40,000,000 lives, over twice as many as
probably died in some 400 years of the African slave trade, from capture to sale
in an Arab, Oriental, or New World market.9
In total, during the first eighty-eight years of this century, almost
170,000,000 men, women, and children have been shot, beaten, tortured, knifed,
burned, starved, frozen, crushed, or worked to death; or buried alive, drowned,
hung, bombed, or killed in any other of the myriad ways governments have
inflicted death on unarmed, helpless citizens or foreigners. The dead even could
conceivably be near 360,000,000 people. This is as though our species has been
devastated by a modern Black Plague. And indeed it has, but a plague of Power
and not germs.
The souls of this monstrous pile of dead have created a new land, a new nation,
among us. Let in Shakespeare's word's "This Land be calle'd The field of
Golgotha, and dead men's Skulls"10 As clear from the megamurderers listed in
table 1.2 alone, this land is multicultural and multiethnic, its inhabitants
believed in all the world's religions and spoke all its languages. Its
demography has yet to be precisely measured and only two rough censuses, the
most recent constituting Death By Government, have so far been taken.11 But this
last census does allow us to rank this land of the murdered sixth in population
among the nations of the living, as shown in figure 1.3.
This census and the estimates of explorers also enables us to estimate
Golgotha's racial and ethnic composition, which is pictured in figure 1.4.
Chinese make up 30 percent of its souls, with Russians next at 24 percent. Then
there is a much lower percentage of Ukrainians (6 percent), Germans (4 percent),
Poles (4 percent), and Cambodians (2 percent). The remaining 30 percent is made
up of a diverse Koreans, Mexicans, Pakistanis (largely ethnic Bengalis and
Hindus), Turk subjects, and Vietnamese.
But still, is Golgotha dominantly Asian? European? What region did most of its
dead souls come from. Figure 1.5 displays two different ways of looking at this:
the percent of Golgothians from a particular region and also the percent of a
region's 1987 population in Golgotha. While most, some 40 percent, are from Asia
and the Middle East, the highest proportion of any region's population in
Golgotha, around 22 percent, is from the territory of the former Soviet Union.
In other words, Asians are the largest group while the former Soviet Union has
contributed the most of its population. Note that 18 percent of Golgothians are
former Europeans, including those from all of Eastern Europe except the former
USSR; Europe has contributed 6 percent of its population to this land of the
murdered.
So much for Golgotha and a summary overview of its statistics. As I already have
made clear, Golgotha owes its existence to Power. I can now be more specific
about this. Table 1.6 summarizes the most prudent democide results and contrasts
them to this century's battle-dead. Figure 1.6 gives a bar chart of these
totals.12 Note immediately in the figure that the human cost of democide is far
greater than war for authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, while although for
democracies they suffer fewer battle-dead than other regimes, this total is
still greater than democratic domestic and foreign democide. In evaluating the
battle-dead for democracies keep in mind that most of these dead were the result
of wars that democracies fought against authoritarian or totalitarian
aggression, particularly World War I and II, the Korean and Vietnam Wars.13
Putting the human cost of war and democide together, Power has killed over
203,000,000 people in this century. If one were to sit at a table and have this
many people come in one door, walk at three miles per hour across the room with
three feet between them (assume generously that each person is also one foot
thick, naval to spine), and exit an opposite door, it would take over five years
and nine months for them all to pass, twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year.
If all these dead were laid out head to toe, and assuming each is an average 5
feet tall, they would reach from Honolulu, Hawaii, across the vast Pacific and
then the huge continental United States to Washington D.C. on the East coast,
and then back again almost twenty times.14 Were each of these people also an
average of two-feet wide, then to bury them side-to-side and head-to-toe would
take fifty-five square miles. Even digging up every foot of all of San Marino,
Monaco, and Vatican city to bury these democide and war battle-dead would not be
sufficient to bury half of them.
Now, as shown in table 1.6 and figure 1.6, democracies themselves are
responsible for some of the democide. Almost all of this is foreign democide
during war, and mainly those enemy civilians killed in indiscriminate urban
bombing, as of Germany and Japan in World War II.15 It also includes the large
scale massacres of Filipinos during the bloody American colonization of the
Philippines at the beginning of this century, deaths in British concentration
camps in South Africa during the Boar War, civilian deaths due to starvation
during the British blockade of Germany in and after World War I, the rape and
murder of helpless Chinese in and around Peking in 1900, the atrocities
committed by Americans in Vietnam, the murder of helpless Algerians during the
Algerian War by the French, and the unnatural deaths of German prisoners of war
in French and American POW camps after World War II.16
All this killing of foreigners by democracies may seem to violate the Power
Principle, but really underlines it. For in each case, the killing was carried
out in secret, behind a conscious cover of lies and deceit by those agencies and
power-holders involved. All were shielded by tight censorship of the press and
control of journalists. Even the indiscriminate bombing of German cities by the
British was disguised before the House of Commons and in press releases as
attacks on German military targets. That the general strategic bombing policy
was to attack working men's homes was kept secret still long after the war.
Finally, with the summary statistics on democide and war shown in table 1.6, we
now can display the role of Power. Figures 1.7A-D illustrate the power curves
for the total democide and battle-dead (figures 1.7A-B); and for the intensity
of democide and battle-dead, both measured as a percent of a regime's population
killed (figures 1.7C-D). In each case, as the arbitrary power of a regime
increases massively, that is, as we move from democratic through authoritarian
to totalitarian regimes, the amount of killing jumps by huge multiples.
Two more figures will exhibit the sheer lethality of Power. Figure 1.8 shows the
proportion of war and democide dead accounted for by authoritarian or
totalitarian power together and compares this to the democratic dead. For all
this killing in this century, democide and war by democracies contributes only 1
and 2.2 percent, respectively to the total.
And in figure 1.9, one of the most important comparisons on democide and power
in Death By Government, the range of democide estimates for each regime-level of
power is shown. As mentioned in the preface, I have collected over 8,100
estimates of democide from over a thousand sources to arrive at an absolute low
and high for democide committed by 219 regimes or groups. It is highly
improbable that the actual democide would be below or above this range. The
totals that have been displayed in previous figures have been the sum of
conservatively determined mid-totals in this range, and are shown in the figure.
Now, what figure 1.9 presents for each type of regime, such as the
authoritarian, is the range resulting from the sum of all the lows and highs for
all the democide of all regimes of that type. The difference between the three
resulting ranges drawn in the figure can only be understood in terms of Power.
As the arbitrary power of regimes increase left to right in the figure, the
range of their democide jumps accordingly and to such a great extent that the
low democide for the authoritarian regime is above the democratic high, and the
authoritarian high is below the totalitarian low.
So Power kills and absolute Power kills absolutely. What then can be said of
those alleged causes or factors in war, genocide, and mass murder favored by
students of genocide. What about cultural-ethnic differences, outgroup conflict,
misperception, frustration-aggression, relative deprivation, ideological
imperatives, dehumanization, resource competition, etc.? At one time or another,
for one regime or another, one or more of these factors play an important role
in democide. Some are essential for understanding some genocides, as of the Jews
or Armenians; some politicide, as of "enemies of the people," bourgeoisie, and
clergy; some massacres, as of competing religious-ethnic groups; or some
atrocities, as of those committed against poor and helpless villagers by
victorious soldiers. But then neighbors in the service of Power have killed
neighbor, fathers have killed their sons, faceless and unknown people have been
killed by quota. One is hard put to find a race, religion, culture, or distinct
ethnic group whose regime has not murdered its own or others.
These specific causes or factors accelerate the likelihood of war or democide
once some trigger event occurs and absolute or near absolute Power is present.
That is, Power is a necessary cause for war or democide. When the elite have
absolute power, war or democide follows a common process (which I call "the
conflict helix"17).
In any society, including the international one, relations between individuals
and groups is structured by social contracts determined by previous conflicts,
accommodations, and adjustments among them. These social contracts define a
structure of expectations that guide and regulate the social order, including
Power. And this structure is based on a particular balance of powers (understood
as an equilibrium of interests, capabilities, and wills) among individuals and
groups. That is, previous conflict and possibly violence determine a balance of
powers between competing individuals and groups and a congruent structure of
expectations (as for example, war or revolution ends in a new balance of powers
between nations or groups and an associated peace treaty or constitution). This
structure of expectations often consists of new laws and norms defining a social
order more consistent with the underlying distribution of relative power.
However, relative power never remains constant. It shifts as the interests,
capabilities, and wills of the parties change. The death of a charismatic
leader, the outrage of significant groups, the loss of foreign support by
outgroups, the entry into war and the resulting freedom of the elite to use
force under the guise of war-time necessity, and so on, can significantly alter
the balance of power between groups. Where such a shift in power is in favor of
the governing elite, Power can now achieve its potential. Where also the elite
have built up frustrations regarding those who have lost power or nonetheless
feel threatened by them, where they see them as outside the moral universe,
where they have dehumanized them, where the outgroup is culturally or ethnically
distinct and the elite perceive them as inferior, or where any other such
factors are present, Power will achieve its murderous potential. It simply waits
for an excuse, an event of some sort, an assassination, a massacre in a
neighboring country, an attempted coup, a famine, or a natural disaster, that
will justify beginning the murder en masse. Most democides occur under the cover
of war, revolution, or guerrilla war or in their aftermath.
The result of such violence will be a new balance of powers and attendant social
contract. In some cases this may end the democide, as by the elimination of the
"inferior" group (as of the Armenians by the Turks). In many cases this will
subdue and cower the survivors (as of the Ukrainians who lived through Stalin's
collectivization campaign and intentional famine). In some cases, this
establishes a new balance of power so skewed toward the elite that they may
throughout their reign continue to murder at will. Murder as public policy
becomes part of the new structure of expectations, of the new social order.
Consider the social orders of Hitler, Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, and their henchmen.
As should be clear from all this, I believe that war and democide can be
understood within a common framework. It is part of the same social process, a
balancing of powers, where Power is supreme.
It is not apparent, however, why among states where Power is limited and
accountable, war and significant democide do not take place. Two concepts
explain this: that of cross pressures and of the associated political culture.
Where Power is diffused, checked, accountable, society is riven by myriad
independent groups, disparate institutions, and multiple interests. These
overlap and contend; they section loyalties and divide desires and wants.
Churches, unions, corporations, government bureaucracies, political parties, the
media, special interest groups, and such, fight for and protect their interests.
Individuals and the elite are pushed and pulled by their membership in several
such groups and institutions. And it is difficult for any one driving interest
to form. Interests are divided, weak, ambivalent; they are cross-pressured. And
for the elite to sufficiently coalesce to commit itself to murdering its own
citizens, there must be a near fanatical, driving interest. But even were such
present among a few, the diversity of interests across the political elite and
associated bureaucracies, the freedom of the media to dig out what is being
planned or done, and the ever present potential leaks and fear of such leaks of
disaffected elite to the media, brake such tendencies.
As to the possibility of war between democracies, diversity and resulting
cross-pressures operate as well. Not only is it very difficult for the elite to
unify public interests and opinion sufficiently to make war, but there are
usually diverse, economic, social, and political bonds between democracies that
tie them together and oppose violence.
But there is more to these restraints on Power in a democracy. Cross-pressures
is a social force that operates wherever individual and group freedom
predominates. It is natural to a spontaneous social field. But human behavior is
not only a matter of social forces, but also depends on the meanings, values,
and norms that things have. That is, democratic culture is also essential. When
Power is checked and accountable, when cross-pressures limit the operation of
Power, a particular democratic culture develops. This culture involves debate,
demonstrations, protests, but also negotiation, compromise, and tolerance. It
involves the arts of conflict resolution and the acceptance of democratic
procedures at all levels of society. The ballot replaces the bullet, and
particularly, people and groups come to accept a loss on this or that interest
as only an unfortunate outcome of the way the legitimate game is played. "Lose
today, win tomorrow."
That democratic political elite would kill opponents or commit genocide for some
public policy is unthinkable (although such may occur in the isolated and secret
corners of government where Power can still lurk). Even publicly insulting and
dehumanizing outgroups in modern democracies has become a social and political
evil. Witness the current potency of such allegations as "racism" or "sexism."
Of course, the culture of democracy operates between democracies as well.
Diplomacy, negotiating a middle-way, seeking common interests, is part of the
operating medium among democracies. A detailed political history of the growth
of the European Community would well display this. Since each democracy takes
the legitimacy of the other and their interests for granted, conflict then is
only a process of non-violent learning and adjustment between them. Conferences,
not war, is the instrumentality for settling disputes.
In sum, then, where absolute Power exists, interests become polarized, a culture
of violence develops, and war and democide follow. In this century alone, by
current count, absolute-totalitarian-Powe
This picture of Power and its human costs is new. Few are aware of the sheer
democide that has been inflicted on our fellow human beings. That Hitler
murdered millions of Jews is common knowledge. That he murdered overall near
21,000,000 Jews, Slavs, Gypsies, homosexuals, Frenchmen, Balts, Czechs, and
others, is virtually unknown. Similarly, that Stalin murdered tens of millions
is becoming generally appreciated; but that Stalin, Lenin, and their successors
murdered almost 62,000,000 Soviet citizens and foreigners is little comprehended
outside of the Soviet Union (where similar figures are now being widely
published). Then there is Mao Tse-tung's China, Chiang Kai-shek's China, the
militarist's Japan, Yahya Khan's Pakistan, Pol Pot's Cambodia, and the others
listed in table 1.4, who have murdered in the millions. Even those students of
genocide who have tried to tabulate such killing around the world have grossly
underestimated the toll. The best, most recent such accounting came up with no
more than 16,000,000 killed in genocide and politicide since World War II.18 But
this estimate does not even cover half of the some 35,000,000 people likely
murdered by just the Communist Party of China from 1949 to 1987 (table 1.2).
Moreover, even the toll of war itself is not well understood. Many estimate that
World War II, for example, killed 40,000,000 to 60,000,000 people. But the
problem with such figures is that they include tens of millions killed in
democide. Many war-time governments massacred civilians and foreigners,
committed atrocities or genocide against them, executed them, and subjected them
to reprisals. Aside from battle or military engagements, during the war the
Nazis murdered around 20,000,000 civilians and prisoners of war, the Japanese
5,890,000, the Chinese Nationalists 5,907,000, the Chinese communists 250,000,
the Nazi satellite Croatians 655,000, the Tito Partisans 600,000, and Stalin
13,053,000 (above the 20,000,000 war-dead and democide by the Nazis of Soviet
Jews and Slavs). I also should mention the indiscriminate bombing of civilians
by the Allies that killed hundreds of thousands, and the atomic bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Most of these dead are usually included among the
war-dead. But those killed in battle versus in democide form distinct conceptual
and theoretical categories and should not be confused. That they have been
consistently and sometimes intentionally confounded helps raise the toll during
World War II to some 60,000,000 people, way above the estimated 15,000,000
killed in battle and military action. And that the almost universally accepted
count of genocide during this period also is no more than "6,000,000" Jews,
around 13 percent of the total war-time democide, has further muddled our
research and thought.19
Even more, our appreciation of the incredible scale of this century's genocide,
politicide, and mass murder has been stultified by lack of concepts. Democide is
committed by absolute Power, its agency is government. The discipline for
studying and analyzing power and government and associated genocide and mass
murder is political science. But except for a few specific cases, such as the
Holocaust and Armenian genocide, and a precious few more general works, one is
hard put to find political science research specifically on this.
Now, one university course I teach is introduction to political science. Each
semester I will review several possible introductory texts (the best measure of
the discipline) for the course. I often just shake my head at what I find. Given
the democide totaled in table 1.2 the concepts and views promoted in these texts
appear grossly unrealistic. They just do not fit or explain, or are even
contradictory to the existence of a Hell-State like Pol Pot's Cambodia, a
Gulag-State like Stalin's Soviet Union, or a Genocide-State like Hitler's
Germany.
For instance, one textbook I recently read spends a chapter on describing the
functions of government. Among these were law and order, individual security,
cultural maintenance, and social welfare. Political scientists are still writing
this stuff, when we have numerous examples of governments that kill hundreds of
thousands and even millions of their own citizens, enslave the rest, and abolish
traditional culture (it took only about a year for the Khmer Rouge to completely
suppress Buddhism, which had been the heart and soul of Cambodian culture). A
systems approach to politics still dominates the field. Through this lens
politics is a matter of inputs and outputs, of citizen inputs, aggregation by
political parties, government determining policy, and bureaucracies implementing
it. Then there is the common and fundamental justification of government that it
exists to protect citizens against the anarchic jungle that would otherwise
threaten their lives and property. Such archaic or sterile views show no
appreciation of democide's existence and all its related horrors and suffering.
They are inconsistent with a regime that stands astride society like a gang of
thugs over hikers they have captured in the woods, robbing all, raping some,
torturing others for fun, murdering those they don't like, and terrorizing the
rest into servile obedience. This exact characterization of many past and
present governments, such as Idi Amin's Uganda, hardly squares with conventional
political science.
Consider also that library stacks have been written on the possible nature and
consequences of nuclear war and how it might be avoided. Yet, in the life of
some still living we have experienced in the toll from democide (and related
destruction and misery among the survivors) the equivalent of a nuclear war,
especially at the high near 360,000,000 end of the estimates. It is as though
one had already occurred! Yet to my knowledge, there is only one book dealing
with the overall human cost of this "nuclear war"--Gil Elliot's Twentieth
Century Book of the Dead.
What is needed is a reconceptualization of government and politics consistent
with what we now know about democide and related misery. New concepts have to be
invented, old ones realigned to correct--dare I write "modernize"-- our
perception of Power. We need to invent concepts for governments that turn their
states into a border to border concentration camp, that purposely starve to
death millions--millions!--of their citizens, that set up quotas of those that
should be killed from one village or town to another (although murder by quota
was carried out by the Soviets, Chinese communists, and Vietnamese, I could not
find in any introductory or general political science literature even a
recognition that governments can be so incredibly inhumane). We have no concept
for murder as an aim of public policy, determined by discussion among the
governing elite in the highest councils, and imposed through government
bureaucracy. Indeed, in virtually no index to any general book on politics and
government will one find a reference to genocide, murder, killed, dead,
executed, or massacre. Such is not even usually indexed in books on the Soviet
Union or China. Most even omit index references to concentration or labor camps
or gulag, even though they may have a paragraph or so on them.
A preeminent fact about government is that some murder millions in cold blood.
This is where absolute Power reigns. A second fact is that some, usually the
same governments, murder tens of thousands more through foreign aggression.
Absolute Power again. These two facts alone must be the basis of our
reconceptualization and taxonomies. Not, as it is today, only whether states are
developed or not, third world or not, militarily powerful or not, or large or
not. But also and more important, whether Power is absolute, and whether it has
engaged in genocide, politicide, and mass murder.
In any case the empirical and theoretical conclusion is this. The way to end war
and virtually eliminate democide appears to be through restricting and checking
Power. This means to foster democratic freedom.
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