Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003
Foreword .
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
SECTION I. Inventory of the most serious violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law
committed within the territory of the DRC between
March 1993 and June 2003
CHAPTER I. March 1993 – June 1996: Failure of the
democratisation process and regional crisis
A. Shaba (Katanga)
B. North Kivu
C. Kinshasa
D. Rest of the country
1. Bas-Zaire (Bas-Congo)
2.
Orientale Province
3. Maniema
4.
Kasai Occidental
CHAPTER II. July 1996 – July 1998: First Congo War and
AFDL Regime
A. Attacks
against Tutsi and Banyamulenge civilians
1. South
Kivu
2. Kinshasa
.
3. Orientale Province
B. Attacks against Hutu refugees
The Flight of Refugees
(1996-1997)
1. South
Kivu .
2. North
Kivu
Attacks against refugees in camps on the Goma to Rutshuru road
Attacks
against refugees in the Mugunga and Lac Vert camps
Attacks against refugees fleeing across the Masisi and Walikale territories
Masisi territory
3. Maniema
4. Orientale Province
Attacks against refugees along the Lubutu-Kisangani road
Executions and forced disappearances of refugees in and around the town of
Kisangani
Attacks against refugees along the Ubundu to Kisangani railway line
Attacks
against refugees along the Kisangani–Opala road
5. Équateur
C. Attacks against
other civilian populations
1. North
Kivu
2. South
Kivu
3.
Orientale Province
4. Maniema
5. Katanga
6. Équateur
7.
Kasai Occidental
8. Bandundu
9. Kinshasa
10.
Bas-Congo
CHAPTER III.
August 1998–January 2001: The Second War
A. Attacks directed at Tutsi
civilians .
1. Kinshasa
2. North
Kivu
3. Katanga
4. Orientale Province
5.
Kasai Occidental
6. Maniema
7.
Kasai oriental
B. Attacks on other
civilian populations
1. Bas-Congo
2. Kinshasa
3. North Kivu
4. South Kivu
5. Maniema .
6. Orientale Province
7. Ituri
8. Kasai Occidental
9. Katanga
10. Équateur
CHAPTER IV. January 2001–June 2003: Towards Transition
A. Orientale Province
B. Ituri
C. Katanga
D. North Kivu
1. Town of Goma, Masisi, Rutshuru, Walikale and
Nyiragongo regions (Petit-Nord)
2. Beni and Lubero regions (Grand-Nord)
E. South Kivu
F. Maniema .
G. Rest of the country
1. Kinshasa
2. Bas-Congo
3. Kasai Occidental
................................................................
4. Kasai Oriental
..............................................................................
CHAPTER V. Legal classification of acts of violence
A. War crimes
.........................................................................................
1. Prohibited acts
..............................................................................
2. Protected persons
................................................................
3. Armed conflict
.............................................................................
4. Nexus
...........................................................................................
5. Issues around the classification of armed conflicts in
the DRC
1993-1996: Regional crisis
Persecution of the
Kasaians in Shaba (Katanga)
B. Crimes against
humanity................................................................
C. Crime of genocide
..............................................................................
1. Listed acts
....................................................................................
2. Directed against a national, ethnic, racial or religious
group
3. With the specific intention to destroy the protected
group, as such, either in whole or in part
................................
4. Crime of genocide
................................................................
D. Serious human rights violations
........................................................
SECTION II. Inventory of specific acts of violence committed
during the conflicts in the DRC .
CHAPTER I. Acts of violence committed against women and
sexual violence
A. Legal framework applicable to acts of sexual violence .....................
1. Domestic law
..............................................................................
2. International Law
................................................................
B. March 1993 - September 1996: Failure of the
democratisation process and regional crisis ................................
C. September 1996 - July 1998: first war and the AFDL/APR
regime
D. August 1998 - January 2001: Second war
1. Government-controlled zone
.......................................................
2. Rebel-controlled zone
................................................................
E. January 2001-June 2003: Towards the transition
..............................
3. Government-controlled zone
.......................................................
4. Rebel-controlled zone
................................................................
F. Multiple aspects of sexual violence
...................................................
1. Sexual violence as an instrument of terror ................................
2. Sexual slavery
..............................................................................
3. Sexual violence committed on the basis of ethnicity...................
4. Sexual violence committed in the name of ritual
practices
......................................................................................
Conclusion ..
CHAPTER II. Acts of violence committed against children .
A. Impact of armed conflict on children
.................................................
1. Children victims of widespread attacks on the civilian
population
....................................................................................
2. Children victims of ethnic violence
.............................................
3. Sexual violence committed against children ................................
4. Infant mortality
................................................................
5. Anti-personnel mines
................................................................
B. Specific case of children associated with armed groups
and forces (CAAFAG)…………………………………
1. Legal framework
................................................................
2. Recruitment and use of children from 1993 to 2003 ...................
3. Acts of violence committed against CAAFAG ...........................
4. Crimes committed by CAAFAG and youth justice .....................
5. Demobilisation and reintegration
.................................................
Conclusion .
CHAPTER III. Acts of violence linked to natural resource
exploitation .
A. Violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law linked to the struggle for control of natural resources
...............
1. North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema Provinces .......................
2. Orientale Province
................................................................
3. Katanga
........................................................................................
B. Human rights violations related to natural resource
exploitation
C. Natural resource exploitation as a factor in the
prolongation of the conflict
................................................................
1. Financing the conflict through natural resource
exploitation
..................................................................................
2. Contributions of State-owned companies to Kabila’s
war effort
......................................................................................
3. Paying back the war debt
.............................................................
4. Illegal or unfavourable contracts
.................................................
5. Links with the arms trade
.............................................................
Conclusion
SECTION III. Assessment of the justice system in the DRC ..........3..6..0.. ..
CHAPTER I. Legal framework applicable to crimes under
international law committed in the DRC
A. The DRC’s binding international obligations ....................
1. Obligations under international human rights law ......................
2. Obligations under international humanitarian law ......................
3. Rules and obligations arising from the Peace
Agreements
.................................................................................
B. Applicable substantive law: crimes under international
law in Congolese law
................................................................
1. Recognition of the main human rights in Congolese
constitutional law
................................................................
2. War crimes
...................................................................................
3. Crimes against
humanity..............................................................
4. Crime of genocide
................................................................
5. Other serious human rights abuses
..............................................
C. Procedural law and basic procedural safeguards
...............................
1. Jurisdiction of the military courts and tribunals
2. Basic procedural safeguards 382 833-840
Conclusion ..................................................
CHAPTER II. Judicial practice in the DRC relating to serious
violations of human rights and of international
humanitarian law
A. Pre-transition
period................................................................
B. Post-transition period
................................................................
1. Équateur Province
................................................................
2. Katanga Province
................................................................
3. Maniema Province
................................................................
4. Orientale Province
................................................................
5. North Kivu and South Kivu Provinces ................................
Conclusion .
CHAPTER III. Evaluation of the capability of the Congolese
justice system to provide justice for crimes
under international law committed between March 1993
And June 2003 .
A. Lack of capability and resources in the Congolese justice
system .
1. Insufficient budget .
2. Lack of personnel
3. Lack of technical and material support
4. Lack of transportation
5. Lack of training, professional development and
specialisation among judges
.......................................................
6. Weakness and deterioration in other components of
the justice system
B. Lack of independence of the judicial system .
C. Military courts have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
under international law
Conclusion .
SECTION IV. Transitional justice options for the DRC
CHAPTER I. Definition of transitional justice
CHAPTER II. Transitional Justice
A. Challenges facing transitional justice
1. Number and types of crimes committed and the number
of perpetrators and victims
2. Characteristics of the conflict
3. Context
B. Implications for transitional justice in the DRC
CHAPTER III. Judicial Mechanisms .
A. Prosecution of perpetrators of serious violations against
human rights and international humanitarian law and
transitional justice .
B. Obligation to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes under
international law committed in the DRC between 1993
and 2003
C. Challenges posed by prosecuting crimes under
international law committed in the DRC between 1993
and 2003
D. Role of the International Criminal Court ................................
E. Role of third-party States: extraterritorial and universal
jurisdiction
F. International Court
.............................................................................
G. Hybrid court
.......................................................................................
1. Tribunal independent from the Congolese judicial
system
2. Special mixed chambers within the judicial system ....................
Conclusion .
CHAPTER IV. Searching for the truth
A. Brief assessment of the TRC during the transition .
B. Creation of a new TRC
CHAPTER V. Reparations
A. Types of reparations
B. Right to reparation in the context of the DRC
1. Responsibility for reparation
2. Existing reparation methods
3. National reparation programme
Conclusion
CHAPTER VI. Reforms
A. Reform of the judicial system
B. Vetting of security services
Conclusion
Pages
ANNEX I
List of key acronyms used
ANNEX II
List of documents on the Democratic Republic of the Congo consulted by the
Mapping Team
ANNEX III
Maps of the province
Foreword
This report is the sum of the work of a team of men and women, from
the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) and beyond, who have spared no effort in providing
the
Congolese people and their leaders with a basic tool to help them build a better
future
where impunity has no place. The result of many interviews, meetings and
exchanges
with several hundred Congolese men and women, the report endeavours to reflect
and
substantiate their aspirations. However, no report could adequately describe the
horrors
experienced by civilian populations in Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Every individual has at least one story to tell of suffering and loss. In
some
cases, victims have turned perpetrators, and perpetrators have in turn been
victims of
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in a cycle
of
violence that continues to this day. This report does not seek to lecture the
men and
women who hold the country’s future in their hands. It is intended to be
inclusive and
representative in its description of the acts of violence that have affected the
entire
Congolese population directly and indirectly. Its aim is not to attribute
individual
responsibility or blame one group rather than another, and nothing has been
concealed,
leaving to the victims and witnesses the sometimes brutal description of the
tragedies
they will never forget. It is meant as a first step towards a sometimes painful
but very
necessary application of the truth. Admittedly, the implicit assumption of such
a plan is
that the authorities and the Congolese people themselves will take over.
This report also takes an objective look at justice in the DRC, inspired by the
remarks
and observations of many of the system’s actors, who are also its victims. It
offers a
number of options and avenues that should inspire Congolese society in the
difficult task
of reforming the justice system, which is threatened on all sides. It calls for
the unfailing
commitment of the authorities to restore justice as one of the fundamental
pillars of
Congolese democracy. Lastly, it looks to the future by formulating a series of
options
that could be used by Congolese society to come to terms with its past, fight
impunity
and handle the present situation without the risk of such atrocities happening
again.
Congolese men and women crave truth and justice. They have gone without both for
too
long. It is up to the DRC and its people to take the initiative to develop and
implement
their strategy for transitional justice. They can, however, count on the support
of the
international community in this respect. The Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) will remain by the side of the DRC and its
people in this important journey towards truly sustainable peace.
Navanethem Pillay
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Background and mandate
1. The discovery by the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the
Congo (MONUC) in late 2005 of three mass graves in North Kivu was a painful
reminder that past gross human rights violations committed in the Democratic
Republic
of the Congo (DRC) had remained largely uninvestigated and that those
responsible had
not been held accountable. Following a number of consultations within the UN
system,
an initial idea to “reactivate” the Secretary-General’s 1997–1998 investigative
Team1 was
abandoned in favour of a plan with a broader mandate. Consultations between the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), MONUC, the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA),
the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) and the Office of the Secretary-General’s
Special
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide led to an agreement aimed at providing the
Congolese authorities with tools needed to break the cycle of impunity. It was
recommended that a mapping exercise of the most serious violations of human
rights and
international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the DRC2
between
March 1993 and June 20033 be conducted and, on the basis of the
findings of the
exercise, that an assessment be carried out of the existing capacities of the
Congolese
national justice system to address these violations and a series of options
formulated for
appropriate transitional justice mechanisms that would assist in combating the
prevailing
impunity in the DRC.
2. In his report of 13 June 2006 to the Security Council on the situation in the
DRC,
the Secretary-General indicated his intention to “dispatch a human rights team
to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to conduct a mapping of the serious violations
committed between 1993 and 2003”.4 This intention was reaffirmed in
the two following
reports of the Secretary-General of 21 September 2006 and 20 March 2007.5
On 8 May
2007, the Secretary-General approved the Terms of Reference (ToR) of the Mapping
Exercise, delineating the following three objectives:
_______________
1 Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team on
serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law in the DRC (S/1998/581).
2 As the DRC was formerly known as “Zaire”, this name may appear in this report
for the period ending
May 1997.
3 March 1993 was chosen as a kick-off date for the mapping exercise because of
the Ntoto market massacre
in North Kivu, which triggered wider ethnic conflict in the province. June 2003
corresponds to the
establishment of a transitional government of “national unity”, made up of
President Joseph Kabila and
four vice-presidents representing the various political persuasions, following
the inter-Congolese talks at
Sun City (South Africa) between the government, rebel groups, civil society and
the different political
parties.
4 Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2006/390), para. 54.
5 Twenty-second and twenty-third reports of the Secretary-General on MONUC
(S/2006/759 and
S/2007/156 and Corr.1).
· Conduct a mapping exercise of the most serious violations of human rights
and
international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the DRC
between March 1993 and June 2003.
· Assess the existing capacities within the national justice system to deal
appropriately with such human rights violations that may be uncovered.
· Formulate a series of options aimed at assisting the Government of the DRC in
identifying appropriate transitional justice mechanisms to deal with the legacy
of
these violations, in terms of truth, justice, reparation and reform, taking into
account ongoing efforts by the DRC authorities, as well as the support of the
international community.6
3. The Mapping Exercise was presented to President Joseph Kabila during the
visit
of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to the DRC in May 2007, and was
well
received. In its Resolution 1794 (2007) of December 2007, the UN Security
Council
requested the full support of the Congolese authorities for the OHCHR-initiated
Mapping
Exercise. On 30 June 2008, a letter was sent by the High Commissioner to
President
Kabila announcing the imminent arrival of the Mapping Team. The Mapping Exercise
began officially on 17 July 2008 with the arrival of the Chief of the Mapping
Team in
Kinshasa. Around twenty human rights officers were deployed across the DRC
between
October 2008 and May 2009 to gather documents and information from witnesses to
meet the three objectives defined in the ToR. The Congolese Government has
expressed
its support for the Mapping Exercise on a number of occasions, notably in the
statement
delivered by the Minister for Human Rights at the Special session of the Human
Rights
Council on the human rights situation in the East of the DRC in November 2008
and in
various meetings between the Chief of the Mapping Exercise and the Justice and
Human
Rights Ministers.
Mapping Exercise
4. “Mapping” is a generic expression implying no predefined methodology or
format.7 A mapping exercise itself should be concerned not only with
the violations
themselves but also with the context(s) in which they were committed, either in
a given
region or across an entire country, as is the case here. Such an exercise
requires various
activities to be carried out, including the collection, analysis and assessment
of
information contained in multiple reports and documents from different sources,
meetings and witness interviews, as well as consultation with field experts and
consultants. However, a mapping exercise is not an end in itself. It remains a
preliminary
_______________
6 Article 1, ToR.
7 As a point of interest, the French translations of “mapping” – cartographie,
inventaire or état des lieux
(inventory) – fail to reflect accurately the scope of the mapping exercise's
mandate, and it was decided by
the team to retain the generic English term to designate this exercise in
French.
exercise leading to the formulation of transitional justice mechanisms,
whether they be
judicial or not. It represents a fundamental step in enabling the identification
of
challenges, the assessment of needs and better targeting of interventions.
5. The ToR for this Mapping Exercise required the Team8 to “start and complete
this
exercise as soon as possible […] to assist the new government with the tools to
manage
post-conflict processes”.9 The six-month deployment period set by the
Secretary-General
for the Mapping Team, with the mandate of compiling an inventory of the most
serious
violations committed over a ten-year timeframe within the territory of the DRC,
provided
a methodology of sorts for the mapping exercise. This stage was not concerned
with
pursuing in-depth investigations or gathering evidence of sufficient
admissibility to stand
in court, but rather with “providing the basis for the formulation of initial
hypotheses of
investigation by giving a sense of the scale of violations, detecting patterns
and
identifying potential leads or sources of evidence”.10 Consequently,
with regard to human
rights and international humanitarian law violations, the Mapping Exercise
provides a
description of the violation(s) and their location in time and space, the nature
of the
violation(s), the victims and their approximate number and the – often armed –
group(s)
to which the perpetrators belong(ed). This exercise was carried out
“chronologically and
province by province”.11
6. Given the scale of the violations committed in the ten years of conflict in
the
DRC, it was necessary to select from the most serious of these crimes. A gravity
threshold12 with a set of criteria enabling the Team to identify
incidents of sufficient
severity to be included in the final report was used for incident selection.
These criteria
fell into four categories: 1) nature of the crimes and violations revealed by
the incident, 2)
scale (number) of crimes and violations revealed by the incident, and number of
victims,
3) how the crimes and violations were committed and 4) impact of crimes and
violations
on communities, regions or the course of events.
7. Since the primary objective of the Mapping Exercise was to “gather basic
information on incidents uncovered”, the level of evidence required was
naturally lesser
than would be expected in a case brought before a criminal court. It was not a
question,
therefore, of being satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that a violation was
committed,
but rather having reasonable suspicion that the incident did occur. Reasonable
suspicion
_______________
8 “Team” is used to designate the body of human rights
specialists who led the Mapping Exercise
investigations across the DRC. These specialists may also be designated “Mapping
Exercise Teams” or
“Mapping Teams”.
9 Article 2.3, ToR.
10 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),
Rule-of-Law tools for
post-conflict states: Prosecution initiatives, United Nations, New York and
Geneva, 2008, p.6.
11 Article 4.2, ToR: “It should be carried out province by province, and in
chronological order of events. It
should gather basic information and not replace in-depth investigations into the
incidents uncovered.”
12 The gravity threshold was developed by the International Criminal Court to
identify “the most serious
crimes for investigation”. See, for example, Article 17(d)(1): Issues of
admissibility under the Rome Statute
is defined as follows: “a reliable body of material consistent with other
verified
circumstances tending to show that an incident or event did happen”.13
Assessing the
reliability of the information obtained was a two-stage process involving
evaluation of
the reliability and credibility of the source,14 and then the
validity and truth of the
information itself.15
8. Unlike some commissions of inquiry with a specific mandate to identify the
perpetrators of violations and make them accountable for their actions, the
objective of
the Mapping Exercise was not to establish or to try to establish individual
criminal
responsibility of given actors, but rather to expose in a transparent way the
seriousness of
the violations committed, with the aim of encouraging an approach aimed at
breaking the
cycle of impunity and contributing to this. This decision is further explained
by the fact
that, in light of the methodology adopted and the level of evidence used in this
Exercise,
it would have been unwise – unjust, even – to seek to ascribe personal criminal
responsibility to any given individual, as this should remain dependent first
and foremost
on legal proceedings pursued on the basis of an appropriate level of evidence.
The report
does, however, identify the armed group(s) to which the alleged perpetrator(s)
belong(ed), since it was essential to identify the groups involved in order to
qualify the
crimes legally. Consequently, information on the identity of the alleged
perpetrators of
some of the crimes listed does not appear in this report but is held in the
confidential
project database submitted to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.16
However,
the identities of perpetrators under warrant of arrest and those already
sentenced for
crimes listed in the report have been disclosed. It should also be noted that
where political
officials have assumed public positions encouraging or provoking the violations
listed,
their names have been cited in the sections relating to the political context.
9. Conducting a mapping exercise of the most serious violations of human rights
and
international humanitarian law committed in the DRC during the period under
examination presented a number of challenges. In spite of the scale of extreme
violence
that characterises the violations in some of the country’s regions, it was also
necessary to
take into consideration less serious violations in seemingly less affected
regions in order
to provide an overview of the entire country. With this in mind, the gravity
threshold was
adapted for each region. Confirming violations that occurred over ten years
previously
was sometimes difficult due to the displacement of witnesses and victims and the
passing
_______________
13 Another formulation would be “reliable and consistent
indications tending to show that the incident did
happen”.
14 Reliability of the source was determined using several factors, including the
nature, objectivity and
professional standing of the source providing the information, the methodology
used and the quality of
prior information obtained from that source.
15 The validity and authenticity of the information were evaluated through
comparison with other data on
the same incidents to ensure cohesion with other verified elements and
circumstances.
16 Article 4.3, ToR: “Sensitive information gathered during the mapping exercise
should be stored and
utilised according to the strictest standards of confidentiality. The team
should develop a database for the
purposes of the mapping exercise, access to which should be determined by the
High Commissioner for
Human Rights.”
of time. In some cases, violations that initially appeared to be isolated
crimes turned out
to be an integral part of waves of violence occurring in a given geographical
location or
within a given timeframe. There is no denying that vis-à-vis the frightening
number of
violations committed between 1993 and 2003, the sheer size of the country and
difficulties accessing a number of sites, the Mapping Exercise remains
necessarily
incomplete and can in no case reconstruct the complexity of each situation or
obtain
justice for the victims. We state this with utmost regret.
10. The Mapping Exercise report contains descriptions of over 600 violent
incidents
occurring within the territory of the DRC between March 1993 and June 2003. Each
of
these incidents demonstrates gross violations of human rights and/or
international
humanitarian law. Each of the incidents listed is backed by at least two
independent
sources identified in the report. As serious as they may be, uncorroborated
incidents
backed by a single source are not included in this report. Over 1,500 documents
relating
to human rights violations committed during this period were gathered and
analysed with
a view to establishing an initial chronology by region of the main violent
incidents
reported. Only incidents meeting the gravity threshold developed in our
methodology
were considered. The in-field Mapping Teams then met with over 1,280 witnesses
to
confirm or invalidate the violations listed in the chronology. During these
interviews,
information was also collected on previously undocumented crimes.
Implementation of the Mapping Exercise
11. Throughout the implementation of the Mapping Exercise, contacts
were
established with Congolese non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in order to
obtain
information, documents and reports on serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law that occurred in the DRC during the period
covered by the
ToR. To this end, meetings were held with over 200 NGO representatives to
present the
Mapping Exercise and request their collaboration. Thanks to this collaboration,
the
Mapping Team had access to critical information, witnesses and reports
pertaining to the
violations committed between 1993 and 2003. Without the courageous and
outstanding
work of the Congolese NGOs during these ten years, documenting the many
violations
committed would have been incredibly difficult.
12. Meetings were also held with the Congolese authorities, in particular with
the
civilian and military judicial authorities across the country, government
representatives,
in particular the Ministers for Justice and Human Rights, and the government
agencies
responsible for judicial system reform.
13. Consultations were also held with the main partners of the Mapping Exercise
[MONUC, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)], diplomatic missions as
well as actors involved in human rights and the fight against impunity in the
DRC
(notably UN organisations, international NGOs, religious groups and trade
unions) to
explain the exercise and seek their collaboration. The project was warmly
received by all
and the collaboration fruitful.
14. The Mapping Exercise was rolled out in three successive phases:
· Phase one began with the arrival of the Chief of the Mapping Team in July
2008,
and was dedicated to the recruitment of teams and to the collection, analysis
and
use of documents, both confidential and in the public domain, from existing
information sources on the violations committed during the period under
examination. Over 1,500 documents on this subject, some of them confidential,
were obtained from many sources, including the United Nations, the Congolese
Government, Congolese human rights organisations, major international human
rights organisations, the national and international media and various NGOs
(notably unions, religious groups, aid agencies and victims’ associations). In
addition, different national and international experts were consulted in order
to
open up new avenues of research, corroborate some of the information obtained
and streamline the overall analysis of the situation.
· Phase two began on 17 October 2008 with the deployment of the field Teams to
carry out the mandate in all provinces of the DRC from five field offices,17
including all investigations, consultations and analyses necessary both to
prepare
the inventory of the most serious violations and also to assess the existing
capacities of the Congolese judicial system to deal with this and formulate
options
for transitional justice mechanisms that could contribute to the fight against
impunity. During this phase previously obtained information was verified in
order
to corroborate or invalidate that information with the aid of independent
sources,
while also obtaining new information on previously undocumented violations.
· Phase three began with the closure of the field offices on 15 May 2009 and was
aimed at compiling all the information gathered and drafting the final report.
During this period, regional consultations regarding transitional justice were
held
with civil society representatives in Bunia, Bukavu, Goma and Kinshasa. The
final report was submitted to OHCHR on 15 June 2009 for review, comments and
finalisation.
I. Inventory of the most serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law committed on the territory of the DRC between March 1993
and June 2003
15. The period covered by this report is probably one of the most tragic
chapters in
the recent history of the DRC. Indeed, this decade was marked by a string of
major
political crises, wars and multiple ethnic and regional conflicts that brought
about the
_______________
17 The five field offices were at Bukavu (South Kivu), Goma
(North Kivu), Kisangani (Orientale), Kalemie
(Katanga) and Kinshasa. The Kisangani team moved to Bunia to cover the Ituri
region. The Kalemie-based
team covered the provinces of Maniema, Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental. The
Kinshasa-based team
covered the provinces of Kinshasa, Bas-Congo, Bandundu and Équateur.
deaths of thousands, if not millions, of people. Very few Congolese and
foreign civilians
living on the territory of the DRC managed to escape the violence, and were
victims of
murder, mutilation, rape, forced displacement, pillage, destruction of property
or
economic and social rights violations. Aside from its historical contribution to
documenting these serious violations and fact-finding during this period, the
ultimate
purpose of this inventory is to provide the Congolese authorities with the
elements they
need to help them decide on the best approach to adopt to achieve justice for
the many
victims and fight widespread impunity for these crimes.
16. The Mapping Exercise report is presented chronologically, reflecting four
key
periods in the recent history of the DRC, each preceded by an introduction
explaining the
political and historical background in which the violations were committed. Each
period
is organised by provinces and sometimes subdivided into groups of victims and
presents
a description of the violations committed, the groups involved and the
approximate
number of victims.
A. March 1993–June 1996: Failure of the democratisation processes and regional
crisis
17. The first period covers violations committed in the final years of the
regime of
President Mobutu and is marked by the failure of the democratisation process and
the
devastating consequences of the Rwandan genocide on the declining Zairian state,
in
particular in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu. During this period, 40
incidents were listed. The most serious violations of human rights and
international
humanitarian law were concentrated for the most part in Katanga, North Kivu and
in the
city-province of Kinshasa.
B. July 1996–July 1998: First Congo War and the Alliance des forces
démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) regime
18. The second period concerns violations committed during the First Congo War
and
the first year of the regime established by President Laurent-Désiré Kabila.
With 238
listed incidents, this period has the greatest number of incidents in the whole
of the
decade under examination. The information available today confirms the
significant role
of other countries in the First Congo War and their direct implication in the
war, which
led to the overthrow of the Mobutu regime.18 At the start of the
period, serious violations
were committed against Tutsi and Banyamulenge civilians,19
principally in South Kivu.
This period was then characterised by the relentless pursuit and mass killing
(104
reported incidents) of Hutu refugees, members of the former Armed Forces of
Rwanda
(later “ex-FAR”) and militias implicated in the genocide of 1994 (Interahamwe)
by the
Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL). A
proportion of the AFDL’s troops, arms and logistics were supplied by the Armée
patriotique rwandaise (APR), the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) and by the
Forces armées burundaises (FAB) throughout the Congolese territory. Hutu
refugees,
often rounded up and used by the ex-FAR/Interahamwe as human shields during
their
flight, began a long trek across the country from east to west towards Angola,
the Central
African Republic or the Republic of the Congo. This period was also marked by
serious
attacks on other civilian populations in all provinces without exception, in
particular by
the Forces armées zaïroises (FAZ) retreating towards Kinshasa, the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe driven back by the AFDL/APR and the Mayi-Mayi.20
C. August 1998–January 2000: Second Congo War
19. The third period concerns the inventory of violations committed between
the start
of the Second Congo War in August 1998, and the death of President Kabila. This
period
includes 200 incidents and is characterised by the intervention on the territory
of the DRC
of the government armed forces of several countries, fighting alongside the
Forces
armées congolaises (FAC) (Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia) or against them, and
also
the involvement of multiple militia groups and the creation of a coalition under
the
_______________
18 In an interview with Washington Post on 9 July 1997, Rwandan
president Paul Kagame (then Defence
Minister) recognised that Rwandan troops had played a key role in the ADFL
campaign. According to
President Kagame, the campaign strategy comprised three elements: a destroy the
refugee camps, b destroy
ex-FAR and Interahamwe structures based in and around the camps and c overthrow
the Mobutu regime.
Rwanda had planned the rebellion and had participated in it by supplying arms,
munitions and training
facilities for Congolese rebel forces. According to Kagame, operations – in
particular key operations – were
directed by Rwandan mid-level commanders. “Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo”,
Washington Post, 9 July
1997. See also the interview with General James Kabarebe, the Rwandan chief
military strategist of the
ADFL, in the Observatoire de l’Afrique Centrale: “Kigali, Rwanda. Plus jamais le
Congo”, Vol. 6, No. 10,
3–9 March 2003. See also the televised interviews with the Ugandan and Rwandan
presidents and General
James Kabarebe explaining in detail their respective roles in the First Congo
War, in “L’Afrique en
morceaux”, a documentary by Jihan El Tahri, Peter Chappell and Herve Chabalier,
100 minutes, produced
by Canal Horizon, 2000.
19 The term “Banyamulenge” came into popular use in the late 1960s to
distinguish ethnic Tutsis
historically based in South Kivu, the Banyamulenge, from those arriving from the
1960s onwards as
refugees or economic migrants. Banyamulenge means “people of Malenge” and takes
its name from a city
in the Uvira territory with a very large Tutsi population. Over time, however,
the use of the term
Banyamulenge has become increasingly more generalised and has been used to
designate all Zairian,
Congolese and occasionally Rwandan Tutsis.
20 In the DRC, the term Mayi-Mayi is used to designate groups of armed
combatants resorting to specific
magic rituals such as water ablutions (“Mayi” in Swahili) and carrying amulets
prepared by witchdoctors,
believed to make them invulnerable and protect them from ill fate. Present
mainly in South Kivu and North
Kivu, but also in other provinces, the various Mayi-Mayi groups included armed
forces led by warlords,
traditional tribal elders, village heads and local political leaders. The
Mayi-Mayi lacked cohesion and the
different groups allied themselves with various government groups and armed
forces at different times.
banner of a new political and military movement, the Rassemblement congolais
pour la
démocratie (RCD), which would later split on several occasions. During this
period the
DRC was racked by numerous armed conflicts: “Some […] international, others
internal
and […] national conflicts that became internationalised. Participants in these
conflicts
include at least eight national armies and 21 irregular armed groups”.21
In spite of the
signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement on 10 July 200922 by all
the parties,23 which
called for the respect of international humanitarian law by all parties and the
definitive
withdrawal of all foreign forces from the national territory of the DRC, the
fighting
continued, as did the serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian
law by all parties to the conflict. On 16 June 2000, the UN Security Council, in
its
Resolution 1304 (2000), called for all parties to cease hostilities and demanded
that
Rwanda and Uganda withdraw from the territory of the DRC, having been in
violation of
its sovereignty. It was not until the signing of two new agreements with Rwanda
(Pretoria
Agreement) and Uganda (Luanda Agreement) in 2002, that these foreign forces
began to
withdraw from the country.24
20. This period was marked by attacks on civilians with Tutsi morphology, in
particular in Kinshasa, Katanga, Orientale Province, East and Kasai Occidental,
Maniema
and North Kivu. Within the context of the war and the conflicts across the whole
of the
territory, civilian populations were broadly speaking the victims of serious
violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law by all parties in the conflicts
and
throughout the territory, but especially in North Kivu and South Kivu, Orientale
Province
(in particular in Ituri), Katanga, Équateur and also Bas-Congo.
D. January 2001–June 2003: Towards transition
21. Lastly, the final period lists 139 incidents describing the violations
committed in
spite of the gradual establishment of a ceasefire along the front line and the
speeding up
of peace negotiations in preparation for the start of the transition period on
30 June 2003.
During this period, fighting that had shaken the province of Ituri, in
particular the ethnic
conflicts between the Lendu and the Hema, reached an unprecedented peak. The
period
was marked by clashes between the Forces armées congolaises (FAC) and the
Mayi-Mayi
forces in Katanga province. As in previous periods, the main victims of the
parties
involved in the conflict were civilian populations throughout the territory,
particularly in
Orientale Province, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema and Kasai Oriental
provinces.
_______________
21 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in the DRC (A/55/403), para. 15.
22 S/1999/815, Annex.
23 The following were party to the Agreement: Angola, Namibia, Uganda, Rwanda,
the DRC and
Zimbabwe. The Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RDC) and the Mouvement
de libération du
Congo (MLC) rebel groups signed at a later date.
24 Pretoria Agreement of 31 July 2002 between the DRC and Rwanda, Article 8,
para. 3 (S/2002/914,
Annex); Luanda Agreement of 6 September 2002 between the DRC and Uganda, Art
E. Legal classification of acts of violence committed in the DRC between
March
1993 and June 2003
22. It must be stated that the vast majority of the 617 most serious incidents
described in this report point to the commission of multiple violations of human
rights
but above all of international humanitarian law. It did not appear either
appropriate or
essential to classify in law each of the hundreds of violent incidents listed.
It was
therefore decided instead to identify the legal framework applicable to the main
waves of
violence and to draw conclusions on the general legal classification of the
incidents or
groups of incidents reported.
War crimes
23. This term is generally used to refer to any serious breaches of
international
humanitarian law committed against civilians or enemy combatants during an
international or domestic armed conflict, for which the perpetrators may be held
criminally liable on an individual basis. Such crimes are derived primarily from
the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols I and II of
1977,
and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Their most recent codification can
be
found in article 8 of the Rome Statute25 of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) of
1998.
24. The vast majority of incidents listed in this report point to the
commission of
prohibited acts such as murder, willfully causing great suffering, or serious
injury to body
or health, rape, intentional attacks on the civilian population, and unlawful
and arbitrary
pillage and destruction of civilian goods, which are sometimes essential to the
survival of
the civilian population. The vast majority of these acts were committed against
protected
persons, as defined in the Geneva Conventions, primarily people who did not take
part in
the hostilities, particularly civilian populations and those put out of combat.
This applies
in particular to people living in refugee camps, who constitute a civilian
population that is
not participating in the hostilities, in spite of the presence of military
personnel among
them in some cases. Finally, there is no doubt that the violent incidents listed
in this
report almost all fall within the scope of armed conflict, whether international
in nature or
not. The duration and intensity of the violent incidents described, and the
level of
organisation of the groups involved, make it possible to state, with few
exceptions, that
this was a domestic conflict and not simply domestic disturbances or tensions or
criminal
acts. In conclusion, the vast majority of violent incidents listed in this
report are the result
of armed conflict and point to the commission of war crimes as serious breaches
of
international humanitarian law.
_______________
25 Official documents of the United Nations Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June-17 July 1998, vol. I: Final
documents (United Nations
publication, sales number: F.02.I.5), sect. A.
Crimes against humanity
25. The definition of this term was codified in paragraph 1 of article 7 of
the Rome
Statute of the ICC. When acts such as murder, extermination, rape, persecution
and all
other inhumane acts of a similar character wilfully causing great suffering, or
serious
injury to body or to mental or physical health are committed “as part of a
widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of
the attack”,
they constitute crimes against humanity.
26. This report shows that the vast majority of incidents listed fall within the
scope of
widespread or systematic attacks, depicting multiple acts of large-scale
violence, carried
out in an organised fashion and resulting in numerous victims. Most of these
attacks were
directed against non-combatant civilian populations consisting primarily of
women and
children. As a consequence, the vast majority of acts of violence perpetrated
during these
years, which formed part of various waves of reprisals and campaigns of
persecution and
pursuit of refugees, were in general terms all transposed into a series of
widespread and
systematic attacks against civilian populations and could therefore be
classified as crimes
against humanity by a competent court.
Crime of genocide
27. Since it was initially formulated in 1948, in article 2 of the Convention
on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the definition of the crime
has
remained substantially the same. It can be found in article 6 of the Rome
Statute, which
defines the crime of genocide as “any of the following acts committed with
intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such”. The
definition is followed by a series of acts representing serious violations of
the right to life
and the physical or mental integrity of the members of the group. The Convention
also
provides that not only the acts themselves are punishable, but also conspiracy
to commit
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, the attempt to commit
genocide and complicity in genocide.26 It is the specific intention
to destroy an identified
group either in whole or in part that distinguishes the crime of genocide from a
crime
against humanity.
28. The question of whether the numerous serious acts of violence committed
against
the Hutus (refugees and others) constitute crimes of genocide has attracted a
significant
degree of comment and to date remains unresolved. In practice, this question can
only be
decided by a court decision on the basis of evidence beyond all reasonable
doubt. Two
separate reports by the United Nations, in 1997 and 1998, examined whether or
not
crimes of genocide had been committed against Hutu and other refugees in Zaire,
subsequently the DRC. In both cases, the reports concluded that there were
elements that
might indicate that genocide had been committed but, in light of the shortage of
_______________
26 Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of
genocide, art. 3.
information, the investigative Teams were not in a position to answer the
question and
requested that a more detailed investigation be carried out.27 The
Mapping Exercise also
addressed this question in accordance with its ToR and drew the following
conclusions.
29. At the time of the incidents covered by this report, the Hutu population
in Zaire,
including refugees from Rwanda, constituted an ethnic group as defined in the
aforementioned Convention. Several of the incidents listed appear to confirm
that
multiple attacks targeted members of the Hutu ethnic group as such, and not only
the
criminals responsible for the genocide committed in 1994 against the Tutsis in
Rwanda
and that no effort had been made by the AFDL/APR to distinguish between Hutu
members of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and Hutu civilians, whether or not they were
refugees.
30. The intention to destroy a group in part is sufficient to constitute a
crime of genocide
and the international courts have confirmed that the destruction of a group can
be limited
to a particular geographical area.28 It is therefore possible to
assert that, even if only a
part of the Hutu population in Zaire was targeted and destroyed, it could
nonetheless
constitute a crime of genocide if this was the intention of the perpetrators.
Several
incidents listed in this report point to circumstances and facts from which a
court could
infer the intention to destroy the Hutu ethnic group in the DRC in part, if
these were
established beyond all reasonable doubt.29
31. The scale of the crimes and the large number of victims, probably several
tens of
thousands, all nationalities combined, are illustrated by the numerous incidents
listed in
the report (104 in all). The extensive use of edged weapons (primarily hammers)
and the
systematic massacres of survivors after the camps had been taken show that the
numerous
deaths cannot be attributed to the hazards of war or seen as equating to
collateral
damage.30 The majority of the victims were children, women, elderly
people and the sick,
_______________
27 See the Report from the joint mission tasked with
investigating allegations of massacre and other
violations of human rights in eastern Zaire (currently the DRC) from September
1996 (A/51/942), par. 80,
and the Report of the Investigative Team of the Secretary General on serious
violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law in the DRC (S/1998/581), par. 4.
28 Brdjanin, ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia),
Trial chamber, 1 September
2004, par. 703, Krstić, ICTY, Trial chamber, 2 August 2001, par. 590 and Krstić,
Appeal chamber, 19 April
2004), par. 13; Jelisić, ICTY, Trial chamber, 14 December 1999, par. 8, which
accepts that a geographical
area can be limited “to a region or municipality”.
29 Among the factors, facts and circumstances used by the international courts
to infer or deduce a
genocidal intention are: the general context, the perpetration of other
reprehensible acts systematically
directed against the same group, the scale and number of atrocities committed,
the fact of targeting certain
victims systematically because of their membership of a particular group, the
fact that the victims were
massacred without regard to their age or gender, the consistent and
methodological nature of the
commission of acts, the existence of a genocidal plan or policy and the
recurrence of destructive and
discriminatory acts.
30 See, for example, the cases of Lubarika and Muturule (20 October 1996),
Kashusha (2 November 1996),
Shanje (21 November 1996), the massive massacre on the Ulindi Bridge (5 February
1997), Osso
(November 1996), Biriko (December 1996 – there were no armed elements at this
location at the time of
the attack).
who were often undernourished and posed no threat to the attacking forces.31
Numerous
serious attacks on the physical or mental integrity of members of the group were
also
committed, with a very high number of Hutus shot, raped, burnt or beaten. The
systematic, methodological and premeditated nature of the attacks listed against
the
Hutus is also marked: these attacks took place in each location where refugees
had been
screened by the AFDL/APR over a vast area of the country.32 The
pursuit lasted for
months, and on occasion, the humanitarian assistance intended for them was
deliberately
blocked, particularly in the Orientale province, thus depriving them of
resources essential
to their survival.33 Thus the systematic and widespread attacks
described in this report
reveal a number of damning elements that, if proven before a competent court,
could be
classified as crimes of genocide.
32. It should be noted, however, that certain elements could cause a court to
hesitate
to decide on the existence of a genocidal plan, such as the fact that as of 15
November
1996, several tens of thousands of Rwandan Hutu refugees, many of whom had
survived
previous attacks, were repatriated to Rwanda with the help of the AFDL/APR
authorities
and that hundreds of thousands of Rwandan Hutu refugees were able to return to
Rwanda
with the consent of the Rwandan authorities. Whilst in general the killings did
not spare
women and children, it should be noted that in some places, particularly at the
beginning
of the first war in 1996, Hutu women and children were in fact separated from
the men,
and only the men were subsequently killed.34
33. Nonetheless, neither the fact of only targeting men in the massacres,35
nor the fact
of allowing part of the group to leave the country or even facilitating their
movements for
various reasons are sufficient in themselves to entirely do away with the
intention of
certain people to in part destroy an ethnic group as such and thus to commit a
crime of
genocide. It will be for a competent court to make a decision on the issue.
_______________
31 This emerges particularly in the crimes committed in the
province of North Kivu in Kibumba (October
1996), Mugunga and Osso (November 1996), Hombo and Biriko (December 1996),
Kashusha and Shanje
(November 1996), in the province of South Kivu, in the province of Maniema in
Tingi-Tingi and Lubutu
(March 1997) and in the province of Équateur in Boende (April 1997).
32 Such cases were confirmed in the province of North Kivu in Musekera, Rutshuru
and Kiringa (October
1996), Mugogo and Kabaraza (November 1996), Hombo, Katoyi, Kausa, Kifuruka,
Kinigi, Musenge,
Mutiko and Nyakariba (December 1996) and Kibumba and Kabizo (April 1997), in
Mushangwe (around
August 1997), in South Kivu in Rushima and Luberizi (October 1996), Bwegera and
Chimanga (November
1996), Mpwe (February 1997) and on the Shabunda-Kigulube road (February-April
1997), in the province
of Orientale in Kisangani and Bengamisa (May and June 1997), in Maniema in
Kalima (March 1997) and
in Équateur in Boende (April 1997).
33 The Investigative Team of the Secretary General concluded that the blockage
of humanitarian assistance
was systematic in nature and constituted a crime against humanity: see the
Report of the Investigative Team
of the Secretary General on serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law in the
DRC (S/1998/581), par. 95.
34 This was confirmed in Mugunga (November 1996), in the province of North Kivu,
and Kisangani (March
1997), in the province of Orientale.
35 Krstić, decision, ICTY, Appeal chamber, no.. IT-98-33-A, 19 April 2004, par.
35, 37 and 38.
II. Inventory of specific acts of violence committed during the conflicts
in the
DRC
34. Given that the methodology used for the first section of the report would
not
enable full justice to be done to the numerous victims of specific acts of
violence such as
sexual violence and violence against children, nor adequately reflect the scale
of the
violence practised by all armed groups in the DRC, nor enable an analysis of the
causes
of some of the conflicts, it was decided at the beginning of the Exercise to
devote a part
of it to these subjects. This approach has helped to highlight the recurrent,
widespread
and systematic nature of these types of violation and enabled a brief analysis
to be
produced.
A. Inventory of acts of violence committed against women and sexual violence
35. This section highlights the fact that women and girls paid a particularly
heavy
price during the decade 1993-2003, primarily as a result of their socio-economic
and
cultural vulnerability, which fostered the forms of extreme violence to which
they were
subjected. Violence in the DRC was, in fact, accompanied by the systematic use
of rape
and sexual assault by all combatant forces. This report highlights the
recurrent,
widespread and systematic nature of these phenomena and concludes that the
majority of
the incidents of sexual violence examined constitute offences and crimes under
domestic
law as well as under rules on human rights and international humanitarian law.
Furthermore, the Mapping Team was able to confirm massive incidents of sexual
violence that had only been documented to a limited extent or not documented at
all,
particularly the rape of Hutu refugee women and children in 1996 and 1997.
36. This chapter emphasises the fact that the scale and gravity of sexual
violence were
primarily the result of the victims’ lack of access to justice and the impunity
that has
reigned in recent decades, which has made women even more vulnerable than they
already were. The phenomenon of sexual violence continues today as a result of
this
near-total impunity, even in areas where the fighting has ended; it has
increased in those
areas where fighting is still ongoing.
B. Inventory of acts of violence committed against children
37. This chapter shows that children did not escape the successive waves of
violence
that swept over the DRC, quite to the contrary: they were often its first
victims. In fact,
children are always affected when crimes under international law are committed
against
civilians, partly because they are particularly fragile and partly because
violence takes
away their first line of defence, namely their parents. Even when children are
not direct
victims themselves, the fact of seeing their parents killed or raped, their
property pillaged
and their homes set on fire leaves them deeply traumatised. Being displaced
makes them
more vulnerable to malnutrition and diseases. Their young age makes them the
target of
contemptible beliefs and superstitions, which claim, for example, that sexual
relationships with children can treat certain diseases or make rapists
invincible. Lastly, war generally deprives them of
their right to education and thus often compromises their
long-term future.36
38. The decade 1993-2003 was also marked by the widespread use by all those
involved in the conflicts37 of children associated with armed groups and forces
(CAAFAG or “child soldiers”), making the DRC one of the countries in the world
where
this phenomenon is most common. In the military camps, these children suffered
indescribable violence, including murder, rape, torture, and cruel, inhuman and
degrading
treatment, and were deprived of all their rights. The report highlights the fact
that child
soldiers were sometimes also forced to commit very serious violations themselves
but
that in terms of justice, it is essential first to pursue the political and
military leaders
responsible for the crimes committed by the child soldiers placed under their
command,
based on the principle of hierarchical superiority and the person with most
responsibility,
as well as investigating to establish to what extent the children were forced to
act or
influenced by their adult superiors.
39. The chapter concludes that the recruitment and use of child soldiers is
ongoing
and cites as an example “Kimia II”, the joint military operation between the
MONUC and
the Forces Armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) in South Kivu,
during which the use of child soldiers was heavily criticised,38 and
emphasises the fact
that the FAC (now FARDC) have been cited since 2002 in every report of the
Secretary
General on children and armed conflict for having recruited and used child
soldiers.39
C. Inventory of acts of violence linked to the exploitation of natural resources
40. Finally, based on the view that it was not possible to draw up an
inventory of the
most serious violations committed in the DRC between 1993 and 2003 without
examining, if only briefly, the role played by the exploitation of natural
resources in the
commission of these crimes, chapter III shows that, in a significant number of
events, the
_______________
36 According to the World Bank, in 2003 the DRC was one of the
five countries in the world with the largest
number of children not in school. Figure cited in: Watch List, The Impact of
Armed Conflict on Children in
the DRC, 2003. See also the Report of the Committee on the Rights of the Child,
50th session, final
observations: DRC (CRC/C/COD/CO/2).
37 See in particular the Report of the Secretary General on children and armed
conflict (A/58/546–
S/2003/1053 and Corr.1 and 2), which cites 12 parties to the conflict: the
Forces armées congolaises (FAC),
the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie–Goma (RCD-G), the Mouvement
national de libération
du Congo (MLC), the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie/Kisangani–Mouvement
de libération
(RCD-K/ML), the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie–National (RCD-N), the
Hema militia
[Union des patriotes congolais (UPC) and Parti pour l’unité et la sauvegarde du
Congo (PUSIC)], the
Lendu/Ngiti militia [Front nationaliste and intégrationniste (FNI) and Forces de
résistance patriotique en
Ituri (FPRI)], the Forces armées populaires congolaises (FAPC), the Mayi-Mayi,
the Mudundu-40, the
Forces de Masunzu and the ex-Forces armées rwandaises and Interahamwe (ex-FAR /Interahamwe).
38 Internal report of the Human Rights division of MONUC, April 2009; Press
statement by Mr Philip
Alston, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary executions,
Mission in the DRC from 5
to 15 October 2009.
39 Report of the Secretary General on children and armed conflict (S/2002/1299,
A/58/546-S/2003/1053
and Corr.1 and 2, A/59/695-S/2005/72, A/61/529-S/2006/826 and Corr.1,
A/62/609-S/2007/757 and
A/63/785-S/2009/158 and Corr.1).
struggle between different armed groups for control of the DRC’s natural
assets served as
a backdrop for numerous violations directed against civilian populations.
41. In this chapter, the link between the exploitation of natural resources
and
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law has been analysed
from
three different points of view: firstly, violations of human rights and
international
humanitarian law committed by those involved in the conflict as part of the
fight to gain
access to and control the richest areas; secondly, the violations committed by
armed
groups during their long-term occupation of an economically rich area; and
thirdly, the
huge profits generated from the exploitation of natural resources, which have
driven and
helped fund the conflict and which are themselves a source and cause of the most
serious
violations.
42. The report concludes that there is no doubt that the abundance of natural
resources in the DRC and the absence of regulation and responsibility in this
sector has
created a particular dynamic that has clearly contributed directly to widespread
violations
and to their perpetuation and that both domestic and foreign state-owned or
private
companies bear some responsibility for these crimes having been committed.
III. Assessment of the resources available to the national justice system
to deal
with the serious violations identified
43. One important aspect of the ToR for the Mapping Exercise was the
assessment of
the resources available to the Congolese justice system to deal with the
numerous crimes
committed, particularly during the decade 1993-2003, but also afterwards. This
involved
analysing the extent to which the national justice system could deal adequately
with the
serious crimes described in the inventory in order to begin to combat the
problem of
impunity. To do this, an analysis was carried out of the domestic and
international law
applicable in this area, as well as the courts with jurisdiction to prosecute
and judge the
presumed perpetrators of the serious violations of human rights and
international
humanitarian law committed in the DRC. A study of Congolese case law on crimes
under
international law was also carried out to examine domestic judicial practice in
relation to
war crimes and crimes against humanity. This study helped to gain a better
understanding
of the legal, logistical, structural and political challenges and obstacles that
characterise
criminal proceedings in relation to crimes under international law in the DRC.
44. Around 200 actors in the judicial system, academics and national experts
in
criminal and international law were interviewed by the Mapping Team.40 Hundreds
of
documents from different sources were obtained and analysed, in particular laws,
judicial
decisions and various reports dealing with the justice system.
_______________
40 Primarily meetings with the civilian and military judicial
authorities in various public prosecutor’s
offices, Government representatives and national bodies tasked with the reform
of the judicial system.
45. The analysis of the legal framework applicable in the DRC to deal with
the most
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed
between
March 1993 and June 2003 shows that there is a significant body of legal norms
and
provisions both in international law and domestic law, which is sufficient to
begin to
tackle impunity in respect of the crimes documented in this report. The DRC is
bound by
the major conventions in respect of human rights and international humanitarian
law and
has been party to the majority of them since well before the conflicts of the
1990s.41
Whilst the lack of jurisdiction of the civilian courts for crimes under
international law
may be regrettable, it should be noted that the military courts are competent to
judge
anyone responsible for crimes under international law committed within the DRC
between 1993 and 2003. Finally, the Constitution of February 2006 is highly
eloquent in
respect of protecting human rights and fundamental judicial guarantees and the
text
incorporates the main international standards in this area.
46. Whilst the legal framework may seem adequate, however, the study of
Congolese
case law identified only around a dozen cases since 2003 where the Congolese
courts had
dealt with incidents classified as war crimes or crimes against humanity.
Furthermore,
only two of these cases concerned incidents covered by this report, namely the
Ankoro
case,42 a judgment of 20 December 2004 on the incidents that took
place in Katanga in
2002, and the Milobs case,43 a judgment of 19 February 2007 on the
incidents that
occurred in Ituri in May 2003.
47. Whilst it is undeniable that some of those involved in the Congolese
military
justice system, inspired by the DRC’s adherence to the Rome Statute of the ICC
in 2002
and supported by the international community, rendered a small number of
courageous
decisions in relation to crimes under international law,44 braving
physical and
psychological obstacles as well as political pressure, all the cases studied
nonetheless
_______________
41 With the exception of Additional Protocol II (1977) to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, ratified in 2002,
the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, ratified
in 1996 (Resolution 39/46 of the General Assembly, appendix), and of course the
Rome Statute of the ICC,
signed in 2000 and ratified in 2002.
42 In the Ankoro case, the investigations carried out by MONUC revealed that
violent confrontations
between the FAC and the Mayi-Mayi, in November 2002, had caused the deaths of at
least 70 people.
Thousands of homes were set on fire and destroyed, and hundreds of public and
private buildings including
hospitals, schools and churches were pillaged. In December 2002, 28 FAC soldiers
were arrested and
handed over to the military judicial authorities. Seven of them were charged
with crimes against humanity.
The trial was delayed for many months to enable the creation of a commission of
enquiry of officers able to
judge a lieutenant-colonel; in the end, the court acquitted six of the
defendants and sentenced the seventh to
20 months’ imprisonment for murder. The Public Prosecutor’s Office, having been
satisfied by the arrest,
did not lodge an appeal (RMP 004/03/MMV/NMB–RP 01/2003, RMP 0046/04/NMB–RP
02/2004).
43 In the Milobs case, in May 2003, members of the Front nationaliste et
intégrationniste (FNI), a militia
that was running wild in Ituri, tortured and killed two soldiers on a peace
monitoring mission for MONUC.
Seven members of the militia were charged with war crimes over three years after
the incidents. On 19
February 2007, the court at the military garrison in Bunia sentenced six of the
defendants to life
imprisonment for war crimes under the Congolese Military Penal Code and article
8 of the Rome Statute of
the ICC (RP 103/2006).
44 This applied in the Songo Mboyo (2006), Milobs (2007), Gety and Bavi (2007),
Lifumba Waka (2008),
Gédéon Kyungu (2009) and Walikale (2009) cases.
illustrate the significant operational limitations of the military judges.
Slapdash, dubious
investigations, poorly drafted or inadequately substantiated court documents,
irrational
decisions, violations of due process and various examples of interference by the
civilian
and military authorities in the judicial process are all examples of defects
that have
characterised some of these decisions, particularly in the cases of Ankoro,
Kahwa
Mandro, Kilwa and Katamisi.
48. The lack of political will to prosecute serious violations of
international
humanitarian law committed in the DRC is also confirmed by the fact that the
vast
majority of decisions handed down came about as the result of constant pressure
from
MONUC and NGOs.
49. This lack of dynamism in the Congolese justice system in relation to war
crimes
and crimes against humanity, particularly in respect of those primarily
responsible for
them, has only encouraged the commission of new serious violations of human
rights and
international humanitarian law, which continue to this day.
Inability of the Congolese justice system to deal adequately with crimes under
international law committed on its territory
50. The problem in the DRC is less a problem of inadequate provisions in the
criminal law than a failure to apply them. Although, as the Report on the
current state of
the justice sector in the DRC confirms, the Congolese judicial system enjoys “a
solid
legal tradition inherited from colonisation, as still evidenced by the quality
of certain
senior judges”,45 it is universally accepted that the Congolese
judicial system is in poor
health and even in a “deplorable state”.46 Having been significantly weakened
under the
Mobutu regime, it suffered severely as a result of the various conflicts that
ravaged the
DRC for over ten years.
51. The research and analyses carried out by the Mapping Team, and the
working
sessions and consultation with key figures in the Congolese judicial system,
both at an
institutional level and within civil society, confirmed that there are
significant structural
and chronic shortcomings in all parts of the Congolese justice system. Even
successful
criminal prosecutions are inadequate if the State does not take the necessary
steps to
_______________
45 The mission tasked with analysing the judicial system was the
result of an initiative of the European
Commission acting jointly with Belgium, France, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern
Ireland, MONUC, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United
Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). See Status report, Organisational audit of
the Justice System in the
DRC, May 2004, p. 7.
46 See in particular the Report from the Special Rapporteur on the Independence
of Judges and Lawyers,
Leandro Despouy, addendum, Mission in the DRC, (A/HRC/8/4/Add.2) (hereinafter
referred to as the
“Despouy report”).
ensure that prisoners do not escape.47 The fact that the military
courts and tribunals have
exclusive jurisdiction over crimes under international law also poses a problem
with
regard to the punishment of serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law.48 Their lack of capacity and lack of independence
are illustrated by the
insignificant number of cases they have heard and the way in which they have
dealt with
them.
52. The high level of involvement of foreign nationals in serious violations
of
international humanitarian law committed in the DRC also causes a problem for
the
Congolese courts. Although they have jurisdiction in respect of any person,
whether or
not they are Congolese, they have few means of ensuring that suspects residing
outside
the country appear in court. Cooperation on extradition from certain States
remains
unlikely, given the few guarantees offered by the Congolese military courts in
respect of
fair and equitable trials and respect for the fundamental rights of defendants,
particularly
as the death penalty is still in effect in Congolese law.
53. To sum up, given the limited commitment of the Congolese authorities to
strengthening justice, the derisory resources allocated to the judicial system
for tackling
impunity, the acceptance and tolerance of multiple incidents of interference by
the
political and military authorities in court cases that confirm the system’s lack
of
independence, the inadequacy of the military justice system, which has sole
jurisdiction
for dealing with the numerous crimes under international law often committed by
the
security forces, inadequate and inefficient judicial practice, non-compliance
with
international principles in relation to minors and the inadequacy of the
judicial system for
cases of rape, it must be concluded that the resources available to the
Congolese justice
system to bring an end to impunity for crimes under international law are
woefully
inadequate. Given the multitude of crimes under international law committed,
however,
the operation and independence of the judicial system is all the more important
in light of
the large number of senior figures in the armed groups that were parties the
conflict, who
are involved in various violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law.
_______________
47 ”The disastrous state of the prison system, perhaps the
weakest link in the judicial chain, means that it is
easy for suspects and convicted prisoners to escape; this includes some very
influential figures, who
“sometimes “escape” with the connivance of the authorities.” Combined report of
seven thematic special
procedures on Technical Assistance to the Government of the DRC and urgent
examination of the situation
in the east of the country (A/HRC/10/59), par. 63. According to figures from
MONUC, during the second
half of 2006 only, at least 429 prisoners, including some who had been convicted
for serious violations of
human rights, escaped from prisons throughout the DRC. See Despouy report (A/HRC/8/4/Add.2),
par. 55.
48 Military justice should “be restricted solely to specifically military
offences committed by military
personnel, to the exclusion of human rights violations, which shall come under
the jurisdiction of the
ordinary domestic courts or, where appropriate, in the case of serious crimes
under international law, of an
international or internationalised criminal court”. Commission on Human Rights
(E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1), Principle 29.
IV. Formulation of options in the field of transitional justice mechanisms
that
could help to combat impunity in the DRC.
54. The transitional justice mandate with which the Mapping Team has been
entrusted consists of providing various options in order to help the Government
of the
DRC to deal with the many serious human rights and international humanitarian
law
violations committed on its territory, with a view to achieving "truth, justice,
reparation
and reform".49 This mandate also echoes the demands that Congolese
society has made of
its leaders, initially at the Inter-Congolese Dialogue which resulted in the
global and
inclusive Agreement concerning transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo in
Sun
City (South Africa) in 200250 and, subsequently, at the Conference on
Peace, Security
and Development which was held in January 2008 in North Kivu and South Kivu.
This
mandate has also received firm support from the Security Council, which has
asked
MONUC "to help [the Government] to create and apply a transitional justice
strategy".51
55. In order to carry out this mission, the Mapping Team has examined recent
experience in DRC in terms of transitional justice and has identified existing
issues in this
area, particularly in the light of the conclusions of the evaluation of the
judicial system
that are presented in this report. The experience of the Truth and
Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) that operated in the DRC during the transition, and current
reforms of
the justice and security sectors have also been reviewed. In addition, there
were
consultations with Congolese experts, particularly judicial authorities and
representatives
from the Ministries of Justice and Human Rights, international experts in this
field, local
and international human rights and criminal law specialists and victims'
associations. As
there was a convincing need for national approval of transitional justice
measures if these
were to be effective, several round-table meetings were also organised, in order
to gather
views and opinions from civil society on this subject.52
56. The options for transitional justice that are put forward in this report
broadly take
into account the diverse points of view expressed by the Congolese and
international
stakeholders who were consulted, and these options are also informed by other
studies of
victim expectations in terms of transitional justice and data from grassroots
work,
reported by members of the Team. Finally, these transitional justice options are
part of
current efforts to reform the judicial system, to reform Congolese law and to
create new
institutions that would promote greater respect in the DRC for its international
obligations concerning justice and the fight against impunity.
_______________
49 Article 1.3 of the ToR.
50 Available at the following address:
http://home.hccnet.nl/docu.congo/Frans/OudSysteem/accordglobal.html
[in French]
51 Mandate repeated by the Security Council in several of its resolutions, in
particular Resolution 1794
(2000) dated 21 December, para. 16, and Resolution 1856 (2008) dated 22 December
2008, para. 4.
52 Round-table meetings concerning the combat against impunity and transitional
justice were organised by
the Mapping Exercise in Bunia, Goma, Bukavu and Kinshasa in May 2009.
57. Because of the many challenges that arise when seeking justice for the
crimes
committed in the DRC, it is crucial that a holistic policy of transitional
justice be adopted,
which will depend on the creation of diverse and complementary mechanisms, both
judicial and non-judicial. The process requires a strategy based on a global
view of
known violations, the timescales involved and the main categories into which the
victims
fall. With this in mind, this report may help to form the basis of a process of
reflection for
civil society and the Congolese Government as well as their international
partners. This
strategy must involve complementarity between various mechanisms, whether these
are
already available or to be created, each of which would have a particular role
to play in
seeking truth, justice, reparation and rehabilitation of victims, in reform of
judicial and
security institutions (including methods for vetting security forces and the
army) and in
reconciliation, or even reconstruction of the historical truth. These mechanisms
complement each other and are not exclusive. Most of the many countries that
have
looked to a past marked by dictatorship, armed conflict and large-scale serious
crime
have used several types of transitional justice measures, implemented
simultaneously or
gradually in order to restore rights and dignity to victims, to ensure that
human rights
violations are not repeated, to consolidate democracy and sustainable peace and
to lay the
foundations for national reconciliation.
Judicial mechanisms:
58. The DRC cannot escape its obligations under international law, namely to
pursue
crimes under international law committed on its territory, any more than it can
remain
unaware of the many Congolese victims who are demanding justice for the harm
they
have suffered. The decision as to which judicial mechanism would be most
appropriate
for dealing with these crimes is the exclusive responsibility of the Congolese
Government, and this decision must take into account the demands of Congolese
civil
society. In order to achieve this, a consultation process must be put in place
by the
Government, with the support of the international community, and this process
must be
as broad as possible.
59. The violations that meet the criteria for crimes under international law
were
committed on a huge scale over more than ten years of conflict and by various
Congolese
and foreign armed groups. These violations were so numerous that no judicial
system
functioning at the peak of its abilities can deal with so many cases. There were
tens of
thousands of serious crimes and perpetrators, and hundreds of thousands of
victims. In
such cases, it is important to establish priorities when embarking on criminal
prosecutions, and to concentrate efforts on "those who bear the greatest
responsibility".
However, prosecution of "those who bear the greatest responsibility" requires an
independent justice system which is capable of resisting political and other
types of
intervention, which is definitely not the case for the current Congolese
judicial system,
the independence of which remains seriously compromised and poorly treated.
60. The generalised and systematic nature of the crimes that have been
committed
poses a challenge in itself. Such crimes require complex investigations, and
these cannot
be carried out without significant material and human resources. In some cases,
specific expertise may be essential, in enquiry staff
and prosecutors. However, the lack of
resources available to Congolese jurisdictions means that they are not capable
of carrying
out their mandate as it pertains to crimes under international law.
Reinforcement and
restoration of the internal judicial system is also of primary importance.
61. In response to these observations, the report concludes that a mixed
judicial
mechanism53 - made up of national and international personnel - would be the
most
appropriate way to provide justice for the victims of serious violations.
Whether national
or international, the exact form and function of such a jurisdiction should be
decided
upon in detail jointly by stakeholders involved, particularly concerning their
participation
in the process, in order to provide credibility and legitimacy for the adopted
mechanism.
In addition, before international resources and stakeholders are deployed, a
rigorous
planning process is required, as well a precise assessment of the available
material and
human resources within the national judicial system.
62. When implementing such a system it is essential that some important
principles
be adhered to so that the mechanism can be effective and so that any lack of
capacity,
independence and credibility can be compensated for, in particular:
- Significant financial involvement and clear government commitment;
- Guarantees of independence and impartiality. The best way of achieving these
objectives is to entrust international stakeholders (judges, magistrates,
prosecutors
and those in charge of the investigation) with key roles in the various
components
of the mechanism;
- Paying special attention, particularly in terms of procedure, to specific
types of
violence, notably sexual violence against women and children.
63. Such a mechanism must also:54
- apply international criminal law as it relates to crimes under international
law,
including the responsibility of superiors for acts committed by their
subordinates;
- ensure that any amnesty granted for crimes under international law does not
apply
in the context of this mechanism; ensure that military courts do not have
jurisdiction over this matter;
_______________
53 There are several forms of mixed judicial mechanisms: a court
that is independent of the national
judicial system or special mixed chambers within the national judicial system.
54 Some of these criteria were established by the Secretary General in his
report on the re-establishment of
the rule of law and administration of justice during the transition period in
societies that are in conflict or
that are emerging from a period of conflict. See S/2004/616, chapter XIX, Sect.
A., para. 64, conclusions
and recommendations.
- have competence over all persons who have committed these crimes, whether
nationals or foreigners, civilians or military personnel, and who at the time
the
crimes were committed were aged 18 or over;
- ensure that all judicial guarantees providing for a fair and equitable process
are
respected, particularly the fundamental rights of the accused;
- plan for a mechanism to provide legal assistance to the accused and to
victims;
- plan for protection measures for witnesses and, if required, legal personnel
who
risk being threatened or intimidated;
- not plan to use the death penalty, in compliance with international
principles;
- ensure the co-operation of third-party States, the United Nations and NGOs
that
would be capable of supporting the activities involved in this mechanism,
particularly with the provision of defence.
64. A mixed court in itself will not solve the problem of the participation
of foreign
armed groups in the waves of violence across the country. There is no doubt that
in many
of the recorded incidents, armed forces and groups from countries other than the
DRC
were involved. However, it is impossible to establish the extent to which
foreign
commanders, controllers and those who gave orders are responsible, without the
assistance of the authorities in the relevant countries. In this respect, since
2001 the
Security Council has been reminding States in the region that were involved in
armed
conflict of their obligations under international law "and to bring to justice
those
responsible, and [...] ensure accountability for violations of international
humanitarian
law".55 The alleged perpetrators can thus be prosecuted by
third-party States for crimes
committed in the DRC, whether in the same region or not, on the basis of
universal
jurisdiction. This facility has been used previously, though not often enough.56
Such
possibilities should be encouraged.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC):
65. The extent and the systematic and generalised nature of the crimes
committed
against vulnerable people, women, children and defenceless refugees requires an
investigation into the reasons behind this cycle of violence, and into the
existence of a
deliberate policy of attacking certain categories of persons for ethnic,
political or
_______________
55 See, for example, resolution 1291 (2000) dated 24 February
2000, para. 15.
56 In three cases, third-party States have exercised universal jurisdiction over
crimes under international
law committed in DRC between 1993 and 2003. See: Arrest warrant under
international law, issued by
examining magistrate Vandermeersch (Belgium) against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia
Ndombasi, dated 11 April
2000; Judgement of Rotterdam District Court (Netherlands), 07 April 2004 against
Colonel Sébastien
Nzapali, and Spanish arrest warrants against 40 officers in the Rwandan army,
“Juzgado Nacional de
Instruccion n. 4, Audiencia Nacional, Madrid”, 06 February 2008.
nationality reasons. The systematic use of sexual violence, which continues
today, must
be given special attention. Economic factors, connected to occupation of land
and illegal
exploitation of natural resources among other issues, must also be considered.
Such
questions will not be answered satisfactorily by a single court, which would
primarily
seek to assess the individual responsibility of perpetrators without attempting
to
understand the conflict as a whole, how it came into being and the deep-seated
underlying reasons. A judicial mechanism, in and of itself, can only look in a
limited and
fragmentary way at such violence, and can only deal with a limited number of
cases,
without taking into account the needs of the majority of victims or their urgent
need for
the truth.
66. Despite the fact that victims were very disappointed with the failure of
the DRC’s
first TRC, there is still a very strong desire for a new commission and for the
truth. In his
closing speech at the Goma Conference in February 2008, President Kabila
positively
welcomed the demand for the creation of a new TRC.57
67. To this end, and to avoid the errors made in the past, a serious and
wide-ranging
consultation process must be started, in a non-politicised atmosphere, so that
the work of
the TRC will be based on a credible foundation and mandate that will be needed
if it is to
establish the truth, propose reparation measures and institutional reforms. With
this in
view, it is important that efforts be made to help victims to organise
themselves so that
they can be better prepared to contribute to the consultation process and the
creation of a
truth-seeking mechanism.
68. Although there is no ready-made model or template for a truth-seeking
mechanism, it is possible, in the light of the experience of the first TRC in
DRC and in
the Congolese context, to propose some basic principles which should enable some
of the
identified issues to be overcome:
- Need for broad consultation: This was absent from the first TRC and from the
new plan lodged with Parliament; a consultative process involving victims and
representatives from civil society appears to be indispensable if the basic
parameters of a future mechanism are to be identified, and if the population are
then to understand how this mechanism works and recognise that it is credible
and
legitimate;
- A realistic and precise mandate: Given the numerous conflicts that have
plagued DRC, the mandate should be limited to the periods in history that have
produced the most serious violations of human rights and of international
humanitarian law. Particular attention should be paid to certain groups that
have
been particularly badly affected by violence in the DRC, particularly women,
_______________
57 Speech by President Kabila closing the peace, security and
development conference in North Kivu and
South Kivu, Goma, 22 February 2008, p. 5.
children and some ethnic minorities and communities of particular
ethnicities,
political views or nationalities;
- Determination of mandate: The variety of different mandates with
which the
first TRC in DRC was entrusted contributed to its failure. A TRC cannot act as a
substitute for a mediation facility or a reparation mechanism58, although it
can, of
course, provide useful recommendations in these areas;
- Membership of the TRC: The process for selecting members of any new
truthseeking
mechanism in the DRC, and the process whereby it can be ensured that
these members are credible, independent and competent, will to a large extent
determine the legitimacy of such a mechanism, the support it receives and,
ultimately, whether it succeeds or fails.59 The possibility of appointing
international members to the commission should also be explored, given the
mistrust that persists in the DRC (among the civilian population and of various
parties towards the authorities);
- Powers of the Commission: It is of primary importance that the
mechanism that
is created can have the power (for example) to cross-examine witnesses, to make
them appear before the Commission, to protect them and guarantee that their
testimony cannot be used against them in judicial proceedings, to obtain the
full
co-operation of the authorities. Prerogatives allowing amnesties to be granted
to
penitent perpetrators must be compatible with principles of international law in
this area, and must not be applicable in cases of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide and other serious human rights violations.
- Content of final report: A truth-seeking mechanism must be able at
least to
make recommendations concerning measures for reparation and compensation for
victims, institutional reform, particularly in the legal system and security
forces,
so that such violations may be avoided in future and, if necessary, it must be
able
to recommend sanctions.
69. The success of any new truth-seeking mechanism remains highly dependent
on a
strong commitment from the Government to confront the past and on a conviction
that
establishing the truth is essential if there is to be a peaceful transition to a
country in
which the rule of law is respected. Any efforts by civil society and the
international
community will be useless without such a commitment from the Government.
_______________
58 ”...truth commissions are not well placed to implement an
extensive reparations programme
themselves”, Truth commissions, OHCHR, p. 35.
59 ”To be successful, they must enjoy meaningful independence and have credible
commissioner selection
criteria and processes.” See the Report on the re-establishment of rule of law
and transitional justice in
conflict and post-conflict societies (S/2004/616), para. 51.
Reparation
70. Many international treaties contain references to the rights of victims
of serious
human rights violations to compensation.60 This is linked to the
right to remedy that
provides all victims with the right to an easily accessible process for
obtaining reparation,
via criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary routes. Hundreds of
thousands of
victims have suffered psychological and physical damage as a result of the
terrible
violence they experienced. They have the right to reparations. The right to
reparation
must account for all injury suffered by the victim and this can take several
possible
forms: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees
that violence
will not be repeated, via adoption of appropriate measures.
71. A comprehensive and creative approach to the issue of reparation is
clearly
required. Even if it seems as though collective reparation is easier to
implement,
individual reparation must nevertheless be considered in some cases,
particularly those in
which the consequences of the violations continue to have a major impact on the
lives of
victims.
72. The Congolese Government must be the first to contribute to a reparations
programme. This contribution must be proportional to the State's budgetary
capacity, but
a suitable investment will demonstrate that the State recognises this legal and
moral
obligation, will provide a clear political signal of its willingness to help
victims, and will
stimulate contributions from other international partners in the programme.
Third-party
countries that have international responsibility for serious violations of human
rights and
of international humanitarian law also have the obligation to pay reparations to
the State
on whose territory these acts were committed and harm suffered, as in the case
of
Uganda.61 This obligation, which arises from customary international
law, exists
independently of any judgement from the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
This
obligation must be respected. Any sum of money seized from perpetrators of
crimes
under international law committed in the DRC, whatever their nationality and
regardless
of which judicial authority seized the money, can also be directed towards such
reparation mechanisms. It may even be possible to consider prosecution of some
private
or nationalised companies, within or outside the country, which illegally bought
natural
resources from the DRC, with a view to obtaining compensation that would be
channelled into the reparation mechanism.
73. The most important issue to resolve when creating any reparation
mechanism is
that of how to determine who should receive help from such a programme. Several
criteria can be used to delimit the scope of a programme and to help those who
have
_______________
60 See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article 8), the
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (article 2.3), the International Convention on the Elimination
of all forms of Racial
Discrimination (article 6), the Convention against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (article 14), the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(article 39) as well as the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (articles 19 and 68).
61 International Court of Justice, Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (DRC v. Uganda), 19
December 2005, para. 259 – 260.
suffered most and who have the greatest need of assistance, without
trivialising the
suffering of other victims. The seriousness of the violation, its consequences
for the
physical or mental health of the victims, stigmas attached, any repetition of
violations
over time, and the current socio-economic situation of victims are all valid
criteria.
74. As an exclusively judicial approach that is required to establish the
extent to
which perpetrators are responsible will never give full satisfaction to victims,
and given
the limitations of the judicial system in the face of the number of crimes
committed and
the number of victims, alternatives to the judicial route must be explored, such
as the
Victims' Fund run by the ICC, which is active in the DRC and which has developed
new
ways to approach reparation.
75. The report concludes that a national agency, a reparation commission or
compensation fund, which would have as its exclusive task the creation and
implementation of a programme of compensation for the victims of conflict in the
DRC,
would be the most appropriate mechanism with which to address the issue of
reparations.
This body must have sufficient independence and prerogatives in order to define
and
identify the categories of victims who have claims to various types of
reparation to be
granted individually and collectively. It should establish relatively simple
procedures that
are free to access and appropriate to victims, in order to facilitate access and
provide
effective solutions, which is often lacking in purely judicial settings.
Reforms
76. One of the purposes of the transitional justice policy is to establish
guarantees that
serious human rights and international law violations that were committed in the
past will
not be repeated. If this aim is to be achieved, it is often of primary
importance to reform
institutions that have committed such violations and that have failed to perform
their
institutional role. Such reforms are clearly highly relevant in the DRC, and
this report has
exposed several instances in which the Zaire (later Congolese) security forces
were
directly or indirectly responsible for serious violations of international human
rights law
and international humanitarian law that were committed between 1993 and 2003 and
which still persist in the DRC. Although all transitional justice mechanisms are
important, it should nonetheless be emphasised that institutional reform is
without doubt
the step that will have the greatest long-term impact in achieving peace and
stability in
the country and which will offer citizens the best protection against repeat
violations.
77. The most crucial and urgent of the reforms that aim to prevent repetition
of these
crimes are those that concern improvements to the judicial system, adoption of a
law to
implement the Rome Statute and the vetting of the security services. Several
reforms of
the judicial system are underway and deserve support. These aim to support
improvements in the capabilities of the judicial system, particularly by
reforming
criminal legislation, deployment of legal administration throughout the whole
country
and the retraining of judges and judicial staff
78. As part of efforts to curb and prevent crimes under international law,
the DRC has
undertaken, by ratifying the Rome Statute, to prosecute the perpetrators of
crimes listed
in the Statute and to provide for all forms of co-operation with the Court in
its national
legislation. This bill, which complies in every way with the DRC's international
obligations, is of paramount importance and Parliament must pass it without
further
delay.
Vetting
79. The process of reforming the security forces, particularly the police and
the army,
was begun at the start of the transition period, along with the reform of the
justice sector.
However, it is to be regretted that transitional justice was not taken into
account during
this process. A significant transitional justice mechanism in the field of
institutional
reform relates to the vetting procedure that aims to ensure that "government
workers who
are personally responsible for flagrant human rights violations, particularly
personnel in
the army, the security services, the police, the intelligence services and the
judicial
system, must be prevented from working in government institutions".62 Vetting is
particularly important and relevant in the DRC, as many people who were
responsible for
serious human rights violations were employed as government workers after the
peace
agreements were reached. The presence of such people within institutions, and
particularly within the army, means that they can block or hold back any
transitional
justice initiative, or threaten or simply discourage potential witnesses and
victims. In
view of this, a vetting process is not just essential in itself, but would seem
to be a
prerequisite for any other credible transitional justice initiative.
80. The Security Council considers that such a measure is necessary in order
to break
the cycle of impunity that has always surrounded the DRC security forces, and
that a true
reform of the security sector will only achieve sustainable results if vetting
is used.63
International Criminal Court
81. Although the ICC is not a transitional justice mechanism in itself, its
contribution
to criminal justice in the DRC remains very important. For the time being it is
the only
judicial mechanism that has the capacity, the integrity and the independence
required to
prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes under
international law
committed on DRC territory. Three ICC cases concerning the situation in Ituri
have been
opened by the Prosecutor.64 By doing this, the ICC has played and continues to
play a
_______________
62 See Set of principles for the protection and promotion of
human rights through action to combat impunity
(E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1), principle 36.
63 See Resolution 1794 (2007) dated 21 December 2007, para. 15; contents
repeated in subsequent
resolutions that extended MONUC's mandate.
64 Case The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06); Case The
Prosecutor v. Germain
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07); Case The Prosecutor v.
Bosco Ntaganda (ICC-
01/04-02/06)
very important role in combating impunity in the DRC, and is likely to
encourage the
work of Congolese courts and tribunals and other mechanisms to be set up in
future. The
Court has also inspired some actors in the Congolese judicial system, who have
looked
into the provisions of the ICC Rome Statute for material to supplement and
clarify
Congolese law in this area, as explained in section III of the report.
82. However, the numerous expectations raised by the ICC have led to
disappointment among the Congolese people and international actors with an
interest in
victims' rights, particularly because of the slow pace of proceedings and the
limited scope
of the charges that were brought, which failed to provide justice for hundreds
or even
thousands of victims and which did not reflect the true scale of the criminal
activities of
the accused, as has been shown in numerous inquiries.65
83. Given the lack of progress in the fight against impunity in the DRC, it
would
seem to be of primary importance that the ICC maintain and indeed increase its
commitment. The ICC must address in particular the most serious crimes, which
could be
difficult to prosecute in the DRC because of their complexity, for example
networks that
fund and arm the groups involved in these crimes. People involved in these
activities
benefit from political, military and economic support and are sometimes outside
the DRC
and hence beyond the reach of national justice. It would therefore appear
important that
the ICC's Prosecutor pay particular attention to these cases, if they are not to
evade
justice.
84. Conversely, the fact that the ICC has no jurisdiction over the many
crimes
committed before July 2002, and the fact that it is not able to deal with a
large number of
cases, limits its direct role in the fight against impunity and confirms the
importance and
need to create new mechanisms which would enable prosecution of the main
perpetrators
of the most serious crimes that are covered in this report.
Conclusion
85. Drawing up an inventory of the most serious violations of human rights
and
international humanitarian law that were committed on DRC territory between
March
1993 and June 2003, the report concludes that the vast majority of the 617
listed incidents
constitute crimes under international law. These were war crimes committed
during
armed conflict, either internal or international, or crimes against humanity
committed in
the context of a generalised or systematic attack against a civilian population,
or in many
cases both. The issue of whether the many serious acts of violence committed
against
Hutus in 1996 and 1997 constitute crimes of genocide has also been addressed,
and the
_______________
65 See “FIDH and its Congolese member organisations disappointed
by the limited scope of the
International Criminal Court’s investigations”, (under “Fourth ICC Arrest
Warrant in DRC Situation”),
available at www.fidh.org
.
report emphasises that there are elements that could indicate that genocide
has been
committed, but that the question can only be addressed by a competent court that
would
rule on individual cases.
86. In terms of justice, the response of the Congolese authorities in the
face of the
overwhelming number of serious crimes committed within the territory of the DRC
has
been negligible or even non-existent. The lack of political will on the part of
the
Congolese authorities to prosecute those who are responsible for serious
violations of
human rights and of international humanitarian law committed in the DRC has only
encouraged further serious violations, which continue to this day. The report
notes that,
because of the many issues that arise when seeking justice for the crimes
committed in
the DRC, it is crucial that a holistic policy of transitional justice be
implemented, which
will depend on the creation of diverse and complementary mechanisms, both
judicial and
non-judicial. While the report is careful not to give any recommendations or
directives in
the strict sense of the word, it does, however, examine the advantages and
drawbacks of
various transitional justice options in terms of truth, justice, reparation for
and
rehabilitation of victims, and reform of judicial and security institutions
(including
vetting measures), in the current Congolese context. These options, which must
be
examined by the Government of the DRC and civil society, include: a) the
creation of a
mixed jurisdiction; b) creation of a new Truth and Reconciliation Commission; c)
reparation programmes; and d) reforms of both the legal sector and the security
forces. In
order to ensure that the Congolese people are intimately involved in assessing
needs,
establishing priorities and finding solutions – in short, to ensure that they
adopt these new
mechanisms and understand their function and scope – it is essential that the
authorities
carry out national consultations on transitional justice beforehand to assure
the credibility
and legitimacy of any approaches carried out in this domain.
87. The discovery by the United Nations Organisation Mission in the
Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in late 2005 of three mass graves in North Kivu
was a
painful reminder that past gross human rights violations committed in the
Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) had remained largely uninvestigated and that those
responsible had not been held accountable. Following a number of consultations
within
the UN system, an initial idea to “reactivate” the Secretary-General’s 1997–1998
investigative Team was abandoned in favour of a plan with a broader mandate
aimed at
providing the Congolese authorities with the tools needed to break the cycle of
impunity.
Consultations between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), MONUC,
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Department of
Political Affairs (DPA), the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) and the Office of the
Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide led to an
agreement
recommending the conduct of a mapping exercise covering the period March 1993 to
June 2003. The agreed purpose was to gather, analyse and publish prima facie
evidence
of human rights and international humanitarian law violations and, on the basis
of the
findings of the exercise, to carry out an assessment of the existing capacities
within the
national justice system in the DRC to address such violations as might be
uncovered. It
was agreed that the initiative should also result in the formulation of options
on
appropriate transitional justice mechanisms to adequately address the legacy of
these
violations. Lastly, it was decided that MONUC’s human rights mandate, approved
by the
Security Council in 2003 (Resolution 1493 (2003)),66 would provide
the basis for the
proposed “Mapping Exercise”.
88. The so-called Mapping Exercise was aimed at providing a key advocacy tool
visà-
vis the Government and Parliament, as well as the international community
regarding
the establishment of appropriate transitional justice mechanisms and to
encourage
concerted efforts to combat impunity in the DRC. In his report of 13 June 2006
to the
Security Council on the situation in the DRC, the Secretary-General indicated
his
intention to “dispatch a human rights team to the Democratic Republic of the
Congo to
conduct a mapping of the serious violations committed between 1993 and 2003”.67
This
intention was reaffirmed in the two following reports of the Secretary-General
of
_______________
66 In paragraph 11 of Resolution 1493 (2003), the Security
Council “encourages the Secretary-General,
through his Special Representative, and the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights to
coordinate their efforts in particular to assist the transitional authorities of
the DRC in order to put an end to
impunity”. In paragraph 5, subparagraph g of Resolution 1565 (2004), the
Security Council “decides that
MONUC will also have the mandate, in support of the Government of National Unity
and Transition: (…)
to assist in the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular
attention to women, children and
vulnerable persons, investigate human rights violations to put an end to
impunity, and continue to cooperate
with efforts to ensure that those responsible for serious violations of human
rights and international
humanitarian law are brought to justice, while working closely with the relevant
agencies of the United
Nations.”
67 Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2006/390), paragraph
54.
21 September 2006 and 20 March 2007.68 On 8 May 2007, the
Secretary-General
approved the Terms of Reference of the Mapping Exercise. The Mapping Exercise
was
subsequently presented to the Congolese authorities, notably to President Joseph
Kabila,
by whom it was well received, and to some of his cabinet ministers, by the UN
High
Commissioner for Human Rights during her visit to the DRC in May 2007. In
Resolution
1794 (2007) of 21 December 2007, the Security Council requested the full support
of the
Congolese authorities for the OHCHR-initiated Mapping Exercise. On 30 June 2008,
a
letter was sent by the High Commissioner to President Kabila announcing the
imminent
arrival of the Mapping Exercise Team. The Mapping Exercise began officially on
17
July 2008 with the arrival of the Chief of the Mapping Team in Kinshasa. Around
twenty
human rights officers were deployed over the entire territory of the DRC between
October 2008 and May 2009 to gather documents and information from witnesses to
meet the three objectives defined in the Terms of Reference. The Congolese
Government
has expressed its support for the Mapping Exercise on several occasions, notably
in the
statement delivered by the Minister of Human Rights at the Special session of
the Human
Rights Council on the human rights situation in the East of the DRC in November
2008
and in various meetings between the Chief of the Mapping Exercise, the Minister
of
Justice and the Minister of Human Rights.
89. On 8 May 2007, the Secretary-General approved the ToR of the Mapping
Exercise, delineating the following three objectives:
· Conduct a mapping exercise of the most serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the DRC
between March 1993 and June 2003.
· Assess the existing capacities within the national justice system to deal
appropriately with such human rights violations that may be uncovered.
· Formulate a series of options aimed at assisting the Government of the DRC in
identifying appropriate transitional justice mechanisms to deal with the legacy
of
these violations, in terms of truth, justice, reparation and reform, taking into
account ongoing efforts by the DRC authorities, as well as the support of the
international community.69
90. It was decided that OHCHR would lead the Mapping Exercise and the project
was
funded by the voluntary contributions of ten interested partners.70
The UNDP Country
Office in the DRC was responsible for the financial administration of the
Mapping
Exercise and MONUC provided logistical support. The three parties signed an
agreement
_______________
68 Twenty-second and twenty-third reports of the
Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2006/759 and
S/2007/156 and Corr.1).
69 Article 1, ToR.
70 Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea,
the United Kingdom,
Sweden, Switzerland and the MacArthur Foundation.
defining their respective rights and obligations.71 The continued
and overwhelming
support of these three bodies for the Mapping Exercise should be mentioned at
this
juncture.
91. In the words of the High Commissioner in office at the time, the Mapping
Exercise report was “expected to be the first and only comprehensive United
Nations
report documenting major human rights violations committed within the territory
of the
DRC between 1993 and 2003. In this regard, the report should be of fundamental
importance in the context of efforts devoted to protecting human rights and
combating
impunity.” By contributing significantly to the documentation on the most
serious
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed in the
DRC
during this time of conflict,72 this report aims to assist the
Congolese authorities and civil
society in defining and implementing a strategy that will enable the many
victims to
obtain justice and thereby fight the widespread impunity. This should also
enable the
mobilisation of other international resources to address the principal
challenges faced by
the DRC with regard to justice and reconciliation.
92. The ToR required the Mapping Exercise Team73 to “start and
complete this
exercise as soon as possible (…) to assist the new Government with the tools to
manage
post-conflict processes”.74 It was expected to take at least two
months for the Team to be
recruited, deployed and become fully operational, followed by an additional
period of six
months to carry out the Mapping Exercise, extendable should the circumstances
require
it. Although many considered the timeframe for the Mapping Exercise to be too
short for
the scale of the task at hand, it was nonetheless necessary given the urgent
need to bring
the operation – the launch of which had been reported on many occasions – to a
speedy
conclusion so that the Congolese people could start benefiting from it right
away. In the
end, the Mapping Exercise would last just over ten months in total, from the
arrival of the
Chief of the Mapping Exercise in late July 2008 to the submission of the final
report to
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in mid-June 2009.
_______________
71 Memorandum of understanding between UNDP, MONUC and OHCHR
relating to the implementation of
the Mapping Exercise on serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law committed
in the DRC between 1993 and 2003, signed in December 2007.
72 As the DRC was formerly known as “Zaire”, this name will appear in this
report for the period ending
May 1997.
73 “Team” is used to designate the body of human rights specialists who led the
Mapping Exercise
investigations across the DRC. These specialists may also be designated “Mapping
Exercise Teams” or
“Mapping Teams”.
74 Article 2.3, ToR.
METHODOLOGY
93. A “mapping exercise” is a generic expression implying no predefined
methodology or format.75 A mapping exercise itself should be
concerned not only with
the violations themselves but also with the context(s) in which they were
committed,
either in a given region or across an entire country, as is the case here. Such
an exercise
may include various activities, such as the collection, analysis and assessment
of
information, surveys and witness interviews, and consultation with field experts
and
consultants, among others. This type of project is not an entirely new concept.
It has
much in common with international commissions of inquiry, commissions of experts
and
fact-finding commissions. It functions perfectly as a preliminary step prior to
the
formulation of transitional justice mechanisms, whether they be judicial or not,
to enable
the identification of challenges, the assessment of needs and better targeting
of
interventions. It can also be found in international and hybrid jurisdictions,
where it is
used to better define investigations and devise global completion strategies.
Among the
recent examples of mapping exercises, some have been based solely on documents
in the
public domain (Afghanistan) and others on interviews with thousands of witnesses
(Sierra Leone).
94. Mapping remains a preliminary exercise that does not seek to gather
evidence of
sufficient admissibility to stand in court, but rather to “provide the basis for
the
formulation of initial hypotheses of investigation by giving a sense of the
scale of
violations, detecting patterns and identifying potential leads or sources of
evidence”.76
With regard to human rights and international humanitarian law violations, the
Mapping
Exercise should provide a description of the violation(s), their nature and
location in time
and space, the victim(s) and their approximate number and the – often armed –
group(s)
to which the perpetrators belong(ed), among others. As a result, the findings of
such an
operation should be very useful for all transitional justice mechanisms, whether
they be
judicial or not.
95. The six-month deployment timeframe set by the Secretary-General for the
Mapping Exercise, with the mandate of covering the most serious violations of
human
rights and international humanitarian law committed across the whole territory
of the
DRC over a ten-year period, provided a methodology of sorts. It was not a case
of
pursuing in-depth investigations, but rather gathering basic information on the
most
serious incidents, chronologically and province by province.77 The
collection, analysis
and use of any existing information sources on the violations committed during
the
_______________
75 As a point of interest, the French translations of “mapping” –
cartographie, inventaire or état des lieux
(inventory) – fail to reflect accurately the potential scope of a mapping
exercise, and it was decided by the
team to retain the generic English term to designate this exercise in French.
76 OHCHR, Rule-of-Law tools for post-conflict states: Prosecution initiatives,
United Nations, New York
and Geneva, 2008, p.6.
77 Article 4.2, ToR: “It should be carried out province by province, and in
chronological order of events. It
should gather basic information and not replace in-depth investigations into the
incidents uncovered.”
period under examination was also established as a starting point for the
Exercise, in
particular “the outcome of past United Nations missions to the country”.78
The
subsequent six-month deployment of five in-field mobile Teams would enable this
information to be verified and corroborated or invalidated with the aid of
independent
sources, while also enabling the reporting of previously undocumented
violations.
96. A document outlining the methodology to be followed by the Mapping Team
was
drafted on the basis of United Nations-developed tools, in particular those of
OHCHR.
These methodological tools covered the following areas in particular: a gravity
threshold
for the selection of serious violations, standard of evidence required, identity
of
perpetrators and groups, confidentiality, witness protection, witness
interviewing
guidelines with a standardised fiche d’entretien, and physical evidence
guidelines
(including mass graves), among others. It was important that the methodology
adopted
for the Mapping Exercise catered for the requirements and constraints of the ToR,
in
particular the necessity to cover the entire Congolese territory as well as the
period from
1993 to 2003, to report only the “most serious” violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law and to ensure that the security of witnesses was
not
compromised and that information was kept confidential.
Gravity threshold
97. The expression “serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian
law”, used by the Secretary-General to define the first objective of the Mapping
Exercise,
is non-specific and open to interpretation. Generally speaking, it is intended
to apply to
violations of the right to life and the right to physical integrity. It may also
cover
violations of other fundamental human rights, in particular where such
violations are
systematic and motivated by forms of discrimination forbidden under
international law.
In international humanitarian law, violations are considered serious when they
endanger
protected persons and property, or when they violate important values.
98. Given the scale of the violations committed in the ten years of conflict
over a very
vast territory, it was necessary to select from the most serious crimes. Each
recorded
incident demonstrates the commission of one or several serious violations of
human
rights and international humanitarian law localised to a given date and
location.
Occasionally, a wave of individual violations (e.g. arbitrary arrests and
detentions,
summary executions, etc.) is considered as one incident.
99. To identify the most serious incidents (those describing the commission
of the
most serious violations) a gravity threshold similar to that used in
international criminal
law to identify the most serious situations and crimes for investigation and
prosecution
was used.79 The gravity threshold provides a set of criteria enabling
the identification of
_______________
78 Article 4.1, ToR.
79 The main organisations that were contacted were: Human Rights Watch, Amnesty
International,
International Center for Transitional Justice, Global Rights, Global Witness,
Open Society (Justice
incidents of sufficient gravity to be included in the final report. These
criteria function as
a whole. No one criterion alone can be the decisive factor and all may be used
to justify
the decision to class an incident as serious. The criteria used to select the
incidents listed
in this report fall into four categories:
Standard of evidence
100. Since the primary objective of the Mapping Exercise is to “gather basic
information on incidents uncovered”, the level of evidence required is naturally
lesser
_____
Initiative), Right and Accountability in Development,
International Crisis Group, The International
Federation for Human Rights, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers,
Minority Rights Group
International, Droits et démocratie, Médecins sans frontières and the
International Committee of the Red
Cross.
than would normally be expected in a case brought before a criminal court. It
is not a
question, therefore, of being satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that a crime
was
committed, but rather having reasonable suspicion that the incident did occur; a
level of
evidence decidedly lower than that required to secure a criminal conviction.
Reasonable
suspicion is defined as “a reliable body of material consistent with other
verified
circumstances tending to show that an incident or event did happen”.80
In cases
where such reliable bodies of material were gathered by the Mapping Team, it was
decided that incidents would be described using the past tense, without the use
of
hypothetical formulations.
---Assessing the reliability of information
101. Assessing the reliability of the information obtained was a two-stage
process
involving evaluation of the reliability and credibility of the source, and then
the
pertinence and truth of the information itself. This method is known as the
admiralty
scale. Reliability of the source is determined using several factors, including
the nature,
objectivity and professionalism of the organisation providing the information,
the
methodology used and the quality of prior information obtained from the same
source.
The validity and authenticity of the information is assessed by comparing it to
other
available data relating to the same incidents to ensure that it tallies with
already verified
elements and circumstances. In other words, the process involves corroborating
the
originally obtained information by ensuring that the corroborating elements do
in fact
come from a different source than the primary source that provided the
information in the
first place. Such corroboration will generally be obtained from evidence
gathered in the
Mapping Exercise, but may also come from other reports and documents. However,
different reports on the same incident and based on the same primary source
would not
constitute corroboration by a separate source.
---Identification of individual and group perpetrators
102. Unlike some commissions of inquiry with a specific mandate to “identify
the
perpetrators of violations and make them accountable for their actions”,81
the objective of
the Mapping Exercise is limited to compiling an inventory of the most serious
violations
of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the
territory of the
DRC between March 1993 and June 2003.82 The objective of the Mapping
Exercise was
_______________
80 Another possible formulation would be “reliable and consistent
indications tending to show that the
incident did happen”.
81 See Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the
Secretary-General (S/2005/60);
see also Security Council Resolution 1564 (2004) of 18 September 2004.
82 The mandate of the Mapping Exercise is closer to that of the Commission of
Experts reviewing the
prosecution of serious violations of human rights committed in Timor-Leste (then
East Timor) in 1999
(S/2005/458), whose mandate was to “gather and compile systematically
information on (…) violations of
human rights and acts which may constitute breaches of international
humanitarian law committed in East
Timor (…) and to provide the Secretary-General with its conclusions with a view
to enabling him to make
recommendations on future actions”; see Commission on Human Rights Resolution
1999/S-4/1.
therefore not to establish or to try to establish individual criminal
responsibility of given
actors.
103. The only reference to this matter in the ToR for the Mapping Exercise
can be
found in the Methodology section, in which it states that the Exercise “should
gather
basic information (e.g. establishing the locations, timings and backgrounds of
major
incidents, the approximate numbers of victims, the alleged perpetrators, etc.)
and not
replace in-depth investigations into the incidents uncovered”. Although the
primary
objective of the Mapping Exercise is not to identify the alleged perpetrators or
people
who should be held accountable for their actions, it was nevertheless necessary
to gather
basic information relating to the identity of alleged individual or group
perpetrators.
Given the level of evidence used in this Exercise, however, it would be unwise –
unjust,
even – to seek to ascribe criminal responsibility to certain individuals. Such a
conclusion
should be dependent on legal proceedings pursued on the basis of an appropriate
level of
evidence. However, it seems essential to identify the groups involved in order
to classify
these serious violations of international humanitarian law. Finally, the
identities of the
alleged perpetrators of some of the crimes listed will not appear in this report
but are held
in the confidential project database submitted to the United Nations High
Commissioner
for Human Rights, who will determine the conditions for its access.83
However, the
identities of perpetrators under warrant of arrest and those already sentenced
for crimes
listed in the report have been disclosed. It should also be noted that where
political
officials have assumed public positions encouraging or provoking the violations
listed,
their names have been cited in the sections relating to the political context.
Other aspects accounted for in the methodology
104. Beyond the methodological tools presented above, certain constraints
particular to
the Mapping Exercise, the prevailing situation in the DRC and the accessibility
of certain
sites have been taken into consideration during investigations to verify
previously
identified incidents. For example, the capacity of the Mapping Exercise to
investigate
certain incidents has at times been limited due to difficulties accessing some
remote
regions of the country, or due to security issues that prevent their access. The
choice of
priority areas for investigation and the main incidents for verification was
also influenced
by the short timeframe – six months – allocated to the implementation of the
Mapping
Exercise itself. Investigations that would take too long to achieve the
anticipated findings
that would feature in the final report were not included. To an even greater
extent,
acknowledgement of the global mandate of the Mapping Exercise – to cover the
whole of
the Congolese territory for the entire period from March 1993 to June 2003
so as to
present a detailed and well-balanced report of the many violations of human
rights and
_______________
83 Article 4.3, ToR: “Sensitive information gathered during the
Mapping Exercise should be stored and
utilised according to the strictest standards of confidentiality. The Team
should develop a database for the
purposes of the Mapping Exercise, access to which should be determined by the
High Commissioner for
Human Rights.”
international humanitarian law committed at that time – for the most part
dictated the
choice of the main incidents reported.
105. In this report, each verified (corroborated) incident is reported in a
separate
paragraph, indented and preceded by a bullet point. Each of these paragraphs
includes a
brief description of the incident identifying the nature of the violations and
crimes
committed, their location in time and space, a description of the individual or
group
perpetrators involved and details of the victims and their approximate number.
In the
reported incidents, figures relating to the number of victims have been provided
as a
means of assessing the scale of violations and are in no way intended to be
definitive. As
a general rule, the Mapping Exercise has used the lowest and most realistic
assessment of
victim numbers indicated by the various sources and has sometimes resorted to
estimates.
In light of its mandate, it was not the responsibility of the Mapping Exercise
to ascertain
the total number of victims of violations of human rights and international
humanitarian
law in the DRC during the period in question, given that precise victim counts
are not
essential to determining the legal classification of violations. Each paragraph
describing
an incident is followed by a footnote identifying the primary and secondary
sources of the
information reported. Incidents not corroborated by a second independent source
have not
been included in this report, even in cases where the information came from a
reliable
source. Such incidents are, however, recorded in the database.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MAPPING EXERCISE
106. The Mapping Exercise was rolled out in three successive phases. Phase
one,
known as the “Pre-Deployment Phase”, began with the arrival of the Chief of the
Mapping Exercise on 17 July 2008 and ended with the deployment of the in-field
Teams
from 17 October 2008 onwards. Phase two covers the deployment of the Teams
across
the country to cover all provinces of the DRC from five regional field offices.
The
deployment phase lasted seven months and ended on 15 May 2009 with the closure
of the
field offices. In the final, post-deployment phase, all the data were compiled
and final
verifications made with a view to completing the draft of the final report,
which was
submitted to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on 15 June
2009.
107. Phase one (17 July 2008 to 17 October 2008) was essentially aimed at
ensuring
the successful start-up of the Mapping Exercise, obtaining logistical support
and
developing the necessary methodological and legal tools for the Mapping Team to
carry
out the mandate.
108. Meetings were also held with the main partners of the Mapping Exercise
(MONUC and UNDP), diplomatic missions as well as actors involved in human rights
and the fight against impunity in the DRC (UN organisations, international NGOs,
religious groups and trade unions, among others) to explain the Exercise and
seek their
collaboration.
109. Phase two (17 October 2008 to 15 May 2009) was dedicated to carrying out
the
mandate itself, including all analyses, investigations and consultations
necessary both to
prepare the inventory of the most serious violations of human rights and
international
humanitarian law and also to assess the existing capacities of the Congolese
judicial
system to deal with this, including options relating to transitional justice
mechanisms that
could contribute to the fight against impunity.
110. Phase three (15 May 2009 to 15 June 2009) saw the closing down of the
Mapping
Exercise with the compilation of data, final updating of the database, the
organisation,
digitisation and classification of all the archives and the drafting of the
final version of
the report. Regional consultations regarding transitional justice were held in
this last
phase in the form of round-table meetings with civil society representatives in
Bunia,
Bukavu, Goma and Kinshasa.
ACTIVITIES OF THE MAPPING EXERCISE
---Official meetings
111. The Chief of the Mapping Exercise attended official meetings with nearly
one
hundred actors, partners and individuals involved in matters of justice and the
fight
against impunity in the DRC to explain the objectives of the Exercise and seek
their
support. Among these, the following should be noted:
· DRC government authorities, i.e. the Minister of Justice (on two occasions)
and
the Minister of Human Rights (also on two occasions). Both Ministers assured the
Chief of the Mapping Exercise of their collaboration and support for this
exercise.
· Donors, who were met at the start, mid-point and end of the Exercise, and to
whom a progress report was submitted on each occasion. Meetings were held with
the following: the Ambassadors of Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands,
Sweden and the United Kingdom, and representatives of the Republic of Korea
and Switzerland.
· Representatives of United States, French and European Union diplomatic
missions.
· Heads of United Nations organisations: UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR,
UNFPA/UNIFEM.
· MONUC leaders: Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Alan Doss,
and his deputies, Ross Mountain and Leila Zerrougui; and representatives of the
various MONUC offices, including Human Rights, Child Protection, Rule of Law
and the Gender Office.
· Francis Deng, Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide; Walter Kälin,
Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally
displaced persons.
· Head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegation;
representatives in the DRC of OXFAM, Save the Children, Global Rights,
Médecins Sans Frontières (France and Belgium), International Center for
Transitional Justice (ICTJ), Avocats Sans Frontières (Belgium) and a
representative of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
· A number of local NGOs involved in human rights and justice in the DRC.
---Professional contacts
112. A number of contacts were established with Congolese non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) in order to obtain information, documents and reports on
the
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that
occurred in the
DRC during the period covered by the ToR. To this end, meetings were held with
over
two hundred NGO representatives during the course of the mandate, both to
present the
Mapping Exercise and request their collaboration. Thanks to this collaboration,
the
Mapping Team has had access to critical information, witnesses and reports
relating to
the violations committed between 1993 and 2003. Without the courageous and
outstanding work of the Congolese NGOs during these ten years, documenting the
many
violations in such a short period of time would have been incredibly difficult.
113. Contacts were also established with international organisations and NGOs
to
obtain information, reports and documents relating to the Mapping Exercise
mandate.84
Almost all responded positively to this request.85 Research and
documentation
centres also contributed to the success of the Exercise by allowing Team members
to
consult their archives and meet with researchers.86 Several DRC
experts also visited the
Mapping Exercise on trips to Kinshasa to speak to the Team.87
---Collection and analysis of information
_______________
84 The main organisations contacted were the following: Human
Rights Watch, Amnesty International,
International Center for Transitional Justice, Global Rights, Global Witness,
Open Society (Justice
Initiative), Rights & Accountability in Development, International Crisis Group,
International Federation
for Human Rights, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Minority Rights
Group International, Rights
& Democracy, Médecins Sans Frontières and the International Committee of the Red
Cross.
85 Two organisations, Rights & Democracy and Global Witness, were also important
contributors and
prepared special reports on the issues of sexual violence and human rights
violations relating to the illegal
exploitation of natural resources respectively.
86 Groupe Jérémie/RODHECIC (Kinshasa-based network of Christian organisations
working to promote
human rights and education), Centre d’information et de solidarité avec
l’Afrique (France), IPRA’s
(International Peace Research Association) Congo Peace Project, Centre for Peace
Research and Strategic
Studies, Institute for International and European Policy, Faculty of Social
Sciences, Catholic University of
Leuven (Belgium), Entraide Missionnaire (Canada) and the University of
Pittsburgh (USA).
87 Suliman Baldo (ICTJ – International Center for Transitional Justice), Anneke
Van Woudenberg (HRW –
Human Rights Watch), Filip Reintjens (University of Antwerp), Peter Rosenblum
(Columbia Law School),
Jason Stearns (UN Group of Experts on the DRC) and Arthur Kepel (ICG –
International Crisis Group).
114. The main activity of the Mapping Exercise consisted in collecting and
analysing
as much information as possible on the serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law committed during the period covered by the ToR.
The
Mapping Teams obtained over 1,500 documents. The documents come from many
sources, including the United Nations and its agencies, the Congolese
government, major
international human rights organisations, Congolese human rights organisations,
the
national and international media and various NGOs (unions, religious groups, aid
agencies, victims’ associations, etc.). Among the documents, over three hundred
are
confidential, notably the archives of the Secretary-General’s 1998 investigative
Team,
and some internal NGO reports. The Mapping Teams also consulted a large number
of
articles in the national and international press, as well as monographs on
topics related to
the mandate. Lastly, various sources, individuals and experts, national and
international,
were also consulted in order to open up new avenues of research, corroborate
some of the
information obtained and streamline the overall analysis of the situation.
115. Analysis of all these documents enabled the Team to establish a
chronology by
region of the main incidents revealing serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law committed on the territory of the DRC between
March
1993 and June 2003. The analysis resulted in the initial identification of over
660 major
incidents for verification. Only incidents meeting the gravity threshold
developed in the
methodology were considered. Subsequently, investigative work in the different
provinces revealed the existence of new and unreported serious incidents which
were
added to the original chronology as and when they were found, bringing the
number of
major incidents in the database to 782 major incidents.
---In-field verification investigations
116. On the basis of the chronology, five in-field mobile Teams had the task
of
verifying, confirming or invalidating information relating to the occurrence of
key
incidents revealing the commission of serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law. Each Team comprised two international human
rights
officers, supported by a Congolese human rights associate. The work of these
Teams
consisted essentially of meeting with witnesses to confirm or invalidate the
occurrence of
the most serious violations reported in the chronology. To this end, each
reported incident
had to be confirmed by at least one independent source in addition to the
primary source
in order to confirm its authenticity. Every incident investigated by the Teams
was then
recorded in the Mapping Exercise database.
117. Over one thousand witnesses were interviewed by the Mapping
Exercise Teams
about major incidents identified in the chronology. Of the 782 open incidents
and cases
in the database, the Teams were able to close 563 (71%) cases in the
verification
process. Although some cases were invalidated, the majority of them were
confirmed. It was not possible, however, to verify the 219 remaining
cases (29%),
either through lack of time or being unable to access the regions in question or
the
witnesses of incidents, or being unable to find an independent source to confirm
the
information obtained from an initial source. Some cases include several
incidents,
meaning, for example, that a large-scale attack could manifest itself in
different types of
violations or target different groups. Consequently, in the report, confirmed
cases
constitute 617 incidents.
118. All the relevant information relating to the 782 open incidents and
cases can be
found in the Mapping Exercise database, which was submitted to the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva. The following entries can be found in
the
database for each incident or case: the source(s) of the original information,
fiche(s)
d’entretien with witnesses to the incident, the nature of the violations
committed, a
description of the violations and their location in time and space, preliminary
classification of crimes revealed by the incident, the approximate number of
victims, the
armed group(s) involved and the identities of some of the victims and the
alleged
perpetrators.
---Investigation and analysis of specific acts of
violence against women and children,
and acts of violence linked to the illegal exploitation of natural resources
119. Given that the methodology used for the first part of the report would
not enable
full justice to be done to the numerous victims of specific acts of violence
such as sexual
violence and violence against children, nor adequately reflect the scale of the
violence
practised by all armed groups in the DRC, nor enable an analysis of the causes
of some of
the conflicts, it was decided at the beginning of the Exercise to devote a part
of it to these
subjects, based partly on the investigations of the Mapping Team but also to a
large
extent on specific documents supporting these violations. Although these
specific acts of
violence are mentioned in several incidents recorded in the first part of the
report, this
more global approach enabled the Team to better illustrate in Part II the scale
of the
phenomena of rape, recruitment of child soldiers and violations of human rights
linked to
the illegal exploitation of natural resources. This has helped to highlight the
recurrent,
widespread and systematic use of these specific violations by all parties in the
various
conflicts and enabled a brief analysis to be produced.
---Assessment of the resources available to the
national justice system to deal with the
serious violations identified
120. One important aspect of the ToR for the Mapping Exercise is the
assessment of
the resources available to the Congolese justice system to deal with the
numerous crimes
committed. A “Justice Team” was created within the Mapping Exercise to address
these
matters. Around 200 actors in the judicial system as well as national experts in
domestic criminal law and international law were interviewed by the Justice Team
in
Kinshasa and in the provinces, notably the civilian and military judicial
authorities,
government representatives and the government agencies responsible for the
reform of
the Congolese judicial system.
121. The Justice Team began by carrying out an analysis of the domestic and
international law applicable in this area, as well as the courts with
jurisdiction
prosecute and judge the alleged perpetrators of the serious violations of
human rights and
international law committed between March 1993 and June 2003. A study of
Congolese
case law on crimes under international law was also carried out to illustrate
domestic
judicial practice in this area. The Team then assessed the capacities of the
national justice
system with regard to fighting impunity. The Team integrated the points of view
and the
needs expressed by judicial system actors met in Kinshasa, Orientale Province,
Ituri,
South Kivu and North Kivu, as well as in audit reports for the Congolese justice
system
created by the Congolese authorities (Plan of Action for Justice Reform) and by
international agencies and some donors involved in the reform of the Congolese
justice
system.
---Formulation of options in the field of
transitional justice mechanisms that could help
to combat impunity in the DRC
122. To formulate options for transitional justice mechanisms that were
compatible
with efforts already underway and with the international obligations of the DRC
concerning the fight against impunity, consultations were held in Goma, Bukavu
and
Kinshasa with professors of criminal law, human rights NGOs, victims’
associations,
civil society experts working in the fight against impunity and representatives
of bar
societies and judges’ associations. Regional consultations regarding various
areas of
transitional justice were organised in the form of round-table meetings with
civil society
representatives in Bunia, Bukavu, Goma and Kinshasa. In all, these round-table
meetings
attracted more than one hundred representatives of victims’ associations and
human
rights organisations involved in matters of justice and the fight against
impunity.
123. In particular, the Team assessed the extent to which current reforms of
the justice
system and the security sector address the imperative to prevent further
violations of
human rights, combat impunity and meet the needs of the many victims in terms of
truth
and reparation. Finally, the Team was in a position to formulate several
transitional
justice options as part of the current efforts in the country to reform the
judicial system,
to reform Congolese law and to create new institutions that would promote
greater
respect in the DRC for its international obligations concerning justice and the
fight
against impunity.
CONCLUSION
124. Drawing up an inventory of the most serious violations of human rights
and
international humanitarian law that were committed on DRC territory between
March
1993 and June 2003, the report concludes that the vast majority of the 617
listed incidents
constitute crimes under international law. These were war crimes committed
during
armed conflict, either internal or international, or crimes against humanity
committed in
the context of a generalised or systematic attack against a civilian population,
or in many
cases both. The issue of whether the many serious acts of violence committed
against
Hutus in 1996 and 1997 constitute crimes of genocide has also been addressed,
and the
report emphasises that there are elements that could indicate that genocide has
been
committed, but that the question can only be addressed by a competent court
that would
rule on individual cases.
125. The lack of political will to prosecute those who are responsible for
serious
violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law committed in
the DRC
has only encouraged further serious violations, which continue to this day. The
report
notes that, because of the many issues that arise when seeking justice for the
crimes
committed in the DRC, it is crucial that a holistic policy of transitional
justice be
implemented, which will depend on the creation of diverse and complementary
mechanisms, both judicial and non-judicial. The report does not give any
recommendations or directives in the strict sense of the word, but it does
examine the
advantages and drawbacks of various transitional justice options in terms of
truth, justice,
reparation for and rehabilitation of victims, reform of judicial and security
institutions
(including vetting measures), and reconciliation, or indeed reconstruction of
the historical
truth in the current Congolese context. These options, which must be examined by
the
Government of the DRC and civil society, include: a) the creation of a mixed
jurisdiction; b) creation of a new Truth and Reconciliation Commission; c)
reparation
programmes; and d) reforms of both the legal sector and the security forces. In
order to
achieve this, the report recommends that national consultations be carried out
in order to
provide credibility and legitimacy to the mechanism(s) to be adopted.
SECTION I. INVENTORY OF THE MOST SERIOUS
VIOLATIONS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW COMMITTED WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE DRC
BETWEEN MARCH 1993 AND JUNE 2003
126. The period examined by this report is probably one of the most tragic
chapters in
the recent history of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), if not the
whole of
Africa. Indeed, the decade was marked by a string of major political crises,
wars and
multiple ethnic and religious conflicts that brought about the deaths of
hundreds of
thousands, if not millions, of people.88 Very few Congolese and
foreign civilians living
on the territory of the DRC managed to escape the violence, and were victims of
murder,
maiming, rape, forced displacement, pillage, destruction of property or economic
and
social rights violations.
127. Compiling an inventory of the most serious violations of human rights
and
international humanitarian law committed in the DRC during this period presents
a
number of challenges. In spite of the scale and the extreme nature of the
violence that
characterises the violations in some of the country’s provinces, it has been
necessary to
take into consideration less serious violations as well as seemingly less
affected regions.
Confirming violations that occurred over ten years ago can sometimes prove
impossible
on account of the displacement of witnesses and victims. In some cases,
violations appear
to be isolated crimes and it is difficult to account for them. They can only be
integrated in
the waves of violence occurring in a given geographical location or within a
given
timeframe. Vis-à-vis the frightening number of violations committed, the sheer
size of the
country and difficulties accessing many sites, the Mapping Exercise is therefore
necessarily incomplete and cannot reconstruct the complexity of each situation
or obtain
justice for all of the victims.
128. The inventory that follows, therefore, aims solely to present the most
serious
violations committed during the period under examination. The inventory
endeavours
nonetheless to cover the entire Congolese territory. It will be presented in
chronological
order, in relation to four key successive periods in the recent history of
Zaire/Congo. The
first period, from March 1993 to June 1996, describes violations committed in
the final
years of the regime of President Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, marked by the failure of
the
democratisation process and the devastating consequences of the Rwandan
genocide, in
particular in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu. The second period,
from July
1996 to July 1998, covers violations committed during the First Congo War and
the first
fourteen months of the regime established by President Laurent-Désiré Kabila.
The third
period concerns the inventory of violations committed between the start of the
Second
Congo War in August 1998 and the death of President Kabila in January 2001.
Lastly, the
final period lists violations committed against a background of increasing
observation of
the ceasefire along the front line and the speeding up of peace negotiations in
preparation
for the start of the transition period on 30 June 2003.
_______________
88 The International Rescue Committee
(IRC) conducted four mortality surveys in the DRC between 1998
and 2004. According to the IRC, from the start of the Second Congo War in August
1998 to the end of April
2004 around 3.8 million people were thought to have died as the direct or
indirect victims of the War and
the armed conflict. It should be noted, however, that the methodology used by
the IRC to determine the
number of indirect deaths is based on epidemiological studies and population
growth estimates that have
been disputed. In light of its mandate, it was not the responsibility of the
Mapping Exercise to ascertain the
total number of deaths attributable to the situation in the DRC during the
period in question.
CHAPTER I. MARCH 1993 – JUNE 1996: FAILURE OF
THE
DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS AND REGIONAL CRISIS
129. In the early 1990s, under pressure from the people and donors, President
Mobutu
was compelled to re-establish a multiparty system and convene a national
conference. As
the months went by, however, Mobutu managed to off-balance his opponents and
remain
in power through the use of violence and corruption, and by using tribal and
regional
antagonisms to his advantage. This strategy had particularly serious
consequences for
Zaire, including the destruction of key infrastructures, economic meltdown, the
forced
deportation of civilians in Katanga, ethnic violence in North Kivu and increased
tribalism. Violations of human rights also became commonplace across the entire
country.
130. In 1994, after months of institutional paralysis, supporters and
opponents of
President Mobutu eventually came to an agreement on the appointment by consensus
of a
prime minister and the establishment of a transition parliament. However, the
agreement
did not succeed in solving the political crisis, curbing the criminalisation of
security
forces or setting the country on the road towards elections. From July 1994
onwards, the
influx of 1.2 million Rwandan Hutu refugees following the Tutsi genocide in
Rwanda
further destabilised the province of North Kivu and made the situation in South
Kivu still
more delicate. Due to the presence among the refugees of members of the former
Forces
armées rwandaises (later “ex-FAR”), as well as militias responsible for the
genocide (the
Interahamwe), and given the alliance that had existed for some years between the
former
Rwandan regime and President Mobutu, this humanitarian crisis quickly
degenerated into
a diplomatic and security crisis between Zaire and the new Rwandan authorities.
131. Faced with the use by the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe of refugee camps as
a
base from which to lead their incursions into Rwanda, in 1995 the new Rwandan
authorities opted for a military solution to the crisis. With the aid of Uganda
and Tutsis
from North and South Kivu who had been denied Zairian citizenship by the
transition
parliament at Kinshasa, they organised a rebellion to counter the ex-FAR and
Interahamwe and bring about a change of regime in Kinshasa.
132. During this period, the most serious violations of human rights and
international
humanitarian law were concentrated for the most part in Katanga, North Kivu and
in the
city-province of Kinshasa.
133. For over a century, a sizeable community from the Kasai provinces had
settled in
Katanga89 to construct the railway at the request of the Belgian
colonial authorities and
_______________
89 The province of Katanga was called Shaba from 1971 to 1997.
50
work
work in the mines. With the exception of the secession period (1960-1963),
the natives of
Katanga90 and the natives of the Kasai provinces91 had always lived
in harmony. Under
the regime of President Mobutu, however, the Katangese felt politically
marginalised and
criticised the Kasaians for taking up too many jobs and management positions, in
particular in the largest mining firm, Gécamines.92 After the political
liberalisation of the
regime, most Kasaian and Katangese delegates to the National Sovereign
Conference
(CNS) united under the opposition front known as the “Sacred Union” to overthrow
President Mobutu. In November 1991, however, President Mobutu managed to get
Katangese delegates from the Union of Federalists and Independent Republicans
(UFERI) to split with the Sacred Union’s main party, the Union for Democracy and
Social Progress (UDPS) led by Étienne Tshisekedi.
134. Following this change of alliance, the president of UFERI, Nguz Karl-i-Bond,
became Prime Minister; the party’s provincial president, Kyungu wa Kumwanza, was
appointed Governor of Shaba and relations between the Kasaians and the Katangese
began to seriously deteriorate. While in Kinshasa, Étienne Tshisekedi and Nguz
Karl-i-
Bond were fighting for control of the CNS, in Shaba, Governor Kyungu wa Kumwanza
had begun to demonise UDPS and its supporters. As UDPS was very popular among
the
Kasaians in Shaba and Étienne Tshisekedi himself hailed from Kasai Oriental, the
political conflict between UFERI and UDPS took on a tribal dimension. For
months,
Kyungu wa Kumwanza accused the Kasaians of opposing Nguz Karl-i-Bond’s
Government so they could continue dominating the Katangese. Blaming them for the
majority of the province’s problems, he called on the Katangese to expel them.
At his
instigation, many young Katangese enlisted in UFERI’s youth wing, JUFERI,93
where
they received paramilitary training inspired by Mayi-Mayi rites.94
135. The first attacks on Kasaian civilians by members of the JUFERI militia
took
place in late 1991 and early 1992 in the towns of Luena, Bukama, Pweto, Kasenga,
Fungurume and Kapolowe. In the first half of 1992, Kyungu wa Kumwanza dismissed
many Kasaians from the courts, the education sector, hospitals, state-owned
companies,
sports associations, state media and the administration. In several towns,
Kasaian traders
could no longer access public markets and, in many areas, JUFERI prohibited them
from
_______________
90 In the text that follows, the natives of Katanga are
designated “Katangese”.
91 In the text that follows, the natives of the Kasai provinces are designated “Kasaians”.
92 La Générale des Carrières et des Mines (state-owned mining company).
93 JUFERI was run as a full-blown militia. It comprised several branches,
including the Division spéciale
Pononai (DSPO), responsible for eliminating the movement’s enemies, the Division
spéciale PUMINA,
responsible for attacks on the Kasaians (torture, beatings, torching homes,
etc.) and the Ninja group, which
practised martial arts and was responsible for ensuring the protection of UFERI
leaders.
94In the DRC, the term Mayi-Mayi is used to designate groups of armed combatants
resorting to specific
magic rituals such as water ablutions (“Mayi” in Swahili) and carrying amulets
prepared by witchdoctors,
believed to make them invulnerable and protect them from ill fate. Present
mainly in South Kivu and North
Kivu, but also in other provinces, the various Mayi-Mayi groups included armed
forces led by warlords,
traditional tribal elders, village heads and local political officers. The
Mayi-Mayi lacked cohesion and the
different groups allied themselves with various government groups and armed
forces at different times.
farming the land. After the election of Étienne Tshisekedi by the CNS to the
post of
prime minister on 15 August 1992, the tension mounted. At Lubumbashi, JUFERI
youths
looted Kasaian homes before being overpowered by the army, the FAZ (Forces
armées
zaïroises), in bloody clashes. In the days that followed, Kyungu wa Kumwanza and
Nguz
Karl-i-Bond accused the Kasaians of insulting the Katangese at gatherings held
to
celebrate the election of the UDPS leader to the Premiership. Likening the
Kasaians to
insects (“Bilulu” in Swahili), they called on the Katangese people to eliminate
them.
136. Starting in August 1992, JUFERI members attacked Kasaians at Luena,
Kamina,
Kolwezi, Sandoa and Likasi. From September to November 1992, JUFERI carried out
a
campaign of persecution and forced displacement against the Kasaians in Likasi,
in
collusion with the local and provincial authorities. The violence resulted in
dozens of
civilian victims and saw hundreds of dwellings looted and many buildings
destroyed,
including places of worship. In a few months, almost 60,000 civilians – almost
half the
Kasaian population of Likasi – had taken refuge in the train station and in high
schools
waiting for peace to be restored or for a train to take them away from the town.
In the
same period, JUFERI carried out similar yet smaller-scale attacks on Kasaians
living in
the mining town of Kipushi.
137. On 20 February 1993, at a meeting held in the Place de la Poste at
Kolwezi,
Governor Kyungu wa Kumwanza urged the Katangese to drive the Kasaians out of
Gécamines and take over the management positions in the firm. Beginning on 20
March
1993, members of the JUFERI militia organised a campaign of persecution and
forced
displacement against the Kasaians of Kolwezi, with the support of the
gendarmerie and
in collaboration with the municipal and provincial authorities.
· Having forbidden Kasaian workers from entering Gécamines sites across the
town
on 23 March, JUFERI units began by killing an unknown number of Kasaian
civilians in the outlying districts of Kolwezi, forcing Kasaians to gather in
schools
and places of worship under the protection of the FAZ. In the Musonoie district,
three kilometres from Kolwezi in the direction of Kapata, members of the FAZ
from the 14th Brigade, Kamanyola Division, attacked JUFERI youths, who fled.
On 24 March, JUFERI received reinforcements from the surrounding villages and
imposed a curfew in several districts of the town.95
· On the morning of 25 March, JUFERI units armed mainly with machetes, knives
and fuel cans burst into the homes of Kasaians in different districts of the
town of
Kolwezi and ordered them to leave immediately or they would be killed and their
houses torched. Over the course of that day, JUFERI went on a targeted killing
spree aimed at terrorising Kasaians and forcing them to leave Kolwezi. Over
50,000 Kasaian civilians fled into the town to take refuge at the train station,
the
_______________
95 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009; Kasai
Oriental and Kasai Occidental,
March–April 2009; La Voix du Centre des droits de l’homme et du droit
humanitaire (CDH), No.1,
January–February–March 1994.
post office, the Hotel Impala, the high school and the convent schools of the
Notre-Dame de Lumière cathedral. In the days that followed, JUFERI killed an
unknown number of Kasaian civilians at identity checks carried out at roadblocks
erected in the town. At least two people were killed by JUFERI with spears or
arrows. There was also mention of Kasaian women killed near the Mutshinsenge
river.96
138. From April onwards, a certain degree of calm was restored. Tensions
remained,
however, between the FAZ97 and the “Mobiles”98 on the one hand and JUFERI and
the
gendarmerie on the other.99
139. In late June 1993, Governor Kyungu wa Kumwanza and the commander of the
military region, General Sumaili, pressured the refoulés to leave Kolwezi before
1 July.
140. The total number of victims of JUFERI’s campaign of persecution in
Kolwezi is
hard to determine. According to statistics from the Comité des refoulés de
Kolwezi,
between 24 March 1993 and 14 January 1994 direct clashes between JUFERI and the
Kasaians are thought to have resulted in 371 victims.
141. According to all the witness accounts gathered, most of the deaths
resulting from
the campaign of persecution and forced displacement were not so much
attributable to
_______________
96 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009, Kasai
Oriental and Kasai Occidental,
March–April 2009; Association zaïroise pour la défense des droits de l’homme (AZADHO),
Périodique
des droits de l’homme, No.5, May–June 1993; Human Rights Watch Africa, Zaire:
inciting hatred, June
1993; La Voix du Centre des droits de l’homme et du droit humanitaire (CDH),
No.1, January–February–
March 1994; Donatien Dibwe Dia Mwembu and Marcel Ngandu Mutombo, Vivre ensemble
au Katanga,
L’Harmattan, 2005, pp. 378–379.
97 The Katanga-based FAZ included many citizens from other provinces in Zaire
and were hostile to
JUFERI’s ideology.
98The “Mobiles” were self-defence groups responsible for protecting expelled
Kasaians (French: refoulés).
99The gendarmerie was predominately Katangese and operated in collaboration with
JUFERI.
100 The term refoulés, meaning “displaced people”, is used by Kasaians driven
out of Shaba.
101 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009 and Kasai Oriental
and Kasai Occidental,
March–April 2009.
102 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009 and Kasai Oriental
and Kasai Occidental,
March–April 2009.
direct attacks by JUFERI as the inhumane living conditions imposed by the
authorities.
According to the Comité des refoulés de Kolwezi, between 24 March 1993 and
January
1994 a total of 1,540 Kasaian refoulés died through lack of food and medicines
or from
diseases contracted in refoulement sites or on trains transporting them to the
Kasai
provinces.
142. Some refoulés managed to leave Kolwezi by road or on foot, but most, for
fear of
coming up against JUFERI roadblocks, remained near the train station, waiting
for a train
for the Kasai provinces. After several passenger trains were laid on by
Gécamines and
religious sisters in April and May 1993, the refoulés had no option but to take
goods
trains. In October 1993, many sick people and people unfit for travel were
airlifted thanks
to planes chartered by the Salvatorian Fathers. By 14 January 1994, fewer than
5,000
Kasaians remained in Kolwezi.
communities in the Kasai provinces, the refoulés received MSF aid and were
taken in charge by CARITAS and OXFAM UK.104
143. Ultimately, according to the statistics put forward by the Comité des
refoulés de
Kolwezi, over 130,000 Kasaian civilians were expelled, including over 80,000
children.
The campaign of persecution and expulsion at Kolwezi is thought to have caused
the
deaths of over 300 children. Those who remained were the target of various acts
of
persecution and discrimination until at least 1995.
144. JUFERI’s persecution of civilians of Kasaian origin that began in
September 1992
continued into 1993 and 1994 in Likasi.
145. In 1993, the campaign of persecution carried out by JUFERI against
Kasaian
civilians since September 1992 continued at Kipushi.
146. Throughout 1993 and 1994, Governor Kyungu wa Kumwanza stepped up his
speeches against Kasaians living in Lubumbashi. In early 1994, he famously
declared that
having cleaned out the “bedrooms” (Likasi and Kolwezi) he would now see to the
“living
room”, by which he meant Lubumbashi, the capital of the province. The Kasaians
of
Lubumbashi lived in terror for months, fearing the same fate as the refoulés of
Likasi and
Kolwezi. Many were dismissed by major private enterprises and the various public
services simply for being Kasaian.
147. The total number of victims of the campaign of persecution executed by
JUFERI
and Governor Kyungu wa Kumwanza, in collusion with President Mobutu, is hard to
determine. Interviews and documents consulted by the Mapping Team have not been
able
to confirm the figure of 50,000 deaths put forward by a human rights NGO in
1994.
_______________
104 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009 and Kasai Oriental
and Kasai Occidental,
March–April 2009.
105 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009 and Kasai Oriental
and Kasai Occidental,
March–April 2009.
106 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kasai Oriental, April 2009.
There is no doubt, however, that several thousand Kasaian civilians lost
their lives in the
course of these events.
148. According to data from the NGO Association des refoulés pour le
développement
du Kasaï (ARKASAI), which worked alongside MSF Belgium and the European Union
on refoulé reception, over 780,000 Kasaians were expelled to Kasai Oriental
between
November 1993 and November 1995. In the same period, around 450,000 Kasaians
were
received in Kasai Occidental, according to statistics provided by a former OXFAM
UK
officer. The remaining refoulés settled mainly in Kinshasa. The consequences of
this
tragedy are still felt more than fifteen years after the events took place. Most
of the
refoulés live in utter destitution, the Kasaians driven out of Gécamines have
never
received outstanding pay checks or pensions, the refoulés have never received
compensation for their loss and no legal action has been brought against those
responsible for this persecution.
149. From the second half of 1994, the political situation in Kinshasa
evolved in a way
that was not advantageous for UFERI. Following the institutional agreement
forged
between the Political Forces of the Conclave and the Sacred Union, Étienne
Tshisekedi
and Faustin Birindwa were removed from the Premiership and a member of the
presidential majority, Kengo wa Dondo, was appointed prime minister. Having no
further
need for UFERI and Kyungu wa Kumwanza to weaken Étienne Tshisekedi, President
Mobutu gradually withdrew his support for them. Against a backdrop of rivalry
for the
control of various types of illicit traffic (mainly cobalt and stolen vehicles)
in the
province, the Zairian security services (the FAZ, the Civil Guard, SNIP)107
attacked
members of the JUFERI militia in several territories of the province. On 27
March 1995,
Governor Kyungu wa Kumwanza was arrested for separatist activities. As a
reaction,
UFERI declared two days of ville morte on 30 and 31 March 1995. Kyungu wa
Kumwanza was discharged from the governorship on 20 April 1995.
_______________
107 National intelligence and protection service.
108 See La Voix du CDH, No.7, March–April 1995; AZADHO, Périodique des droits de
l’homme, No.19,
Annual Report 1995, January 1996; Fédération des droits de l’homme, Rapport
succinct au Rapporteur
spécial, 20 August 1995.
150. For decades, the increasing number and economic prosperity of the
Banyarwanda109 had been a source of tension with the other
communities of North Kivu
(the Hunde, Nyanga, Tembo, Kumu and Nande).110 Present to a modest
extent even
before the colonial partitioning of 1885, through successive waves of migration
the
Banyarwanda had become a sizeable community in the province. Their dynamism and
the support of influential members in Kinshasa had enabled them to purchase a
lot of land
and head of cattle and take control of several major trade networks. This
growing hold on
the province was often hard for the other communities to come to terms with.
They
accused the Banyarwanda in particular of stealing their land in collaboration
with the
central government and violating the ancestral rights of their tribal chiefs.
Their
discontent was fuelled by the fact that many Banyarwanda had not arrived in
Zaire until
the early 1930s and were only granted Zairian citizenship by virtue of a law
contested on
5 January 1972. Far from clarifying the situation, the repeal of this law by
President
Mobutu in the early 1980s had created confusion among the people and reopened
the
polemic. In fact, the Banyarwanda were allowed to keep their Zairian identity
cards and
their title deeds. Nevertheless, the other communities saw them as refugees and
immigrants whose title deeds were worthless in comparison to the ancestral
rights held by
“nationals”.
151. In 1989, the refusal of part of the population to allow the Banyarwanda
to
participate in local elections had led to violent incidents and forced the
Government to
postpone the elections in North Kivu. With the liberalisation of political
activity in the
early 1990s, competition for power in the province had become more intense and
the
“indigenous” communities111 had begun to contest the political and
land rights of the
Banyarwanda more openly. Accusing the provincial authorities dominated by the
Nande
and Hunde of trying to deny them their political rights, some members of the
Hutu-
Banyarwanda farmers’ mutual association, the MAGRIVI,112 became more
radical and
set up small armed groups. In May 1991, armed units of the Hutu Banyarwanda
attacked
officers overseeing the population census in Masisi territory. At the National
Sovereign
_______________
109 The term “Banyarwanda”, literally “people from Rwanda”, is
used to designate both Hutu and Tutsi
populations originating from Rwanda and living in North Kivu. Some are the
descendants of peoples of
Rwandan origin who settled on the Congolese territory before 1885 and whose
Zairian nationality has
never been seriously contested. Most Banyarwanda, however, arrived in
Congo/Zaire during the colonial
era or after the country’s independence.
111 In this report, the term “indigenous” refers to people with a particular
attachment to the land they
traditionally occupy. The term “indigenous” as used in the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No.169) of the
International Labour
Organisation, or the report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights on indigenous
peoples in Africa is broader as it aims to cover communities in a situation of
extreme marginalisation and in
non-dominant positions in terms of politics and their economy, while still
having a particular attachment to
the territories they traditionally occupy, representative institutions that are
particular to them and a distinct
identity from the rest of the population.
112 Mutuelle des Agriculteurs de Virunga.
Conference (CNS), Nande and Hunde delegates pressed for the Banyarwanda not
to be
allowed to take part in future elections. At provincial level, Governor
Jean-Pierre
Kalumbo (of Nande origin) and his party the DCF/Nyamwisi encouraged young
indigenous people to enlist in tribal self-defence militias (the Ngilima for the
Nande and
the Mayi-Mayi for the Hunde and Nyanga) to counterbalance the militiamen from
the
MAGRIVI. From 1992 onwards, conflicts relating to land ownership and
ethno-political
murders became more common and every community started to live in fear of
attacks by
other communities.
152. In 1993, Hunde and Nyanga groups in the Walikale territory believed that
an
attack by the Hutu Banyarwanda was imminent. In March 1993, Governor Jean-Pierre
Kalumbo (of Nande origin) called on the FAZ to help the Ngilima and the Nyanga
and
Hunde militias to “exterminate the Banyarwanda”. On 18 March, Vice-Governor
Bamwisho, from the Walikale territory, delivered an inflammatory speech against
the
Banyarwanda in the village of Ntoto.
153. Starting in the Walikale territory, the violence spread quickly to the
Masisi and
then to the Rutshuru territories.
_______________
113 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, April 2009;
Report of the Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team charged with investigating serious violations of human rights
and international
humanitarian law in the DRC (S/1998/581); Mémorandum des communautés hutu et
tutsi du Nord-Kivu à
la Commission d’enquête sur les massacres de Walikale, Masisi et Bwito en mars
et avril 1993, 25 April
1993; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des crimes impunis, la tragédie du
Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.34;
Human Rights Watch (HRW), Zaire: Forced to flee: Violence against the Tutsis in
Zaire, 1996.
114 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008/March 2009.
In April 1993, Hutu armed units killed at least twelve Hunde civilians,
including
children, in Mulinde village in the Masisi territory. The victims were killed
with
blows of machetes, hoes and axes.115
154. It is very hard to determine how many people died in the first few
months of the
conflict. Every community has its own version of the facts and its own estimate
of the
number of victims. Furthermore, killing sprees often occurred at very heavily
dispersed
sites that are hard to access even now. Where it is possible to visit these
sites, it is rare to
find first hand witnesses to the events, because the successive wars that
ravaged the
province often entailed the displacement of the people in the villages that came
under
attack. With respect to the Ntoto massacre, the figure most often put forward is
500
_______________
115 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008;
Léon Batundi Ndasimwa,
“Recensement des victimes hunde des massacres et affrontements interethniques de
1993 à nos jours”,
undated.
116 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008.
117 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008, March and April
2009.
118 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008 and April 2009.
119 Léon Batundi Ndasimwa, “Recensement des victimes hunde des massacres et
affrontements
interethniques de 1993 à nos jours”, undated; Groupe d’étude et d’action pour le
développement (GEAD),
Mahano No.24, October-November-December 1993.
deaths.120 At the provincial level, MSF estimated in 1995 that
between 6,000 and 15,000
people had died between March and May 1993, and that the violence had caused the
displacement of 250,000 people.121
155. In July 1993, President Mobutu travelled to Goma and deployed soldiers
from the
Special Presidential Division (DSP) to restore order. Thanks to changes in the
leadership
of the province, in the sense of a more balanced representation of the various
communities, and dialogue between the various civil society associations (from
November 1993 to February 1994), calm was gradually restored in North Kivu.
However,
the deep-rooted issues behind the conflict were not settled and the situation
remained
very delicate when over 700,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees, some ex-FAR staff and a
large
number of Interahamwe militiamen responsible for the Tutsi genocide arrived in
the
province of North Kivu between 14 July and 17 July 1994.
156. Their long-term settlement added to the insecurity. Above all, it
rekindled the fear
of Rwandan domination in the region in communities in conflict with the
Banyarwanda.
Hutu armed units from MAGRIVI were very quick to join forces with the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe and strengthened their position towards the Hunde and Nyanga
Mayi-
Mayi and the Nande Ngilima. From late 1994, the ethnic war resumed, with a
higher
degree of violence than in 1993.
157. During this period, the solidarity between Hutu Banyarwanda and Tutsi
Banyarwanda was shattered. For a number of years, this solidarity had already
been
tested, as many Tutsi Banyarwanda had left to fight in the Front patriotique
rwandais
(FPR), while many Hutu Banyarwanda were working alongside the security forces of
Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana to stop the FPR from recruiting soldiers
in
Zaire. After the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda and after the FPR took control in
Kigali, the
split was confirmed between the two ethnic groups. Between July 1994 and March
1995,
over 200,000 Tutsis left the province of North Kivu and returned to Rwanda. Some
left of
their own volition to benefit from the employment opportunities offered in the
army and
administration of the new Rwandan regime. Others fled the growing hostility of
the Hutu
Banyarwanda and ex-FAR/Interahamwe attacks, as well as the resumption of the
ethnic
war between the Hutu Banyarwanda and the Hunde and Nyanga Mayi-Mayi.
158. For the Tutsis of Goma, the situation became increasingly difficult in
the second
half of 1994. Tutsis living in North Kivu were the victims of harassment by
other groups
and, in some cases, by the authorities. They often lost their jobs and became
the target of
threats, acts of intimidation and extortion, rape and pillage. An unknown number
of
Tutsis were abused and killed, or died in this period.
_______________
120 Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team
(S/1998/581); Mémorandum des communautés
hutu et tutsi du Nord-Kivu à la Commission d’enquête sur les massacres de
Walikale, Masisi et Bwito en
mars et avril 1993, 25 April 1993; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des crimes
impunis, la tragédie du
Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.34.
121 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Populations in danger 1995, 1995.
159. In August 1995, in the hope of regaining control over the situation at
grassroots
level, and probably also satisfying the demands of the Rwandan authorities to a
certain
extent, the Zairian Government made the decision to expel the Hutu refugees.
160. Criticised by the entire international community, the operation was a
disaster.
Indeed, many refugees, convinced that they would be killed on their return to
Rwanda,
chose to flee the camps and join the Hutu-Banyarwanda people living in the
surrounding
countryside. Their arrival in these regions went hand in hand with fresh waves
of
pillaging and caused the inter-community conflict in the Masisi and Rutshuru
territories
to intensify.
161. These attacks brought about massacres and the large-scale displacement
of
civilian populations, leading to the creation of a number of ethnically
homogeneous
enclaves in the Masisi and Rutshuru territories. In this climate of increasing
lawlessness,
the few thousand Tutsis still living in North Kivu became an easy target for the
various
armed groups. While some Hunde Mayi-Mayi groups formed alliances with them,
others
attacked them in the same way as the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and the Hutu armed units
from the MAGRIVI. Over the course of 1995, the standpoint of the Zairian
security
forces became more and more ambiguous. While in some cases they protected the
Tutsis
_______________
122 Confidential document submitted to the Secretary-General’s
1997/1998 Investigative Team; “Zaire
Expels 3,500 Refugees From Rwanda Border Camp” and “Zaire Troops Step Up
Expulsion of Rwanda
Refugees”, New York Times, 22 and 23 August 1995.
123 AZADHO (Association zaïroise de défense des droits de l’homme), “État
d’urgence”, April 1996; Léon
Batundi Ndasimwa, “Recensement des victimes hunde des massacres et affrontements
interethniques de
1993 à nos jours”, undated.
124 AZADHO, “État d’urgence”, April 1996, p.6; Lutheran Church, Rapport
d’enquête sur les violations des
droits de l’homme à l’est du Congo, May 1997; HRW, “Zaire: Forced to flee:
Violence against the Tutsis in
Zaire”, 1996, p.12; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des crimes impunis, la
tragédie du Nord-Kivu,
2006, pp.61–62.
from attacks by armed groups and the civilian population, in other cases they
targeted
them directly.
_______________
125 HRW, “Zaire: Forced to flee: Violence against the Tutsis in
Zaire”, 1996, pp.14–17.
126 Louis Mugawe Ruganzu, “La tension persiste en zone de Masisi”, in Dialogue
No.192 August–
September 1996, p.73; Sheldon Yett, “Down the Road from Goma: Ethnic Cleansing
and Displacement in
Eastern Zaire”, US Committee for Refugees Issue Brief, June 1996, p.6.
127 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire
(E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2);
HRW, “Zaire: Forced to flee: Violence against the Tutsis in Zaire”, 1996, p.15.
128 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008, January and
March 2009; Report of
the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire
(E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2); “La guerre de
Masisi”, in Dialogue No.192 August–September 1996; HRW, “Zaire: Forced to flee:
Violence against the
Tutsis in Zaire”, 1996, p.13; Associated Press (AP), “Refugees Continue to Flee
Zaire”, 21 May 1996;
Voice of America (VOA), “Ethnic Violence in Zaire”, 16 May 1996.
massacre is thought to have been carried out in retaliation for the attack by
Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers at Bunagana several days earlier, leading to the
deaths of at least twenty Hutu-Banyarwanda civilians.129
162. In late 1995, faced with the growing insecurity in the territories of
Masisi and
Rutshuru, the FAZ carried out a number of operations against the various armed
groups
and militias operating in the province of North Kivu. During these campaigns,
the FAZ
committed multiple acts of violence against civilian populations.
163. In March 1996, the Zairian Government sent 800 troops from the Special
Presidential Division (DSP), members of the Military Action and Intelligence
Service
(SARM) and Paracommando units from the 312th battalion into the Masisi
territory. The
operation, code-named “Kimia” (“peace” in Lingala) enabled a somewhat precarious
calm to be restored in the territory for several weeks. For want of troops and
adequate
logistical and financial support, however, the operation did not succeed in
disarming a
sufficient number of militiamen. Furthermore, rather than fight the armed
groups, some
units in operation Kimia turned to pillaging livestock and gave money to the
Tutsis in
exchange for their protection, hoping to be escorted to Goma or Rwanda.131
164. In May 1996, the Zairian Government launched Operation “Mbata” (“slap”
in
Lingala) to disarm the Hunde and Nyanga Mayi-Mayi and the Nande Ngilima militia.
However, the operation again failed due to a lack of motivation on the part of
the units
involved, the hostility of the local people and the resistance of the targeted
armed groups.
_______________
129 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2);
Amnesty International (AI), “Lawlessness and Insecurity in North and South-Kivu”,
November 1996, p.10.
130 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November–December 2008 and
January 2009;
AZADHO, Nord-Kivu: État d’urgence, April 1996, p.6; Didier Kamundu Batundi,
Mémoire des crimes
impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.62; AI, “Zaire – Lawlessness and
insecurity in North and
South-Kivu”, 1996, p.8.
131 HRW, Zaire: Forced to flee: Violence against the Tutsis in Zaire, 1996,
p.26.
committing acts of violence in the village. The Hutu Banyarwanda are thought to
have been targeted due to their alleged collaboration with the FAZ.132
165. For reasons mentioned above, the total number of victims of the
massacres that
occurred in North Kivu between July 1994 and June 1996 is impossible to
determine.
According to some estimates, the inter-ethnic conflict is thought to have caused
close to
one thousand deaths in 1995 and led to the displacement of 100,000 people. In
June 1996,
there were between 100,000 and 250,000 displaced persons in the province. At
that time
it was estimated that since 1993, between 70,000 and 100,000 people had died as
a result
of the ethnic war in the province. These figures are impossible to verify in the
absence of
reliable statistics, but also in the absence of the large number of people who
were the
subject of forced “disappearances” that occurred at this time in the province.
One case
illustrating the very common practice of forced disappearance was confirmed by
the
Mapping Team and is presented below by way of example.
_______________
132 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, April 2009;
Action paysanne pour la reconstruction et le
développement communautaire intégral (APREDECI), Mission d’enquête sur la
situation des droits de
l’homme dans la province du Nord-Kivu, 1997, pp.7–8.
133 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire
(E/CN.4/1995/67 and Corr.1),
para. 59; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des crimes impunis, la tragédie du
Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.66;
APREDECI, “Mission d’enquête sur la situation des droits de l’homme dans la
province du Nord-Kivu”,
1997, pp.7–8.
134 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008; IRIN (Integrated
Regional Information
Networks), Masisi Report, 23 August 1996; APREDECI, “Mission d’enquête sur la
situation des droits de
l’homme dans la province du Nord-Kivu”, 1997, pp.8–9.
135 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008 and February
2009; Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.
1), para. 59; IRIN,
Masisi Report, 23 August 1996; APREDECI, “Mission d’enquête sur la situation des
droits de l’homme
dans la province du Nord-Kivu”, 1997, pp.9–10.
166. During this period, the violence in North Kivu also led to widespread
looting.
Buildings designated for education, hospitals and dispensaries were frequently
targeted,
in particular in the Masisi territory. The war did not spare livestock, one of
the province’s
key resources. Over three years, 80 percent of the livestock was pillaged,
mainly by the
ex-FAR/Interahamwe and Hutu armed units from the MAGRIVI, in collaboration with
some FAZ units.137
167. From March 1993 to June 1996, the crackdown on the political opponents
of
President Mobutu’s regime was especially violent, particularly in Kinshasa.
Under the
direct control of President Mobutu, the security forces carried out many summary
and
extrajudicial executions as well as forced disappearances, tortured and raped a
great
number of civilians.138 They also committed many acts of pillage. The
widespread
impunity they enjoyed leads to the supposition that the highest powers of
government
were providing cover for their actions – even encouraging them – in order to
destabilise
their opponents.
168. The security force agencies most involved in violations of the right to
life were
the Special Presidential Division (DSP), the Civil Guard, the FAS (Forces
d’action
spéciale), the FIS (Forces d’intervention spéciale) and the National
Intelligence and
Protection Service (SNIP). The BSRS (Special Research and Surveillance Brigade)
and
the SARM (Military Action and Intelligence Service) were also heavily involved
in
serious violations of the right to life. A special unit formed within the DSP,
known as
Hibou (“the owls”), was specifically responsible for spreading fear among the
people by
carrying out summary executions and kidnapping not only political opponents but
soldiers and ordinary citizens too.
169. Opponents were typically detained at the Civil Guard headquarters on the
Avenue
Victoire in the Kasa-Vubu commune, the Civil Guard/IBTP prison, the 11th
military
garrison (CIRCO), various SNIP detention centres dotted across the capital, and
cells at
the Lufungula, Kokolo and Tshatshi military camps. Some were imprisoned at
secret
detention sites. In the majority of cases, those arrested were tortured.
Flogging, electric
shock, suspension by the feet, whipping and sexual abuse were the most
frequently used
_______________
136 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008.
137 IRIN, Masisi Report, 23 August 1996.
138 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire
(E/CN.4/1997/6); AZADHO,
Périodique des droits de l’homme, May–June 1993; AZADHO, Périodique des droits
de l’homme, July–
August 1993; AZADHO, “L’armée tue”, 1994.
methods of torture. The detention conditions themselves amounted to cruel,
inhuman and
degrading treatment, and led to a large number of deaths. A great many victims
were
packed into tiny cells, without ventilation or sanitary facilities, where they
received
neither food nor medical treatment.
170. Between March 1993 and June 1996, over thirty communications regarding
cases
in Kinshasa were sent to the Government via mechanisms provided for by the
United
Nations Commission on Human Rights, including the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman
or
degrading treatment or punishment and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.139
171. The serious violations of human rights are too numerous to be listed
here in their
entirety, and therefore only a few illustrative cases of summary executions and
torture are
reported below.
172. In some densely-populated areas, like Kimbanseke, the people reacted to
the
violence meted out by the security forces by creating self-defence groups. These
groups,
in turn, committed summary executions and theft. Although the Mapping Team was
unable to confirm these figures, it is estimated that over one thousand people
in total were
killed in Kinshasa by uniformed and plain-clothes members of the Zairian
security forces
during this period.144
173. During this period, some provinces underwent a chaotic democratisation
process
accompanied by mounting xenophobia, ending in the persecution of non-originaires,
or
outsiders. The constant political arm-wrestling between President Mobutu and
Étienne
Tshisekedi of the UDPS and the manipulation of regionalist and tribalist
sentiment by
local political actors gave rise to many instances of abuse and acts of violence
against
opponents and non-originaires in the different provinces.
174. In 1994, the Governor of Bas-Zaire province, Bieya Mbaki, staged a
number of
public meetings, mainly in September, in which he encouraged the indigenous
people of
the province to drive out all non-originaires holding positions of authority in
the region.
Using xenophobic slogans that inflamed ethnic hatred, the Governor and the local
authorities expelled several natives of the Kasai provinces and issued an
ultimatum to the
non-originaires to leave the province before 24 November 1994, the anniversary
of
Mobutu’s 1965 coup. The following two incidents are cited as examples of this
campaign
of persecution.
_______________
143 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009; AI, “Zaire: Nine
demonstrators killed”, 1995;
HRW, “Uncertain Course: Transition and Human Rights Violations in the Congo”,
1997.
144 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights in Zaire
(E/CN.4/1994/49); AZADHO,
Périodique des droits de l’homme, December 1993; AZADHO, Périodique des droits
de l’homme, July–
August 1994; AZADHO, Périodique des droits de l’homme, January 1995; HRW, Annual
Report, 1994.
175. In this period, changes in the political situation underway in Kinshasa
had only a
delayed and limited effect on Maniema province. The province remained under the
control of Governor Omari Léa Sisi and President Mobutu’s party, the MPR (Mouvement
pour la révolution). In 1994, in response to opposition attempts to organise
themselves in
the field, the Governor demanded the deployment of a Civil Guard contingent to
reinforce the Gendarmerie Nationale garrison. Over the course of 1995, the
Gendarmerie
and the Civil Guard committed dozens of rapes, inflicted torture and cruel,
inhuman and
degrading treatment on many civilians and looted many properties. Public reports
have
mentioned the existence of dozens of serious cases. Two such cases were
confirmed by
the Mapping Team and are reported below by way of example.
_______________
145 AZADHO, Annual Report 1994, January 1995.
146 Toges Noires, “Kongolisation des cadres ou épuration ethnique au Bas-Zaïre?”,
December 1994.
147 Interview with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, March 2009; “Victimes
de xénophobie, les
Kasaiens souhaitent quitter le Haut-Zaïre”, La Référence Plus, 7 September 1995;
Annual report of
AZADHO, 1996; document submitted to the Mapping Team, February 2009.
148 Interview with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, March 2009; “Victimes
de xénophobie, les
Kasaiens souhaitent quitter le Haut-Zaïre”, La Référence Plus, 7 September 1995;
AZADHO Annual
Report, 1996; document submitted to the Mapping Team, February 2009
176. In October 1993, as Zaire sank deeper and deeper into economic crisis,
Faustin
Birindwa’s Government launched a programme of monetary reform and introduced a
new currency, the “New Zaire”. However, the use of the currency was swiftly
opposed by
Étienne Tshisekedi and the Catholic Church. In opposition strongholds, such as
the two
Kasai provinces, the people rallied to reject the monetary reform. In response,
President
Mobutu sent military reinforcements into the province of Kasai Occidental.
CHAPTER II. JULY 1996 – JULY 1998: FIRST CONGO
WAR AND AFDL
REGIME
177. From July 1996, Tutsi/Banyamulenge152 armed units who had
left Zaire to pursue
military training in Rwandan army, the APR (Armée patriotique rwandaise), in
Rwanda,
along with APR soldiers, began their operations to infiltrate the province of
South Kivu
via Burundi and destabilise North Kivu via Uganda. The first serious clashes
between the
FAZ and the infiltrés took place on 31 August 1996 near Uvira in the province of
South
Kivu. On 18 October, the conflict took a new turn when an armed movement, the
AFDL
(Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo), was officially
formed
in Kigali, asserting its intention to topple President Mobutu.153
Under the cover of the
AFDL, whose own troops, weapons and logistics were supplied by Rwanda, soldiers
from the APR, the UPDF (Uganda People’s Defence Force) and the FAB (Forces
armées
burundaises) entered Zaire en masse and set about capturing the provinces of
North and
South Kivu and the Ituri district.154
178. During this lightning offensive, units of the AFDL, APR and FAB attacked
and
destroyed all the Rwandan and Burundian Hutu refugee camps set up around the
towns of
Uvira, Bukavu and Goma. Several hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees
returned
to Rwanda, but hundreds of thousands of others, like the ex-FAR/Interahamwe,
fled
towards the territories of Walikale (North Kivu) and Shabunda (South Kivu). For
several
months, they were pursued by AFDL/APR soldiers, who went about systematically
destroying the makeshift refugee camps and persecuting anyone who came to their
aid.
_______________
152The term “Banyamulenge” came into popular use in the late 1960s to
distinguish ethnic Tutsis
historically based in South Kivu, the Banyamulenge, from those arriving from the
1960s onwards as
refugees or economic migrants. Banyamulenge means “people of Mulenge” and takes
its name from a city
in the Uvira territory with a very large Tutsi population. Over time, however,
the use of the term
Banyamulenge has become increasingly more generalised and has been used to
designate all
Zairian/Congolese and occasionally Rwandan Tutsis.
153 From the second half of 1995, the Rwandan authorities, in cooperation with
those in Kampala, began
their preparations to facilitate a mass military intervention of the Zairian
territory by the APR and UPDF,
under the guise of a domestic rebellion. To enable the rebellion to surface,
Rwandan and Ugandan leaders
requested the help of Tutsis in Zaire who had served in the FRP and APR for
several years to mass recruit
in North Kivu and South Kivu to start a Banyamulenge rebellion. They also made
contact with the leaders
of small Zairian rebel groups that had been foes of President Mobutu for decades
(André Kisase Ngandu’s
CNRD (Conseil national de résistance pour la démocratie) and Laurent-Désiré
Kabila’s PRP (Parti de la
Révolution Populaire)) to give the rebellion a national dimension. In addition
to the CNRD led by André
Kisase Ngandu, AFDL President until his assassination in January 1997, and the
PRP led by Laurent-Désiré
Kabila, the AFDL also included the ADP (Alliance démocratique des peuples), led
by Déogratias Bugera,
and the MRLZ (Mouvement révolutionnaire pour la libération du Zaïre), led by
Anselme Masasu Nindaga.
154 Given the high numbers of APR soldiers among AFDL troops and at AFDL
headquarters – a fact later
acknowledged by the Rwandan authorities (see footnote on page 1014) – and the
great difficulty
experienced by witnesses questioned by the Mapping Team distinguishing between
AFDL and APR
members in the field, this report will refer to AFDL armed units and APR
soldiers engaged in operations in
Zaire between October 1996 and June 1997 under the acronym AFDL/APR. In cases
where, in certain
regions, several sources have confirmed high numbers of Ugandan soldiers (in
some districts of Orientale
Province, for example) or the Forces armées burundaises (as in some territories
in South Kivu) under the
cover of the AFDL, the acronyms AFDL/APR/UPDF and AFDL/APR/FAB or AFDL/UPDF and
AFDL/FAB may also be used.
70
179.
179. From December 1996, the Kinshasa Government attempted to launch a
counteroffensive
from Kisangani and Kindu with the aid of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe. However,
it proved impossible to reorganise the ailing Zairian army in such a short space
of time.
The AFDL/APR/UPDF troops, who were reinforced from February 1997 by anti-Mobutu
Katangese soldiers who had served in the Angolan Government army (the ex-Tigers)
since the 1970s, and by children involved with armed forces and armed groups
(CAAFAG),155 commonly known as the Kadogo (“small ones” in Swahili) and
recruited
during the conquests, took control of Kisangani on 15 March 1997 and Mbuji Mayi
and
Lubumbashi in early April. After the fall of Kenge in Bandundu province, the
AFDL/APR troops and their allies reached the gates of the capital and President
Mobutu
had to resign himself to stepping down. On 17 May 1997, AFDL/APR troops entered
Kinshasa, and on 25 May, the AFDL president, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, declared
himself
President of the Republic and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC). Within a few months, however, President Kabila’s authoritarian
measures,
his reneging on contracts signed with a number of foreign companies and his
refusal to
cooperate with the special Team sent by the UN Secretary-General to investigate
the
massacre of refugees in the East of the DRC lost the new regime its main
international
allies.
A. Attacks against Tutsi and Banyamulenge civilians
180. Since the 1980s, the issue of the nationality of Tutsis living in South
Kivu, like
that of the Banyarwanda in North Kivu, had been a matter of controversy. Most
Tutsis in
South Kivu declared themselves to be Zairian Banyamulenge,156 the descendants of
Tutsis from Rwanda and Burundi who had settled on the Hauts Plateaux in the
Uvira and
Fizi territories before the colonial partitioning of 1885. The other
communities, on the
other hand, were of the opinion that most Tutsis living in South Kivu were
political
refugees and, as economic migrants who had arrived in the country in the
twentieth
century, they could not, therefore, claim Zairian nationality. The decision
taken in 1981
by President Mobutu to repeal the law of 1972, by which Zairian nationality had
been
granted collectively to peoples of Rwandan and Burundian origin present in the
Zairian
territory before 1 January 1950, strengthened the position of the so-called
“indigenous”
communities. Since then, there had been widespread suspicion over the true
nationality of
_______________
155 Children associated with armed groups and armed forces (CAAFAG)
designates children who were
enlisted in regular or irregular armed forces or armed groups either of their
own free will or by force,
regardless of their role.
156 Gisaro Muhoza, of Tutsi origin, a deputy for the Congolese parliament in the
territory of Uvira,
popularised this term in the late 1960s to distinguish ethnic Tutsis
historically based in South Kivu, the
Banyamulenge, from those arriving from the 1960s onwards as refugees or economic
migrants.
Banyamulenge means “people of Mulenge”, and takes its name from a city in the
Uvira territory with a
very large Tutsi population. It should be noted, however, that most of Mulenge’s
inhabitants are not Tutsis
but Vira. Over time, the term Banyamulenge has become increasingly used to
designate all
Zairian/Congolese Tutsis.
the Tutsis in South Kivu and no Tutsi members of parliament had been elected
in the
province. Moreover, as in North Kivu in 1989, controversy over the uncertain
nationality
of the Tutsis in the province had led to the postponement of elections. Despite
all that, in
the absence of major conflict over land, and in view of the relatively small
size of the
Banyamulenge and Tutsi community in the province, in South Kivu the political
liberalisation of the regime after 1990 did not result in the same degree of
violence and
tribalist manipulation of the political debate that was rife in North Kivu.
181. From 1993, however, the arrival in the province of Burundian157
and Rwandan158
Hutu refugees and armed groups, and the integration after July 1994 of many
Banyamulenge and Tutsis from South Kivu in the army and the administration of
the new
Rwandan regime,159 stirred the anti-Banyamulenge and anti-Tutsi
sentiment in many
South Kivuans. Accused of being agents of the Rwandan and Burundian Governments,
many Tutsis, and also some Banyamulenge, lost their jobs and were subject to
threats and
discrimination. On 28 April 1995, the transition parliament (HCR-PT) in Kinshasa
officially rejected all claims of the Banyamulenge to Zairian citizenship and
recommended to the Government that they be repatriated to Rwanda or Burundi, on
the
same basis as the Hutu refugees and Tutsi immigrants. In the months that
followed, the
provincial administration seized many Banyamulenge properties.
182. In a memorandum released on 19 October 1995, the authorities of the
Uvira
territory stated that the Banyamulenge ethnic group was unrecognised in Zaire
and that,
with the exception of a dozen families, all Tutsis living in South Kivu were
“foreigners”.
On 25 November, in Uvira, the signatories of a petition denouncing the
persecution of the
Banyamulenge by the Zairian authorities were arrested by the security forces. In
the
Hauts Plateaux and Moyens Plateaux in the Uvira, Fizi and Mwenga territories,
the
Bembe, long-time foes of the Banyamulenge,160 took advantage of the situation to
set up
armed groups and step up their cattle raiding activities and acts of
intimidation against the
Banyamulenge. In response to this situation, an increasing number of young
Tutsis and
Banyamulenge left for Rwanda to pursue military training in the APR. Some
returned
_______________
157 After the assassination of Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye on
21 October 1993 at Bujumbura, interethnic
violence broke out in Burundi between the Hutus and the Tutsis. In response to
the crackdown
organised by the Tutsi-dominated FAB (Forces armées burundaises), several tens
of thousands of Hutus
took refuge in South Kivu between 1993 and 1995. In their wake, in 1994, the
Burundian Hutu movement
CNDD (Centre national pour la défense de la démocratie), led by Léonard Nyangoma,
and its armed wing
FDD (Forces pour la défense de la démocratie) set up in the territories of Uvira
and Fizi. From their bases
in South Kivu, they launched a number of attacks against the FAB (Forces armées
burundaises). The armed
wing of the Burundian Hutu movement PALIPEHUTU (Parti pour la libération du
peuple hutu – Party for
the Liberation of the Hutu People), the FNL (Forces nationales de libération –
National Forces of
Liberation), also used South Kivu as a base in its fight against the Burundian
army.
158 The ex-FAR/Interahamwe.
159 From 1990, many Banyamulenge youths uncertain of their future in Zaire and
many young Tutsis
wanting to return to Rwanda enlisted in the FPR (Front patriotique rwandais –
Rwandese Patriotic Front) to
fight the FAR (Forces armées rwandaises – Rwandan Armed Forces).
160 Between 1963 and 1965, huge numbers of Bembe fought in the ranks of the
Mulelist rebellion (the
“Simba”) against the state army. The Banyamulenge, on the other hand, had sided
with the Kinshasa
government and then participated in the organised crackdown on the Bembe after
the defeat of the Simba.
quickly to Zaire and created a self-defence militia in the Hauts Plateaux and
the Moyens
Plateaux of the Mitumba mountains. Others remained in Rwanda, where they helped
form a Banyamulenge rebellion that would allow the APR to neutralise the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe and enable the Tutsis of South Kivu and North Kivu to obtain
full and
official recognition of their Zairian citizenship by a new regime in Kinshasa.
183. From July 1996 onwards, as Banyamulenge/Tutsi armed units began
operations to
infiltrate South Kivu, the situation for Banyamulenge and Tutsi civilians in
general
became extremely precarious. On 31 August 1996, when members of the FAZ
intercepted Rwandan soldiers at Kiringye, sixty kilometres north of Uvira, the
zone
commissioner Shweka Mutabazi called on local youths to enlist in fighting
militias and
ordered FAZ soldiers to arrest all Banyamulenge and Tutsis161 living
in the Uvira
territory.
_______________
161 It is not for the Mapping Team to pass comment on the
ever-controversial matter of the nationality of
Tutsis in South Kivu, or the respective sizes of the Banyamulenge and Tutsi
communities living in the
province at the time. In some cases, the Mapping Team was able to confirm that
victims were members of
Tutsi communities settled in the Moyens Plateaux and Hauts Plateaux and has
chosen to designate them by
“Banyamulenge”. In other cases, the Mapping Team was able to establish that the
victims were
Zairian/Congolese, Rwandan or Burundian Tutsis, and “Tutsi” is used to describe
them in the text that
follows. In the majority of cases, however, it was not possible to establish the
precise origin of Tutsi
victims, and therefore they are referred to in this text as Banyamulenge/Tutsi.
162 Interview with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February 2009; confidential
documents submitted to the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; IRIN, “Weekly Roundup of
Main Events in the
Great Lakes region”, 2–8 September 1996; AI, “Lawlessness and Insecurity in
North and South-Kivu”,
1996.
163 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, June 2009.
Banyamulenge community was executed soon after at Kamanyola by FAZ
soldiers.164
184. In Fizi territory, faced with the risk of clashes between the FAZ and
Banyamulenge/Tutsi armed units in the Moyens Plateaux and Hauts Plateaux of the
Mitumba mountains, several hundred Banyamulenge civilians left the village of
Bibokoboko and the surrounding area to seek refuge in Baraka and Lueba. By
putting
themselves under the protection of the FAZ in this way, these civilians hoped
not to be
confused with the infiltrated groups. In spite of this, the following incidents
were
reported.
_______________
164 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, November 2008,
February/April 2009; Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6),
para. 180, Lutheran Church,
Rapport d’enquête sur les violations des droits de l’homme à l’est du Congo, May
1997, p.8.
165 Interview with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and April 2009; Report
of the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6), para. 180.
166 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009.
167 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009.
168 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, November 2008 and February
2009.
185. On 6 October 1996, Banyamulenge/Tutsi armed units killed over thirty
people at
Lemera in the Uvira territory, including civilians and soldiers who were being
treated at
the local hospital.172 In response to the outpouring of emotion that
followed this
massacre, on 8 October the Vice-Governor of South Kivu, Lwabanji Lwasi, gave the
Tutsi/Banyamulenge one week to leave the province for good, or they would be
considered and treated as infiltrated armed units. On 10 October, Rwanda
encouraged all
Banyamulenge men to remain in Zaire and fight for their rights. Meanwhile, the
Governor of South Kivu, Pasteur Kyembwa Walumona, called on all the young people
of
the province to enlist in militias to support the FAZ.
_______________
169 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, November 2008
and February 2009, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6),
para. 191; AI, “Loin des
regards de la communauté internationale: violations des droits de l’homme dans
l’est du Zaïre”, 1996, p.3.
170 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009; AI, “Loin des
regards de la communauté
internationale: violations des droits de l’homme dans l’est du Zaïre”, 1996,
p.3.
171 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009; Lutheran Church,
Rapport d’enquête sur
les violations des droits de l’homme à l’est du Congo, May 1997, p.8.
172 See page 119, note 366.
186. On 11 October 1996, the FAZ Chief of Staff, General Eluki Monga Aundu,
officially accused the Banyamulenge of attacking the country with the help of
Rwanda,
Uganda and Burundi. On 18 October, Banyamulenge/Tutsi armed units launched an
attack on Kiliba, for which the AFDL (Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la
libération du Congo) immediately claimed responsibility.
187. During this period, mention was made of a number of massacres of
Banyamulenge in Minembwe, in the Hauts Plateaux of the Fizi territory. The
Mapping
Team was not, however, able to confirm these cases. The members of the
Banyamulenge
community who were consulted claimed not to have accurate information on these
events.
_______________
173 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009.
174 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February 2009.
175 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009.
176 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009.
188. After war broke out in North and South Kivu, the people of Kinshasa
became
increasingly hostile towards Rwandans and peoples of Rwandan origin, in
particular the
Tutsis, whom they systematically accused of being in collusion with the AFDL/APR.
189. After the start of the First Congo War, and as the AFDL/APR troops
advanced
across Orientale Province, the Zairian security services and the people of
Kisangani
adopted an increasingly hostile attitude towards the Rwandans and peoples of
Rwandan
origin, especially Tutsis, who they systematically accused of being in collusion
with
AFDL/APR.
_______________
177 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April and May
2009; Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6); AI, “Zaire/Rwanda:
Disappearances/Fear for
Safety”, 1996; AI, “Zaïre-Violentes persécutions perpétrées par l’État et les
groupes armés”, 1996.
178 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, February to April
2009, North Kivu, March
2009.
B. Attacks against Hutu refugees
190. After moving into North and South Kivu in July 1994, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe
used the refugee camps along the Rwanda and Burundi borders as bases and
training
camps. Using the decades-old strategic alliance with President Mobutu and the
widespread corruption within the FAZ to their advantage, the ex-FAR bought back
or
recovered the military equipment confiscated on their arrival in Zaire and
resumed war
against the army of the Front patriotique rwandais, which was now the national
army of
Rwanda, the Armée patriotique rwandaise (APR).
191. In response to the mounting tension between Zaire and Rwanda, several
countries
suggested moving the refugee camps away from the border. Some also recommended
that
an international peacekeeping force be deployed and that negotiations be opened
in the
region. However, due to a lack of adequate funding, political willpower and a
suitable
strategy for separating combatants from refugees, the camps were not moved and
the ex-
FAR and Interahamwe units continued to rearm themselves with a view to
recapturing
Kigali by force. On account of the presence of many génocidaires among the
ex-FAR,
the growing diplomatic isolation of President Mobutu and the refusal of the new
Rwandan authorities to open negotiations, no political settlement was reached
and ex-
FAR/Interahamwe attacks in Rwanda became more common, as did the incursions of
the
APR into the Zairian territory. From August 1996, Banyamulenge/Tutsi armed units
and
soldiers from the APR and the FAB infiltrated South Kivu. They attacked the FAZ
and
the ex-FAR/Interahamwe but also, and above all, the refugee camps, some of which
served as bases for the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and for Burundian Hutu armed groups
(CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL).
192. The entire period was characterised by the relentless pursuit of Hutu
refugees and
the ex-FAR/Interahamwe by the AFDL/APR forces across the entire Congolese
territory.
The refugees, who were sometimes rounded up and used by the ex-FAR/Interahamwe
as
human shields during their flight, then began a long trek across the country
from east to
west towards Angola, the Central African Republic or the Republic of the Congo.
During
this journey, acts of violence against Zairian civilian populations were common
among
refugees and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, and there were many instances of looting.
The Flight of Refugees (1996-1997)
193. After the massacres that occurred in Burundi in late 1993179
and after the FPR
took power in Rwanda in 1994, several hundred thousand Burundian and Rwandan
Hutu
refugees, as well as ex-FAR/Interahamwe units and Burundian CNDD-FDD rebels, had
found refuge in the province of South Kivu. In late 1994, ex-FAR/Interahamwe
units
stepped up their (sometimes deadly) incursions into Rwanda to take back the
power by
force. From 1995 onwards, the Armée patriotique rwandaise (APR) carried out at
least
two raids in Zaire to neutralise them.
194. Another incident took place in April 1996 at the Burundian and Rwandan
refugee
camp at Runingu in the Uvira territory.
195. In 1996, UNHCR estimated the number of refugees in the territory of
Uvira at
219,466; two thirds of them were of Burundian nationality.182 These
refugees were spread
_______________
179 As previously indicated, after the assassination on 21
October 1993 at Bujumbura of the Hutu president
Melchior Ndadaye, inter-ethnic violence broke out in Burundi between the Hutus
and the Tutsis. Faced
with the crackdown organised by the Tutsi-dominated Forces armées burundaises (FAB),
several tens of
thousands of Hutus took refuge in South Kivu between 1993 and 1995. In their
wake, during 1994, the
Burundian Hutu movement Centre national pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD),
led by Léonard
Nyangoma, and its armed wing, the Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (FDD),
moved into the
territories of Uvira and Fizi.
180 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and South Kivu,
January 2009; Report
of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team (S/1998/581), p.57; Witness
accounts gathered by the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; Groupe Jérémie, press
release “Massacres à Birava”,
13 April 1995.
181 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, October 2008 and April 2009;
Report on the situation
of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6), para. 198; Witness statement gathered
by the Secretary-
General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; Voice of America, “Rwanda Denies
Attack in Zaire”, 14
October 1997; IRIN, “Weekly Roundup of Main Events in the Great Lakes region”,
14–21 October 1996;
CNN, “Zaire Refugee Camps Site of New Ethnic Killing”, 14 October 1997; New York
Times, “Refugees
Flee Camp In Zaire After Killings”, 14 October 1997; The Independent, “Hutus
flee gun raiders”,
14 October 1997.
182 Office of the Regional Special Envoy of UNHCR, Kigali, Rwanda, Zaire: UNHCR
population statistics
as of 26 September 1996.
over the eleven camps located along the Ruzizi River: Runingu, Rwenena,
Lubarika,
Kanganiro, Luvungi, Luberizi (between Mutarule and Luberizi), Biriba, Kibogoye,
Kajembo, Kagunga and Kahanda. Although in some camps civilian refugees lived
alongside ex-FAR/Interahamwe units (in Kanganiro camp, for example) or members
of
CNDD-FDD (Kibogoye camp), the vast majority of refugees were unarmed civilians.
196. After the AFDL was officially formed on 18 October 1996, Alliance
troops,
supported by soldiers from the APR and FAB (Forces armées burundaises) attacked
the
village of Bwegera. On 20 October, having taken control of the village, the
soldiers were
divided into two columns, the first leaving northwards towards Luvungi and the
second
southwards towards Luberizi. As they advanced, AFDL/APR/FAB soldiers carried out
widespread and systematic attacks on the eleven Rwandan and Burundian refugee
camps
set up in the territory. Many witnesses have confirmed that these attacks took
place
within a few days of the majority of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and CNDD-FDD units
leaving the area.
197. After the capture of the town of Uvira in the night of 24 and 25 October
1996 and
the routing of the FAZ over practically all of Uvira territory, the Burundian
and Rwandan
refugees fled in several directions. Some left for the territory of Fizi, then
travelled on to
North Katanga, Tanzania or Zambia. Others tried to escape towards the north,
passing
through the territories of Kabare and Walungu. Many Burundian refugees fled in
the
direction of Burundi. Unable to cross the Ruzizi River, they were often
apprehended at
the Kiliba sugar mill and the villages of Ndunda, Ngendo and Mwaba.
_______________
186 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March–April 2009.
187 Interview with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February 2009; witness accounts
gathered by the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; CARITAS, “Tableau
synoptique relevant les cas des
massacres et tueries commis par l’AFDL à l’endroit des réfugiés et populations
civiles autochtones dans les
zones d’Uvira et Fizi du 18 octobre 1996 au 10 avril 1997”, p.2.
188 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009; Report on the
situation of human rights in
Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6), para. 198; Confidential documents submitted to the
Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team in 1997/1998; CADDHOM (Collectif d’actions pour le
développement des droits de
l’homme), “Enquête sur les massacres des réfugiés 1998”, p.3.
189 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009; Report of the
Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team (S/1998/581); AI, “Loin des regards de la communauté
internationale: violations des
droits de l’homme dans l’est du Zaïre”, 1996, pp.4–5; Peacelink, “Les violations
des droits de l’homme par
l’AFDL”, p.3.
198. AFDL/APR/FAB soldiers set up a number of checkpoints on the Ruzizi Plain
around the villages of Bwegera, Sange, Luberizi and Kiliba, at the entrance to
Uvira town
(Kalundu Port), at Makobola II (Fizi territory) and at the Rushima ravine (Uvira
territory). At these checkpoints, soldiers sorted the people they intercepted
according to
their nationality, under the pretext of preparing for their return to their
country of origin.
Individuals identified as Rwandan or Burundian Hutus on the basis of their
accent, their
morphology or their dress were systematically separated from the other
intercepted
people and killed in the surrounding area.
_______________
190 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, May 2009.
191 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April/May 2009; Report of the
Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team (S/1998/581); CARITAS, “Tableau synoptique relevant les cas
des massacres et tueries
commis par l’AFDL à l’endroit des réfugiés et populations civiles autochtones
dans les zones d’Uvira et
Fizi du 18 octobre 1996 au 10 avril 1997”, p.2.
192 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, October 2008 and April 2009.
CARITAS, “Tableau
synoptique relevant les cas des massacres et tueries commis par l’AFDL à
l’endroit des réfugiés et
populations civiles autochtones dans les zones d’Uvira et Fizi du 18 octobre
1996 au 10 avril 1997”, p.
Rwanda, units of the AFDL/APR/FAB led an unknown number of additional
refugees into the Rushima ravine and executed them.193
_______________
193 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009;
Report of the Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team (S/1998/581); Lutheran Church, Rapport d'enquête sur les
violations des droits de
l’homme à l’est du Congo, May 1997, p.8.
194 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April/May 2009.
195 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April/May 2009; witness
account gathered by the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998.
196 Interview with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March-April 2009; CARITAS,
“Tableau synoptique
relevant les cas des massacres et tueries commis par l’AFDL à l’endroit des
réfugiés et populations civiles
autochtones dans les zones d’Uvira et Fizi du 18 octobre 1996 au 10 avril 1997”,
p.2; Association contre la
malnutrition et pour l’encadrement de la jeunesse (ACMEJ), Report 2009, p.5.
197 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in
1997/1998.
men and boys. The bodies of the victims were thrown in the latrines beside the
church.198
Walungu and Kabare territories
199. In 1996, UNHCR estimated that there were 307,499 refugees spread over
the 26
camps in the territories of Walungu, Kabare and Kalehe, commonly known as the
“Bukavu camps”: Kamanyola, Izirangabo, Karabangira, Nyangezi (Mulwa), Nyantende,
Muku and Mushweshwe to the south of Bukavu, Bideka, Chimanga (Burhale), Bulonge
(non-UNHCR-recognised), Nyamirangwe and Chabarhabe to the west of the town,
Panzi,
Nyakavogo, Mudaka/Murhala, INERA (Congolese Institute for Agronomic Studies and
Research), ADI-Kivu (Action for Integrated Development in Kivu), Kashusha,
Katana,
Kalehe and Kabira north of Bukavu and Chondo, Chayo, Bugarula, Maugwere and
Karama on Idjwi Island.201
200. As they advanced towards Bukavu, the AFDL/APR troops destroyed the
makeshift camps created by refugee survivors of the massacres committed in the
Ruzizi
Plain (in the Uvira territory) and to the west of Bukavu city. When they left
Nyantende
village, the AFDL/APR troops split into two groups. The first group continued in
the
direction of Bukavu, passing through Buhanga, Mushweshwe, Comuhini, Chabarhabe,
_______________
198 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009;
CARITAS, “Tableau synoptique relevant
les cas des massacres et tueries commis par l’AFDL à l’endroit des réfugiés et
populations civiles
autochtones dans les zones d’Uvira et Fizi du 18 octobre 1996 au 10 avril 1997”,
p.3.
199 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, October 2008 and April 2009;
CARITAS, “Tableau
synoptique relevant les cas des massacres et tueries commis par l’AFDL à
l’endroit des réfugiés et
populations civiles autochtones dans les zones d’Uvira et Fizi du 18 octobre
1996 au 10 avril 1997”, p.3.
200 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, October 2008 and April 2009;
CARITAS, “Tableau
synoptique relevant les cas des massacres et tueries commis par l’AFDL à
l’endroit des réfugiés et
populations civiles autochtones dans les zones d’Uvira et Fizi du 18 octobre
1996 au 10 avril 1997”, p.2.
201 Office of the Regional Special Envoy of UNHCR, Kigali, Rwanda, Zaire: “UNHCR
population statistics
as of 26 September 1996
Ciriri and Lwakabirhi. The second group headed towards Walungu-Centre via
Muku,
Cidaho and Cidodobo.
201. From 22 October 1996, in the face of the advancing AFDL/APR troops,
refugees
from the Nyangezi and Nyantende camps began to flee towards Bukavu. From 26
October 1996 onwards, the soldiers launched attacks on the camps to the south
and west
of Bukavu city. In most cases, the refugees had already left the camps before
the soldiers
arrived, fleeing towards the Kashusha, INERA and ADI-Kivu camps (north of Bukavu)
and the Chimanga camp (west of Bukavu in the direction of Shabunda). On 26
October,
AFDL/APR soldiers set fire to the already abandoned camp of Muku, ten kilometres
from
Bukavu in the Walungu territory.
_______________
202 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009;
confidential documents submitted to the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; Lutheran Church, “Rapport
d’enquête sur les
violations des droits de l’homme à l’est du Congo”, May 1997, p.8.
203 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February 2009 and April 2009;
Report of the Secretary-
General’s Investigative Team (S/1998/581).
204 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, December 2008 and March 2009;
witness accounts
gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; CADDHOM,
“Les atrocités
commises en province du Kivu 1996-1998”, p.5; Palermo-Bukavu Solidarity
Committee, “Les morts de la
libération”, June 1997, pp.5–6.
202. After the capture of Bukavu on 29 October 1996, AFDL/APR troops
continued
their operations against the camps located north of the city.
_______________
205 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, May 2009; list
of those killed in the parish of Ciriri
from 1996 to 2008 by different armed groups, submitted to the Mapping Team in
2009.
206 Since 1995, this unit had been financed by UNHCR to guarantee the protection
of its facilities.
207 Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team (S/1998/581);
confidential documents submitted to
the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; HRW (HRW), “Zaire:
Attacked by All Sides.
Civilians and the War in Eastern Zaire”, 1997, p.13; CADDHOM, “Les atrocités
commises en province du
Kivu 1996-1998”, p.5; ICHRDD & ASADHO (International Centre for Human Rights and
Democratic
Development & Association africaine de défense des droits de l’homme),
International Non-Governmental
Commission of Inquiry into the Massive Violations of Human Rights Committed in
the DRC - Former Zaïre
- 1996-1997, 1998, p.14.
208 Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team (S/1998/581); Witness
accounts gathered by the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; Ospiti/Peacelink, “Les
violations des droits de
l’homme dans le territoire contrôlé par l’AFDL”, undated, p.3.
209 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009; The Guardian,
“Truth buried in Congo’s
killing fields”, 19 July 1997, p.2.
203. After the capture of Bukavu by the AFDL/APR troops and the destruction
of the
refugee camps north of the town, the survivors fled in the direction of North
Kivu. They
either passed through Kahuzi-Biega National Park (towards Bunyakiri/Hombo) or
Nyabibwe, on the Goma road. However, the refugees who travelled via Nyabibwe
were
caught between AFDL/APR troops arriving from Goma and Bukavu, and did not reach
North Kivu.
204. Most of the refugees who were trapped at Nyabibwe tried to reach
Bunyakiri and
Hombo via the Hauts Plateaux of Kalehe. One group moved into the makeshift camps
at
Shanje and Numbi. Pursued by the AFDL/APR soldiers, many refugees were killed in
these makeshift camps and at Chebumba and Lumbishi in the Kalehe territory.
_______________
210 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March–April
2009; The Guardian, “Truth buried in
Congo’s killing fields”, 19 July 1997, p.2.
211 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in
1997/1998;
Ospiti/Peacelink, “Les violations des droits de l’homme dans le territoire
contrôlé par l’AFDL”, undated,
p.4; New York Times, “Refugees Tell of Youths Killed on March Back to Rwanda”,
30 November 1996;
Benoit Rugumaho, L’hécatombe des réfugiés rwandais dans l’ex-Zaïre, témoignage
d’un survivant,
L’Harmattan, 2004, p.7.
212 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in
1997/1998; ICHRDD &
ASADHO, International Non-Governmental Commission of Inquiry into the Massive
Violations of Human
Rights Committed in the DRC - Former Zaïre - 1996-1997, 1998, pp.14–15, 27, 51.
205. Most of the Shanje survivors fled via the Rukiga bamboo forest. At the
village of
Hombo, they joined the survivors of the Kashusha/INERA camp, who were trying to
reach North Kivu by travelling through the Kahuzi-Biega National Park.
206. Many refugee survivors of the Uvira and Bukavu camps tried to escape via
the
Shabunda territory. These refugees took the old Bukavu to Kindu road, passing
through
the villages of Chimanga, Kingulube, Katshungu and Shabunda, 71, 181, 285 and
337
kilometres east of Bukavu respectively. Around mid-December 1996, 38,000
refugees
were registered in three makeshift camps around Shabunda: Makese I, Makese II
and
Kabakita (also known as Kabakita I, Kabakita II and Kabakita III). An unknown
number
of these refugees, often those falling behind, were killed by AFDL/APR soldiers
on the
Shabunda road. Massacres were reported in the villages of Mukenge, Baliga and
Kigulube in January 1997. In the region, there were some sporadic clashes
between
AFDL/APR soldiers, the FAZ and ex-FAR/Interahamwe soldiers beating their
retreat.
The victims of the AFDL/APR units were for the most part unarmed civilians.213
207. The refugees who managed to escape in time headed in the direction of
Kindu.
Others, after hearing that UNHCR had opened a branch at Kigulube, headed towards
Bukavu. Several thousand refugees went this way, moving through the forest in
small
groups of 50 to 100 people. Since January 1997, AFDL/APR soldiers had controlled
the
zone and had set up many checkpoints along the major routes. Between February
and
April 1997, AFDL/APR units systematically killed refugees travelling through the
village
of Kigulube and the surrounding forest, and on the 156 kilometres of road
between
Kigulube and the town of Shabunda.
_______________
213 IRIN, “Emergency Update No. 60 on the Great Lakes”, 17
December 1996.
214 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009; Report of the
Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team (S/1998/581); confidential documents submitted to the
Secretary-General’s Investigative
Team in 1997/1998; CADDHOM, “Les atrocités commises en province du Kivu
1996-1998”, p.8;
MSF, ”L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale d’élimination à l'est du Zaïre”,
April 1997, pp.8–10; K.
Emizet, “The Massacre of Refugees in Congo: a Case of UN Peacekeeping Failure
and International Law”,
The Journal of Modern African Studies, 38, 2, 2000, p.12; ICHRDD & ASADHO,
International Non-
Governmental Commission of Inquiry into the Massive Violations of Human Rights
Committed in the DRC
- Former Zaïre - 1996-1997, 1998, p.16.
208. When they intercepted refugees at Kigulube, the AFDL/APR soldiers
usually
asked them to follow them under various pretexts, in particular helping them
push their
vehicle to Mpwe. Along the way, they killed them with machete blows or knives.
Despite
orders given to villagers to recover the bodies of the refugees, international
NGOs and
local witnesses observed many corpses and skeletons on the roads around Kigulube,
as
well as personal effects that belonged to the refugees. On several occasions,
international
NGO personnel witnessed the clean-up operations between Shabunda and Kigulube
and
observed the presence of mass graves around graveyards in several villages and
at several
remote sites along the roadside. The total number of victims is hard to
ascertain but runs
to several hundred, and could even exceed one thousand.215
_______________
215 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team in 1997/1998; MSF,
“L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale d’élimination à l’est du Zaïre”, April
1997, pp.8–10.
216 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, January and March 2009;
confidential documents
submitted to the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; AI,
“Deadly alliances in Congolese
forests”, 1997, p.2; ICHRDD & ASADHO, “International Non-Governmental Commission
of Inquiry into
the Massive Violations of Human Rights Committed in the DRC - Former Zaïre -
1996-1997”, 1998, p.16.
217 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008, and South Kivu,
January and March
2009; Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998
(S/1998/581); CADDHOM,
“Enquête sur les massacres des réfugiés 1998”, p.3; MSF, ”L’échappée forcée: une
stratégie brutale
d’élimination à l’est du Zaïre”, April 1997, pp.8–10; Sunday Times, “Kabila’s
death squads”, 22 June 1997.
presence along the road of human remains and personal effects that belonged to
the refugees. 218
209. The murders and serious violations of human rights carried out against
Rwandan
and Burundian refugees continued well after the military conquest of the
province by the
AFDL/APR/FAB troops.
_______________
218 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009;
witness accounts gathered by the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; AI, “Deadly alliances in
Congolese forests”, 1997,
p.5; ICHRDD & ASADHO, International Non-Governmental Commission of Inquiry into
the Massive
Violations of Human Rights Committed in the DRC - Former Zaïre - 1996-1997,
1998, p.16.
219 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in
1997/1998; MSF,
“L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale d’élimination à l’est du Zaïre”, April
1997, pp.8–10.
victims reported that there were many other containers at the airport and that they
were used by soldiers to torture refugees.220
Attacks against refugees in camps on the Goma to Rutshuru road
210. In October 1996, UNHCR estimated that there were 717,991 Rwandan
refugees
in the province of North Kivu. Most were living in the five camps located around
the city
of Goma. The Kibumba (194,986), Katale (202,566) and Kahindo (112,875) camps
were
located on the Rutshuru road, north of Goma. The Mugunga (156,115) and Lac Vert
(49,449) camps were located on the Sake road, less than ten kilometres west of
Goma.221
Although the vast majority of the refugees were unarmed civilians, these camps
also
functioned as bases from which ex-FAR soldiers (of which there were many in the
Lac
Vert camp) and Interahamwe militiamen (especially in the Katale camp) could lead
frequent incursions into Rwandan territory.222
211. As in South Kivu, infiltrated units from Rwanda attacked the refugee
camps on
the Rutshuru road on several occasions, even before the hostilities officially
began.
212. From mid-October 1996 onwards, infiltrations from Rwanda intensified and
AFDL/APR soldiers began to fire sporadically at the three camps along the Goma
to
Rutshuru road, with heavy and light weapons.225 The Kibumba camp, twenty-five
kilometres north of Goma, was the first to fall.
_______________
220 Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team
(S/1998/581); witness accounts gathered by the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; IRIN, “Emergency Update
No.159 on the Great
Lakes”, 26–28 April 1997; MSF, “L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale
d’élimination à l’est du Zaïre”,
April 1997, p.10.
221 Office of the Regional Special Envoy of UNHCR, Kigali, Rwanda, Zaire: “UNHCR
population statistics
as of 26 September 1996”.
222 Degni-Ségui estimated the number of ex-FAR units in the Zairian camps at
16,000; see Report on the
situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted by René Degni-Ségui, Special
Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights (E/CN.4/1995/12).
223 Since 1995, this unit had been financed by UNHCR to guarantee the protection
of its facilities.
224 Witness account gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in
1997/1998; IRIN, “Weekly
roundup of main events in the Great Lakes Region”, 23–30 June 1996.
225 Reuters, “UN: East Zaire Troubles Spread”, 21 October 1996.
and destroying the camp’s hospital. Around 194,000 refugees fled Kibumba and
headed towards the Mugunga camp.226
213. The Katale camp was also attacked in the night of 25 October to 26
October 1996
by the AFDL/APR, but FAZ/CZSC soldiers and ex-FAR/Interahamwe units drove back
the attackers.
214. After violent clashes with FAZ soldiers and ex-FAR/Interahamwe units
from the
Katale refugee camp who had come in as reinforcements, the AFDL/APR soldiers
took
control of the FAZ military camp at Rumangabo, between Goma and Rutshuru, close
to
the Rwandan border. On 30 October, most of the refugees in the Katale and
Kahindo
camps, which were close to the military camp, began to leave. As the AFDL/APR
troops
had cut off the road to Goma, some of the refugees headed in the direction of
Masisi via
Tongo, while others set about reaching the Mugunga camp through the Virunga
National
Park.228 Other refugees remained in the camps.
215. In the first week after the AFDL/APR soldiers’ offensive in North Kivu,
a small
number of refugees decided to return to Rwanda. According to UNHCR, around 900
refugees crossed the border at Mutura between 26 October and 31 October 1996.230
The
physical and psychological pressures to which the refugees were subjected by the
ex-
_______________
226 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008;
Report of the Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team (S/1998/581); Organisation interafricaine des juristes (OIJ),
“Recueil de témoignages
sur les crimes commis dans l’ex-Zaïre depuis octobre 1996”, September 1997,
pp.5–6; Reuters, “Human
Tide of Refugees on the Move in Zaire”, 27 October 1996; Reuters, “Aid Agencies
Scramble to Help
500,000 in Zaire”, 28 October 1996; Voice of America, “Background Report”, 27
October 1996.
227 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in
1997/1998; HRW, “Zaire:
Attacked by All Sides. Civilians and the War in Eastern Zaire”, 10 March 1997,
pp.12–15; OIJ, “Recueil de
Témoignages sur les crimes commis dans l’ex-Zaïre depuis octobre 1996”,
September 1997, pp.11–12;
AFP, “Un soldat zaïrois tué et trois blessés dans l’attaque du camp de Katale,
selon le HCR”, 27 October
1996.
228 Reuters, “UN says 115,000 refugees flee camp in Zaire”, 31 October 1996.
229 Report on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2), para.
11; confidential
documents submitted to the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998;
OIJ, “Recueil de
témoignages sur les crimes commis dans l’ex-Zaïre depuis octobre 1996”,
September 1997, p.12.
230 IRIN, “Emergency Update No. 1 on Kivu, Zaire”, 30 October 1996.
FAR/Interahamwe partly explains their reluctance to re-enter Rwanda. However,
their
refusal to return was also tied to the risks the refugees ran when they
volunteered
themselves to the AFDL/APR soldiers for their repatriation. Indeed, the Mapping
Team
can confirm that on several occasions the AFDL/APR soldiers deliberately killed
refugees who had requested their help to return to the country.
216. It was impossible to determine the number of refugees killed by AFDL/APR
soldiers in the attacks on the camps along the Goma to Rutshuru road. Figures
released
by the Équipe d’urgence de la biodiversité (EUB), a local NGO which assisted in
the
burial of the victims’ bodies to prevent possible epidemics in the region, along
with the
Association des volontaires du Zaïre (ASVOZA) and the Zairian Red Cross,
nonetheless
provide an idea of the scale of the killings.
217. By 1 November 1996, all of the refugee camps between Goma and Rutshuru
had
been dismantled. The survivors of Kibumba found themselves near the Mugunga
camp.
The survivors of Kahindo and Katale were scattered across the Virunga National
Park. As
they tried to escape the AFDL/APR interception teams sent into the Virunga
National
Park, many refugees wandered into the forest for weeks on end and died of thirst
due to
the lack of drinking water in the lava field that covered the Park at this
point.
_______________
231 Équipe d’urgence de la biodiversité (EUB), Rapport final des
activités de ramassage & inhumation de
corps, February 1997.
232 Ibid.
233 Ibid.
234 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in
1997/1998; OIJ, “Recueil
de témoignages sur les crimes commis dans l’ex-Zaïre depuis octobre 1996”,
September 1997, pp.7–8.
218. The killings around the former camps of Katale, Kahindo and Kibumba and
in the
Virunga National Park continued for several months.236 In February 1997, one
witness
recounted how bodies of the recently deceased were found each morning by the
local
people on the site of the former Kibumba refugee camp.237
Attacks against refugees in the Mugunga and Lac Vert camps
219. After the fall of the FAZ military camp in Rumangabo on 29 October,
AFDL/APR soldiers launched an attack on Goma and took control of the town on 1
November 1996. For several days, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe from the Mugunga and Lac
Vert camps and Mayi-Mayi armed groups from Sake blockaded the AFDL/APR soldiers
seven kilometres from the Mugunga camp. Some of the refugees took advantage of
this
situation to leave the camps and move towards the town of Sake. On 12 November,
however, after entering into an alliance with the local Mayi-Mayi, the AFDL/APR
soldiers took control of the hills around Sake and surrounded the refugees who
were
gathered between the Mugunga camp and the town.
_______________
235 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009;
OIJ, “Recueil de témoignages sur les
crimes commis dans l’ex-Zaïre depuis octobre 1996, September 1997”; HRW, “Zaire:
Attacked by All
Sides. Civilians and the War in Eastern Zaire”, 10 March 1997, pp.12–15.
236 Report on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2), pp.7
and 8; OIJ, “Recueil de
témoignages sur les crimes commis dans l’ex-Zaïre depuis octobre 1996”,
September 1997, pp.12–13.
237 Colette Braeckman, ”Ces cadavres dans le sillage des rebelles”, Le Soir, 26
February 1997.
238 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009; confidential
documents submitted to
the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998.
239 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008; Report of the
Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team (S/1998/581); OIJ, “Recueil de témoignages sur les crimes
commis dans l’ex-Zaïre
depuis octobre 1996”, September 1997, p.6; APREDECI (Action paysanne pour la
reconstruction et le
développement communautaire intégral), Rapport circonstanciel: novembre 1996 et
ses événements, 1996,
p.8.
220. In the afternoon of 14 November, after violent clashes with the
Mayi-Mayi at
Sake, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe in the Mugunga camp broke through the cordon and
fled
in the direction of Masisi, taking many refugees with them.
221. On 15 November 1996, while the Security Council was giving the green
light to
the deployment of a multinational force in eastern Zaire, AFDL/APR soldiers
entered the
Mugunga camp and ordered the refugees still present in the camp to return to
Rwanda.241
Between 15 November and 19 November 1996, several hundred thousand refugees left
the Mugunga and Lac Vert camps and returned to Rwanda.242
222. Many witnesses reported the existence of a checkpoint between the
Mugunga and
Lac Vert camps where the AFDL/APR units would sort refugees according to their
age
and sex. Generally speaking, the soldiers allowed women, children and the
elderly to pass
through. Men, on the other hand, were very often arrested and executed.
_______________
240 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team in 1997/1998; APREDECI,
Rapport circonstanciel: novembre 1996 et ses événements, 1996, p.8; APREDECI,
Groupe des volontaires
pour la paix (GVP), Centre de recherche et d’encadrement populaire (CRE),
“L’Apocalypse au Nord-
Kivu”, October 1997, p.23.
241 See Security Council Resolution 1080 (1996), dated 15 November 1996. With
the mass return of
Rwandan refugees, the plan to deploy a peacekeeping force in eastern Zaire was
no longer considered a
priority and the Canadian soldiers left their advanced base in Kampala at the
end of December 1996.
242 The figure of 600,000 repatriates is most commonly cited. However, this
figure is an estimate;
repatriated refugees were not counted as they crossed the border between 15
November and 19 November
1996. Many observers estimate that between 350,000 and 500,000 refugees crossed
the border during this
time.
243 “Bloodied Corpses Litter Camp – Signs of Massacre Found in Deserted Refugee
Camp”, Toronto Star,
16 November 1996.
244 AFP, “Les volontaires de la Croix-Rouge chargés du ramassage des cadavres”,
19 November 1996.
they drowned. Others were shot in the head and their bodies dumped in the
lake.245
· The killings around Mugunga and Lac Vert continued for several weeks. Some
survivors have recounted how they were attacked by AFDL/APR soldiers in late
November 1996 when they were seeking repatriation to Rwanda. Some of the
refugees were rounded up when they came out of the Park and then executed. One
source reported the existence of several mass graves inside the park, five
kilometres from the Mugunga camp.246
Attacks against refugees fleeing across the Masisi and Walikale territories
223. From 15 November 1996, the AFDL/APR soldiers went in pursuit of the
refugee
survivors and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe who were escaping across the Masisi towards
the
town of Walikale. They caught up with the slowest units of the column, who were
settled
in makeshift camps in the villages of Osso, Kinigi and Katoyi (mainly survivors
of
Mugunga and Kibumba), Kilolirwe, Ngandjo, Nyamitaba, Miandja, Nyaruba, Kirumbu
and Kahira (mainly survivors of Kahindo and Katale). During their operations
against the
refugees, the AFDL/APR soldiers often received the backing of local Mayi-Mayi
groups,
who saw this as an opportunity to take their revenge on the Hutu armed groups
with
whom they had been at war for over three years and who had been supported by the
ex-
FAR/Interahamwe from 1994 onwards.
_______________
245 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team in 1997/1998.
246 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in
1997/1998; AZADHO,
“Existence des charniers et fosses communes”, March 1997.
247 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, March 2009; AZADHO, “Existence
des charniers et
fosses communes”, March 1997; APREDECI, Rapport circonstanciel: novembre 1996 et
ses événements,
1996, p.8.
massacre, eyewitnesses confirmed having seen between 20 and 100 bodies in the
camp.248
224. Around 8 November 1996, many refugees, most of them survivors from the
Kahindo and Katale camps, settled in the Bashali chiefdom in the north-east of
the Masisi
territory. Towards 18 November 1996, AFDL/APR soldiers attacked their makeshift
camp at Rukwi. Over the weeks and months that followed, they attacked and killed
an
unknown number of survivors from the camp as they tried to flee the territory.
_______________
248 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008;
Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire
des crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.85.
249 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, April 2009; Peacelink, “Rapport
sur la situation qui
prévaut actuellement dans les provinces du Nord-Kivu et du Sud-Kivu”, 1997;
APREDECI, GVP, CRE,
“L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, October 1997, p.30.
250 The term “Banyarwanda” denotes peoples originating from Rwanda and living in
the province of North
Kivu.
251 Peacelink, “Rapport sur la situation qui prévaut actuellement dans les
provinces du Nord-Kivu et du
Sud-Kivu”, 1997; APREDECI, GVP, CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, October 1997,
p.32.
252 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, January 2009; APREDECI,
“Mission d’enquête sur la
situation des droits de l’homme dans la province du Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.32;
APREDECI, GVP, CRE,
“L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, October 1997, p.36.
253 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in
1997/1998; Peacelink,
“Rapport sur la situation qui prévaut actuellement dans les provinces du
Nord-Kivu et du Sud-Kivu”, 1997.
The victims were part of a group of refugees on their way to the Karuba UNHCR
transit centre with a view to their repatriation to Rwanda.254
225. The Rwandan refugees arrived in Walikale territory in November 1996 via
three
different routes. One group, which came from Bukavu, reached Walikale territory
via
Bunyakiri. A second group, also from Bukavu, travelled through the Kahuzi-Biega
forest
via Nyabibwe. A final group, which had fled the camps of North Kivu, reached
Walikale
territory via southern Masisi territory and the towns of Busurungi and Biriko.
Pursued by
the AFDL/APR soldiers, the slowest refugees, who were often left behind by the
armed
men, were indiscriminately attacked and killed.
226. The AFDL/APR soldiers from Bukavu arrived at Hombo, a village located on
the
border between North Kivu and South Kivu, around 7 December 1996. They then
split
into several groups. Some of the troops continued to head towards Walikale town,
while
others stayed in the area to hunt down the refugees. A third group left to
pursue fleeing
refugees in the Walowa-Luanda groupement, in the south-east of Walikale
territory.
227. When they arrived in Walikale territory, the AFDL/APR soldiers held
public
meetings for the attention of the Zairian people. In these meetings, they
accused the Hutu
refugees of being collectively responsible for the genocide of the Tutsis in
Rwanda. They
also claimed that the refugees were planning to commit genocide against Zairian
civilians
in the region. In their speeches, they frequently likened the refugees to “pigs”
running
rampage through the fields of the villagers. They also often called on the
Zairians to help
them flush them out and kill them. According to several sources, the term “pigs”
was the
code name used by the AFDL/APR troops to refer to the Rwandan Hutu refugees.
When
the AFDL/APR soldiers blocked the Zairians from accessing some execution sites,
they
told them that they were “killing the pigs”.255
228. In this region, massacres were staged on the basis of an almost
identical plan,
designed to kill as many victims as possible. Every time they spotted a large
group of
refugees, the AFDL/APR soldiers fired indiscriminately at them with heavy and
light
weapons. They would then promise to help the survivors return to Rwanda. After
herding
them up under a variety of pretexts, they most often killed them with hammers or
hoes.
Those who tried to escape were shot dead. A number of witnesses have claimed
that in
1999, APR/ANC256 soldiers went specifically to the sites of several
massacres to dig up
the bodies and burn them.257
_______________
254 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team in 1997/1998; AI, “Deadly
alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997, p.6.
255 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008.
256 Armée nationale congolaise, the armed branch of the Rassemblement congolais
pour la démocratie
(RCD), a political and military movement formed in August 1998.
257 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008.
229. When the AFDL/APR soldiers took control of the tarmac road between Hombo
and Walikale, the Rwandan refugees who had not yet reached the main road between
Bukavu and Walikale had to turn back towards Masisi. The majority set up home
temporarily in the village of Biriko in the Walowa-Luanda groupement.
230. In the days that followed, the AFDL/APR soldiers continued their hunt,
attacking
refugees in the villages of Kilambo, Busurungi (Bikoyi Koyi hill), Nyamimba and
Kifuruka in the Walowa-Luanda groupement in the Walikale territory.
_______________
258 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, April 2009 and
with the Mapping Team, South Kivu,
March 2009; Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team (S/1998/581);
confidential documents
submitted to the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998.
259 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November-December 2008 and
April 2009; witness
accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998.
260 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November/December 2008 and
April 2009;
CADDHOM, “Les atrocités commises en province du Kivu au Congo-Kinshasa (ex-Zaïre)
de 1996-1998”,
July 1998.
believe that they were going to help them return to Rwanda. Once they had left
the village, however, the soldiers shot them dead or killed them with machetes.261
231. While some units of the AFDL/APR were committing these massacres in the
Walowa-Luanda groupement, others continued to head towards the administrative
centre
of the territory, Walikale.
232. An execution system was rolled out around Itebero where, from December
1996,
special AFDL/APR units set about systematically hunting down refugees.
233. Around 16 December 1996, the AFDL/APR soldiers arrived in Walikale-Centre.
_______________
261 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu,
November/December 2008 and April 2009.
262 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November/December 2008 and
February 2009; Report
of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team (S/1998/581); confidential
document submitted to the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998; APREDECI, GVP, CRE,
“L’Apocalypse au Nord-
Kivu”, October 1997, p.52; CADDHOM, “Enquête sur les massacres de réfugiés
rwandais et burundais”,
September 1997; Associated Press, “Massacre: Victims Leave Clues Behind”, 14
March 1998.
263 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November-December 2008;
witness account gathered
by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in 1997/1998.
entering. Most of the victims’ bodies were dumped in the Lowa River and its
tributaries.264
234. Another group of Rwandan refugees from Masisi reached Walikale territory
in
December 1996 via a forest track linking the villages of Ntoto and Ngora, around
fifteen
kilometres north of Walikale-Centre. After Walikale was captured by AFDL/APR
forces,
these refugees and some ex-FAR/Interahamwe tried to hide in the village of
Kariki,
sheltering in an abandoned fish farm on the winding track between the Ntoto and
Ngora
villages.
235. From late 1996, the Zairian Government massed its forces in Kindu and
Kisangani with a view to launching a counter-offensive in the Kivu provinces.
The first
refugees arrived in Maniema province in early 1997 from the Walikale territory
in North
Kivu. They headed first towards the town of Kisangani but were stopped by the
FAZ and
rerouted to the Tingi-Tingi site, seven kilometres from Lubutu, near an
airfield. Over the
weeks that followed, almost 120,000 refugees settled in a makeshift camp at
Tingi-Tingi.
In the meantime, 40,000 other Rwandan Hutus, including many ex-FAR/Interahamwe,
arrived in the village of Amisi, seventy kilometres east of Tingi-Tingi. From
the start of
1997, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe used the Tingi-Tingi camp as a recruitment and
training
base with a view to leading a joint counter-offensive with the FAZ against the
AFDL/APR troops. The FAZ and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe began to work in very close
coordination with one another. The FAZ also provided the ex-FAR/Interahamwe with
arms, munitions and uniforms in particular.
236. In January 1997, violent clashes took place between the AFDL/APR
soldiers and
the ex-FAR/Interahamwe for several weeks at the Osso bridge, at the border
between
North Kivu and Maniema province. On 7 February, after violent fighting in the
village of
Mungele, AFDL/APR troops took the Amisi camp. Most of the camp’s population
managed to escape in the direction of Lubutu and settled by the Tingi-Tingi
camp. The
_______________
264 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu,
November-December 2008; CADDHOM, “Enquête sur
les massacres des réfugiés rwandais et burundais hutu ainsi que des populations
civiles congolaises lors de
la guerre de l’AFDL”, June 1998.
265 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008.
final skirmishes between the AFDL/APR and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe took place
in the
village of Mukwanyama, eighteen kilometres from Tingi-Tingi. After this time,
the
fighting virtually ceased and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe fled in all different
directions.
Some dignitaries of the old Rwandan regime and refugees who could afford the
price of
the ticket (USD 800) booked seats onboard commercial aircraft that landed
specially at
Tingi-Tingi and left for Nairobi. In the evening of 28 February, the refugees,
after
hearing that the AFDL/APR troops were ten kilometres from Tingi-Tingi, left the
camp
and headed towards Lubutu. However, they were blocked until the next morning by
the
FAZ at the bridge over the Lubilinga River, commonly known as “Lubutu Bridge”.
237. On 27 February 1997, AFDL/APR troops entered the town of Kindu, which
had
been deserted by the FAZ. The refugees continued to head towards Lodja
(westwards) or
Kasongo (southwards). Previously, a third group, which was much smaller in
number,
had joined the refugees at the Tingi-Tingi camp via the Punia road.
_______________
266 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009; AI,
“Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”,
1997, p.5; MSF, “L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale d’élimination à l’est
du Zaïre”, April 1997, pp.4
and 5.
267 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009; AI, “Deadly alliances
in Congolese forests”,
1997, p.5; MSF, “L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale d’élimination à l’est
du Zaïre”, April 1997, pp.4
and 5.
Rwanda. On 1 March, they boarded a minibus sent by the soldiers. During the
evening, the soldiers beat them to death with sticks. The bodies of the victims
were buried at the scene.268
238. Although there were no more clashes between the ex-FAR/Interahamwe/FAZ
and
the AFDL/APR troops, the massacres of refugees continued in the weeks that
followed
the fall of Tingi-Tingi. The refugees apprehended by AFDL/APR soldiers based in
Lubutu were led to a site called Golgotha, three kilometres from Lubutu, where
they were
systematically executed.
_______________
268 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008; Haki Za Binadamu,
press release no.1,
7 March 1997; AI, “Memorandum to the UN Security Council: Appeal for a
Commission of Inquiry to
Investigate Reports of Atrocities in Eastern Zaire”, 24 March 1997.
269 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009.
270 MSF, “L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale d’élimination à l’est du
Zaïre”, April 1997, pp.4 and 5.
239. With the exception of the group of soldiers who accompanied the
entourage of the
former Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana that swiftly crossed the region
between
late 1996 and early 1997, the vast majority of Rwandan refugees did not arrive
in
Orientale Province until March 1997. Although they tried to reach Kisangani in
the
company of an extremely small number of ex-FAR/Interahamwe units via the Lubutu-
Kisangani road, on the right bank of the Luluaba River (the Congo River),271
they were
pushed back by the FAZ towards Ubundu, 100 kilometres south of Kisangani, on the
left
bank of the Luluaba River.
240. From 6 March 1997, tens of thousands of refugees set up camp at Njale,
in the
Ubundu territory, on the right bank of the Zaire River, opposite the village of
Ubundu.
The fighting that ensued between the AFDL/APR troops and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe
troops around Njale272 created a wave of panic among the refugees and many of
them
tried to cross the river any way they could, in spite of the harsh weather
conditions.
Several hundred refugees drowned as they tried to cross the river.
Attacks against refugees along the Lubutu-Kisangani road
241. Advancing faster than the others, a small group of approximately 1,000
refugees
and ex-FAR/Interahamwe units managed to pass through before the closure of the
Lubutu-Kisangani road and arrived on 12 March 1997 at the village of Wania
Rukula,
sixty-four kilometres from Kisangani. They settled in two makeshift camps
between the
towns of Luboya and Maiko, on the right bank of the Luluaba River. On the same
day,
FAZ soldiers from the Special Presidential Division (DSP) entered the camps and
handed
out weapons to the ex-FAR/Interahamwe in anticipation of an AFDL/APR attack.
Executions and forced disappearances of refugees in and around the town of
Kisangani
242. After the capture of Kisangani on 15 March 1997, the AFDL/APR soldiers
staged
combing operations in and around the town, looking for refugees. The new AFDL
_______________
271 The Luluaba River is known as the Congo River from Kisangani.
272 Fighting took place in the villages of Obiakutu and Babunjuli.
273 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, November 2008 and Orientale
Province, January and
February 2009; Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team in the DRC in
1997/1998.
authorities instructed local officials to round up all the refugees in the
region. Whenever
groups of refugees were spotted, the AFDL/APR soldiers went to the round-up
sites and
led the refugees away towards an unknown fate.
Attacks against refugees along the Ubundu to Kisangani railway line
243. After crossing the Luluaba River at Ubundu village, most of the refugees
pressed
onwards and settled around 14 March 1997 in a makeshift refugee camp known as
“Camp de la Paix”, or “peace camp”, in the village of Obilo, 82 kilometres from
Kisangani. On 15 March, however, AFDL/APR/UPDF troops captured Kisangani and
most of the refugees decided to continue on their way, except for a few hundred
refugees
who remained in Obilo.
_______________
274 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province,
February 2009.
275 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in
the DRC in 1997/1998.
276 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008, January
and May 2009;
Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the
DRC in 1997/1998; MSF,
“L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale d’élimination à l’est du Zaïre”, April
1997.
244. The refugees who had left Obilo before the attack split and headed in
two
different directions. One group, which included ex-FAR/Interahamwe units, left
in the
direction of Équateur province, cutting through the forest at the 52 kilometre
marker and
then travelling through the Opala territory. Most of the refugees continued to
head
towards Kisangani in the hope of accessing humanitarian aid, or even being
repatriated.
Several tens of thousands of people set up camp in the village of Lula, seven
kilometres
from Kisangani, on the left bank of the river. On 31 March 1997, however, AFDL/APR
soldiers arrived in the area and forced them to turn back towards Ubundu. The
refugees
then crowded into makeshift camps along the 125 kilometres of railway line
linking
Kisangani and Ubundu. Towards the middle of April, at least 50,000 refugees were
living
in the Kasese I and II camps,277 located near the Kisesa locality, 25
kilometres from
Kisangani. A second makeshift camp at Biaro, 41 kilometres from Kisangani,
received
30,000 refugees.278 Aid workers rallied quickly to assist the
refugees living in these
camps. Given the scale of the needs and due to problems accessing the camps,
only a
small proportion of the refugee population were able to benefit from
humanitarian aid.
Aid workers were also faced with the hostility of AFDL/APR officials in the
field.
_______________
277 For reasons unknown to the Mapping Team, reports and the
international press commonly use “Kasese”
to refer to the village of Kisesa.
278 IRIN, “Emergency Update No. 156 on the Great Lakes”, 23 April 1997.
279 IRIN, “Emergency Update No. 151 on the Great Lakes”, 16 April 1997.
280 IRIN, “Emergency Update No. 152 on the Great Lakes”, 17 April 1997; MSF,
“L’échappée forcée: une
stratégie brutale d’élimination à l’est du Zaïre”, April 1997, p.6.
day. From 21 April onwards, aid workers were banned entirely from accessing the
camps.281
245. Many witnesses and various sources have told how a train from Kisangani
arrived
near the camps on 21 April 1997, carrying members of the APR special units that
had
been deployed at Kisangani Airport since 17 April.
_______________
281 Interview with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January
and May 2009; confidential documents
submitted to the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998;
UNHCR, “Situation
Reports”, April 1997; “Zaïre: le fleuve de sang”, a France-Télévisions
documentary broadcast in La marche
du siècle by Jean-Marie Cavada, Pascal Richard and Jean-Marie Lemaire in June
1997; IRIN, “Emergency
Update No. 143 on the Great Lakes”, 4 April 1997; MSF, “L’échappée forcée: une
stratégie brutale
d’élimination à l’est du Zaïre”, April 1997; AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese
forests”, 1997; James
McKinley Jr. “Machetes, Axes and Guns: Refugees Tell of Attacks in Zaire”, New
York Times, 30 April
1997; IRIN, “Emergency Update No. 151 on the Great Lakes”, 16 April 1997 and
following days.
282 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, November 2008,
January-May 2009;
confidential documents submitted to the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team
in the DRC in 1997/1998;
C. McGreal, “Truth Buried in Congo’s Killing Fields”, Guardian, 19 July 1997;
John Pomfret, “Massacres
Were a Weapon in Congo’s Civil War; Evidence Mounts of Atrocities by Kabila’s
Forces”, Washington
Post, 11 June 1997; IRIN, ”Emergency Update No. 155 on the Great Lakes”, 22
April 1997; IRIN,
“Emergency Update No. 157 on the Great Lakes”, 24 April 1997.
283 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, November 2008-January
2009 and May 2009;
confidential documents submitted to the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team
in the DRC in 1997/1998;
C. McGreal, “Truth Buried in Congo’s Killing Fields”, Guardian, 19 July 1997;
John Pomfret, “Massacres
Were a Weapon in Congo’s Civil War; Evidence Mounts of Atrocities by Kabila’s
Forces”, Washington
Post, 11 June 1997; F. Reyntjens, La guerre des Grands Lacs: alliances mouvantes
et conflits
extraterritoriaux en Afrique centrale, L’Harmattan, 2009.
journalists visited the Kasese I and II camps under AFDL/APR military escort.
All the refugees, including the sick and the children, had disappeared.284
246. Straight after the Kasese massacres, AFDL/APR soldiers attacked Biaro
camp, 41
kilometres from Kisangani.
247. On 28 April 1997, the non-governmental organisation MSF was granted
permission to visit the Kasese and Biaro camps, but all their occupants had
disappeared.
According to MSF,286 before the attacks these camps were sheltering
at least 5,000
people in a state of extreme exhaustion.287
248. On 22 April 1997, while the attacks were taking place on the Biaro and
Kasese
camps, AFDL/APR soldiers and villagers stopped refugees who were trying to
escape
and forced them to leave in the direction of Ubundu town centre.
_______________
284 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province,
December 2008 and January 2009; Witness
accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in
1997/1998; AI, “Deadly
alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997; MSF, “L’échappée forcée: une stratégie
brutale d’élimination à l’est
du Zaïre”, April 1997; James McKinley Jr., “Machetes, Axes and Rebel Guns:
Refugees Tell of Attacks in
Zaire”, New York Times, 30 April 1997; James McKinley Jr., “Zaire Refugees Bear
Signs of Rebel
Atrocities”, New York Times, 2 May 1997; James McKinley Jr. and Howard French,
”Hidden Horrors: A
Special Report, Uncovering the Guilty Footprints Along Zaire’s Long Trail of
Death”, New York Times, 14
April 1997.
285 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008 and
January 2009; confidential
documents submitted to the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in
1997/1998; AI, “Deadly
alliances in Congolese forests”, 3 December 1997; MSF, “L’échappée forcée: une
stratégie brutale
d’élimination à l’est du Zaïre”, April 1997; James McKinley Jr., “Machetes, Axes
and Rebel Guns:
Refugees Tell of Attacks in Zaire”, New York Times, 30 April 1997; James
McKinley Jr. and Howard
French, “Hidden Horrors: A Special Report: Uncovering the Guilty Footprints
Along Zaire’s Long Trail of
Death”, New York Times, 14 November 1997; James McKinley Jr., ”Zaire Refugees
Bear Signs of Rebel
Atrocities”, New York Times, 2 May 1997.
286 MSF, “L’échappée forcée: une stratégie brutale d’élimination à l’est du
Zaïre”, April 1997.
287 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008 and
January 2009; Witness
accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in
1997/1998; AI, “Deadly
alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997; MSF, “L’échappée forcée: une stratégie
brutale d’élimination à l’est
du Zaïre”, April 1997; James McKinley Jr., “Machetes, Axes and Rebel Guns:
Refugees Tell of Attacks in
Zaïre”, New York Times, 30 April 1997; James McKinley Jr., “Zaire Refugees Bear
Signs of Rebel
Atrocities”, New York Times, 2 May 1997; James McKinley Jr. and Howard French,
”Hidden Horrors: a
Special Report. Uncovering the Guilty Footprints Along Zaire’s Long Trail of
Death”, New York Times,
14 November 1997.
249. In May 1997, while UNHCR and aid workers were arranging the repatriation
of a
group of refugees between the 41 kilometre marker and Kisangani, the massacres
continued in the area south of Biaro camp. The zone remained out of bounds to
aid
workers, journalists and diplomats until at least 19 May. On 14 May, the
delegation of
UNHCR Assistant High Commissioner Sérgio Vieira de Mello was refused access to
the
zone by AFDL/APR soldiers.289 At the same time, when questioned by
journalists as part
of a television report, a Zairian member of the Katangese ex-Tigers who had been
integrated into the AFDL/APR claimed to have witnessed over a thousand
executions
each week in this zone. He also reported that the victims’ bodies were
transported to
certain sites at night to be burned.290 The AFDL/APR soldiers led an
“awareness-raising”
campaign among the people to stop them speaking out about what had happened.291
250. From 30 April 1997 onwards, AFDL/APR soldiers began to transport several
groups of refugee survivors of the attacks on the Kasese camps by train to the
transit
camp that had been set up near Kisangani Airport.
Attacks against refugees along the Kisangani–Opala road
251. In early April 1997, refugees from the Ubundu territory, the probable
survivors of
the Biaro and Kasese massacres, gathered in the Yalikaka locality, by the Lobaye
River.
_______________
288 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998;
“Zaire: le fleuve de sang”, a France-Télévisions documentary broadcast in La
marche du siècle by Jean-
Marie Cavada, Pascal Richard and Jean-Marie Lemaire in June 1997; C. Cyusa, “Les
oubliés de Tingi-
Tingi”, Éditions La Pagaie, pp.132–135; M. Niwese, “Le peuple rwandais un pied
dans la tombe”,
L’Harmattan, 2001, p.149.
289 IRIN, “Emergency Update No. 172 on the Great Lakes”, 15 May 1997.
290 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, May 2009; confidential
documents submitted to
the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998; “Zaire: le
fleuve de sang”, a France-
Télévisions documentary broadcast in La marche du siècle by Jean-Marie Cavada,
Pascal Richard and
Jean-Marie Lemaire in June 1997.
291 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008-February
2009; Witness
accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in
1997/1998.
292 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, January 2009 and Orientale
Province, May 2009;
UNHCR “Great Lakes Briefing Notes”, 6 May 1997; J. Chatain, “Zaïre: 91 réfugiés
étouffés ou piétinés”,
L’Humanité, 6 May 1997.
252. After the massacre, the residents of Yalikaka village continued to
prevent many
refugees from crossing the river and escaping. They also informed AFDL/APR
soldiers
about refugees present in the village.
253. After the fall of Kisangani and the destruction of the camps between
Kisangani
and Ubundu, several thousand refugees regrouped in the villages of Lusuma and
Makako,
206 kilometres from Kisangani. Unable to cross the Lomami River to reach Opala,
they
remained in these villages, looting the property and crops of civilians.
_______________
293 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January
and February 2009; Documents
submitted to the Mapping Team on the events in Opala; K. Emizet, “The Massacre
of Refugees in Congo:
A Case of UN Peacekeeping Failure and International Law”, The Journal of Modern
African Studies,
Vol. 38, No. 02, 2000, p.177.
294 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January and February
2009; Documents
submitted to the Mapping Team on the events in Opala; K. Emizet, “The Massacre
of Refugees in Congo:
A Case of UN Peacekeeping Failure and International Law”, The Journal of Modern
African Studies,
Vol. 38, No. 2, 2000, p.177.
295 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January and February
2009; Documents
submitted to the Mapping Team.
296 Ibid.
254. The victory of AFDL/APR over the FAZ and ex-FAR/Interahamwe in Orientale
province failed to put an end to the massacre, forced disappearances and serious
violations of the rights of refugees in the province.
255. After the closure of the Bengamisa camp, the AFDL/APR soldiers set up
camp
around thirty kilometres away in the Alibuku locality. They set up a temporary
camp five
kilometres from the village, in an unoccupied zone near a gravel quarry. They
told the
villagers that they were looking for the Hutus who had killed the Tutsis in
Rwanda and
asked them to help in their search. They set up a roadblock on the camp’s access
road and
ordered the chef de secteur to ban the people from hunting in the surrounding
forest.
256. As in the other provinces, the victory of the AFDL/APR soldiers over the
FAZ
did not signal the end of the serious violations of human rights of refugees in
Orientale
province.
_______________
297 This was a former Gendarmerie camp near the river.
298 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008 and
March 2009.
299 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, February 2009.
257. The first refugees arrived in Équateur province in December 1996. This
initial
group predominately comprised high-ranking civilian and military dignitaries
from the
old Rwandan regime. The group headed swiftly towards Zongo via Gemena or
Gbadolite,
and then crossed the Ubangi River to reach the Central African Republic. Most of
the
refugees did not reach Équateur province until March or April 1997. They arrived
on
foot, having crossed the forest west of the Kisangani-Ubundu road, and took the
road
_______________
300 From June 1997, the national army of the DRC was known as the
Forces armées congolaises (FAC).
Until the start of the Second Congo War, among the ranks of the FAC, in addition
to the AFDL soldiers and
the ex-FAZ, were many Rwandan and, to a lesser extent, Ugandan soldiers. On
account of the difficulty in
distinguishing clearly between Congolese and Rwandan soldiers at this time, the
acronym FAC/APR has
been used for the period from June 1997 to August 1998.
301 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January, February and
May 2009; UNHCR,
press release: “UNHCR condemns refugee expulsion from ex-Zaire”, 4 September
2009; Great Lakes
Briefing Notes, 5 September 2009.
302 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, May 2009.
303 Report on allegations of massacres and other human rights violations
occurring in eastern Zaire (now
the DRC) since September 1996, prepared by the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in the
DRC, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
and a member of the
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (E/CN.4/1998/64).
304 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, February 2009.
towards Ikela. They then journeyed to the heart of the province along the
Ikela-Boende
road, in the Tshuapa district. They travelled for the most part in groups of 50
to 200
people, accompanied by a few armed men. Some of the groups were made up
exclusively
of ex-FAR and Interahamwe militiamen. Like in the other provinces, when they
passed
through the villages, the latter committed acts of violence against the civilian
populations.
For their part, the AFDL/APR soldiers reached Équateur province in April via
Isangi and
Djolu.
258. The AFDL/APR troops continued to kill refugees around Boende throughout
May, June and July 1997.307 By way of example, the Mapping Team was
able to confirm
the following cases.
259. Once Boende was captured by the AFDL/APR troops, the refugees on the
Ikela
road, upriver from the town, fled in several directions. Some headed in the
direction of
_______________
305 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March 2009; AEFJN
(Africa Europe Faith and Justice
Network), “Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme dans le sud de
l’Équateur”, 30 September
1997.
306 Ibid.
307 AEFJN, “Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme dans le sud de
l’Équateur”, 30 September
1997.
308 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in
the DRC in 1997/1998;
AEFJN, “Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme dans le sud de
l’Équateur,” 30 September 1997.
309 Ibid.
Monkoto, 218 kilometres south of Boende, crossed the Zaire River at Loukolela
and
entered the Republic of the Congo. Others fled northwards and reached Basankusu
via
Befale. Most continued to head westwards towards Ingende and Mbandaka, pursued
by
AFDL/APR soldiers.
260. Towards the end of April 1997, thousands of refugees had gathered on the
right
bank of the Ruki River, waiting for a boat to Mbandaka. In two trips on 1 May
and 8
May, the ferry from Ingende, requisitioned for this purpose by the Military
Governor,
evacuated 4,200 refugees to Irebu, a former naval command centre 120 kilometres
south
of Mbandaka. Others left for Mbandaka in canoes or on foot. The weakest refugees
and
the sick, however, were unable to leave the area before the arrival of the AFDL/APR
soldiers.
261. After spending the night of 12 May to 13 May in the village of Kalamba,
the
AFDL/APR troops reached Wendji, 20 kilometres from Mbandaka. 6000 refugees were
living in a local Red Cross makeshift camp in the village, near an old SECLI
plant
_______________
310 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009;
Letter from Losanganya groupement notables,
15 July 1997.
311 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
312 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
313 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009; HRW and FIDH
(International Federation for
Human Rights), “What Kabila is hiding: Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo”,
October 1997.
314 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, March/April 2009.
(Société équatoriale congolaise Lulonga-Ikelemba). They were not armed
because the
Gendarmerie had confiscated their weapons. Under the aegis of the Bishop of
Mbandaka,
an assistance and repatriation committee comprising members of the Catholic and
Protestant Churches and MSF, ICRC and Caritas, tried to help the refugees but,
given
that AFDL/APR troops were advancing swiftly towards the zone, the committee
elected
to arrange the evacuation of the refugees to Irebu.
262. While one group of AFDL/APR soldiers was massacring refugees in Wendji,
another headed towards Mbandaka onboard two trucks.
263. Around ten o’clock in the morning on 13 May 1997, several hundred
refugees
raced into the streets of Mbandaka.
264. The soldiers then entered the ONATRA port zone, where many refugees had
been
waiting for days to board a boat for Irebu.
_______________
315 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, March/April 2009;
Witness accounts gathered by the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998; Howard French,
“Refugees From Congo
Give Vivid Accounts of Killings”, New York Times, 23 September 1997.
316 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, March 2009; AEFJN (Africa Europe
Faith and Justice
Network), “Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme dans le sud de
l’Équateur”, 30 September
1997.
317 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, March/April 2009; Witness
accounts gathered by the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998.
265. In the end, the survivors of the various massacres committed in the
south of
Équateur province were moved into a camp at Mbandaka Airport. Starting on 22 May
1997, 13,000 refugees were repatriated by air to Rwanda. Most of the Rwandan
refugees
who had managed to cross the Zaire River settled in the Republic of the Congo,
in three
camps approximately 600 kilometres north of Brazzaville: Loukolela (6,500
refugees),
Liranga (5,500 refugees) and Ndjoundou (3,500 refugees).
266. In the second half of 1997, the new regime’s national and provincial
authorities
systematically hindered the work of the Secretary-General’s fact-finding
mission, which
was trying to investigate the Wendji and Mbandaka massacres. In November, the
Governor of Équateur province, Mola Motya, ordered the human remains from the
mass
grave at Bolenge to be dug up to erase all trace of evidence before UN
investigators could
reach the scene. The Minister of the Interior facilitated the exhumation by
imposing a
curfew in Mbandaka town on 13 November.
267. The Wendji and Mbandaka massacres revealed the doggedness with which the
AFDL/APR soldiers killed the refugees. Although the refugees had often mixed
with ex-
FAR/Interahamwe units during their flight across Congo/Zaire, by the time the
AFDL/APR soldiers arrived in Mbandaka and Wendji, most of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe
had already left the zone, as had the FAZ soldiers. Despite this, the AFDL/APR
soldiers
continued to treat the refugees as armed combatants and military targets.
C. Attacks against other civilian populations
268. During their flight, members of President Mobutu’s security services and
the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe killed a large number of civilians and committed acts of rape
and
pillage. As they advanced towards Kinshasa, in addition to vast swathes of
refugees, the
_______________
318 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, March/April 2009;
confidential documents submitted to
the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998; AI, “Deadly
alliances in Congolese
forests”, 1997, pp.6–8; Gandhi International, “Rapport d’activités avec addendum
sur les violations des
droits de l’homme et le dossier de massacre sur les réfugiés”, 1997; Raymond
Bonner, ”For Hutu Refugees,
Safety and Heartbreak”, New York Times, 6 June 1997; John Pomfret, “Massacres
Were a Weapon in
Congo’s Civil War; Evidence Mounts of Atrocities by Kabila’s Forces”, Washington
Post, 11 June 1997.
AFDL/APR soldiers massacred a large number of Hutu Banyarwanda. They also
eliminated many civilians suspected of assisting the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and
Burundian
Hutu armed groups, participating in the killings of Tutsis/Banyamulenge, helping
the
refugees as they fled or supporting President Mobutu’s regime. After President
Laurent-
Désiré Kabila came to power in Kinshasa, the new security forces committed
serious
violations of human rights against civilians viewed as opponents of the new
regime and
of the continued presence of APR soldiers in the Congolese territory.
Goma city
269. On 29 October 1996, having captured the Rumangabo military base between
Goma and Rutshuru, near the Rwandan border, AFDL/APR troops launched an attack
on
the city of Goma.
270. In spite of the capture of Goma by AFDL/APR forces, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe
from the Mugunga camp remained active in the area around the city. On 3 November
1996, they looted vehicles and property from the Grand Séminaire in Buhimba, on
the
outskirts of Goma.
_______________
319 Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team on
serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law in the DRC (S/1998/581), Annex, p.39 and p.47;
Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2), p.7.
320 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, March 2009.
321 Équipe d’urgence de la biodiversité (EUB), “Rapport final des activités de
ramassage et inhumation de
corps”, February 1997. EUB was a Congolese NGO working on the issue of the
environmental effects (e.g.
deforestation) of the presence of high numbers of refugees in the region. The
NGO had been contracted to
bury the bodies in the vicinity of Goma.
322 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008.
Rutshuru territory
271. AFDL/APR soldiers began to infiltrate the Bwisha chiefdom in October
1996.
Towards mid-October, AFDL/APR units launched their first attack on the FAZ
military
base at Rumangabo. Aided by ex-FAR/Interahamwe units from the Katale and Mugunga
refugee camps, the FAZ drove back the attackers. In the days that followed,
additional
AFDL/APR soldiers infiltrated the southern part of Rutshuru territory via the
Virunga
National Park and the Kibumba camp. The new infiltrators cut off the road
between the
Katale and Mugunga refugee camps and the FAZ military base, with a view to
launching
a second attack on Rumangabo. From the start of the infiltrations, AFDL/APR
troops
massacred civilian populations in the Bweza and Rugari groupements. The victims
were
principally Hutu Banyarwanda.326
272. In almost every instance, the massacres by the AFDL/APR soldiers
followed the
same pattern. Upon entering a locality, they ordered the people to gather
together for a
wide variety of reasons. Once they were assembled, the civilians were bound and
killed
by blows of hammers or hoes to the head. Many witnesses have claimed to have
spotted a
large number of Tutsi Banyarwanda youths who had left Rutshuru territory between
1990
and 1996 among the AFDL/APR soldiers. According to several witnesses, the
AFDL/APR soldiers displayed a clear desire for revenge in their massacres of the
Hutu
Banyarwanda, targeting villages where Tutsis had been persecuted in the past.
_______________
323 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008
and March 2009.
324 The term “Banyarwanda” denotes peoples originating from Rwanda and living in
the province of North
Kivu.
325 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008; WFP (World Food
Programme),
“Emergency Report No. 22 of 1996”, 7 June 1996; AI, “Zaire – Lawlessness and
insecurity in North- and
South-Kivu”, 1996, p.10.
326 Locally, these Hutu Banyarwanda are known as Banyabwisha or Hutus from the
Bwisha chiefdom.
273. On 26 October 1996, AFDL/APR soldiers captured Rutshuru town, the
administrative headquarters of Rutshuru territory.
274. When the AFDL/APR troops entered Rutshuru, the inhabitants of the
surrounding
villages fled into the hills in the Busanza groupement.
_______________
327 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February and
April 2009.
328 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February and April 2009.
329 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February and March 2009.
330 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and February and
April 2009.
275. Over the course of the weeks that followed, AFDL/APR soldiers committed
many
massacres in villages in the Busanza, Kisigari and Jomba groupements, to the
south and
east of Rutshuru. The victims were principally Hutu Banyarwanda civilians.
_______________
331 The Albert National Park (ANP) is the former name of the
Virunga National Park.
332 Interviews with MONUC Human Rights Office, North Kivu, October 2005; CREDDHO
(Research
Centre on Environment, Democracy, and Human Rights), “Appel urgent sur la
découverte des fosses
communes en territoire de Rutshuru”, October 2005; APREDECI, “Mission d’enquête
sur la situation des
droits de l’homme dans la province du Nord-Kivu”, pp.11 and 12.
333 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, March 2009.
334 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, January, March and April 2009.
Hutu Banyarwanda. They were last seen talking to AFDL/APR soldiers. Their
bodies have never been found.335
_______________
335 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008
and February 2009; Report on the
situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2), p.7; Didier Kamundu
Batundi, Mémoire des
crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.76; Luc de l’Arbre, “Ils
étaient tous fidèles, nos martyrs
et témoins de l’amour en RDC”, November 2005, p.177.
336 This building was located near the Bwisha chief’s house.
337 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009.
338 Kiwanja is a village near Rutshuru, with a predominately Nande population.
339 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and
February/April 2009; Witness
account gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in
1997/1998; APREDECI,
“Mission d’enquête sur la situation des droits de l’homme dans la province du
Nord-Kivu”, p.13; CEREBA
(Centre d’études et de recherche en éducation de base pour le développement
intégré), “Rapport de mission
en territoire de Rutshuru”, October 2005, p.19; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire
des crimes impunis, la
tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, pp.101 and 102.
340 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and
February/March 2009.
276. From late 1996 onwards, the AFDL/APR soldiers began to mass-recruit
among
the Congolese population. Most of the new recruits were children (CAAFAG),341
commonly known as the Kadogo (“small ones” in Swahili).
_______________
341 Children involved with armed forces and armed groups.
342 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, March and April 2009.
343 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, April 2009.
344 Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu,
2006, p.102;
APREDECI, “Mission d’enquête sur la situation des droits de l’homme en province
du Nord-Kivu”, 1997;
AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997, p.18.
Bwito chiefdom345
277. After the Katale and Kahindo refugee camps were dismantled, many Rwandan
Hutu refugees roamed the Bwito chiefdom until March 1997. They frequently mixed
with
the local population, which comprised mainly Hutu Banyarwanda.
________________
345 Bwito is one of two chiefdoms in Rutshuru territory. It is located in
the west of the territory.
346 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, April 2009; CEREBA, “Rapport
de mission en
territoire de Rutshuru”, October 2005, p.29.
347 Ibid.
348 Ibid.
349 Witness account gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in
the DRC in 1997/1998;
Report on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2), p.6.
people to gather together in order to attend a meeting. They then surrounded the
civilians and opened fire indiscriminately.350
Masisi territory
_______________
350 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and January
2009; AI, “Deadly
alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997, p.8; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des
crimes impunis, la
tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.94; APREDECI, GVP, CRE, “L’Apocalypse au
Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.36;
AZADHO, “Droits de l’homme au Nord-Kivu. Une année d’administration AFDL: Plus
ça change plus
c’est la même chose”, 1997, p.17.
351 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and February
2009; CEREBA,
“Rapport de mission en territoire de Rutshuru”, October 2005, p.30.
352 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, April 2009; AI, “Deadly
alliances in Congolese
forests”, 1997, p.9; APREDECI, “Mission d’enquête sur la situation des droits de
l’homme dans la province
du Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.31; CEREBA, “Rapport de mission en territoire de Rutshuru”,
October 2005, p.29.
353 It was not possible to determine whether these were ex-FAR/Interahamwe or
Hutu Banyarwanda
militiamen.
354 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008 and February
2009; APREDECI,
“Mission d’enquête sur la situation des droits de l’homme dans la province du
Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.31;
APREDECI, “Rapport circonstanciel, novembre 1996 et ses événements”, 1996;
AZADHO, press release,
“Massacre de plus de 500 personnes dans la localité de Kitchanga, zone de Masisi,
par une bande armée”, 6
December 1996.
_______________
355 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, March 2009.
356 APREDECI, GVP, CRE, ”L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997; Peacelink, “Rapport
du Kivu - bilan
victimes, territoire de Masisi”, undated. Available online at the following
address:
http://ospiti.peacelink.it/bukavu/znews047.html.
357 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and
February/March 2009;
APREDECI, GVP, CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.27; Didier Kamundu
Batundi, Mémoire
des crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.85.
358 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and February
2009; Didier Kamundu
Batundi, Mémoire des crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.86;
APREDECI, GVP, CRE,
“L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.30.
who tried to escape were shot dead. After the massacre, the soldiers raped many
women. A large number of women and children, as well as Rwandan refugee
survivors of the Mugunga camp, were among the victims.359
_______________
359 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008
and January 2009; Report of the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team (S/1998/581), Annex, p.48; Report on the
situation of human rights
in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2), p.7; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des crimes
impunis, la tragédie
du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.96; APREDECI, GVP, CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997,
p.34; Grande
Vision pour la défense des droits de l’homme, “Rapport sur les violations des
droits de l’homme dans la
zone agropastorale de Masisi”, March 1997, p.4.
360 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and January
2009; Report on the
situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2), para. 21; Didier
Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire
des crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.97; La Grande Vision,
“Rapport sur les violations
des droits de l’homme dans la zone agropastorale de Masisi”, March 1997, p.4.
361 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and March/April
2009.
362 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and January
2009; Grande Vision,
“Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme dans la zone agropastorale de
Masisi”, March 1997, p.3.
Hutu Banyarwanda, of collaborating with ex-FAR/Interahamwe. The soldiers then
opened fire and threw grenades at the civilians.363
_______________
363 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008
and March 2009; Report on the
situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2), p.6; Didier Kamundu
Batundi, Mémoire des
crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.81.
364 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, March and April 2009.
365 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and
February/March 2009;
APREDECI, GVP, CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.25; La Grande Vision,
“Rapport sur les
violations des droits de l’homme dans la zone agropastorale de Masisi”, March
1997, p.4.
366 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, March 2009; Didier Kamundu
Batundi, Mémoire des
crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.86; APREDECI, GVP, CRE,
“L’Apocalypse au Nord-
Kivu”, 1997, p.28.
367 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009; Witness account
gathered by the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998; Report of the
Secretary-General’s
Investigative Team (S/1998/581), Annex, p.48; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire
des crimes impunis, la
tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.83.
which the victims came buried the bodies at a number of locations, most of them near the Kinyabibuga River.368
278. After President Kabila came to power in Kinshasa, the alliance between
the
AFDL/APR and the Hunde Mayi-Mayi swiftly deteriorated. Accusing the new regime
of
trying to marginalise them in the new army and refusing to accept the long-term
presence
_______________
368 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008
and April 2009; APREDECI, GVP,
CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.35.
369 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008; AI, “Deadly
alliances in Congolese
forests”, 1997, p.15; APREDECI, GVP, CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997,
p.35.
370 As mentioned before, from June 1997 the national army of the DRC was known
as the Forces armées
congolaises (FAC). Until the start of the Second Congo War, in addition to AFDL
soldiers and ex-FAZ, the
FAC included many Rwandan and, to a lesser extent, Ugandan soldiers. On account
of the difficulty
distinguishing accurately between Congolese soldiers and Rwandan soldiers at
this time, the acronym
FAC/APR is used for the period from June 1997 to August 1998.
371 APREDECI, “Mission d’enquête sur la situation des droits de l’homme dans la
province du Nord-Kivu”,
1997, p.38; AZADHO, “Une année d’administration AFDL: plus ça change plus c’est
la même chose”,
1997.
372 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, March 2009.
373 AZADHO, ”Une année d’administration AFDL: plus ça change, plus c’est la même
chose”, 1997, p.5;
AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997, p.8.
of APR soldiers in the two Kivu provinces, a number of Mayi-Mayi groups
decided to
take up the armed struggle again. On 22 July 1997, violent clashes broke out in
the
village of Katale, twelve kilometres from Masisi, where the AFDL/APR had a
military
base. On 29 July, FAC/APR soldiers received reinforcements from Goma and
embarked
on a combing operation in the vicinity of Masisi. During the operation, they
committed
many acts of violence against the predominately Hunde civilian population, whom
they
accused of supporting the Mayi-Mayi.
Nyiragongo territory (Petit Nord)
279. Situated between the city of Goma and the Mount Nyiragongo volcano,
Nyiragongo is the smallest territory in the province of North Kivu. One refugee
camp
was located in this territory, on the Goma to Rutshuru road. From mid-October
1996,
AFDL/APR soldiers moved on to the small strip of land of the Virunga National
Park
between the village of Rugari, in the Rutshuru territory, and Kibumba, in the
Nyiragongo
territory.
_______________
374 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December
2008-January 2009; APREDECI, GVP,
CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997, pp.55 and 56; AI, “Deadly alliances in
Congolese forests”,
1997, p.15 and 16; APREDECI, GVP, CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997, pp.55
and 56.
375 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and March/April
2009.
they entered Mudja and opened fire on the people, killing ten civilians and
injuring four. The soldiers had accused the people of Mudja of bartering supplies
and coal with the Interahamwe operating near Goma.376
Territories of Beni and Lubero (Grand Nord)
280. In 1997 and 1998, the AFDL/APR soldiers (known as the Forces Armées
Congolaises (FAC) from June 1997377) and those of the APR committed massacres in
the
territories of Lubero and Beni. As the local population is 95% Nande and few
refugees
attempted their escape via these two territories, these massacres fulfilled a
different logic
to that observed in the territories of Masisi and Rutshuru. The main massacres
took place
in 1997 after the breakdown of the alliance between the AFDL/APR soldiers and
the
numerous local Mayi-Mayi groups. Denouncing the constant interference of Rwanda
in
the region and the brutal methods used by the AFDL/APR soldiers towards refugees
and
local people alike, many Mayi-Mayi groups distanced themselves and then entered
into
conflict with them. In response, the AFDL/APR soldiers carried out several
attacks on
populations suspected of collaborating with Mayi-Mayi groups.
_______________
376 AZADHO, ”Une année d’administration AFDL: plus ça change,
plus c’est la même chose”, 1997, p.30;
APREDECI, GVP, CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.42; APREDECI, “Rapport
sur le massacre
de Mudja”, 25 April 1997; AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997,
p.14.
377 As mentioned before, from June 1997 the national army of the DRC was known
as the Forces armées
congolaises (FAC). Until the start of the Second Congo War, in addition to AFDL
soldiers and ex-FAZ, the
FAC included many Rwandan and, to a lesser extent, Ugandan soldiers. On account
of the difficulty
distinguishing accurately between Congolese soldiers and Rwandan soldiers at
this time, the acronym
FAC/APR is used for the period from June 1997 to August 1998.
378 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008 and February
2009; APREDECI, GVP,
CRE, “L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu”, 1997, p.43; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire
des crimes impunis,
la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p.106.
flush out the Mayi-Mayi. In the course of the operation, they killed civilians and
looted dwellings.379
281. During their capture of South Kivu, “Tutsi/Banyamulenge armed units” and
_______________
379 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009.
380 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009; ASADHO, Annual
Report, 1998, p.13;
Groupe de chercheurs libres du Graben, “Rapport sur les massacres perpétrés au
camp militaire de Kikyo”;
AI, DRC: A Year of Dashed Hopes, 1998, pp.2–3.
381 Ibid.
382 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009
forces from the AFDL, APR and the FAB383 committed serious
violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law against Zairian civilians viewed as
hostile to
local Tutsi and Banyamulenge communities or friends of their enemies (the FAZ,
the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe, Burundian Hutu armed groups, “Bembe armed units” and the Mayi-
Mayi groups in general). Many tribal chiefs were also killed during this time on
political
and ethnic grounds, or simply in order to loot their property afterwards.
_______________
383 As mentioned before, given the high numbers of APR soldiers
among AFDL troops and at AFDL
headquarters – a fact later acknowledged by the Rwandan authorities – and the
great difficulty experienced
by witnesses questioned by the Mapping Team distinguishing between AFDL and APR
members in the
field, this report will refer to AFDL armed units and APR soldiers engaged in
operations in Zaire between
October 1996 and June 1997 under the acronym AFDL/APR. In cases where, in
certain regions, several
sources have confirmed high numbers of Ugandan soldiers (in some districts of
Orientale Province, for
example) or the Forces armées burundaises (as in some territories in South Kivu)
under the cover of the
AFDL, the acronyms AFDL/APR/UPDF and AFDL/APR/FAB or AFDL/UPDF and AFDL/FAB may
also
be used.
384 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009; CADDHOM
(collective action for human
rights development), “Les atrocités commises en province du Kivu au Congo
Kinshasa (ex-Zaïre) de 1996
à 1998”, 1998, p.5; Palermo-Bukavu Solidarity Committee, “Les morts de la
rebellion”, 1997, p.2.
385 Witness accounts gathered by the Secretary-General’s investigative Team in
the DRC in 1997/1998;
Report of the Secretary-General’s investigative team (S/1998/581), Annex, p.45;
Palermo-Bukavu
Solidarity Committee, “Les morts de la rébellion”, 1997, p.2; AI, “Loin des
regards de la communauté
internationale: Violations des droits de l’homme dans l’est du Zaïre”, 1996,
p.3.
386 Interview with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February 2009; Witness accounts
gathered by the
Secretary-General’s investigative team in the DRC in 1997/1998; Report of the
Secretary-General’s
investigative team (S/1998/581), Annex, p.45; Report on the situation of human
rights in Zaire
(E/CN.4/1997/6), para. 198; Palermo-Bukavu Solidarity Committee, “Les morts de
la rébellion”, 1997, p.1;
AI, “Loin des regards de la communauté internationale: Violations des droits de
l’homme dans l’est du
Zaïre”, 1996, pp.3 and 4.
282. When they left Uvira, the AFDL/APR/FAB soldiers advanced towards the
interior
of Fizi territory.
_______________
387 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, November 2008
and March 2009; Confidential
document submitted to the Secretary-General’s investigative team in the DRC in
1997/1998; Report on the
situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6), para. 198; AI, “Loin des
regards de la communauté
internationale: Violations des droits de l’homme dans l’est du Zaïre”, 1996,
p.4.
388 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009; Witness accounts
gathered by the
Secretary-General’s investigative team in the DRC in 1997/1998.
389 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, November 2008 and February
2009; Report of the
Secretary-General’s investigative team (S/1998/581), Annex, p.37; AI, “Loin des
regards de la communauté
internationale: Violations des droits de l’homme dans l’est du Zaïre”, 1996,
pp.5 and 6.
390 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009.
391 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February 2009.
_______________
392 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and
March 2009.
393 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and March 2009;
Witness accounts gathered
by the Secretary-General’s investigative team in the DRC in 1997/1998; ICHRDD
(International Centre for
Human Rights and Democratic Development) and ASADHO, “International
Non-Governmental
Commission of Inquiry into the Massive Violations of Human Rights Committed in
the DRC - Former
Zaïre - 1996-1997”, 1998, p.12; CADDHOM, “Les atrocités commises en province du
Kivu, 1996-1998”,
1998, pp.9 and 10; Lutheran Church, “Rapport d’enquête sur les violations des
droits de l’homme à l’est du
Congo”, May 1997, p.7.
394 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, December 2008 and March 2009.
395 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, January and February 2009.
_______________
396 Pilot village for modern farming.
397 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009; Witness accounts
gathered by the
Secretary-General’s investigative team in the DRC in 1997/1998; AI, “Deadly
alliances in Congolese
forests”, 1997, p.8.
398 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, November 2008 and
February/March 2009; Report of
the joint mission charged with investigating allegations of massacres and other
human rights violations
occurring in eastern Zaire (now DRC) since September 1996 (A/51/942), p.14;
CADDHOM, “Les atrocités
commises en province du Sud-Kivu”, 1998, pp.11 and 12; AI, “Deadly alliances in
Congolese forests”,
1997, p.9; ICHRDD and ASADHO, International Non-Governmental Commission of
Inquiry into the
Massive Violations of Human Rights Committed in the DRC - Former Zaïre -
1996-1997, 1998.
399 From June 1997, the national army of the DRC was known as the Forces armées
congolaises (FAC).
Until the start of the Second Congo War, in addition to AFDL soldiers and ex-FAZ,
the FAC included many
Rwandan and, to a lesser extent, Ugandan soldiers. On account of the difficulty
distinguishing accurately
between Congolese soldiers and Rwandan soldiers at this time, the acronym FAC/APR
is used for the
period from June 1997 to August 1998.
400Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and April 2009;
Witness accounts gathered by
the Secretary-General’s investigative team in the DRC in 1997/1998; CADDHOM,
“Enquête sur les
massacres de réfugiés”, 1998.
401 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March and April 2009; AI, DRC:
A Year of Dashed
Hopes, 1998, p.3.
283. In December 1996, President Mobutu sent his elite troops and large
stockpiles of
weapons into the provinces of Orientale and Maniema. Mercenaries and the ex-FAR
were
integrated into the Zairian military system. The counter-offensive promised by
the
Kinshasa government in the Kivu provinces never materialised, however, owing to
the
state of decline of Mobutu’s regime, the prevailing disorder within the FAZ and
the
careful planning by the AFDL/APR/UPDF soldiers of their attacks on Kindu and
Kisangani.
284. After their lightning conquest of the Kivu provinces and Ituri, AFDL/APR/UPDF
leaders made contact with Mobutu’s generals and various Mayi-Mayi groups and led
an
intensive campaign of demoralisation against the FAZ. The AFDL President,
Laurent-
Désiré Kabila,402 who initially had only very few troops, drafted in
many CAAFAG403 or
Kadogo recruited during his conquests, then received strategic reinforcement
from the
“Katangese Tigers”. These long-time opponents of Mobutu’s regime, who had served
for
decades in the Angolan government army, arrived in Orientale province in
February 1997
and provided the AFDL/APR/UPDF soldiers besieging Kisangani with the heavy
artillery
capacity they lacked.
285. As they retreated, FAZ soldiers committed acts of murder and rape
against
civilians. They also looted and destroyed much of their property. They often
forced
civilians to carry the goods they had looted over long distances.405 The looting
was of
such an intense and systematic nature that the Kinshasa government declared
Orientale
province (formerly Haut-Zaïre) a disaster area on 10 January 1997.
_______________
402 Following the death in January 1997 in mysterious
circumstances of the first AFDL president, Kisase
Ngandu, the party’s spokesperson Laurent Désiré Kabila became president of the
Alliance.
403 Children involved with armed forces and armed groups.
404 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March and May 2009.
405 A practice known as botikake.
of the Congolese institute for agronomic studies and research (INERA) at
Yangambi.406
286. After the AFDL captured Bunia, in December 1996, military leaders in
Kinshasa
sent an elite Civil Guard unit comprising Katangese ex-Tigers siding with Mobutu
into
Orientale province to support the FAZ.
287. As they withdrew in the face of the advancing AFDL/APR/UPDF, the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe also attacked civilians.
_______________
406 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January
and February 2009; Mgr Banga Bana,
“La situation de violence à Buta”, in Zaïre-Afrique-CEPAS (Centre of Study for
Social Action), February
1997; La Tempête des tropiques, “Buta, Lodja et Katako-Kombe pillés”, 6 and 7
March 1997; Le Soft
international, “Des soldats en déroute pillent Isangi”, no.630, March 1997; La
Référence Plus, “Le pillage
du Haut-Zaïre se poursuit en toute impunité”, 5 March 1997; AI, “Zaire: Rape,
killings and other human
rights violations by security forces”, 1997.
407 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January-February 2009;
AI, “Zaire: Rape,
killings and other human rights violations by security forces”, 1997.
408 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January 2009.
409 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008; La
Référence Plus, “Massacre
des habitants de tout un village à 314 km de Kisangani”, 17 February 1997; N.
Kristof, “Along a Jungle
Road in Zaire, Three Wars Mesh”, New York Times, 26 April 1996.
288. After the capture of Kindu, on 27 February 1997, AFDL/APR/UPDF troops
stepped up the military pressure on Kisangani and the surrounding area. The FAZ
and
foreign mercenaries in Kisangani stepped up their acts of violence against the
population,
known for its hostile attitude towards the Mobutu regime. According to some
sources,
they executed over 120 civilians at this time.412
_______________
410 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province,
February 2009.
411 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, February 2009; La Voix
des opprimés, “Rapport
sur les événements du Haut-Zaïre entre 1993 et 2003”, 2008.
412 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, February 2009; Witness
account gathered by the
Secretary-General’s investigative team in the DRC in 1997/1998; Friends of
Nelson Mandela for the
Defence of Human Rights (ANMDH), “La précarité de la situation des droits de
l’homme avant la chute de
la ville de Kisangani entre les mains de l’AFDL”, March 1997; ICHRDD and ASADHO,
“International
Non-Governmental Commission of Inquiry into the Massive Violations of Human
Rights Committed in the
DRC - Former Zaïre - 1996-1997”, June 1998, AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese
forests”, 1997; AI,
“Zaïre -Viols, meurtres et autres violations des droits de l'homme imputables
aux forces de sécurité”, 1997;
M. Mabry and S. Raghavan, “The Horror, The Horror: With A Final Spasm Of
Violence, Mobutu’s Corrupt
Regime Lurches Toward A Chaotic Collapse”, Newsweek, 31 March 1997.
Bayanguna, killing at least four civilians. Some were stabbed; others were shot
dead.413
289. Deserted by the FAZ, Kisangani fell into the hands of the AFDL/APR/UPDF
soldiers on 15 March 1997. Over the course of the months that followed, AFDL
leaders
tried to form a new army incorporating Kadogo and young Mayi-Mayi militiamen
recruited during their conquests.
_______________
413 Ibid.
414Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, February 2009; Witness
account gathered by the
Secretary-General’s investigative team in the DRC in 1997/1998, 14 March 1997;
Friends of Nelson
Mandela for the Defence of Human Rights (ANMDH), “La précarité de la situation
des droits de l’homme
avant la chute de la ville de Kisangani entre les mains de l’AFDL”, March 1997;
ICHRDD and ASADHO,
“International Non-Governmental Commission of Inquiry into the Massive
Violations of Human Rights
Committed in the DRC - Former Zaïre - 1996-1997”, 1998; AI, “Deadly alliances in
Congolese forests”,
1997; AI, “Zaire: Rape, killings and other human rights violations by security
forces”, 1997; M. Mabry and
S. Raghavan, “The Horror, The Horror: With A Final Spasm Of Violence, Mobutu’s
Corrupt Regime
Lurches Toward A Chaotic Collapse”, Newsweek, 31 March 1997; James McKinley Jr.,
“Serb Who Went to
Defend Zaïre Spread Death and Horror Instead”, New York Times, 19 March 1997.
415 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, November 2008; Groupe
Horeb, Annual Report,
1999.
290. On 24 February 1997, the FAZ fled the town of Kindu and AFDL/APR troops
entered the town on 27 February.
291. As they retreated, the FDD units420 from South Kivu arrived
in the north of
Katanga province. They killed civilians and pillaged villages, in particular in
the
territories of Moba and Pweto.
_______________
416 In late 1997, Uganda had withdrawn most of its troops from
Orientale Province. However, large
numbers of APR soldiers remained in the major towns. On behalf of the FAC, an
APR commander ran the
military region covering Orientale Province, North Kivu and South Kivu from
Kisangani.
417 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January-February 2009;
Groupe Lotus, press
release on acts of violence committed at Ubundu and Kisangani, 22 September
1997.
418 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January 2009; Groupe
Lotus-Groupe Justice et
Libération, “Rapport conjoint sur les événements de Bondo”, 1998; AI, “Zaire:
Rape, killings and other
human rights violations by security forces”, 1997.
419 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009.
420 The FDD (Forces pour la défense de la démocratie) were the armed wing of the
Burundian Hutu rebel
movement CNDD (Centre national pour la défense de la démocratie).
292. Since the 1970s, a sizeable Tutsi community from the Minembwe plateaus
in the
Fizi territory in South Kivu had settled in the area of Vyura, a locality
situated 150
kilometres from Moba, in the Tanganyika district. As the anti-Tutsi sentiment
deepened
from 1995 onwards and the start of the First Congo War, relations between the
Tutsis of
Vyura (known as the Banyavyura) and the rest of the predominately Tabwa
population
seriously deteriorated.
293. After the fall of Kisangani, on 15 March 1997, FAZ soldiers fled towards
the west
of the country, taking a variety of routes. On the way, they were joined by
groups of
Rwandan refugees. As they retreated, the FAZ, ex-FAR/Interahamwe and Rwandan
refugees looted many civilian properties and public buildings and destroyed
facilities,
including hospitals, health centres, schools and places of worship.
_______________
421 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, March 2009.
422Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, March 2009; Report of SOCIMO
(civil society of Moba)
submitted to the Mapping Team on 2 March 2009.
423 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, March 2009; Document submitted
to the Mapping Team,
Équateur, April 2009.
424 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
425 Witness account gathered by the Secretary-General’s investigative team in
the DRC in 1997/1998.
294. Throughout their withdrawal, the FAZ and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe units
committed many acts of assault on women living in the villages in the region.
The ex-
FAR/Interahamwe also killed civilians when they refused to allow them to loot
their
property.
295. Generally speaking, the AFDL/APR troops did not encounter serious
resistance as
they advanced across Équateur province. Fighting was limited to a few skirmishes
with
ex-FAR/Interahamwe units near Lolengi, in the Boende territory, and clashes with
DSP
units at Wapinda. As a whole, the people of Équateur gave a relatively warm
welcome to
the AFDL/APR troops on their arrival. However, large-scale public massacres of
Rwandan refugees, summary execution of many civilians, and arbitrary arrests,
torture431
_______________
426 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March and April
2009.
427 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March and April 2009.
428 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, February and March 2009; AI,
Deadly Alliances in the
Congolese Forests, 1997, p.14.
429 Interview with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009; AEFJN (Africa Europe
Faith and Justice
Network), “Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme dans le sud de
l’Équateur”, undated.
430 Interview with the Mapping Team, Équateur, March and April 2009.
431 One of the most frequently used methods of torture was “Fimbo Na Libumu”
(“whipping to the
stomach” in Lingala), which involved forcing the victim to drink five litres of
water and then beating their
stomach.
and other ill-treatment inflicted on the population swiftly worsened their
relations with
the locals.432
296. The AFDL/APR forces arrived in Kananga on 12 April 1997.
_______________
432 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur and Kinshasa,
February, March and April 2009.
433 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009.
434 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur and Kinshasa, March and April
2009.
435 As mentioned before, from June 1997 the national army of the DRC was known
as the Forces armées
congolaises (FAC). Until the start of the Second Congo War, in addition to AFDL
soldiers and ex-FAZ, the
FAC included many Rwandan and, to a lesser extent, Ugandan soldiers. On account
of the difficulty
distinguishing accurately between Congolese soldiers and Rwandan soldiers at
this time, the acronym
FAC/APR is used for the period from June 1997 to August 1998.
436 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, March and April 2009; Report of
Gandhi International
(Équateur), Mbandaka, 1997.
437 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kasai Occidental, April 2009.
297. In May 1997, the two main towns in Bandundu province, Bandundu town and
Kikwit, fell into the hands of AFDL/APR troops, without a great deal of
resistance. In a
last-ditch effort to halt the progress of the AFDL/APR towards Kinshasa,
military leaders
sent FAZ and DSP troops, along with UNITA439 and ex-FAR units and mercenaries of
various nationalities to Kenge, approximately 200 kilometres from Kinshasa.440
When
they arrived near Kenge, on 4 May, the troops passed themselves off as AFDL/APR
units
to test the loyalty of the people towards President Mobutu’s regime. In their
eagerness to
see the AFDL arrive, some of Kenge’s inhabitants had already destroyed symbols
of state
authority – the state authorities having fled before the rebels arrived – and
prepared
welcome banners for the soldiers of the Alliance.
_______________
438 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kasai Occidental, April
2009; Société civile du Kasai Occidental,
“Panorama de la situation des droits de l’homme au Kasai Occidental”, August
2000, pp.7–10.
439 União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the
Total Independence of
Angola), an armed group at war with the Angolan government from 1975 to 2002.
440 In the text that follows, this coalition is designated as FAZ/DSP/UNITA/ex-FAR.
441 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bandundu, February 2009; Odon Bakumba, “La
bataille de Kenge”,
pamphlet created at Kenge, undated.
442 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bandundu, February 2009; LINELIT (National
League for Free and
Fair Elections), “Jungle ou état de droit”, 1997; Odon Bakumba, “La bataille de
Kenge”, pamphlet created
at Kenge, undated; Le Moniteur, “Toute la vérité sur les massacres de Kenge,
1997”, 9 May 2005; HRW
and FIDH, “What Kabila is hiding: Civilian Killings and Impunity in Congo”,
October 1997; ICRC
(International Committee of the Red Cross), press release no.7, May 1997; Zaire
Watch News Briefs, 1
May and 12 May 1997; World Vision, “Zaire Update”, 8 May 1997; Australian
Broadcasting Corporation
(ABC), “Fierce fighting continues”, 9 May 1997.
open support for the AFDL. The soldiers of the FAZ/DSP/UNITA/ex-FAR also
raped an unknown number of women, in particular in the Kwango Bridge
district.443
298. In the days that followed the capture of Kinshasa, the AFDL/APR troops
and their
allies committed summary executions, acts of torture sometimes resulting in
death, and
rape. Between 18 May and 22 May 1997, volunteer teams from the national Red
Cross
collected between 228 and 318 bodies in Kinshasa and the surrounding area. They
also
evacuated over a dozen wounded to various hospitals and clinics in the city.445
Soldiers
from the DSP were a particular target, as were the former dignitaries of the
Mobutu
regime. Ordinary civilians were also victims of serious violations. In
particular, many
people were arbitrarily arrested and detained in conditions likely to cause
considerable
loss of human life. In October 1997, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human
rights in the DRC referred over 40 cases of torture to the Government.446
_______________
443 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bandundu, February 2009;
Odon Bakumba, “La bataille de Kenge”,
pamphlet created at Kenge, undated.
444 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bandundu, February 2009.
445 ICRC, press release, 22 May 1997.
446 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
Republic of Zaire (now DRC)
(A/52/496).
447 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March-April 2009; Report of the
Secretary-General’s
investigative team (S/1998/581), Annex; ACPC (Association des cadres
pénitentiaires du Congo), “30 jours
de violations des droits de l’homme sous le pouvoir de l’AFDL”, 1997; VSV (La
Voix des sans-voix pour
les droits de l’homme), “Bref aperçu sur la situation actuelle des droits de
l’homme à Kinshasa sous
l’AFDL”, 1997; La lettre hebdomadaire de la FIDH, 3 July to 10 July 1997;
Info-Congo/Kinshasa,
11 August 1997; AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997; “Jours de
guerre à Kinshasa”, a France-
Télévisions documentary broadcast in La marche du siècle by Jean-Marie Cavada,
Pascal Richard and
Jean-Marie Lemaire in June 1997.
Antoine Gizenga, in the Limete commune. During the operation, they killed a
PALU activist and seriously injured six more by beating them with whips, iron
bars and rifle butts.456
302. Under President Mobutu’s regime and until its fall, in May 1997, the
various
Zairian security services, in particular the Civil Guard, committed many acts of
violence,
especially rape, and tortured many civilians with complete impunity. An
illustrative case
has been heard in the Rotterdam District Court (Netherlands).
303. From the start of 1997, the Angolan government made contact with the
Rwandan
and Ugandan authorities and lent its support to the AFDL/APR/UPDF operation
aimed at
removing President Mobutu from power. The FAA (Forces armées angolaises)
soldiers
took advantage of their presence in Kinshasa alongside AFDL/APR/UPDF troops to
step
up their crackdown on Cabindan populations who had taken refuge in the province
of
Bas-Congo.
_______________
456 HRW, “Uncertain Course: Transition and Human Rights
Violations in the Congo”, 1997; Info-
Congo/Kinshasa, 11 August 1997; AI, “Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”,
1997.
457 HRW, “Uncertain Course: Transition and Human Rights Violations in the
Congo”, 1997; AI, “Deadly
alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997; AI, DRC: A Year of Dashed Hopes, 1998.
458 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, May 2009; AI, DRC: A Year of
Dashed Hopes, 1998.
459 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009; Verdict of the
Rotterdam District Court
(Netherlands), 7 April 2004.
originating from Cabinda. In 1998, the FAA set up an operations centre at Tshela,
from where they led several crackdown operations. The Congolese security forces
also arrested several natives of Cabinda accused of having separatist designs and
transferred them to various detention sites in Kinshasa.460
304. At the end of May 1997, after the capture of Kinshasa, the AFDL/APR
soldiers
arrived in the province of Bas-Congo. They publicly inflicted cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment and punishment on a large number of civilians for often
minor
offences. Several people who were tortured with the chicotte died from internal
bleeding
caused by being whipped on the stomach.461
305. The AFDL/APR soldiers also raped a large number of women. By way of
example, the Mapping Team has been able to document the following cases.
306. After President Laurent-Désiré Kabila came to power, between 35,000 and
45,000
FAZ soldiers from all over the country were sent to the Kitona military base, in
the town
of Moanda, to be “re-educated”. The base could only accommodate around 10,000
people
and was in an advanced state of disrepair.
_______________
460 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, Kinshasa,
March-April 2009; Report of the Special
Rapporteur (A/52/496); Info-Congo/Kinshasa (citing an AZADHO report), 11 August
1997; Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on
Human Rights
Practices, 2001; Mouvement séparatiste cabindais (Cabindan separatist movement),
press release, 8
November 1998.
461 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009.
462 Ibid.
463 Ibid
during the first two months of operation at the Kitona centre, between five and ten
people died every day.464
In July 1997, FAC/APR units secretly executed ex-FAZ soldiers who had
rebelled in
protest against the living conditions enforced on them at the Kitona base. From
October
1997, living conditions at the base improved and the soldiers began to receive
their
pay.465
464 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, Kinshasa,
March-April 2009; AZADHO, “Espoirs
déçus”, 1997; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Rapport sur le Congo”,
1998; Colonel Kisukula
Abeli Meitho, “La désintégration de l’armée congolaise de Mobutu à Kabila”,
L’Harmattan, 2001, p.78; AI,
“Deadly alliances in Congolese forests”, 1997.
465 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009; “Emergency Update No.
211 on the Great
Lakes”, 15 July 1997.
CHAPTER III. AUGUST 1998–JANUARY 2001: THE SECOND WAR
307. From late 1997 onwards, the relationship between President Kabila,
Rwanda and
the Tutsi soldiers present in the Forces armées congolaises (FAC) had
deteriorated
significantly, primarily because the Rwandan authorities and certain Congolese
Tutsi
soldiers had accused the Congolese president of favouring his Katanga clan,
failing to
respect his commitments in relation to recognising the right of the Banyamulenge
to
Congolese nationality and being too conciliatory towards the ex-Forces armées
rwandaises/Interahamwe [ex-FAR/Interahamwe] and Mayi-Mayi militias, which were
hostile to the presence of the Armée patriotique rwandaise (APR) in the Congo.
In July
1998, fearing a coup d'état, President Kabila dismissed the Rwandan general
James
Kabarebe from his position as Chief of Staff of the FAC and ordered the APR
soldiers to
leave Congolese territory. In response, on 2 August 1998, some Tutsi soldiers
mutinied
and, with the help of the APR, the Ugandan army [Ugandan People’s Defence Force
(UPDF)], the Burundi army [Forces armées burundaises (FAB)] and some soldiers
from
the ex-Forces armées zaïroises (ex-FAZ), launched a rebellion intended to
overthrow
President Kabila.
308. Within a few weeks, this coalition, under the banner of a new political
and
military movement, the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD),466
took
control of the main towns in North and South Kivu, Orientale Province and North
Katanga and broke through into the province of Équateur. Its offensive into the
province
of Bas-Congo and Kinshasa failed, however, due to the military intervention of
Angola
and Zimbabwe alongside President Kabila. During the following months, the DRC
therefore found itself divided into two zones, one led by Laurent Kabila with
the support
of the armed forces of Zimbabwe [Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF)], Angola (Forças
Armadas Angolanas – Angolan Armed Forces (FAA)), Namibia [Namibia Defence Force
(NDF)], Chad [Armée nationale tchadienne (ANT)] and Sudan, and the other
controlled
by the armed wing of the RCD, the Armée nationale congolaise (ANC), the Rwandan
army (APR), the Ugandan army (UDPF) and the Burundian army (FAB).
309. Over the months, the military situation became more complex. To limit
the
ANC’s and APR’s grip on North and South Kivu, Laurent Kabila formed alliances
with
the Mayi-Mayi armed groups, the Burundian Hutu armed group, the Forces pour la
défense de la démocratie (FDD)467 and with ex-FAR/Interahamwe and
“Hutu armed
elements”, now reorganised within the Armée de libération du Rwanda (ALiR).
Uganda,
meanwhile, whose army was in control of a large part of Orientale Province,
created and
supported a second political and military movement, the Mouvement pour la
libération
du Congo (MLC), led by Jean-Pierre Bemba, to manage the areas it had conquered
in the
province of Équateur. In March 1999, against a background of growing
disagreement
_______________
466 The RCD was officially created on 16 August 1998. Led by a
Congolese, Wamba Dia Wamba, the
movement’s stated aim was to end the presidency of Laurent-Désiré Kabila.
467 The FDD was the armed wing of the Burundi Hutu movement of the Centre
national pour la défense de
la démocratie (CNDD).
between Rwanda and Uganda as to the strategy to pursue against President
Kabila, the
RCD split into a pro-Rwandan wing (RCD-Goma) and a pro-Ugandan wing [RCDMouvement
de libération (ML)]. In spite of these divisions, the RCD-Goma army (the
ANC) and the APR continued to extend their area of influence into North Katanga,
the
Kasais and Équateur.
310. On 10 July 1999, under intense diplomatic pressure, an agreement was
signed in
Lusaka between the principal belligerents.468 In addition to a
ceasefire, the agreement
called for the disarmament of all armed groups, starting with the ex-FAR/Interahamwe,
the departure of foreign troops and for inter-Congolese political discussions to
be held.
This highly ambitious agreement had no effect on the ground, as the belligerents
continued to seek a military solution to the crisis and the conflict became more
entrenched, against a background of the pillaging of the country’s natural
resources and
an exacerbation of violence directed at civilians, especially women, in
particular in North
and South Kivu, North Katanga and Orientale Province.
A. Attacks directed at Tutsi civilians
311. Following the outbreak of the second war, on 2 August 1998, radio and
television
stations based in Kinshasa broadcast official communiqués calling for a general
mobilisation of the population and collectively accusing the Tutsis of being in
collusion
with APR rebels and soldiers. In the days that followed, President Kabila’s
security
services and those people who were hostile to the rebellion embarked on a
campaign of
hunting down Tutsis, Banyamulenge and people of Rwandan origin in general.
Numerous
civilians deemed to have a “Tutsi” or “Rwandan” appearance were also targeted.
In total,
several thousand people were arrested and had their property confiscated or
destroyed.
Several hundred of them disappeared, the majority of them victims of summary
executions. In the area controlled by the Kabila Government, around 1,500 people
were
arbitrarily held in detention camps, officially in order to guarantee their
safety. From July
1999 onwards, having then lived for over a year in deplorable conditions, these
people
were gradually able to leave the country as the result of an agreement between
the
Congolese Government, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and several host countries.
312. In early August 1998, clashes broke out between the FAC, which had
remained
loyal to President Kabila, and Tutsi soldiers in the Kokolo and Tshatshi camps.469
At the
_______________
468 For the text of the Agreement, see S/1999/815, appendix.
469 On 4 August 1998, hundreds of Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers placed under the
orders of James
Kabarebe arrived by plane at the base in Kitona, in Moanda (Bas-Congo), from
Goma. A number of
soldiers from the ex-FAZ staioned at the base for months rallied to support
them. During the days that
followed, this Rwandan-Ugandan-Congolese military coalition advanced rapidly
along the road between
Moanda, Boma and Matadi, heading for Kinshasa.
same time, President Kabila’s security forces embarked on a series of
searches
throughout the capital, looking for rebels and their possible accomplices.
Almost a
thousand civilians responded to the call from the Congolese authorities and
signed up to
“popular defence” groups. The Congolese Government equipped them with edged
weapons and used them alongside the regular security forces. People of Tutsi or
Rwandan
origin or who bore a physical resemblance to them were the prime targets.
Several senior
figures in the regime, including the head of President Kabila’s cabinet, Mr
Abdoulaye
Yerodia Ndombasi, stirred up hatred against the Tutsis, comparing them to a
“virus, a
mosquito and filth that must be crushed with determination and resolve”.470
_______________
470 International arrest warrant dated 11 April 2000 from the
Examining Magistrate Vandermeersch
(Belgium) for Mr. Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi; ASADHO, “A round-table discussion
on peace and
national reconciliation is essential”: press release no. 11/986, September 1998.
471 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009; IRIN, “Update No.
483”, citing an article
from Libération, 19 August 1998; IRIN, “Update No. 473 for Central and Eastern
Africa”, 4 August 1998;
The Times, “Embattled Congo plans “nightmare” for Tutsi rebels”, 12 August 1998;
The Times, “Kabila
régime calls for slaughter of the Tutsis”, 14 August 1998; ICRC, press release,
17 September 1998; HRW,
Casualties of War, February 1999.
472 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March 2009.
473 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March and April 2009; HRW,
Casualties of War,
February 1999.
313. When the ANC/APR/UPDF troops entered the suburbs of Kinshasa around 26
August 1998, the members of the popular defence groups and to a lesser extent,
the FAC
began to hunt down the infiltrators and their supposed accomplices. An unknown
number
of Tutsis, people of Rwandan origin and others who resembled them were killed
during
this period. On 27 August, in the municipality of Kasavabu, a civilian declared
on Radio
France Internationale (RFI) that it was the population and not the soldiers who
were at
the front of the queue to “burn the Tutsis”.476 People with traces of
red mud on their
shoes, such as is found in the Bas-Congo, people wearing sports clothes, certain
members
of the attacking forces moving around as civilians and several people with
learning
disabilities who did not comply with the ceasefire were attacked.477
In total, at least 80
people were killed, some of them burned alive by necklacing, others impaled or
mutilated
to death and others shot. The bodies of the victims were most often left in the
streets or
thrown into the River Ndjili or the River Congo.478 During these
events, several hundreds
_______________
474 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March and April
2009; ICRC, press release, 28 August
1998; IRIN, 28 August 1998; HRW, Casualties of War, February 1999.
475 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March and April 2009.
476 ”It was the people. It was not the soldiers. It was us, we were the ones who
burnt the Tutsis. We, when
we see a Tutsi - myself, when I see one, I burn him.” BBC [British Broadcasting
Corporation], Summary of
World Broadcasts, 29 August 1998.
477 HRW, Casualties of War, February 1999; AI, DRC: War against unarmed
civilians, 1998.
478 Report on the situation of human rights in the DRC (E/CN.4/1999/31),
appendix III; ASADHO, “RDC:
Le pouvoir à tout prix. Répression systématique et impunité”, Annual report
1998, p.16; Libération, “La vie
reprend à Kinshasa”, 1 September 1998.
of people were wounded and large amounts of property pillaged.479
Many isolated cases
were reported, although the Mapping Team has not been able to verify all of
these.
314. Between September and December 1998, a commission made up of
representatives of the Government of Kinshasa, international organisations and
national
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) arranged for the exhumation of an unknown
number of bodies in the General Motors neighbourhood of the municipality of
Masina, in
the neighbourhoods of Kingasani ya suka and Mokali in the municipality of
Kimbanseke,
_______________
479 IRIN, “Weekly Round-Up - DRC: Rebels admit loss of Matadi”, 4
September 1998.
480 Libération “Meurtre en direct à Kinshasa”, 2 September 1998.
481 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March 2009.
482 Colonel Kisukula Abeli Meitho, “La désintégration de l’armée congolaise de
Mobutu à Kabila”, 2001, p.
64 and 68; ASADHO, press release, September 1998; Union des patriotes de la
diaspora congolaise
(UPDC), “Comment le peuple de Kinshasa a défendu la capitale contre les
agresseurs”. Available at:
www.updcongo.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=2&p=3
483 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009.
484 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009.
in the neighbourhoods of Ndjili/Brasserie and Kimwenza in the municipality of
Mont-
Ngafula, in the neighbourhood of Binza/Météo in the municipality of Ngaliema and
in the
neighbourhood of the CETA camp in the municipality of Nsele. The bodies were
later
buried in the cemetery of Mbenseke Futi in the municipality of Mont-Ngafula. It
has not
been possible to confirm the number of people exhumed.485
315. Arbitrary arrests, rapes and summary executions continued for over a
year,
although in a more attenuated form. At times, over a thousand people were
detained in
the military camps and the various prisons in Kinshasa.486
316. The total number of people killed during this period on the basis of
their Tutsi or
Rwandan origins or physical appearance is impossible to estimate. Following
pressure
exerted by the international community and the personal commitment of the
Congolese
_______________
485 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March 2009;
Congoso, “Bulletin droits de l’homme
hebdo”, September 1998.
486 Report on the situation of human rights in the DRC (E/CN.4/1999/31); HRW,
Casualties of War,
February 1999; ICRC, Activities report, 1998; ICRC, “Update No. 99/02 on ICRC
Activities in the DRC”,
9 December 1999; IRIN, 6 August 1998 and 3 September 1999; IRIN, 14 August 1998,
citing a press
release from the U.S. Department of State.
487 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March 2009.
488 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March 2009.
489 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009; Report of the
Special Rapporteur on torture
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments and treatments
(E/CN.4/2001/66) ; HRW, Casualties of
War, February 1999.
Minister of Human Rights, the authorities in Kinshasa agreed to transfer some
detainees
to the “Accommodation site for vulnerable people” in the premises of the
Institut
national de sécurité sociale (INSS) [National Social Security Institute] in Cité
Maman
Mobutu in the municipality of Mont-Ngafula.
317. At the end of 1998, the ICRC counted at least 925 people, a majority of
whom
were Tutsis, in the INSS centre and the various detention centres it visited.490
Between
June and September 1999, the ICRC and UNHCR were able to get almost 1,000 people
out of the country, including people staying at the INSS centre, prisoners and
people
living in secret.491 In 2002, however, there were still over 300
Tutsis as the INSS centre,
as well as Hutus and people from mixed marriages awaiting resettlement.492
318. When the second war broke out, in August 1998, all the troops in the
10th brigade
of the FAC mutinied and the town of Goma fell into the hands of the RCD without
any
real fighting. On 14 September, however, the Mayi-Mayi and ex-FAR/Interahamwe
launched an attack on several neighbourhoods in the town.
319. In early August 1998, after the outbreak of the second war, the District
Commissioner for Tanganyika organised a meeting at the stadium in Kalemie,
during
which he called on the population to enlist in so-called “Volunteer”
paramilitary groups
and attack the Tutsis living in the district.
_______________
490 ICRC “Update No. 99/02 on ICRC Activities in the DRC”, 9
December 1999.
491 The ICRC evacuated a total of 857 people who had been held in Kinshasa and
Lubumbashi; IRIN, 2 and
4 July and 3 September 1999.
492 Centre d’information géopolitique de la Commission des recours des réfugiés,
“L’identité rwandaise en
RDC”, 2 October 2003.
493 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February and March 2009;
ASADHO, “RDC: Le
pouvoir à tout prix. Répression systématique et impunité”, Annual Report, 1998,
p. 16; Solidarité pour la
promotion sociale et la paix (SOPROP), “La situation des droits de l'homme dans
la ville de Goma et ses
environs depuis l'éclatement de la rébellion jusqu'au 21 septembre 1998”, 1998,
p. 10.
320. As mentioned previously, in the early 1970s a sizeable Tutsi community
from the
Minembwe plateaux in the Fizi region in South Kivu had settled in the Vyura
region, 150
kilometres from Moba, in the Tanganyika district. During the 1990s, the
relationship
between the Vyura Tutsis (known as Banyavyura) and the rest of the population,
most of
whom were Tabwa, had deteriorated significantly, particularly following the
execution,
in April 1997, of the Tabwa traditional leader by AFDL/APR troops.495
Following the
outbreak of the second war, in August 1998, the District Commissioner for
Tanganyika,
in a public address given in Kalemie, called on the local population to “wipe
Vyura off
the map”.
_______________
494 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, October 2008/March
2009; ASADHO, “RDC: Le pouvoir
à tout prix. Répression systématique et impunité”, Annual Report, 1998, p. 16;
AI DRC: War against
unarmed civilians, 1998, p. 4; Deutsche Presse-Agentur “Massacres of Tutsis
reported as more DRC peace
talks tabled”, 3 September 1998; Deutsche Presse-Agentur “Congo rebels bury
remains of massacre
victims”, 10 December 1998.
495 See incident mentioned in paragraph 329.
settled in South Kivu, whilst others sought refugee status in neighbouring
countries.496
321. At the beginning of 1998, over 1,000 young recruits, including several
hundred
young Tutsis, had just completed their military training under Tanzanian
instructors at the
cadet college on the Kamina base.
322. During the first half of the 20th century, encouraged by the colonial
authorities, a
sizeable community of people of Rwandan origin (Hutus and Tutsis) settled in the
southern part of Katanga province (Lubumbashi, Likasi, Kipushi and Kolwezi) to
work in
the mines. This relatively quiet community had become more visible after the
arrival of
AFDL/APR soldiers in Lubumbashi, in April 1997.
_______________
496 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, October
2008/January 2009; ASADHO, “RDC: Le
pouvoir à tout prix. Répression systématique et impunité”, 1998, p. 16; AI, DRC:
War against unarmed
civilians, 1998, p. 4; IRIN, “Weekly Round-Up”, 11 September 1998.
497 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, October 2008; Memorandum of the
Banyamulenge student
community at the National University of Rwanda “Isoko”, 6 August 2007.
498 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, March 1999; Memorandum of the
Banyamulenge student
community at the National University of Rwanda “Isoko”, 6 August 2007.
July 1999, those held at the Bakhita convent were authorised to leave Lubumbashi
and were able to resettle abroad with the help of UNHCR and the ICRC. In the
area under government control, however, the hunt led by the ANR and the FAC
continued in Katanga province into 2000 and resulted in an unknown number of
summary executions and disappearances.499
323. Between 31 July and 1 August 1998, following the decision taken by
President
Kabila to send the APR troops back home, the Rwandan troops stationed in
Kisangani
were sent to Bangboka airport. Some of the soldiers refused to get on the
planes,
however, and remained at the airport where there were also soldiers from the ex-FAZ
waiting to leave for the retraining centre at the Kamina base in Katanga. After
the
outbreak of the second war, on 2 August 1998, fighting broke out over control of
Bangboka airport by the APR troops and the FAC who had remained loyal to
President
Kabila (the Tigres Katangais and the Mayi-Mayi incorporated into the FAC). As a
result
of the ex-FAZ rallying to the cause of President Kabila, the FAC managed to
retain
control of the town and the airport and prevent the APR from sending in
reinforcements
by plane. On 21 August, however, ANC/APR/UPDF soldiers launched a land-based
operation along the Lubutu highway. Following intense fighting, the FAC were
forced to
leave Kisangani and on 23 August, the town passed into the hands of the
ANC/APR/UPDF troops.
_______________
499 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, February 2008 and
Kinshasa, March 2009; ASADHO,
“RDC: Le pouvoir à tout prix. Répression systématique et impunité”, 1998, p. 16
and 40; AI, DRC: War
against unarmed civilians, 1998, p. 4; IRIN, “Weekly Round-Up”, 11 September
1998; Oral presentation of
the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DRC,
55th session of the
Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, 22 March-30 April 1999; Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights
and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,
2001.
500 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January-March 2009,
Kinshasa, May 2009;
Confidential document submitted to the Mapping Team in December 2008.
324. Persecution of Tutsis and Rwandans in general took place in several
other towns
in Orientale Province. As an example, the Mapping Team was able to confirm the
following case.
325. As in other provinces, after the outbreak of the second war, the
security services
that had remained loyal to the Government in Kinshasa and the FAC arrested and
executed an unknown number of Rwandan soldiers and civilians: Tutsis, people of
Rwandan origin and those who resembled them. During the period under
consideration,
several ex-FAZ soldiers accused of colluding with the APR and ANC were also
executed.
326. After the outbreak of the second war, fighting broke out in Kindu
between the
FAC troops who had remained loyal to President Kabila and those who had chosen
to
rebel. First, the loyalist troops managed to force the rebels to flee. As in all
the provinces
still under the control of Kinshasa, President Kabila’s security services
increased their
attacks on Tutsis and civilians of Rwandan origin in general.
327. Since the colonial period, many people from Rwanda and Burundi had
settled in
Kalima to work in the region’s mines.
_______________
501 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province,
January-February 2009; Voix des opprimés,
“Rapport sur les événements du Haut-Zaïre entre 1993 et 2003”, 2008.
502 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kasai Occidental, April 2009
503 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009.
B. Attacks on other civilian populations
328. On 4 August 1998, hundreds of Rwandan troops and a small number of
Ugandan
troops placed under the orders of James Kabarebe arrived by plane at the
military base in
Kitona, in Moanda, having travelled from Goma. Some ex-FAZ soldiers stationed at
the
Kitona base for several months rallied to join them. During the days that
followed, the
Rwandan-Ugandan-Congolese military coalition was reinforced by several thousand
men
and embarked on its conquest of the Bas-Congo via the road between Moanda, Boma
and
Matadi. Some elements in the FAC, which included numerous children associated
with
armed groups and forces (“child soldiers”) (known as “Kadogo” in Swahili) tried
to
resist, particularly in Boma and Mbanza Ngungu, but were swiftly overwhelmed;
many
died during the fighting.
329. Throughout their advance on Kinshasa, the Rwandan-Ugandan-Congolese
coalition, referred to in the remainder of the report using the acronym ANC/APR/UPDF,
killed numerous civilians and committed a large number of rapes and acts of
pillaging.
_______________
504 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kasai Oriental, March-April
2009.
505 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009.
330. On 17 August 1998, however, during the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) summit, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia announced they were
sending troops to the DRC to support the army that had remained loyal to
President
Kabila. During the days that followed, elements of the ZDF were deployed to
Kinshasa,
whilst the FAA launched a land and air offensive in the Bas-Congo. On 23 August,
the
FAA took back control of the Kitona base from the ANC/APR/UPDF troops.
331. During their advance along the Moanda-Boma-Matadi-Kisantu road, the FAA
killed civilians, committed rape and pillaged hospitals and homes. When they
entered an
area, the FAA would carry out a systematic search operation and execute all
those it
suspected of collusion with their enemies. The FAA took advantage of these
operations to
rape women and pillage homes. The property pillaged was then sent to Angola by
river,
road and even by helicopter. The FAA killed any civilians, including women and
children, who tried to oppose the atrocities. The scale of the pillaging gave
both the
victims and witnesses the impression that this was a planned operation. It is
clear that the
Angolan military hierarchy and the authorities in Kinshasa at least tolerated
the
commission of these various violations.
_______________
506 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009.
507 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009.
508 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009; Report on the
situation of human rights in the
DRC (E/CN.4/1999/31); ICRC, press releases, 19, 28 August and 9 September 1998.
509 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009; HRW, Casualties of
War, February 1999.
332. In mid-September 1998, the FAA, ZDF and FAC regained control of the
province
of Bas-Congo. The ANC/APR/UPDF troops withdrew to Angola, to an area under the
control of UNITA, before leaving for Rwanda between November and December.
During
this period, the humanitarian situation remained very worrying because of the
scale of the
pillaging, carried out primarily in hospitals, the destruction of major
infrastructure and
restrictions imposed on the freedom of movement of humanitarian workers in the
province by the Government in Kinshasa.
333. At the end of August 1998, soldiers from the ANC/APR/UPDF and FAC/ZDF
fought each other for control of Kinshasa.
_______________
510 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009.
511 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009.
512 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009
513 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009.
514 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009
main hospitals and medical centres. The bombardments prompted thousands of
people to move to other municipalities. Elements of the ZDF fired with heavy
weapons, making no distinction between civilian and military targets. These
therefore included healthcare institutions and places of worship. The military
authorities often exposed civilians to indiscriminate fire, ordering them to remain
in their homes so that ANC/APR/UPDF soldiers were unable to hide in
abandoned houses.515
334. On 13 August 1998, ANC/APR/UPDF troops took control of the Inga
hydroelectric power station in the Bas-Congo and stopped the turbines on the
dam.
335. During the same period, the security forces in general committed
assassinations,
murders, extrajudicial executions, rapes and acts of torture directed against
political
opponents and ordinary civilians, with almost complete impunity.519
_______________
515 Interviews with the Mapping Team, April 2009; Report on the
situation of human rights in the DRC
(E/CN.4/1999/31); ASADHO, press release, 6 September 1998; AI, DRC: War against
unarmed civilians,
1998; Reuters, “Shelling in Kinshasa suburb, Civilians Flee”, 23 August 1998;
IRIN, “Weekly Round-Up”,
4 September 1998.
516 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa April 2009.
517 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa March 2009.
518 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009; Report on the
situation of human rights in the
DRC (E/CN.4/1999/31); ICRC, press releases, 19, 28 August and 9 September 1998.
519 ASADHO, Annual Report, 1998; AI, DRC: Killing human decency, 2000; Bureau of
Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, 1999,
2000 and 2001.
336. Between the months of August 1998 and January 2001, around 50 reports of
incidents that had occurred in Kinshasa were sent to the Government through the
mechanisms provided by the Commission on Human Rights, which included: the
Working Group on enforced or involuntary disappearances, the Special Rapporteur
on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur on
torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments or treatments and the Working
Group on
arbitrary detentions.520
337. The incidents are too numerous for them all to be listed. The Mapping
Team was
able to confirm the following cases, which are included by way of example.
338. As part of their alliance with the Angolan Government, the authorities
in
Kinshasa tried to impede the activities of the members of the Cabindan
independence
movement, the FLEC (Front pour la libération du Cabinda).
_______________
520 Most of these communications, which concern hundreds of
people, were made jointly with the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DRC: E/CN.4/1999/39/Add.1,
E/CN.4/1999/61,
E/CN.4/1999/62, E/CN.4/1999/63, E/CN.4/2000/4, E/CN.4/2000/9, E/CN.4/2000/64 and
Corr.1 and 2,
E/CN.4/2001/9/Add.1, E/CN.4/2001/14, E/CN.4/2001/66, E/CN.4/2001/68 and
E/CN.4/2003/Add.1
521 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April and May 2009; ASADHO,
Annual Report, 1998;
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country
Reports on Human
Rights Practices, 1999, 2000 and 2001.
522 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa May 2009; Report on the mission
conducted between 11
and 21 March 2001 by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
the DRC
(E/CN.4/2001/40/Add.1); CODHO [Committee of Human Rights Observers], press
release, 30 December
2000; Info-Congo/Kinshasa, October-December 2000 and January-March 2001.
City of Goma, Masisi, Rutshuru, Walikale and Nyiragongo regions (Petit-Nord)
339. On 2 August 1998, General Sylvain Buki read out a communiqué on
Radiotélévision
nationale congolaise (RTNC) [Congolese national television and radio] in
Goma, announcing that a rebellion has broken out within the FAC. All the troops
in the
10th Brigade of the FAC mutinied and the city of Goma fell into the hands of the
ANC
and APR without any real fighting. Goma thus remained out of reach of the forces
of the
Government of Kinshasa throughout almost the whole period, i.e. between August
1998
and January 2001, with the FAC only managing to bombard the city on one
occasion.
340. During the campaigns in North Kivu, however, the bias of the RCD towards
the
local Tutsi community, the interference by Rwanda in the management of the
province
and the brutality of the ANC and APR troops towards civilians prompted numerous
people in North Kivu to join the Mayi-Mayi armed groups. The latter formed an
alliance
with the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and the Hutu armed elements that had joined forces
within
the ALiR from the end of 1997, and stepped up the number of attacks against
ANC/APR
troops by using the forests in the Walikale and Masisi regions and the Virunga
National
Park as support bases.
341. With financial support and arms supplied by the Government in Kinshasa,
the
Mayi-Mayi and ALiR groups stepped up the number of ambushes of ANC/APR soldiers
and committed acts of pillaging against the civilian populations. As a result of
their
activism, the ANC/APR soldiers were only able to control part of the urban
areas. In light
of this situation, they stepped up their search operations in the Masisi,
Rutshuru and
Walikale regions. Numerous civilians were targeted based on their ethnicity,
with the
Hutu Banyarwanda systematically accused of supporting the ALiR and the Hunde,
Nyanga and Tembo of collaborating with the Mayi-Mayi groups.
_______________
523 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March and May
2009; Reports on the situation of human
rights in the DRC (E/CN.4/1999/31 and E/CN.4/2000/42).
524 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009; IRIN, “Over 40
killed as Uvira, Goma
bombed”, 14 May 1999.
_______________
525 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009.
526 La Grande Vision, “La situation dramatique des droits de l’homme sous la
rébellion du RCD”; report
published ex-situ January to April 1999; SOPROP [Solidarité pour la promotion
sociale et la paix],
“Génocide en coulisses”, 1999; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des crimes
impunis, la tragédie du
Nord-Kivu, 2006, p. 121.
527 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu; HRW, Eastern Congo ravaged,
May 2000, p. 10.
528 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008; AI, DRC:
Killing human decency,
2000, p. 15.
529 Report on the situation of human rights in the DRC (A/55/403), par. 99;
Didier Kamundu Batundi,
Mémoire des crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p. 121; HRW, Eastern
Congo ravaged, May
2000, p. 9 and 10.
530 Report on the situation of human rights in the DRC (A/55/403), par. 99; HRW,
Eastern Congo ravaged,
May 2000, p. 9 and 10.
342. During this period, members of the ALiR also attacked civilians in the
territories
of Walikale and Masisi.
Beni and Lubero regions (Grand-Nord)
343. On 7 August 1998, the UPDF took unopposed control of the town of Beni
and the
surrounding region. During the following months, however, numerous local young
people joined the Mayi-Mayi groups operating in the Beni and Lubero regions.
With
financial support and weapons provided by the Government in Kinshasa, these Mayi-
Mayi groups increased in strength and stepped up the number of attacks against
the
UPDF military convoys travelling between Beni and Butembo and in an area to the
northwest
of the two towns. On 14 November 1999, Mayi-Mayi combatants attacked Ugandan
troops in Beni, killing several soldiers and a UPDF colonel.
344. The Mayi-Mayi groups in Grand-Nord quickly began to fight due to rivalry
for
the control of the region’s agro-pastoral and mining resources and local control
over
peace negotiations. Violent confrontations broke out between the Vurondo
Mayi-Mayi of
Chief Lolwako Poko Poko and those of Chief Mudohu.
345. In 2000, the attempts made by the RCD-ML to regain control of the
Vurondo
Mayi-Mayi and incorporate them in the Armée patriotique congolaise (APC), the
armed
wing of the RCD-ML, failed and led to further incidents. In August, the Vurondo
Mayi-
Mayi, who had been brought to Lubero by the APR for a military training course
run by
UPDF troops, rebelled.
_______________
531 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, January 2009;
Didier Kamundu 531 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, January 2009;
Didier Kamundu Batundi, “Mémoire des
crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord Kivu”, 2006, p. 144.
532 Report of the Special Rapporteur (A/55/403), par. 34; ASADHO, Annual report
2000, p. 39; AI,
Rwandese-controlled eastern DRC: Devastating human toll, 2001, p. 8;
International Crisis Group (ICG),
“Anatomie d’une sale guerre”, December 2000.
that 17 civilians were killed and seven Mayi-Mayi prisoners summarily
executed.533
346. Following these incidents, the Mayi-Mayi restarted and intensified their
attacks
on UPDF convoys between Beni and Butembo. In retaliation, the UPDF forces led
operations against villages suspected of sheltering Mayi-Mayi groups. UPDF
soldiers
often made disproportionate use of force during these attacks, killing
combatants and
civilians indiscriminately.
347. On 8 November 2000, close to the village of Butuhe, 10 kilometres north
of
Butembo, Vurondo Mayi-Mayi attacked a UPDF convoy that was escorting lorries
transporting minerals.
348. In the town of Beni, UPDF soldiers instituted a reign of terror for
several years
with complete impunity. They carried out summary executions of civilians,
arbitrarily
detained large numbers of people and subjected them to torture and various other
cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatments. They also introduced a particularly cruel form
of
detention, putting the detainees in holes dug two or three metres deep into the
ground,
where they were forced to live exposed to bad weather, with no sanitation and on
muddy
ground.
_______________
533 Interview with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009;
HRW, “Uganda in Eastern DRC:
Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife”, March 2001, p. 41.
534 United Nations, press release, Commission on Human Rights, 2 April 2001;
ASADHO, “L’Ouganda
sacrifie la population civile congolaise”, February 2001; HRW, “Uganda in
Eastern DRC: Fueling Political
and Ethnic Strife”, p. 42; De l'Afrique vers le monde, “Butembo, en territoire
occupé: message de paix pour
le Nouvel An 2001 par l’évêque catholique et par le représentant des baptistes”,
5 January 2001. available
on the Internet at:
http://web.peacelink.it/dia/report/jan_05_2001.txt
.
535 ASADHO, “L’Ouganda sacrifie la population civile congolaise”, February 2001;
Didier Kamundu
Batundi, Mémoire des crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p. 123;
HRW, “Uganda in Eastern
DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife”, p. 42.
349. During the period under consideration, UPDF soldiers carried out several
operations against an armed group of Ugandan origin, the ADF-NALU (Allied
Democratic Forces–National Army for the Liberation of Uganda537)
based in the
Ruwenzori massif in the Beni region. For their part, ADF-NALU carried out
attacks on
villages in the Ruwenzori region, kidnapping numerous civilians and pillaging
their
property.
350. In Bukavu, during the first few hours following the outbreak of the
second war,
Tutsi soldiers who had mutinied with the help of the APR were faced with heavy
resistance from the FAC soldiers who had remained loyal to the Government in
Kinshasa.
_______________
536 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009.
537 Formed from an amalgamation of former rebel groups, the ADF-NALU [Allied
Democratic Forces-
National Army for the Liberation of Uganda] appeared in the second half of the
1980s after the arrival in
power of the Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni. During the 1990s, the ADF-NALU
were supported by
President Mobutu and used North Kivu as a sanctuary.
538 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009.
539 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009.
351. In spite of their rapid conquest of most of the towns in South Kivu,
ANC/APR/FAB soldiers did not manage to gain control of the countryside. The
RCD’s
bias towards the Tutsi and Banyamulenge communities, its political and military
dependence on Rwanda and the violent acts committed by its soldiers on
civilians,
traditional leaders and members of the Catholic clergy in fact deprived the
movement of
the support of the majority of those living in the province. During the months
following
the outbreak of the second war, numerous young men joined the existing Mayi-Mayi
armed groups or were involved in the creation of new groups, such as Mudundu 40
in the
Walungu region. Many of these groups formed alliances with the ex-FAR/Interahamwe
and the Hutu armed groups that had reorganised in the ALiR, as well as the
Burundian
Hutu armed group, the CNDD-FDD.
352. Except for the special Mayi-Mayi Division of General Padiri in the
Bunyakiri
groupement and the Shabunda region and, to a lesser extent, the Forces
d’autodéfense
populaires (FAP) of Colonel Dunia, which received arms and money from the
Government in Kinshasa to coordinate their operations, most of the Mayi-Mayi
groups in
South Kivu operated on a highly decentralised basis. Faced with attacks by
Mayi-Mayi
groups, the FDD and the ALiR, the ANC/APR/FAB soldiers reacted by stepping up
the
number of search operations and rapes and systematically attacking civilian
populations
suspected of collaborating with the enemy. For their part, Mayi-Mayi groups and
_______________
540 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008;
Interviews with the Mapping Team,
South Kivu, November 2008 and March 2009; Anonymous account submitted to the
Mapping Team, South
Kivu, by a local NGO; Ambroise Bulambo, “Mourir au Kivu, du génocide tutsi aux
massacres dans l’est du
Congo RCD”, L’Harmattan 2001, p. 73 to 75 and 88 ; ASADHO, Annual Report,1998;
Groupe Jérémie,
“Parole à la base”, 1999, p. 30; CADDHOM, Half-year report, 15 February 1999, p.
6; AI, “DRC: The war
against unarmed civilians”, 1998, p. 10; Petition to the International Court of
Justice of the DRC against
Rwanda dated 28 May 2002, p. 3.
541 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March and May 2009; Report on
the situation of human
rights in the DRC (E/CN.4/1999/31); HRW, Casualties of War, 1999, p. 36; AI,
“DRC: The war against
unarmed civilians ”, 1998, p. 11 and 12.
elements of the CNDD-FDD and the ALiR also attacked and raped civilians, whom
they
accused of supporting the RCD, stole their property and committed numerous acts
of
pillage.542
_______________
542 The violations attributable to Mayi-Mayi groups are at first
sight less numerous than those committed by
other armed groups operating in the province. There are a number of explanations
for this. In some cases,
Mayi-Mayi groups effectively acted as community self-defence militia and only
rarely targeted civilians. In
other cases, the population did not want to confirm the violations attributable
to them because they still
consider that overall these groups played a positive role during the war. In yet
other cases, the population
refused to confirm incidents for fear of being subjected to retaliation, given
that some of these groups are
still active in the region.
543 Further to the split within the RCD between the pro-Ugandan and pro-Rwandan
branches of the
movement, South Kivu found itself in the area under the control of the RCD-Goma
from March 1999.
544 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March and May 2009;
Confidential document
submitted to the Mapping Team on the subject of four people deported to Rwanda
in 1998; AI, DRC: A
Year of Dashed Hopes, 1998.
545 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, November 2008 and February and
April 2009; Jean
Migabo Kalere, “Génocide au Congo? Analyse des massacres des populations civiles”,
Broederlijk Delen,
2002, p. 48; HRW, Casualties of War, 1999, p. 32; AI, “DRC: The war against
unarmed civilians”, 1998, p.
7 and 8.
546 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February, April and May 2009.
with daggers or shot in the area around the main port in Kalundu and at SEP
Congo facilities. Young people, conscripted by the soldiers, and members of the
local Red Cross then buried the bodies of the victims in mass graves.547
_______________
547 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March and April
2009; Compilation of accounts on the
massacres committed in the Eastern Congo/Zaïre by the armies of Rwanda, Uganda
and Burundi, “Pour
que l'on n'oublie jamais”, 2001, p. 16; ASADHO, Annual Report, 1998, p. 15; Jean
Migabo Kalere,
“Génocide au Congo ? Analyse des massacres des populations civiles”, Broederlijk
Delen, 2002, p. 48;
CADDHOM, Half-year report, 15 February 1999 p. 5; AI, “DRC: The war against
unarmed civilians”,
1998, p. 7.
548 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, October-December 2008,
February-March 2009;
Ministry of Human Rights of the DRC, “Livre Blanc: La guerre d’agression en RDC.
Trois ans de
massacres et de génocide à huis clos”, October 2001, p. 11 to 13; Petition to
the International Court of
Justice of the DRC against Rwanda dated 28 May 2002, p. 4; CADDHOM, “Massacres
de Kasika au sud-
Kivu”, 1998; COJESKI, “Report of 20 November 1998”, 1998, p. 2 and 3; COJESKI,
Report of January
1999, 1999, p. 26; Christian Hemedi Bayolo, “L’Église profanée, chronique et
violation des droits du clergé
pendant la guerre d’agression 1998-2000”, February 2002, p. 21 to 23; Jean
Migabo Kalere, “Génocide au
Congo ? Analyse des massacres des populations civiles”, Broederlijk Delen, 2002,
p. 47 and 48 and 61 to
67; Ambroise Bulambo, Mourir au Kivu, du génocide tutsi aux massacres dans l’est
du Congo RCD,
L’Harmattan 2001, p. 87 and 98 and 99 (photographs); Groupe Jérémie, “Parole à
la base”, 1999 p. 21 and
30; AI, “DRC: The war against unarmed civilians”, 1998, p. 8 and 11; HRW,
Casualties of War, 1999,
p. 30.
549 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Sud–Kivu, May 2009; Report on the
situation of human rights in the
DRC (E/CN.4/1999/31); COJESKI, “Vue synoptique des violations au South Kivu”,
1998.
550 Interview with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009; CADDHOM, Half-year
report, 1999 p. 8;
Héritiers de la Justice (HJ), “Vue synoptique sur le cas du South Kivu” 1998, p.
4.
kilometres south of Uvira. The victims were in the marketplace on the shores of
Lake Tanganyika when the soldiers opened fire indiscriminately. These soldiers
had accused the inhabitants of Swima of being Mayi-Mayi and collaborating with
elements of the CNDD-FDD. The massacre took place after a member of the FDD
wounded an ANC/FAB soldier in the area.551
_______________
551 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Sud–Kivu, April 2009; HJ,
“Report for the 4th quarter of 1998”,
1999, p. 6; COJESKI, “Vue synoptique des violations au South Kivu”, 1998, p. 6.
552 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and April 2009; HJ,
Report for the 4th
quarter of 1998, 1999, p. 3; HRW, Casualties of War”, 1999, p. 31.
553 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009; CADDHOM, Half-year
report, 1999, p.
6.
554 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and April 2009; HJ,
Report for the 4th
quarter of 1998, 1999, p. 3; HRW, Casualties of War, 1999, p. 31.
555 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and April 2009.
Mubumbano, Mudirhi and Ntondo/Mubumbano in the Walungu region, around 60
kilometres to the south-west of Bukavu. The victims had been accused of
supporting local Mayi-Mayi groups, including the Mudundu 40 group, which was
very active in the region.556
_______________
556 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and
March 2009; COJESKI, “Cinq mois
d’invasion - South Kivu”, 1999, p. 32 and 33; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights
and Labor, U.S.
Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 1999, p. 6.
557 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February 2009; Ambroise
Bulambo, Mourir au Kivu,
du génocide tutsi aux massacres dans l’est du Congo RCD, L’Harmattan, 2001 p.
88; Ministry of Human
Rights of the DRC, “Livre Blanc: La guerre d’agression en RDC, Trois ans de
massacres et de génocide à
huis clos” October 2001, p. 13 to 15; Petition to the International Court of
Justice of the DRC against
Rwanda dated 28 May 2002, p. 5; CADDHOM, Half-year report, 1999, p. 6; Jean
Migabo Kalere,
“Génocide au Congo ? Analyse des massacres des populations civiles”, Broederlijk
Delen, 2002, p. 49 and
69 to 79; AI, DRC: Killing human decency, 2000, p. 13; Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor,
U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2001, p. 6.
558 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and March 2009.
559 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and March 2009; HRW,
DRC, Eastern Congo
ravaged 2000, p.10.
were taken to the headquarters of the ANC/APR on the Mero hill and then killed
with edged weapons. Their bodies were then thrown into three mass graves
located on the site of the University of Kamituga.560
_______________
560 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March and May
2009; IRIN, “Update No. 629 for
Central and Eastern Africa”, 1999; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor,
U.S. Department of
State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 1999, p. 7.
561 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March-April 2009; AI, DRC:
Killing human decency,
2000, p. 15.
562 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009.
563 Interview with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009; Jean Migabo Kalere,
“Génocide au
Congo ? Analyse des massacres des populations civiles”, Broederlijk Delen, 2002,
p. 50; AI, DRC: Killing
human decency, 2000, p. 13.
massacre in retaliation for the losses suffered during fighting with the Mayi-Mayi
of the Mudundu 40.564
564 Interview with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009;
Compilation of accounts on the massacres
committed in the Eastern Congo/Zaïre by the armies of Rwanda, Uganda and
Burundi, “Pour qu’on
n’oublie jamais”, 2001, p. 30; Jean Migabo Kalere, “Génocide au Congo ? Analyse
des massacres des
populations civiles”, 2002, p. 50; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor,
U.S. Department of
State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 1999, p. 7; AI, DRC: Killing
human decency, 2000, p.
13.
565 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu and Maniema, January and March
2009; Document
submitted to the Mapping Team by the NGO CADDHOM, Shabunda office, in March
2009; OHCHR,
Report of mission to Nyakulungu, 2 May 2008; HJ, “Terreur en territoire de
Shabunda”. Available at:
www.heritiers.org/shabundadesolation.html (accessed
January 2009)
566 Interviews with the Mapping Team South Kivu, March and April 2009;
Compilation of accounts on the
massacres committed in the Eastern Congo/Zaire by the armies of Rwanda, Uganda
and Burundi, “Pour
qu’on n’oublie jamais”, 2001, p. 30; HRW, Eastern Congo ravaged 2000, p. 10.
567 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, December 2008, February, March
and May 2009;
Confidential document submitted to the Mapping Team in 2009; Christian Hemedi
Bayolo, “L’Église
profanée, chronique and violation des droits du clergé pendant la guerre
d’agression 1998-2000”, February
2002, p. 32; AI, DRC: Killing human decency, 2000, p. 13.
Shortly before the killing, there had been confrontations between the soldiers and
the Mayi-Mayi in the area around Sange.568
_______________
568 Interview with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009;
ASADHO, Annual Report, 2000 p. 40;
Dignité des sans-voix, ”La femme dans la tourmente des guerres en RDC”, 2003, p.
7; Jean Migabo Kalere,
“Génocide au Congo ? Analyse des massacres des populations civiles”, 2002, p.
52; Memorandum from
civil society in South Kivu to the MONUC, 14 December 1999, p. 5; AI, DRC:
Killing human decency,
2000, p. 13.
569 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009; AI, DRC: Killing
human decency, 2000,
p. 22.
570 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, November 2008 and March 2009;
DRC Ministry of
Human Rights, Livre Blanc: La guerre d’agression en RDC. Trois ans de massacres
and de génocide à huis
clos, October 2001, p. 31 and 33; Petition to the International Court of Justice
of the DRC against Rwanda
dated 28 May 2002, p. 4; COJESKI, Rapport 1999-2000, 2000, p. 9; HJ, “Le
Gouverneur du South Kivu
n'a pas convaincu”, 5 February 2000; Info–Congo/Kinshasa, May-June 2000, p. 161;
Jean Migabo Kalere,
“Génocide au Congo ? Analyse des massacres des populations civiles”, 2002, p.
52; Ambroise Bulambo,
“Mourir au Kivu, du génocide tutsi aux massacres dans l’est du Congo RCD”, 2001,
p. 90; Memorandum
from civil society in South Kivu to the MONUC, 14 December 1999, p. 5.
571 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, November 2008 and April 2009;
COJESKI, “Les
violations caractérisées des droits de l’homme dans les Kivu”, March 2000, p. 10
and 11; Christian Hemedi
Bayolo, “L’Église profanée, chronique and violation des droits du clergé pendant
la guerre d’agression
1998-2000”, February 2002, p. 27.
572 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009;
ASADHO, press release no. 0018, 2000;
Dignité des sans-voix, “La femme dans la tourmente des guerres en RDC”, 2003, p.
73; Ambroise
Bulambo, “Mourir au Kivu, du génocide tutsi aux massacres dans l’est du Congo
RCD”, 2001 .p. 88; AI,
Rwandese-controlled eastern DRC: Devastating human toll, 2001, p. 13.
573 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009; IRIN, “Central and
Eastern Africa Weekly
Round-Up 26”, 30 June 2000; Diocesan Commission on Justice and Peace, “Flash
special - Les
Interahamwe massacrent la population de Bushwira en territoire de Kabare”, 29
November 2002.
574 Ibid.
575 Ibid.
576 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February 2009; AI,
Rwandese-controlled eastern DRC:
Devastating human toll, 2001, p. 12.
ANC/APR soldiers against the Mayi-Mayi and CNDD-FDD in the Baraka
region.577
353. Between August 1998 and January 2001, ANC/APR soldiers and Mayi-Mayi
fought for control of the mining town of Lulingu, which has a large number of
coltan
mines579 and was therefore seen as a strategic target by the
belligerents.
354. One of the main leaders of the Bunyakiri Mayi-Mayi had set up his
headquarters
in the Shabunda region, in the strategic, mineral-rich location of Nzovu, in the
chiefdom
of Bakisi in the Bamuguba-Sud groupement, 192 kilometres south of the centre of
the
town of Shabunda. In 1999, the Government in Kinshasa had sent arms and
munitions in
by plane to the local airstrip to support the Mayi-Mayi East division. The Nzovu
Mayi-
Mayi and ANC/APR soldiers fought for control of the region throughout 1999 and
2000.
_______________
577 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February 2009;
Report on the situation of human rights
in the DRC presented by the Special Rapporteur (A/55/403), AI,
Rwandese-controlled eastern DRC:
Devastating human toll, 2001, p. 14; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor,
U.S. Department of
State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2000, p. 7
578 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, January and February 2009.
579 Coltan is a mineral used in the manufacture of mobile phones, computers and
other electronic devices.
580 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009; AI,
Rwandese-controlled eastern DRC:
Devastating human toll, 2001.
581 Interview with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009; Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,
2000, p. 6; AI, Rwandesecontrolled
eastern DRC: Devastating human toll, 2001, p. 13
wardens from the Kahuzi-Biega national park, in the Kabare/Kalehe regions. The
victims were taking part in an ICCN mission when they were caught in an
ambush. Several civilians were also wounded during the attack. The survivors
were held by the Mayi-Mayi and elements of the ALiR for a day and forced to
carry the property that had been pillaged during the ambush. They were then
released.582
_______________
582 Interview with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February 2009;
ASADHO, Annual Report, 2000. p. 40;
AI, Rwandese-controlled eastern DRC: Devastating human toll, 2001, p. 19 and 20;
Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, 2000, p.
5.
583 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009; Report on the
situation of human rights in
the DRC (E /CN.4/1999/31); Petition to the International Court of Justice of the
DRC against Rwanda dated
28 May 2002. p. 4; COJESKI, “Vue synoptique sur les violations massives des
droits de l’homme pendant
les trois mois d’agression du South Kivu/RDC”, 1998, p. 3.
584 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March and April 2009.
585 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009; IRIN, “Central and
Eastern Africa Weekly
Round-Up 26”, 30 June 2000; Diocesan Commission on Justice and Peace, “Flash
special - Les
Interahamwe massacrent la population de Bushwira en territoire de Kabare”, 29
November 2002.
586 Ibid.
355. In September 1998, President Kabila sent several tens of thousands of
soldiers to
Kindu to launch a counter-offensive against the ANC/APR in North and South Kivu.
On
12 October, however, after seven days of fighting, the ANC/APR soldiers took
control of
Kindu. The rest of Maniema province moved into the RCD’s zone of influence
during the
months that followed, without the ANC/APR encountering any real resistance. In
spite of
the presence at the head of the RCD of two important figures in the province,
Arthur
Zaidi Ngoma and Alexis Thambwe Mwamba, the movement remained unpopular in
Maniema. In early 1999, Mayi-Mayi from South Kivu began to infiltrate the
province.
_______________
587 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March, April
and May 2009.
588 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and March 2009;
Committee on the Rights of
the Child, “Child Soldiers – Country Reports”, 2004; HRW, Casualties of War,
1999, p. 36 and 37;
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, “Child Soldiers Global Report –DRC”,
2001.
589 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009; Politique africaine,
“Le Maniema, de la
guerre de l'AFDL à la guerre du RCD”, no. 84, December 2001, p. 74.
356. The disproportionate scale of the retaliation prompted numerous young
people in
the Kasongo region to join the Mayi-Mayi movement. A week after the incident in
Kipaka, the Fizi Mayi-Mayi leader in South Kivu came in person to Kipaka to
recruit
young soldiers. From the Kasongo region, the Mayi-Mayi movement gradually spread
to
the Kabambare, Kibombo, Kailo and Pangi regions. During the second quarter of
1999,
Mayi-Mayi and ANC/APR troops fought each other for control of the villages in
the
Kabambare region.
357. Between August and September 1998, ANC/APR/UPDF soldiers took control of
almost all of Orientale Province. FAC soldiers engaged in looting as they fled,
in
particular in the regions of Opala, Basoko and Yahuma. They also brutally
suppressed all
those whom they suspected of supporting the RCD.
_______________
590 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009;
Document submitted to the Mapping Team
by the NGO ADDHELI [Action de développement, de défense des droits de l’homme
and de lutte contre
l’ignorance], Kalemie, March 2009.
591Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009.
592 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental, April
2009.
358. After the withdrawal of the FAC from Orientale Province, numerous
civilians
joined the Mayi-Mayi armed groups and attacked ANC/APR soldiers at several
places in
the region. In retaliation, ANC/APR soldiers led punitive expeditions against
civilian
populations suspected of collaborating with the Mayi-Mayi.
359. During the period under consideration, FAC planes bombarded ANC/APR/UPDF
positions in Orientale Province on several occasions.
_______________
593 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January
2009.
594 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January 2009; Document
submitted to the
Mapping Team by the President of civil society in Wanie Rukula, Orientale
Province, 2009; Congolese
Foundation for the Promotion of Human Rights and Peace (FOCDP), “Memorandum to
the Secretary-
General of the United Nations”, 2001; Justice and Liberation group, 1999 report.
595 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January 2009.
596 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, February 2009.
360. In August 1999, whilst international pressure on the leaders of the
RCD-Goma to
sign the Lusaka Agreement598 was intensifying, the simmering crisis between
Rwanda
and Uganda for the control of the RCD degenerated into open conflict in
Kisangani. On
the morning of 7 August, APR and UDPF soldiers fought with heavy weapons for
several
hours without any civilians being wounded. The situation calmed down again over
the
course of the following days. Tension continued to build, nonetheless, and both
sides
strengthened their positions and brought large numbers of weapons into the town.
On the
evening of 14 August, fighting again broke out between the two armies at the
airport and
extended along the main roads and into the town centre.
361. After three days of fighting, Uganda and Rwanda signed a ceasefire
agreement
that provided for Kisangani to be demilitarised and the headquarters of the
pro-Ugandan
branch of the RCD, the RCD-Kisangani-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-K-ML) led by
Wamba dia Wamba, to be relocated to Bunia on 1 October 1999. During the months
that
followed, Orientale Province found itself divided into a “Rwandan zone” under
the
control of the RCD-G and a “Ugandan zone” dominated by the various movements
supported by Kampala. In May 2000, however, tension between the Ugandan and
Rwandan armies again moved up a notch in Kisangani. The UPDF strengthened its
military positions to the north-east of the town and the APR reacted by bringing
in
additional weapons.
_______________
597 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January
and February 2009; Horeb Group,
Annual Report, 1999; Justice and Liberation group, “La guerre des alliés and le
droit international
humanitaire”, May 1999; Lotus Group, Report on the bombardments of 1999, 2000.
598 For the text of the agreement, see S/1999/815, appendix.
599 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008;
Judicial Commission of
Inquiry - Republic of Uganda, Final Report on Allegations into Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources
and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC, 2001, November 2002; Horeb Group, “Les
affrontements de
Kisangani: crimes contre les droits humains and le processus de paix durable”,
August 1999; Justice and
Liberation group, “La guerre des alliés en RDC and le droit à
l’autodétermination du peuple congolais”,
August 1999; Lotus Group, “Les conséquences de la contradiction des alliances
and factions rebelles au
nord-est de la RDC: La guerre de Kisangani”, September 1999.
362. On 12 May 2000, a team of United Nations military observers was sent to
the
area. Under international mediation, the two parties adopted a demilitarisation
plan for
the town, which they began to implement on 29 May. Fighting broke out again on 5
June,
however, resulting in the so-called “Six-Day War”.
363. In mid-August 1998, UPDF soldiers arrived in Ituri and quickly took
control of
the district without encountering any real resistance. Like the rest of
Orientale Province,
Ituri was placed under RCD administration. Following the movement’s split, in
March
1999, into a pro-Rwandan branch (RCD-Goma) and a pro-Ugandan branch (RCD-ML),
Ituri was integrated into the RCD-ML zone and administered from Kisangani. The
key
man on the ground in Ituri, however, was the UPDF Chief of Staff, General Kazini.
He
applied a policy that supported autonomy for the region in relation to the rest
of Orientale
_______________
600 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province,
November 2008; Judicial Commission of
Inquiry - Republic of Uganda, Final Report on Allegations into Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources
and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC 2001, November 2002; Justice and Liberation
group, “La guerre
des alliés à Kisangani (5 mai-10 juin 2000)”, 2000; Lotus group, “Les rivalités
ougando-rwandaises à
Kisangani: La prise en otage de la population civile”, May 2000.
601 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, November 2008 and
February 2009; Report of
the inter-agency assessment mission to Kisangani (S/2000/1153), appendix; IRIN,
Weekly reports, May
2000 to June 2000; Judicial Commission of Inquiry - Republic of Uganda, Final
Report on Allegations into
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC
2001, November 2002;
Justice and Liberation group, “La guerre des alliés à Kisangani (5 mai-10 juin
2000), 2000; Lotus group,
Report on the war in Kisangani, 2000; Lotus Group, “Kisangani, Le visage de la
fatalité”, January 2001.
Province and openly favoured the interests of the Hema community, thus
reviving former
conflicts over land.
364. The Hema-Gegere farmers602 who, a few years previously, had
acquired new
concessions from the land registry in the Djugu region, took advantage of the
new
political situation to enforce their rights. As the Lendu from the Walendu Pitsi603
community, who held the customary rights to the land concerned, disputed the
value of
their title deeds, the Hema-Gegere farmers appealed to the courts and had the
Walendu
Pitsi expelled from the concessions they wanted. The latter refused to leave,
however,
and clashes broke out with the police officers who had come to remove them.
Several
senior Lendu, including the leaders of the Walendu Pitsi and Walendu Djatsi
communities, were arrested for vandalism. In April 1999, the Hema-Gegere
concessionholders
paid UPDF and APC soldiers to attack the Lendu villages located in the disputed
concessions.604
365. In this climate, the appointment in June 1999 of Adèle Lotsove, a Hema
woman
from the Djugu region,605 as Governor of the new province of
Kibali-Ituri,606 was seen by
the Djugu Lendu as a provocation. Her arrival in Ituri was accompanied by a
deployment
of Ugandan soldiers to the disputed concessions and the withdrawal of the police
forces
from the majority of the Djugu region. The Walendu Pitsi organised themselves
into selfdefence
forces and confronted the UPDF soldiers and Hema self-defence forces created
by the concession-holders in the Walendu Pitsi, Walendu Djatsi, Walendu Tatsi
and Ndo
Okelo communities. The Lendu and Hema self-defence forces quickly transformed
themselves into community militias and people living in the Djugu region were
subjected
to a first campaign of ethnic cleansing, which resulted in hundreds of deaths.
_______________
602 The term Hema-Gegere or Hema-Nord refers to the Hema in the
northern part of the district and
speaking the same language as the Lendu. Until 2002, they were allied to Hemas
living in the southern part
of the district (sometimes called Hema-Sud) although the latter did not speak
the same language as them.
603 In the remainder of the text, Lendu from the Walendu Pitsi community will be
referred to by the term
Walendu Pitsi.
604 The chiefs of the Pitsi and Djatsi community were released in September
1999.
605 Adèle Lotsove is a Hema woman from the Bahema-Badjere chiefdom in the Djugu
region. She
previously occupied the post of Vice-Governor of Orientale Province.
606 The new province combined the districts of Ituri and Haut-Uélé
village was set on fire or following heavy arms fire directed at their homes. Some
victims were shot dead at point-blank range.607
_______________
607 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Report
of the Ituri Peacekeeping Committee,
Bunia, August 1999; Document submitted to the Mapping Team on statistics for the
Djugu region, March
2009.
608 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March and May 2009.
609 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March to April 2009.
610 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Documents submitted to
the Mapping Team in
February and March 1999; Special report on the events in Ituri (January
2002-December 2003)
[S/2004/573], MONUC; Report of the Ituri Peacekeeping Committee, Bunia, August
1999.
611 Ibid.
612 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Confidential document
submitted to the Mapping
Team in February 2009; Document submitted to the Mapping Team on the victims of
the conflict, Ituri,
March 2009.
366. During the months that followed, members of the Lendu militias tried to
regain
control of Fataki on several occasions. For its part, the UPDF concentrated its
troops on
Fataki and Linga and led several offensives against Lendu militia bases in
Kpandroma
and Rethy, in the Walendu Djatsi community.
367. During the period under consideration, the Lendu militias also attacked
villages in
the Djugu region on the shores of Lake Albert, the majority of which were
populated by
Hema.613
· In July 1999, members of the Lendu militias from the Buba group in the
Walendu
Pitsi community killed over 100 Hema civilians in the fishing village of
Musekere
in the Bahema-Nord community. Having encircled the village at dawn and forced
six APC soldiers there to flee, they massacred the population using machetes and
other edged weapons. From the start of the conflict, the Lendu leaders of the
Buba
groupement had threatened to attack the inhabitants of Musekere on several
occasions.614
368. In October 1999, the RCD-ML set up a Peacekeeping and Monitoring
Committee615 and organised several inter-community meetings, which
resulted in peace
agreements being signed by the leaders of the different communities. Whilst the
Peacekeeping Committee deployed in the north of the Djugu region succeeded in
restoring calm to the region, however, confrontations broke out between Hema and
Lendu militias in the south of the region in the Walendu Djatsi, Banyari Kilo,
Mabendi,
Mambisa and Ndo Okebo communities.
369. At the end of 1999, Ugandan soldiers and senior members of the RCD-ML617
tried to ease the conflict in the Djugu region. In November, the Ugandan
President,
Yoweri Museveni, met representatives of the Ituri communities. On 16 December,
Adèle
_______________
613 Ibid.
614 Interviews with the Mapping Team, May 2009, ACIAR [Australian Centre for
International
Agricultural Research]-Justice Plus, “Tentative de paix, action humanitaire and
bilan des affrontements
sanglants entre Lendu (Bbale) et Hema (Gegere) en territoire de Djugu”, August
1999–March 2000.
615 The Committee was led by the academic Jacques Depelchin, a friend of the
President of the RCD-ML,
Wamba dia Wamba and the Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni.
616 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009; Confidential documents
submitted to the Mapping
Team in February 2009.
617 In October 1999, the RCD-ML relocated its headquarters from Kisangani to
Bunia.
Lotsove handed over her post as Governor to Ernest Uringi Padolo, a member of
the Alur
community, which was seen as neutral in the Hema/Lendu conflict.618 The sector
commander who had made UPDF soldiers available to the Hema-Gegere
concessionholders
to attack the Walendu Pitsi was replaced. These initiatives helped to restore
calm
to the district over the course of 2000, but did not put an end to the serious
violations of
human rights in the Djugu region.
370. Between March and July 1999, ANC/APR soldiers launched a vast offensive
to
take control of the provinces of Eastern and Kasai Occidental. In April, they
captured the
areas of Lodja and Lubefu, and the FAC fled towards Kananga, committing numerous
atrocities and looting as they went. Between May and June, FAC and ZDF soldiers
entered into violent confrontations with ANC/APR troops for the control of the
Demba
and Dimbelenge regions, north of Kanaga. People on both sides of the front line
were
_______________
618 In numerical terms the Alur are the largest community in
Ituri. In 1999, members of the Lendu militias
had attacked members of the Alur community which were then supported by the Hema
militias. In
September 1999, however, following the peace agreement concluded in Rethy with
the Lendu, the Alur
distanced themselves from the Hema.
619 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; ACIAR-Justice Plus,
“Tentative de paix, action
humanitaire and bilan des affrontements sanglants entre Lendu (Bbale) and Hema (Gegere)
en territoire de
Djugu”, August 1999-March 2000; ASADHO, press release, “Affrontements sanglants
entre Lendu and
Hema”, 7 February 2000; ASADHO, “Rapport sur le conflit interethnique Hema-Lendu
en territoire de
Djugu, dans la province Orientale”, 7 December 1999.
620 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009; Documents submitted to
the Mapping Team in
March 2009.
621 Interviews with the Mapping Team Ituri, March and April 2009; Documents
submitted to the Mapping
Team in March 2009.
subjected to numerous atrocities. Given the land-locked nature of the region
and the lack
of time, the Mapping Team was only able to confirm a limited number of
incidents,
which are reported below as representative of the violations committed during
this
period.
371. Having conquered and then lost the town on several occasions, ANC/APR
soldiers finally took control of Dimbelenge on 30 June 1999.
· In June 1999, elements of the FAC based in Bibumba killed four civilians in
Kankole, 32 kilometres from Katende, in the Dimbelenge region. The village had
been occupied for a time by ANC/APR soldiers.623
372. In spite of the signature of the Lusaka Agreement in July 1999,624 the
ceasefire
never came into effect. In September 1999 and March 2000, the ANC/APR launched
several unsuccessful offensives in order to take control of the whole province.
_______________
622 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kasai Occidental and Kasai
Oriental, April 2009.
623 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental, April
2009.
624For the text of the Agreement, see 1999 (S/1999/815), appendix.
625 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental, April
2009.
626 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental, April
2009.
373. During the second half of 1998, ANC/APR troops launched an offensive to
take
control of North Katanga. On 26 August, they took control of the town of Kalemie,
in the
district of Tanganyika. A week later, elements of the FAC and groups of
“Volunteers”629
launched a counter-attack, but without success.
374. The ANC/APR troops regained control of Kalemie on 4 September 1998 and
conducted search operations for two days.
_______________
627 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kasai Occidental and Kasai
Oriental, April 2009.
628 Interview with the Mapping Team, Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental, April
2009.
629 The groups of “Volunteers” had been set up by the Government in Kinshasa
immediately following the
outbreak of the second war in order to enlist civilians and support the FAC
against the ANC/APR.
630 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, December 2008-February 2009;
Report on the situation of
human rights in the DRC (E /CN.4/1999/31), p. 37; AI, “DRC: The war against
unarmed civilians”, 1998,
p. 5.
out of the prison and summarily executed on a bridge over the River Lukuga.
In
total, the ANC/APR soldiers killed at least 84 people.631
375. After Kalemie had been taken back, the town became the principal
logistics base
for the ANC/APR in Katanga. Over the course of the following months and years,
aircraft
from the ZDF, which was allied to the FAC, bombarded the town on several
occasions.
376. Starting in February 1999, the ANC/APR launched a major offensive in
order to
take control of the Kongolo, Kabalo, Moba, Nyunzu, Manono and Malemba Nkulu
regions. President Kabila brought ex-FAR/Interahamwe and Hutu combatants under
the
control of the ALiR into the area to support the FAC/ZDF/FDD already operating
there,
in the hope of blocking their advance. He also encouraged the formation,
throughout the
whole of Katanga, of civil self-defence militias or Forces d’autodéfense
populaires
(FAP) [local self-defence forces]; in rural areas, these took the form of
Mayi-Mayi
groups similar to those operating in North and South Kivu. During the period
under
consideration, the population of northern and central Katanga was taken hostage
by
different armed groups. The ANC/APR troops and to a lesser extent, those of the
ALiR,
FDD and Mayi-Mayi systematically massacred civilians suspected of collaborating
with
their respective enemies.
_______________
631 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January-February
2009; Report submitted to the Mapping
Team by the NGO ADDHELI, Kalemie, 6 March 2009; ASADHO, RDC: Le pouvoir à tout
prix.
Répression systématique and impunité - Annual report, 1998, p. 16; AI, “DRC: The
war against unarmed
civilians”, 1998, p. 9.
632 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, December 2008-March 2009; Report
of the Special
Rapporteur (A/56/327), par. 68; Memorandum from the group of victims of the
bombings from 1998 to
2003, Kalemie, 13 June 2006; IRIN, “Weekly Round-up”, 11 September 1998.
633 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009.
634 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, February 2009.
_______________
635 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, February 2009.
636 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, February 2009.
637 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, November 2008; Anonymous document
”La rébellion à
Kongolo, août 1998-juillet 1999”; Document submitted to the Mapping Team on 24
February 2009: “Les
faits saillants des incidents du territoire de Kabalo”.
638 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, February 2009; Document submitted
to the Mapping Team
on 24 February 2009: “Les faits saillants des incidents du territoire de Kabalo”
control of the village, the FAC killed at least 41 civilians, including
representatives of the RCD-Goma and their families. The FAC then forced some
40 civilians to transport the property pillaged in Kitule to the village of Kyoto.
Around ten of these civilians managed to escape, but the others have been
recorded as missing since that time.639
· On 4 March 1999, elements of the ANC/APR killed 84 civilians in the village
of
Lyapenda in the Manda community, in the Moba region. Accused of having
collaborated with the FAC who had controlled the village until that point, the
victims were locked in two houses and then burned alive. Anyone who tried to
escape was shot dead.643
_______________
639 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, November 2008;
Document submitted to the Mapping
Team on 24 February 2009: “Les faits saillants des incidents du territoire de
Kabalo”.
640 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, February 2009; Document submitted
to the Mapping Team
on 24 February 2009: “Les faits saillants des incidents du territoire de Kabalo”.
641 The information given to the Mapping Team by the witnesses to this incident
was judged to be
sufficiently precise and credible for it to be included in the report despite
the fact that none of the witnesses
was in a position to be more precise in respect of the date on which the
violations took place. The Team
subsequently tried, unsuccessfully, to establish a more precise date.
642 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, November 2008.
643 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009; Report from the
Socimo submitted to the
Mapping Team on 2 March 2009
377. In March 1999, the Mufu 3 Mayi-Mayi succeeded in regaining control of
the town
of Kongolo for three days. As they retreated, they dispersed into the Munga
groupement.
_______________
644 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009;
Report from the Socimo submitted to the
Mapping Team on 2 March 2009.
645 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January/March 2009.
646 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January/February 2009.
647 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, November 2008.
In April, the ANC/APR launched a military operation in the groupement in
order to
neutralise the Mayi-Mayi.
378. From May 1999 onwards, during their operations against the Mayi-Mayi in
the
region, ANC/APR soldiers killed numerous civilians in the Yambula community, in
the
Kongolo region. They also looted and set fire to over 20 villages.
_______________
648 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, November 2008.
649 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, November 2008; Anonymous document
”La rébellion à
Kongolo, août 1998-juillet 1999”.
650 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, November 2008 and February 2009;
Letter from the Great
Chief of the Bena Mambwe to the President of the Republic, “Mémorial du massacre
de 125 innocents à
Tubundu”, 15 April 2006; Lieve Joris, “L’heure des rebelles”, Actes Sud, 2007,
p. 193 to 195.
least two civilians in Imba and one in Mukoko and set fire to numerous villages
including Imba 1, Imba 2, Imba 3, Kalawa, Mesu, Kabenge, Muti, Mukoko,
Kilongo, Seba and Himba.651
379. The Nyunzu region was under the control of ANC/APR troops. From April
1999
onwards, Mayi-Mayi allied to elements of the ALiR tried to chase elements of the
ANC/APR out of the community of Nord-Lukuga.
_______________
651 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, November 2008;
Anonymous document ”La rébellion à
Kongolo, août 1998-juillet 1999”.
652 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, November 2008.
653 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, November 2008.
654 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, November 2008.
655 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, February 2009.
656 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, February 2009.
_______________
657 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, February 2009.
658 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, February 2009.
659 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, February 2009.
660 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, February 2009.
_______________
661 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, February 2009.
662 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, February 2009.
663 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, February 2009.
664 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, February 2009.
665 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, February 2009.
666 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, February 2009.
Biengele, two kilometres from Nyunzu, on the main road to Kongolo. The
assailants had accused the victims of having given food to the ANC/APR
troops.667
Malemba Nkulu
_______________
667 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, February 2009.
668Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009; Report of the
Special Rapporteur
(A/54/361), par.101; Syfia RD Congo, “Le calvaire des déplacés katangais”, 1
September 1999; Kalenge
Yamukena Yantumbi, Le Nord-Katanga à feu and à sang, Kyamy Network Editions,
Lubumbashi, 2004;
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country
Reports on Human
Rights Practices, 2000.
669 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, December 2008; Confidential
document submitted to the
Mapping Team in 2008.
ASADHO’s senior official in Katanga was arbitrarily detained and tortured for
several months in the GLM building.670
380. In November 1998, a new rebellion, the Mouvement pour la libération du
Congo
(MLC) began with support from Uganda. Led by Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, in the
early
days the MLC had just one battalion consisting mainly of ex-FAZ soldiers
supported by
elements of the UPDF. In a few months, however, the MLC army, the Armée de
libération du Congo (ALC) added numerous ex-FAZ to its ranks and took control of
several urban areas in the north of Équateur province. The town of Bumba fell on
17
November, the town of Lisala on 10 December, the village of Businga, on the
crossroads
to the towns of Gemena and Gbadolite on 20 December, the town of Gemena on 24
December and the village of Libenge, in the far west of the province, on the
border with
the Central African Republic, on 4 January 1999. The FAC conducted very intense
air
bombardments in December 1998 to block the advance of the ALC/UPDF.
381. At the same time, the FAC, elements of the Armée nationale tchadienne
(ANT)
and others from the ALiR launched a land-based counter-offensive. During the
operation,
FAC/ANT/ALiR soldiers committed serious violations directed at civilians whom
they
considered to be hostile to the regime of President Kabila and accomplices of
the ALC.
_______________
670 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga/Kinshasa, February
2009; Report of the Special
Rapporteur (A/56/327), par. 32; Actualités en RDC, “Commandant Anselme Masasu
Nindaga: La VSV
exige la copie du jugement de l'exécution”, 21 March 2001. Available at:
http://web.peacelink.it/dia/sommar/mar_21_2001.txt; AI, “From assassination to
state murder?”, 12
December 2002.
671 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, February 2009.
672 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
382. After the ALC/UPDF troops had withdrawn to Lisala, the FAC/ANT/ALiR
soldiers continued their offensive and arrived in Umangi during the night of 23
to 24
February 1999. On 24 February, the FAC attacked the town of Lisala.
_______________
673 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, February 2009.
674 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009; Confidential
document submitted to the
Mapping Team, March 2009.
675 The “Presidential Protection Unit” later became the Groupe spécial de
sécurité présidentielle (GSSP)
[Presidential Special Security Group].
676 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa and Équateur, February, March and
April 2009; AFP
[Agence France-Presse], DRC troops massacre 300 civilians, 13 January 1999; AI,
Killing human decency,
2000, p. 10.
677 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
678 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
679 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
383. On 26 February 1999, ALC/UPDF troops regained control of Lisala, forcing
the
FAC/ANT/ALiR to withdraw to Umangi.
384. During the following months, violent fighting broke out between elements
of the
FAC/ANT/ALiR and the ALC/UPDF around Businga and Kateke, two villages in the
district of Nord-Oubangui. The fighting resulted in heavy losses on both sides.
385. Taking advantage of the withdrawal of ANT troops and the arrival of
reinforcements from the recruitment and training camps, ALC/UPDF soldiers
launched a
second major offensive in May 1999. In three months, ALC/UPDF troops regained
control of the towns of Kateke (27 April 1999), Businga (14 May 1999) and
Gbadolite (3
July 1999). As they retreated, elements of the FAC/ALiR carried out deliberate
attacks on
civilians, either because they were accused of collaborating with ALC/UPDF
soldiers or
in order to provide an opportunity to loot their property.
_______________
680 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
681 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
682 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, February-March-April 2009.
683 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
684 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March/April 2009; Action
humanitaire du Congo,
“Situation des graves violations des droits humains dans le Nord-Équateur”, 4
April 2009.
386. In June 1999, the ALC/UPDF troops took control of Bongandanga, a town
south
of Lisala. Elements of the FAC, belonging to a battalion nicknamed “Robot”
because of
the uniforms and equipment used by the soldiers, beat a retreat towards Djolu.
387. In spite of the signature of the Lusaka Agreement by all parties to the
conflict,690
none of them respected the ceasefire in Equateur province. In the hope of
blocking the
advance of ALC/UPDF troops towards Mbandaka, the FAC restarted their air raids
over
the region, using hand-made bombs.
_______________
685 Ibid.
686 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
687 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, March-April 2009.
688 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, March-April 2009.
689 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, March-April 2009.
690 For the text of the agreement, see S/1999/815, appendix.
691 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009; IRIN, “Bemba Waiting
for Chiluba Reply
Over Bombings”, 6 August 1999; AI, Killing human decency, 31 May 2000, p. 11.
388. On 23 February 2000, violent fighting broke out between the FAC and
ALC/UPDF troops around Bolomba. As they retreated, the FAC turned on the
civilian
population on at least three occasions.
_______________
692 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
693 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
694 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
695 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
696 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009; MSF, RDC, Silence on
meurt, Témoignages,
L’Harmattan, 2002.
389. According to some sources, some of the perpetrators of the crimes
committed
around Mange were summarily judged at the Military Court in Boende and then
executed.
390. In early May 2000, the ALC/UPDF troops gained control of the village of
Buburu, on the River Oubangui. In July, the FAC regained control of all the
villages as
far as Libenge by mounting heavy artillery on boats. Numerous civilians living
in the
villages along the riverbank were indiscriminately killed by the bombardments.
391. On 9 August 2000, a UPDF tank fired on a boat transporting FAC soldiers
and at
least several dozen soldiers were drowned near the Protestant Mission in Kala, a
village
30 kilometres from Libenge.
_______________
697 Ibid.
698 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
699 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa and Équateur, April 2009; Ian
Fisher, “Congo’s War
Triumphs over Peace Accord”, New York Times, 18 September 2000; Voice of
America, “Congo Rebels”,
14 September 2000.
CHAPTER IV. JANUARY 2001–JUNE 2003: TOWARDS TRANSITION
392. Following the assassination of Laurent-Désiré Kabila on 16 January 2001
and his
replacement by his son Joseph Kabila, a new phase of the conflict began. The
belligerents
agreed to implement a plan to withdraw their forces and start preparing for the
Inter-
Congolese Dialogue (ICD). From March 2001 onwards, MONUC’s military observers
were able to be deployed along the front line and consolidate the ceasefire.
393. In the provinces of North and South Kivu, however, the war continued
between
Kabila’s Government (the Mayi-Mayi groups, FDD and ALiR) and the soldiers of the
ANC, (the armed wing of the RCD-Goma), and the Rwandan soldiers of the APR.
394. In Orientale Province, the efforts made by Uganda to unite its two
allies, the
RCD-ML and the MLC, failed. After the RCD-ML rallied to the Government in
Kinshasa, the ALC (the army of the MLC) and the ANC stepped up their attacks on
the
army of the RCD-ML, the APC. The attacks were designed to prevent the government
army of the FAC from regaining a foothold in North Kivu and Orientale Province
through its new ally, the RCD-ML.
395. In spite of reluctance on both sides, the Inter-Congolese dialogue began
on 25
February 2002 in Sun City (South Africa). On 19 April, President Joseph Kabila
and the
head of the MLC, Jean-Pierre Bemba, announced the conclusion of a framework
powersharing
agreement for which they gained the support of most of those involved in the
Dialogue, except the RCD-Goma and several parties from the unarmed political
opposition, including the UDPS.
396. On 30 July 2002, the Congolese and Rwandan Presidents signed a peace
agreement in Pretoria, providing for the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from
Congolese
territory in return for the dismantling of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and Hutu armed
groups
within the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR700).701
At the same
time, the Government in Kinshasa concluded a peace agreement with Uganda in
Luanda
on 6 September, providing for the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the Congo
and the
re-establishment of peace in the Ituri district.702 Starting in
September 2002,
Zimbabwean, Angolan, Namibian, Rwandan and Ugandan troops began to withdraw
from Congolese territory. Under intense international pressure, the various
elements and
entities involved in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue finally signed the Global and
All-
Inclusive Agreement in Pretoria on 17 December 2002.703 In spite of
the continued
fighting in North and South Kivu, the deterioration in the security situation in
North
_______________
700 The ALiR was dissolved as part of the FDLR at the end of
2000.
701 For the text of the Agreement, see S/2002/914, appendix.
702 Available at the following address:
www.droitcongolais.info/files/0426_accord_du_6_septembre_2002_rdc-ouganda_r.pdf
.
703 Available at the following address:
http://democratie.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/VII.1.pdf
.
Katanga and the intensification of the war between the different militias in
Ituri, the
participants in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue ratified the Global and
All-Inclusive
Agreement in Sun City (South Africa) on 1 April 2003 along with an additional
memorandum on the integration of the various armed groups into a single national
army.
The transition institutions were officially put in place on 30 June
2003.
Government and Rebel Zones, June 2002
397. From January 2001 to June 2003, in spite of acceleration in the pace of
the peace
negotiations, the situation did not improve for those living in Orientale
Province. In the
area under the control of the RCD-Goma (the town of Kisangani and the Ubundu,
Opala,
Isangi and Yahuma regions), ANC/APR soldiers continued to commit atrocities and
use
disproportionate force against civilians.
398. In June 2001, the ANC/APR launched a punitive operation against the
Mayi-Mayi
groups operating in the diamond-producing area of Masimango, in the south of the
Ubundu region.
399. In April 2002, Joseph Kabila and Jean-Pierre Bemba signed a
power-sharing
agreement. As the agreement was rejected by the RCD-Goma and the main opposition
party, the UDPS, the negotiations taking place as part of the Inter-Congolese
Dialogue
_______________
704 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January
2009; Report produced by the Lotus
Group, 2009.
705 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008 and
January 2009; Groupe
Justice et Libération, “Massacres des populations civiles dans les villages de
Masimango, Kababali and
Abali”, 2001; Memorandum from the FOCDP [Fondation congolaise pour la promotion
des droits humains
and de la paix] to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 2001.
706 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008 and
January 2009; Groupe
Justice et Libération, “Massacres des populations civiles dans les villages de
Masimango, Kababali and
Abali”, 2001; Memorandum from the FOCDP to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, 2001.
707 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008 and
January 2009; Groupe
Justice et Libération, “Massacres des populations civiles dans les villages de
Masimango, Kababali and
Abali”, 2001; Memorandum from the FOCDP to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, 2001.
stalled. On 14 May 2002, in Kisangani, a group of soldiers and police
officers with no
identifiable leader called on the RCD-Goma security forces to rebel. They also
incited the
local population to kill any Rwandans in the town.
400. Over the course of the day, soldiers from the ANC/APR were sent
reinforcements
from Goma and regained control of the town.
401. During the period under consideration, the Bas-Uélé district remained
under the
control of ALC/UPDF soldiers. The latter committed serious violations against
all those
who dared to dispute their authority or criticised their involvement in
pillaging the natural
resources of the region. The case below is mentioned for illustrative purposes.
_______________
708 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province,
December 2008; Eleventh report of the
Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2002/6); Report of the Special Rapporteur
(E/CN.4/2003/3/Add.3); DRC
Ministry of Human Rights, “Livre blanc spécial sur les récurrentes violations
des droits de l’homme and du
droit international humanitaire dans la ville de Kisangani”, June 2002; Groupe
Justice et Libération, “Vraie
ou fausse mutinerie de Kisangani and le massacre des populations civiles”, June
2002; ANMDH,
“Kisangani – Les événements du 14 May 2002 – Rapport sur le massacre de la
population and le pillage
des biens des paisibles citoyens”, 30 May 2002, Lotus Group, “Comprendre les
événements du 14 mai
2002 et agir pour le respect des droits humains and une paix juste”, July 2002;
Synergie pour la paix
(SYPA), Rapport d’enquête sur le massacre de Kisangani du 14 au 16 mai 2002,
June 2002; AI, “RDC: Il
faut que justice soit rendue maintenant aux victimes des massacres de Kisangani”,
press release, 12 June
2002; AI, DRC, Our brothers who help kill us: economic exploitation and human
rights abuses in the east,
2003; HRW, “Crimes de guerre à Kisangani: Identification des officiers impliqués”,
20 August 2002.
709 Ibid.
710 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January 2009.
402. Between 2001 and 2003, troops from the ALC, the army of the MLC, and the
few
soldiers in Roger Lumbala’s RCD-National711 confronted elements of
the APC, the
armed wing of the RCD-ML, for control of the district of Haut-Uélé on several
occasions.
During the period under consideration, the town of Isiro passed back and forth
into the
hands of both sides several times. In October 2002, faced with the advance of
the APC,
the ALC sent reinforcements from Équateur to Isiro as part of the “Clean the
blackboard”
operation (Operation effacer le tableau). This operation was designed to destroy
the APC
once and for all, so as to deprive the Government in Kinshasa of its ally, the
RCD-ML, in
the eastern Congo and to get hold of the natural resources still under the
control of the
RCD-ML before the transition period began. The UPC, which was also trying to
crush
the APC, joined in with the operation. Elements from the “Clean the blackboard”
operation mounted an ambush against the APC in the village of Madesi.
_______________
711 The RCD-National is a small political and military movement
that appeared in 2001 and had a military
presence in the regions of Isiro and Watsa. Led by Roger Lubumla, who had long
been President of the
UDPS opposition party in France, the movement allied itself to Jean-Pierre
Bemba’s MLC on the ground
and had few of its own troops.
712 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January and February
2009; Voix des opprimés,
“Rapport sur les événements du Haut-Zaïre entre 1993 et 2003”, 2008.
713 Ibid.
714 Ibid.
715 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January and February
2009.
403. During the second half of 2000, the underlying conflict between the
President of
the RCD-ML, Wamba dia Wamba and his two principal lieutenants, the Nande Mbusa
Nyamwisi716 and the Hema John Tibasima717 broke out in public. Wamba dia Wamba
had
long criticised Nyamwisi and Tibasima for trying to orchestrate the conflict
between the
Hema and Lendu communities718 in order to establish a power base in the district
and
control the region’s natural resources. In August, Wamba dia Wamba tried to
regain
control of the movement by dismissing Nyamwisi and Tibasima from their posts,
but they
resisted and the number of incidents on the ground between the different
factions of the
APC increased. After several unsuccessful attempts at mediation by Uganda and a
series
of confrontations in the centre of Bunia, Wamba dia Wamba was exiled to Kampala
in
December, leaving the leadership of the RCD-ML to Nyamwisi and Tibasima.
404. In January 2001, Ituri saw a resurgence of violence in the Djugu area.
Between
January and February, members of the Hema militias from Bogoro, generally
accompanied by Hema soldiers from the APC and UPDF soldiers, led indiscriminate
attacks in the Walendu Tatsi community, next to the Bahema-Nord community,
killing an
unknown number of civilians.
_______________
716 Originally from North Kivu, Mbusa Nyamwisi was then Prime
Minister of the RCD-ML.
717 A former director of the Okimo mining company, which sold gold from Ituri,
John Tibasima was the
Movement’s Defence Minister.
718 Since 2000, Mbusa Nyamwisi and the UPDF had organised military training for
Lendu militiamen at the
Nyaleke camp, close to the town of Béni, in North Kivu. John Tibasima supervised
the training in Uganda
and in the Rwampara camp, close to Bunia, of thousands of Hema militiamen in
order to integrate them
into the APC.
719 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009.
720 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, February 2009; Documents produced
by members of the
Lendu communities and submitted to the Mapping Team in March 2009.
721 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March and April 2009; Documents
submitted to the Mapping
Team in March 2009.
405. At the end of 2000, the conflict between the Hema and Lendu finally
reached the
Irumu region. The UPDF soldiers lent their support to the local Hema communities
and
violent incidents broke out on the ground.
406. Following the bombardment of the Walendu Bindi community by a UPDF
helicopter, Ngiti militiamen, originally in conjunction with the Djugu Lendu
from the
Walendu Bindi community, launched an attack on 19 January 2001 against UPDF
positions at the airport in Bunia. During the attack, Ngiti militiamen tried to
destroy the
helicopter the UPDF had used to bomb their villages. The UPDF finally repelled
the
attack but at the cost of a significant loss of human life.
_______________
722 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Special
report on the events in Ituri (January
2002-December 2003) [S/2004/573], MONUC; Documents submitted to the Mapping Team
in April 2009;
Transcription of the phone message of the chief of the Walendu Tatsi community
to the press, 11 February
2001, list of events that occurred in the community.
723 Interview with the Mapping Team, Ituri. May 2009; Report of the Bbale
community submitted to the
Mapping Team in March 2009.
724 The Ngiti are Lendu from the Irumu region.
725 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, February 2009; Documents produced
by members of the
Lendu communities and submitted to the Mapping Team in March 2009.
Shortly before the massacre, UPDF officers and senior members of the Hema
community in Bunia had held a meeting and called on Hema civilians to attack
the Lendu population.726
407. In order to restore calm to Ituri and avoid new splinter groups
developing within
the RCD-ML, Uganda forced the RCD-ML and MLC to join forces within a new
movement, the Front de libération du Congo (FLC), led by Jean-Pierre Bemba.727
On 6
February 2001, the FLC organised consultations with the traditional chiefs in
Ituri and on
17 February, the latter signed a memorandum of agreement, providing in
particular for an
immediate cessation of hostilities, the disarmament of the militiamen and the
dismantling
of the training camps.728 During the months that followed, the number
of violations
decreased significantly. Inter-community tension on the ground nonetheless
remained
high and the militias continued to arm themselves.
_______________
726 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009;
Documents submitted to the Mapping Teamà in
Bunia in March 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573), MONUC;
New York Times,
“Congo's War Turns a Land Spat Into a Blood Bath”, 29 January 2001.
727 The army of the MLC, the ALC, already controlled the districts of Haut-Uélé
and Bas-Uélé.
728 The memorandum of agreement also included various provisions on the reform
of the local land and
judicial system and on combating impunity.
729 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March and May 2009, HRW, Ituri:
Covered in Blood.
Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern DRC, July 2003.
730 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009
to the village, the villagers found 35 decomposed bodies, which they buried in
various places. Those responsible for the massacre were trying to remove Lendu
populations from the Kobu area, close to the Kilomoto gold mines. Following the
killing, the population of Kobu sent a petition to Governor Lopondo, who visited
the area shortly afterwards accompanied by senior figures in the UPDF.
Following the visit, UPDF soldiers left the area.731
408. In February 2002, against a background of growing economic rivalry
between
Hema and Nande businessmen and disagreements on the new strategic directions
taken
by the Mouvement,736 the Defence Minister of the RCD-ML, Thomas
Lubanga, and the
_______________
731 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009; ASADHO,
Annual Report 2002, March 2003, p.
28.
732 Ibid.
733 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April-May 2009; ASADHO, Annual
Report 2002, March
2003, p. 28.
734 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March and April 2009.
735 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March-April 2009; Confidential
documents on the events in
Ituri submitted to the Mapping Team, March 2009; Special report on the events in
Ituri (S/2004/573),
MONUC.
736 In 2001, Mbusa Nyamwisi broke away from the FLC and the MLC to enter into an
alliance with the
Government in Kinshasa.
Hema soldiers of the APC broke away from the RCD-ML to form a political and
military
Hema group, the Union des patriotes congolais (UPC). In response, Mbusa Nyamwisi
and Nande officers in the APC, supported by certain members of the UPDF, reduced
Hema influence in the district,737 intensified their cooperation with
the FAC738 and
encouraged members of the Lendu and Ngiti militias to join forces in political
military
groups, namely the Front National Intégrationiste (FNI)739 and the Forces de
résistance
patriotique en Ituri (FRPI)740. During the course of 2002, these
various armed groups
received significant supplies of weapons from Uganda and the Government in
Kinshasa.
409. In June 2002, faced with the advance of Lendu militiamen into the
Banyali-Kilo
community in the Djugu region, the local Security Council for the town of
Mongwalu
decided to chase away or eliminate any Lendu living in the town.
_______________
737 Governor Uringi was replaced by a Kasaian, Jean-Pierre
Molondo, the bishop of Bunia, a Hema accused
of having taken part in the ethnic conflict, who was in turn replaced by a Nande.
738 From 2002, the FAC set up an integrated operational headquarters (EMOI) in
Nyaleke with the APC
from Nyamwisi.
739 The FNI united the Lendu militias from the Djugu region.
740 The FRPI brought together the Ngiti militias from the Irumu region. The
Ngiti are related to the Lendu
but nonetheless distinct from them.
741 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, May 2009; Special report on the
events in Ituri (S/2004/573),
MONUC.
742 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009.
743 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009; Documents submitted to
the Mapping Team, Ituri,
March 2009.
411. Over the course of the following months, violent fighting broke out on
several
fronts, between elements of the UPC and UPDF on the one hand, and those of the
APC
and FNI-FRPI on the other. Both coalitions targeted civilian populations on the
basis of
their ethnic origins. Numerous civilians from non-belligerent tribes were also
massacred
on the basis of their actual or supposed support for one or other camp. Many of
them
were also victims of forced recruitment to the various armed groups. The mining
regions
north of Bunia, control of which was seen as strategic by the various groups
involved,
were the theatre for some particularly violent fighting.
_______________
744 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April and May 2009;
Special report on the events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence
in Northern DRC,
July 2003.
745 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April and May 2009; Document
submitted to the Mapping
Team, “Rapport d’enquête-massacre à Mongwalu”, undated; Special report on the
events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence
in Northern DRC,
July 2003.
746 Interview with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Special report on the
events in Ituri (S/2004/573),
MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern
DRC, July 2003.
412. On 9 August 2002, having had to leave Bunia quickly, Governor Lopondo,
the
APC troops and Lendu and Ngiti militiamen747 established a base in Komanda for
the
purpose of preparing the counter-offensive. The UPC, meanwhile, consolidated its
positions south of Bunia in order to prevent the counter-attack from elements of
the APC
and FNI-FRPI and to gain control of the area’s mining resources.
_______________
747 The latter did not come from Bunia but had been recruited on
the way, during their flight to Beni, in the
village of Medu, halfway between Bunia and Komanda.
748 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January 2009 and Ituri,
April 2009; Document
submitted to the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009; Special report on the events
in Ituri (S/2004/573),
MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern
DRC, July 2003.
749 Ibid.
750 The term “non-natives” here refers to inhabitants of Ituri who originated
from other parts of the
DRC. The term used locally is “Jajambo”.
751 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Special report on the
events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence
in Northern DRC,
July 2003.
_______________
752 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March and April
2009; Special report on the events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence
in Northern DRC,
July 2003.
753 Interview with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009; Special report on the
events in Ituri (S/2004/573),
MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern
DRC, July 2003; AI,
“DRC: On the precipice: the deepening human rights and humanitarian crisis in
Ituri”, 2003.
754 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009; Document submitted to
the Mapping Team:
Report on the violation of human rights committed during the organised attacks
on the Bahema-Sud
community from 2001 to 2003, undated.
According to witnesses, the FNI militiamen accused inhabitants of the town from
all ethnic groups of supporting the UPC.755
413. Between October and December 2002, confrontations between elements of
the
FNI-FPRI and UPC had spread throughout the Irumu region. The UPC troops led
major
military operations in the same region directed at the FRPI bases in the Walendu
Bindi
community and Lendu enclaves in the Bahema-Sud community. The Bira farmers
living
in Pinga, in Songo in the Irumu region were also attacked, with the UPC
suspecting them
of funding the FNI and FRPI.
_______________
755 Interview with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009; Special
report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573),
MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern
DRC, July 2003.
756 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009; Special report on the
events in Ituri (S/2004/573),
MONUC.
757 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Special report on the
events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC.
758 Ibid.
mutilated. The militiamen were critical of the Bira in Saliboko for having given
shelter to displaced Hema. The village has not been rebuilt since.759
414. The signing of a peace agreement in September 2002 between the DRC and
Uganda offered new prospects for peace in Ituri. In addition to the withdrawal
of UPDF
troops from Gbadolite and Beni, the agreement provided for the creation of a
Peacekeeping Commission in Ituri and the setting up of an Administration
intérimaire de
l’Ituri (AII) [Interim Administrative Authority for Ituri] responsible for
managing the
district after the departure of the Ugandan soldiers. On the ground, however,
far from
stabilising the region, the closer relationship between Kinshasa and Kampala
prompted
new patterns of alliances that made the situation even more volatile. As
mentioned
previously, in October 2002, the MLC army, the ALC, and its allies in the RCD-N
launched a major operation east of Orientale Province, called “Clean the
blackboard”.
This operation aimed to destroy the APC once and for all, so as to deprive the
Government in Kinshasa of its ally in eastern Congo and get hold of the natural
resources
still under the control of the RCD-ML before the transition period began. The
UPC,
which was also trying to crush the APC, joined in with the operation.
415. On 12 October 2002, the ALC and its allies from the RCD-N entered the
town of
Mambasa. On 29 October, however, they were forced to withdraw, before regaining
control of the town from the APC on 27 November. During the attacks, the ALC
soldiers
(MLC and RCD-N) committed numerous atrocities directed at civilians.
_______________
759 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March and April
2009.
760 Minority Rights Group International, Erasing the Board. Report of the
international research mission
into crimes under international law committed against the Bambuti Pygmies in the
eastern DRC, 2004;
Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573), MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered
in Blood. Ethnically
Targeted Violence in Northern DRC, July 2003.
or killed with edged weapons. Some were killed whilst they were hiding in a
church. Some survived but were badly mutilated and tortured.761
417. On 30 November 2002, APC, FNI and FRPI troops regained control of the
towns
of Irumu and Komanda. Following the scandal caused by the publicity organised
about
acts of cannibalism committed by troops taking part in the “Clean the
blackboard”
operation, the international community put pressure on the leaders of the MLC,
the RCDML
and the RCD-N to sign a ceasefire agreement in Gbadolite on 30 December 2002.762
The UPC, however, which in December 2002 had successfully taken control of the
strategic town of Mwanga and blocked access north of Bunia for the FNI
militiamen
based in the Kilomoto region, rejected the agreement. Faced with the closer
relationship
between the Government in Kinshasa and Uganda and the ALC’s withdrawal from
Ituri,
the UPC entered into an alliance with Rwanda, which brought weapons and military
advisers into the area immediately. In response to the arrival of Rwandan
soldiers into the
area, Uganda ended its collaboration with the UPC and offered its support to the
Lendu
militia and the APC. During the first half of 2003, fighting between the UPC and
elements of the FNI, FRPI, APC and UPDF intensified and spread throughout the
district.
418. On 23 January 2003, the UPC officially asked the UPDF troops to evacuate
Ituri.
In February, the Peacekeeping Commission in Ituri began its work but the UPC
rejected
the creation of the interim institutions provided for in the agreement of
September 2002.
The hardening of the UPC’s positions and the open conflict with the UPDF caused
several internal splits. The Hema-Sud militiamen led by Chief Kawa Mandro left
the
UPC to create a new armed group, the Parti pour l’unité et la sauvegarde de
l’intégrité du
Congo (PUSIC), with the support of Uganda. In the Mahagi and Aru regions, Jérôme
Kakwavu also left the UPC and created the Forces armées du peuple congolais (FAPC)
with the support of Ugandan soldiers who wanted an ally in areas with
substantial forest
resources.
419. Between January and March 2003, the UPC carried out several military
offensives
in order to take control of the mining areas around Mongwalu and Kobu.764
_______________
761 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April and May 2009,
Special report on the events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood, July 2003.
762 Following the “Erasing the board” operation, the Kabila Government wrote to
the President of the
Security Council to ask him to set up an International Criminal Court for the
DRC. The proposal was
supported by Jean-Pierre Bemba, who asked in return that the court should be
competent to judge all the
crimes committed in the country since 1996.
763 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009.
764 Interviews with the Mapping Team; Ituri, April 2009; Confidential documents
submitted to the Mapping
Team, April 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573), MONUC.
_______________
765 Ibid.
766 Ibid.
767 Document submitted to the Mapping Team: Report on the violation of human
rights committed during
the attacks organised against the Bahema-Sud community from 2001 to 2003, March
2009; Special report
on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573), MONUC; Second special report of the
Secretary-General on MONUC
(S/2003/566); Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC, 2 July 2007, Arrest warrant for
Germain Katanga, ICC-
01/04-01/07, Pre-Trial chamber I of the ICC, Amended Document Containing the
Charges Pursuant to
Article 61(3)(a) of the Statute, 26 June 2008.
768 Ibid
numerous civilian casualties. The militiamen also arrested tens of civilians,
including numerous women and children who were hiding in the Jitchu forest in
the area around Buli. Having brought them back to the village of Kobu and held
them there, they executed them with edged weapons. The 40 or so bodies found in
Kobu were then buried in the village by the local people.769
420. On 6 March 2003, after the UPC had attacked the UPDF base in Ndele, a
few
kilometres from Bunia, UPDF soldiers and elements of the FNI and FRPI set up a
joint
military operation and regained control of the town of Bunia.
421. After taking control of Bunia, elements of the FNI launched a major
offensive
against the UPC bastions located north of the town.
_______________
769 Ibid.
770 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009, Special report on the
events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC.
771 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March and April 2009, Special
report on the events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC; AI, DRC-Ituri - a need for protection, a thirst for
justice, 2003.
indiscriminately killing 20 civilians. The UPDF soldiers there tried, without any
great success, to stop the FNI atrocities directed at civilians.772
422. After the departure of the UPDF troops from the Ituri district, under
considerable
international pressure, in early May 2003, the UPC and FNI troops fought to take
control
of the strategic locations left vacant by the Ugandan soldiers. Anticipating new
massacres, thousands of Bunia’s inhabitants opted to leave the town. Some
followed the
UPDF troops to Uganda. Others fled to Beni, in North Kivu. On 6 May, serious
clashes
broke out in Bunia between elements of the FNI under the orders of Mathieu
Ngudjolo
and elements of the UPC under the command of Bosco Ntaganda.
_______________
772 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009, HRW, Le
fléau de l’or, June 2005.
773 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Special report on the
events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC.
774 Interviews with the Mapping Team, April and May 2009; Judgment of the
military court at the Bunia
garrison on 19 February 2007, RP no. 103/2006; HRW, Ituri: Couvert de sang,
Violence ciblée sur
certaines ethnies dans le nord-est de la RDC, July 2003.
and looted the offices of several international NGOs including Medair, Agro-
Action Allemande (AAA) and COOPI [Cooperazione Internazionale].775
423. The UPC swiftly led a counter-offensive and finally took control of Bunia.
424. In response to this series of massacres and the attacks carried out
against
MONUC facilities, the Secretary-General of the United Nations asked Member
States on
15 May 2003 to form a coalition in order to end the humanitarian disaster and
allow
MONUC to complete its deployment in Bunia.777 On 16 May, Tanzania organised a
summit, during which President Kabila met delegations from the Administration
intérimaire de l’Ituri [Interim Administrative Authority for Ituri] and the
leaders of the
main armed groups. In light of the continued fighting, on 30 May the Security
Council
adopted Resolution 1484 (2003), authorising the deployment to Bunia of an
interim
emergency multinational force under European command.
425. On 31 May 2003, the FNI and Lendu from Datule launched a major offensive
against the village of Tchomia, which at the time was under the control of PUSIC
troops.
The attack was intended as revenge for the attack carried out by the PUSIC on
Datule on
26 January 2002. In just a few hours, elements of the FNI chased out the PUSIC
troops
and destroyed their military camps.
_______________
775 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March and April
2009, Special report on the events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC; AI, DRC-Ituri - How many more have to die? 2003; AI,
DRC-Ituri - a need for
protection, a thirst for justice, 2003; MSF, “Ituri: promesses non tenues ? Un
semblant de protection and
une aide inadéquate“, 25 July 2003.
776 Ibid.
777 Letter sent to the President of the Security Council by the
Secretary-General (S/2003/574).
778Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Special report on the
events in Ituri (S/2004/573),
MONUC; AI, DRC-Ituri - How many more have to die, 2003.
426. The interim emergency multinational force began its deployment in Bunia
on 6
June 2003. After a few weeks, it managed to restore order in the town and put an
end to
ethnic killing. Outside Bunia, however, the acts of violence continued. Elements
of the
FNI, FRPI and FAPC launched a series of attacks against UPC and PUSIC positions
in
the Djugu and Irumu regions. These violent clashes resulted in numerous
massacres of
civilians, most of them from the Hema ethnic group.
_______________
779 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Special
report on the events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence
in Northern DRC,
July 2003; documents submitted to the Mapping Team, April 2009.
780 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April 2009; Special report on the
events in Ituri (S/2004/573),
MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northern
DRC, July 2003.
781 Interviews with the Mapping Team, April 2009; Documents submitted to the
Mapping Team, April
2009; Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573), MONUC.
782 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, March 2009; Special report on the
events in Ituri
427. Following the withdrawal of the UPDF soldiers from the mining region of
Mongwalu, in March 2003, FNI troops took control of the area. On 10 June, UPC
troops
regained control of the town of Mongwalu but, after 48 hours, FNI troops
launched a
counter-attack with the support of elements of the UPDF.
429. Throughout 2000, the Mayi-Mayi led by Chief Makabe based in Musao, in
the
Badia area, fought alongside the FAC and ZDF in order to prevent the ANC/APR
from
taking control of the Malemba Nkulu region. As the front stabilised and the
number of
atrocities by the FAC directed at the civilian population increased, however,
the
relationship between the FAC and the Mayi-Mayi deteriorated significantly. In
January
2001, the accidental killing of two Mayi-Mayi in the Makabe group by FAC
soldiers
during a joint operation degenerated into open conflict.
_______________
783 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April and May 2009,
Special report on the events in Ituri
(S/2004/573), MONUC; HRW, Ituri: Covered in Blood. Ethnically Targeted Violence
in Northern DRC,
July 2003.
784 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Ituri, April and May 2009; Confidential
documents submitted to the
Mapping Team, May 2009; Special report on the events in Ituri (S/2004/573),
MONUC; Reports of the
Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (S/2002/1299,
A/58/546-S/2003/1053 and Corr. 1 and 2
and A/59/695-S/2005/72); BBC News, “UN finds Congo child soldiers”, 21 February
2001; BBC News,
“DRC awash with child soldiers”, 17 February 2003.
430. In 2001, following the introduction of the ceasefire between the
principal
belligerents and the cessation of most military operations in Katanga, the
Government in
Kinshasa dissolved the FAP but did not implement an appropriate demobilisation
and
reintegration plan. Feeling they had been abandoned by those in power, the
Mayi-Mayi
led by Chief Makabe and his lieutenant Kabale became more and more aggressive
towards the FAC and representatives of the State. On 14 November, in Katoto, in
the
Haut-Lomami district, the interim Governor of Katanga, Jacques Muyumba,
organised a
reconciliation meeting between the Mayi-Mayi leaders, the FAC and the police.
The
agreement reached at the meeting did not hold, however, and further acts of
violence
began to be committed on the ground from 2002. It appears that during the period
under
consideration, the Mayi-Mayi continued to receive weapons from certain senior
figures in
the FAC, further adding to the confusion reigning at the time.
27 February 2002, elements of the FAC burned 11 civilians alive,
including at
least one child, and set fire to houses in Kilumba Kumbula, in the Mwanza area
in
the Malemba Nkulu region. The victims had been arrested by an FAC patrol as
they were returning from the fields. The FAC tied up the victims and took them
to
the village of Kilumba Kumbula, where they locked them in a thatched hut and
set fire to it. Victims who tried to escape were shot dead. One civilian managed
to
get away.786
_______________
785 Interviews with the Mapping Team,
Katanga, December 2008; Confidential document of the working
group on international crimes committed in the DRC submitted to the Mapping
Team; CVDHO
[Commission de vulgarisation des droits de l’homme and de développement],
“Alerte sur la situation
d’insécurité générale et de violation massive des droits de l’homme and du droit
humanitaire dans le
territoire de Malemba Nkulu, fevrier-mars 2001”, April 2001; ASADHO, CDH [Centre
démocrate
humaniste], CVDHO, “Nord- Katanga: attaques délibérées contre la population
civile”, October 2003, p.
23; Kalenge Yamukena Yantumbi, Le Nord-Katanga à feu and à sang, Kyamy Network
Editions,
Lubumbashi, 2004, p. 113 to 116.
786 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, December 2008.
Convinced that the chief was collaborating with the Mayi-Mayi, they decided to
kill both him and his family. The FAC set fire to the village before they left.787
431. During the period under consideration, ANC/APR troops pursuing the FDLR
troops stationed in Katanga cracked down on civilians suspected of collaborating
with the
FDLR.
_______________
787 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, December 2008.
788 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, November 2008; Document submitted
to the Mapping
Team on 24 February 2009: “Les faits saillants des incidents du territoire de
Kabalo”.
789 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, December 2008.
790 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, December 2008.
791 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, December 2008; Yamukena Yantumbi
Kalenge, Le Nord-
Katanga à feu and à sang, Kyamy Network Editions, Lubumbashi, 2004, p. 113 to
116.
_______________
792 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, December 2008;
Confidential document of the working
group on international crimes committed in the DRC submitted to the Mapping
Team.
793 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, December 2008.
794 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, December 2008.
795 As mentioned before, From June 2002, the Armée patriotique rwandaise (APR)
was renamed the
Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) or Forces rwandaises de défense (FRD) in French.
796 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009; Réseau national des
organisations non
gouvernementales des droits de l’homme de la République démocratique du Congo (RENADHOC),
“Panorama de la situation des droits de l’homme en RDC, rapport annuel”, 2003,
p. 16.
the Sud-Lukuga community controlled by the ANC/APR. During the operation,
they killed and mutilated civilians, set fire to houses and looted property. In 2002,
in the Tumbwe community, in the Kalumbi groupement in the Kalemie region,
the Mayi-Mayi tortured, mutilated and killed civilians. They also looted civilian
property and set fire to villages.797
433. On 30 July 2002, President Kabila and President Kagame signed a peace
agreement in Pretoria.799 On 18 and 19 September, the Rwandan Defence
Forces
withdrew from the towns of Kalemie, Nyunzu, Kongolo and Kabalo. Kinshasa, for
its
part, prohibited FDLR activities on its territory and tried to repatriate the
1,500 to 1,800
members of the FDLR who had been stationed at the Kamina base for over a year.
As the
FDLR rejected the process, the FAC attacked the Kamina base on 30 October,
however
the main result of the operation was that it allowed over 1,300 members of the
FDLR to
flee to North Katanga, South Kivu and Eastern and Kasai Occidental. On 1
November,
the 95th Brigade, based in Ankoro, was given orders to arrest FDLR members in
the
Horizon Brigade, disarm them and take them to Kamina. The FAC managed to disarm
the 3rd Company of the FDLR and arrest 21 of its members. Following mediation
efforts
by the Mayi-Mayi Chief Médard and Chief Ntuta, with whom the FDLR were allied,
the
FAC released these members of the FDLR on 5 November. In spite of this, tension
in
Ankoro remained high between the Mayi-Mayi and the FAC, with the latter accusing
the
former of opposing the disarmament of the FDLR.
_______________
797 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, February 2009.
798 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009; RENADHOC, “Panorama
de la situation
des droits de l’homme en RDC, rapport annuel”, 2003, p. 16.
799 For the text of the Agreement, see S/2002/914, appendix.
neutralise the Mayi-Mayi. Believing the civilian population to be complicit with
the Mayi-Mayi and the FDLR, the soldiers bombarded the residential
neighbourhoods of Ankoro-Nord and Ankoro-Sud with heavy weapons for
several days.800
434. In order to restore calm to the Malemba Nkulu region, the Governor of
Katanga,
Ngoy Mukena, and General John Numbi Banza Tambo met in August 2002 at Makabe’s
headquarters in Musao. They gave the Mayi-Mayi leaders, Makabe, Mwende and
Kabale,
numerous gifts in return for their commitment to disarm. The Mayi-Mayi leaders
fell out
over how to share the spoils, however, and refused to disarm, which resulted in
the
violence continuing throughout 2002. In February 2003, Governor Mukena and
General
John Numbi paid another visit to Makabe. They made him a General and give him
the
title of Head of Security for the Malemba Nkulu region. In return, Makabe
reorganised
his militia, had Kabale arrested and promised to call in the weapons that had
been
distributed across the region.
435. After a lull of a few months, Kabale was released and returned to the
chiefdom of
Kayumba. The local population, which had suffered at the hands of Kabale’s
Mayi-Mayi
in 2002, immediately set off to hunt him down. On 13 May 2003, they killed
Kabale near
Lake Zibambo. Elements of the Mayi-Mayi organised a punitive expedition in
retaliation.
In the town of Malemba Nkulu, the Mayi-Mayi, claiming they were now solely
responsible for maintaining order in the region, attacked and looted the offices
and homes
of the local police. The violence then spread to the chiefdom of Kayumba and to
the
Bukama and Kabongo regions, on the main Kitenge road.
436. The Mayi-Mayi in the Bukama region sowed terror and committed atrocities
directed at numerous civilians in the region. An autonomous Mayi-Mayi movement
was
_______________
800 Confidential documents of the working group on international
crimes committed in the DRC sent to the
Mapping Team; ASADHO, CDH, CVDHO, “Nord-Katanga: Attaques délibérées contre la
population
civile”, October 2003; ASADHO, “Rapport sur le procès d’Ankoro”, February 2005;
Kalenge Yamukena
Yantumbi, Le Nord-Katanga à feu and à sang, Kyamy Network Editions, Lubumbashi,
2004.
801 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, December 2009; Confidential
documents of the working
group on international crimes committed in the DRC sent to the Mapping Team;
ASADHO, CDH,
CVDHO, “Nord-Katanga: attaques délibérées contre la population civile”, October
2003; Service chrétien
d’animation rurale du Katanga (SCARK), “Secours humanitaire d’urgence en faveur
des victimes de Mayi-
Mayi dans la chefferie de Kayumba à Kyolo-Museka”, 5 June 2003; “Aide-mémoire
des notables de la
chefferie de Kayumba à l’attention de la délégation venue de Kinshasa pour
suivre la tragédie de
Kayumba”, 9 June 2003; Kalenge Yamukena Yantumbi, Le Nord-Katanga à feu and à
sang, Kyamy
Network Editions, 2004.
created in the Kabongo region and, from the end of 2003, it became
increasingly
aggressive and violent towards the FAC and the civilian population.
437. In total, according to an estimate produced by the MONUC office, between
2002
and 2004, over 500 people were killed and over 2,000 villages destroyed as a
result of
open warfare between the FAC and Mayi-Mayi from Katanga.
438. From the end of 2000 the RCD-Goma tried to strengthen its popular base
in North
Kivu. To this end, it appointed a Hutu Banyarwanda, Eugène Serufuli, as Governor
of the
province. Serufuli tried to recreate a sense of unity between Tutsi and Hutu
Banyarwanda, which had been largely lost since the early 1990s, around the
concept of a
“Rwandan-speaking” area. In order to break the alliance between the Mayi-Mayi
and ex-
FAR/Interahamwe and the Hutu armed groups within the FDLR, the Governor offered
the Mayi-Mayi a separate peace and recruited massive numbers of Hutu Banyarwanda
to
the “Local Defence Forces”, which were allied with the ANC/APR soldiers.
439. In spite of the failure of the “Oracle of the Lord” operation launched
by the FDLR
against Rwanda in May-June 2001 and the start of the withdrawal of Rwandan
soldiers
from the province in September 2002, the strategy of the RCD-Goma towards the
Mayi-
Mayi and Hutu Banyarwanda groups did not have the anticipated impact. Most of
the
Mayi-Mayi groups, encouraged by the Government in Kinshasa, refused to negotiate
with
the RCD-Goma and maintained their alliance with the FDLR. In response, the
RCDGoma
tried to divide the various Mayi-Mayi groups and offered certain Mayi-Mayi
leaders positions within the ANC in return for their collaboration in the war
against the
groups cooperating with the FDLR. As in the previous period, civilians continued
to be
targeted by armed groups, against a background of widespread pillaging of
natural
resources by the various forces involved. Given problems of access to certain
areas and a
lack of time, the Mapping Team was only able to confirm a small number of cases,
which
are described below by way of example.
1. Town of Goma, Masisi, Rutshuru, Walikale and Nyiragongo regions (Petit-
Nord)
member of the Mayi-Mayi group who came from the village and was from the
Nyanga ethnic group.802
_______________
802 Statements gathered by MONUC’s Human Rights Division, North
Kivu, 2003; SOPROP, “Les droits de
l'homme au Nord-Kivu, une affaire qui te concerne aussi”, January-March 2003;
Didier Kamundu Batundi,
Mémoire des crimes impunis, la tragédie du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p. 135 and 136.
803 Ibid.
804 Ibid.
805 Ibid.
806 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008.
807 Statements gathered by MONUC’s Human Rights Division, North Kivu, 2003;
Réseau européen Congo
(REC), “Info 06”, 2003.
Pygmies had been regularly accused of collaborating with one or other of the
armed
groups. It appears, however, that certain violations, such as rape, were
motivated by the
belief that raping Pygmy women was a remedy for illness.
2. Beni and Lubero regions (Grand-Nord)
441. In the Beni and Lubero regions controlled by the RCD-ML, fighting
continued
between the troops from the APC (the armed wing of the RCD-ML) and the UPDF on
the
one hand and the various Mayi-Mayi groups on the other.
442. From 2001, Mayi-Mayi groups and UPDF soldiers, sometimes supported by
elements of the APC, engaged in fierce fighting to gain control of the village
of Irango,
around 20 kilometres from Beni.
443. In the town of Beni, UPDF soldiers instituted a reign of terror for
several years
with complete impunity. They summarily executed civilians, tortured and
arbitrarily
_______________
808 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, April 2009.
Confidential document submitted to the
Mapping Team, April 2009.
809Ibid.
810 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009.
811 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009.
detained an unknown number of people, several of them in muddy holes two or
three
metres deep.
444. During the period under consideration, the RCD-Goma tried to secure a
popular
base in South Kivu and increase the isolation of the FDLR by organising an
inter-Kivu
dialogue in September 2001 and offering local Mayi-Mayi groups the opportunity
to sign
a separate peace agreement. With the exception of the Mudundu 40 group,
Mayi-Mayi
groups in the province, although encouraged by the Government in Kinshasa,
refused to
negotiate with the RCD-Goma. The inter-Kivu dialogue was boycotted by most local
civil society organisations.
445. Fighting between the ANC/APR and the Mayi-Mayi groups supported by
Kinshasa and collaborating with the FDLR and armed Hutu Burundian groups (the
FDD813 and FNL814) continued on the ground until 2003.
From 2002 onwards, the
ANC/APR was also confronted with a real insurgency on the part of the
Banyamulenge
in the Minembwe area, led by a former ANC commander, Patrick Masunzu. Seen by
the
ANC/APR as “Tutsi Mayi-Mayi”, Masunzu’s Forces républicaines et fédéralistes (FRF)
were allied to two Mayi-Mayi groups operating in the Mwenga, Uvira and Fizi
regions
and challenged the ANC/APR with the support of the Government in Kinshasa.
446. From September 2002, the gradual withdrawal of the soldiers of the
Rwandan
Defence Forces (RDF) allowed the Mayi-Mayi and FDLR to regain control of several
villages and broaden their zone of influence in South Kivu.815 In
light of this situation,
the ANC and RDF led several offensives against local Mayi-Mayi groups in order
to
regain lost ground.
_______________
812 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February and
April 2009.
813 Les Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (FDD) were the armed wing of the
Burundian Hutu
movement of the Centre national pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD).
814 The Forces nationales de libération (FNL) were the armed wing of the
Burundian Hutu movement Parti
pour la libération du peuple hutu (PALIPEHUTU).
815 From 14 to 20 October 2002, the Mayi-Mayi had taken control of the town of
Uvira
816 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, January and February 2009.
_______________
817 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009.
818 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009.
819 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009.
820 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009.
821 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu March and April 2009;
Confidential report submitted to
the Mapping Team by NGOs in Uvira, October 2008.
822 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March and April 2009.
447. Towards the end of 2002, senior figures in the RCD-Goma began
negotiations
with a political wing of the Mudundu 40 Mayi-Mayi movement led by Odilon
Kurhenga
Muzimu and Patient Mwendanga. The aim of the negotiations was to complete the
withdrawal of RDF soldiers from the Walungu region in return for the
collaboration of
the political wing of the Mudundu 40 in order to annihilate the movement’s
military
wing, led by Commander Kahasha (Foka Mike) and elements of the Mudundu 40
operating in the region. In December, when the negotiations ended, the RCD-Goma
appointed Patient Mwendanga to the post of Governor of South Kivu. The military
wing
of the Mudundu 40, however, received support from the Padiri Mayi-Mayi and
strengthened its positions in the Burhale groupement. In March 2003, as the
rapprochement between the RCD-Goma and the political wing of the Mudundu 40 had
failed to undo the movement’s military wing, Patient Mwendanga was dismissed
from his
post and the ANC, with the help of RDF reinforcements, launched an attack on the
armed
elements of the Mudundu 40 in the Walungu region.
_______________
823 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009;
Documents from October 2002 submitted
to the Mapping Team by local NGOs, April 2009; IRIN, “Weekly Round-Up No. 146”,
26 October-1
November 2002.
824 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009; Confidential
report from October 2002
submitted to the Mapping Team by local NGOs in Uvira, April 2009; IRIN, “Weekly
Round-Up 146”, 26
October-1 November 2002.
825 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009.
40, ANC soldiers intentionally and systematically destroyed educational
institutions and healthcare facilities in the southern part of the centre of the town
of Walungu.826
_______________
826 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009;
RODHECIC [Réseau d’organisations des
droits de l’homme and d’éducation civique d’inspiration chrétienne], “INFO
droits de l’homme no. 36”,
2003, p. 7 to 12 and 29; ANB [African News Bulletin], “Weekly News Issue”, 14
April 2003, p. 1 to 4;
MESEP [Messagers pour l’éducation and la sensibilisation des enfants à la paix],
“Walungu après les
Mudundu 40”, 2003, p. 2.
827 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and April 2009.
828 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009.
829 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and April 2009.
830 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, June 2009.
448. From 2001 onwards, the Mayi-Mayi groups in Maniema stepped up the number
of attacks against ANC/APR troops. In response, the ANC/APR set up local
self-defence
forces made up of young Congolese militiamen. The civilian population was thus
forced
to side with either one camp or the other and was targeted by the ANC/APR and
the
Mayi-Mayi.
449. From February 2001, the Mayi-Mayi and ANC/APR troops fought for control
of
the village of Kasenga Numbi, 22 kilometres from Kindu.
_______________
831 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March and April
2009; Réseau des femmes pour un
développement associatif (RFDA), Réseau des femmes pour la défense des droits
and la paix (RFDP) and
International Alert (IA), “Le corps des femmes comme champ de bataille durant la
guerre de la RDC, 1996-
2003”, 2004, p. 54.
832 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009.
833 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009.
834 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009.
_______________
835 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March and April
2009.
836 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009; Haki Za Binadamu,
“Les exécutions
sommaires, extrajudiciaires and les meurtres dans la province du Maniema (septembre
2001 à mai 2002)”,
18 June 2002.
837 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009.
838 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009.
839 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009.
840 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009.
450. In May 2002, there was fighting in the Pangi region between Mayi-Mayi
based in
Kampene and the ANC/APR troops based in Kasongo.
451. From 2001 onwards, Mayi-Mayi groups organised a blockade around Kindu in
order to hamper the provision of fresh supplies to the ANC and force the APR to
leave
the town, which created a situation of ongoing food shortages. The people living
in the
town were accused of supporting the Mayi-Mayi and suffered numerous atrocities
at the
hands of the ANC/APR/RDF troops and their allies in the local self-defence
forces. They
were also the victims of frequent attacks by the Mayi-Mayi, many elements of
which
acted criminally. To counter the blockade, the ANC/RDF842 troops
launched an operation
known as “Kangola Nzela” (Open the Door) above and below Kindu. During the
operation, the civilian populations living around Kindu were assumed to be
Mayi-Mayi
and targeted directly by the soldiers.
_______________
841 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009;
Twelfth report of the Secretary-General on
MONUC (S/2002/1180); CDJP-Kasongo, “La province du Maniema dans la tourmente de
deux guerres
dites de libération”, June 2003; Kaki Za Binadamu, “Lecture de l’environnement
and situation des droits de
l’homme dans la province du Maniema (juin-juillet 2002)”, 10 August 2002.
842 As mentioned previously, from June 2002, the Armée patriotique rwandaise
(APR) was renamed the
Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF).
had been taken to the island of Nyonga were finally taken to Kindu. Over the
same period, the ANC/RDF soldiers also arrested numerous civilians in the
forests around the village of Keko. Having taken them back to the village, they
killed the ten or so men in the group.843
452. On 30 July 2002, President Kabila and President Kagame entered into an
agreement in Pretoria, providing for the withdrawal of the RDF from Congolese
territory
and the dismantling of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe over a period of 90 days. During
the
following weeks, Kinshasa prohibited the political activities of the FDLR in the
area
under its control. Between 17 and 18 September, the RDF left Kindu and the
mining
town of Kalima. On 19 September, the Mayi-Mayi groups active around Kindu
entered
into a ceasefire agreement with the leaders of the RCD-Goma, which was
immediately
welcomed by the population. During the day, however, an isolated incident
between
Mayi-Mayi elements and ANC soldiers degenerated into several violent incidents.
_______________
843 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009; CDJP
[Commission diocésaine Justice et
Paix]-Maniema “La province du Maniema (1998 à 2004) durant 7 ans de guerre and
de conflits sanglants”,
2006; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State,
Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices, 2003.
844 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009; Haki Za Binadamu
“Lecture de
l’environnement and situation des droits de l’homme dans la province du Maniema
(juin à juillet 2002)”,
10 August 2002.
845 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March and April 2009; Interview
with MONUC’s Human
Rights Division, Kindu, April 2003; Les Amis de Desmond Tutu, Rapport
d’identification des tombeaux
anonymes and des fosses communes au quartier de Brazza May 2006; CDJP-Maniema,
“La province du
Maniema (1998 à 2004) durant 7 ans de guerre and de conflits sanglants”, 2006.
_______________
846 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009;
Interview with MONUC’s Human Rights
Division, Kindu, April 2003; Twelfth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC
(S/2002/1180), CDJPManiema,
“La province du Maniema (1998 à 2004) durant 7 ans de guerre and de conflits
sanglants”, 2006;
Haki Za Binadamu, “Lecture de l’environnement and situation des droits de
l’homme dans la province du
Maniema (juin-juillet 2002)”, 10 August 2002.
847 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009; Twelfth report of the
Secretary-General on
MONUC (S/2002/1180); Haki Za Binadamu, “Lecture de l’environnement and situation
des droits de
l’homme dans la province du Maniema (juin-juillet 2002)”, 10 August 2002; ACIDH
[Action contre
l’impunité pour les droits humains], “Pour un système judiciaire plus
opérationnel and crédible au
Maniema. Rapport sur l’observation du système judiciaire du Maniema à travers 13
cas ciblés”, October
2008; Military Prosecutor at the Kindu garrison, Rapport de l’instruction du
dossier judiciaire RMP 087/
KMB/ 04 MP c/ Longamba et consort, October 2006; CDJP-Maniema “La province du
Maniema (1998 à
2004) durant 7 ans de guerre and de conflits sanglants. Quelles leçons tirées
pour l’avenir?”, 2006.
848 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009.
dead. In the neighbouring village of Mongali, the ANC troops found five
civilians, whom they accused of collaborating with the Mayi-Mayi and killed.849
_______________
849 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009;
CDJP-Maniema “La province du Maniema
(1998 à 2004) durant 7 ans de guerre and de conflits sanglants”, 2006.
850 BNUDH, Mission report - discovery of two mass graves in Kibombo, 15 January
2007.
851 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009.
852 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March-April 2009; CDJP-Kasongo,
“Des graves
violations des droits de l'homme consécutives aux affrontements mai-mai and
militaires du RCD (de juin à
août 2002)”, August 2002.
and others for several months. All of them were raped on a daily basis by several
men and subjected to all kinds of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.853
453. These figures are given by way of example and represent only a fraction
of what
happened in reality. As in the other provinces, many places are still
inaccessible;
sometimes victims and witnesses did not survive the violations or are still
ashamed to
speak about them. When they did survive rape, women were generally rejected by
their
husbands and families instead of being supported by their communities.
454. Between January 2001 and June 2003, the repression of political
opponents and
members of civil society continued. Although there were fewer cases of
violations, the
security forces continued to commit murder, summary and extrajudicial
executions, rape
and acts of torture with complete impunity. They also caused the disappearance
of an
unknown number of people. The conditions in which people were detained remained
cruel, inhuman or degrading and likely to lead to heavy losses of human life.
455. During the period under consideration, over 30 reports of cases in
Kinshasa were
sent to the Government through the mechanisms provided by the Commission on
Human
Rights, including the Working Group on enforced or involuntary disappearances,
the
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the
Special
Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments or
treatments
and the Working Group on arbitrary detentions.855 A large number of
these reports
concerned human rights violations committed in relation to the pursuit of those
suspected
of playing a part in the assassination of President Kabila.
_______________
853 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March and April
2009; CDJP-Kasongo, “Au nom de
toutes les miennes. SOS pour les femmes victimes des crimes sexuels and autres
violences à Kalima”,
2003.
854 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009.
855 Most of these reports, which relate to hundreds of people, were produced
jointly with the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DRC: E/CN.4/2002/74 /Add.2,
E/CN.4/2002/76/Add.1,
E/CN.4/2002/77, E/CN.4/2002/79, E/CN.4/2003/3/Add.1, E/CN.4/2003/8,
E/CN.3/2003/68/Add.1,
E/CN.4/2003/70, E/CN.4/2004/3, E/CN.4/2004/7/Add.1, E/CN.4/2004/56/Add.1 and
E/CN.4/2004/58.
456. During the period under consideration, the security forces in general
committed
assassinations, extrajudicial executions, rapes and acts of torture directed
against political
opponents and ordinary civilians, with almost complete impunity. As the
incidents are too
numerous to list in full, a few cases are reported below for illustrative
purposes.
_______________
856 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March 2009;
Report on the situation of human rights in
the DRC (A/56/327); Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading
punishments or treatment (E/CN.4/2004/56/Add.1).
857 Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments or treatment –
Report presented by the
Special Rapporteur (E/CN.4/2002/76/Add.1); CODHO, “Des arrestations and
détentions arbitraires à
Kinshasa”, 2003; AI, DRC. A past that haunts the future, 2003.
858 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, April 2009.
859 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009; Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and
Labor, U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2001.
457. The Bundu Dia Kongo (BDK) is a political, cultural and religious
movement that
fights for the defence of the Kongo people. In addition to the establishment of
a federal
State in the DRC, the BDK wants a redefinition of national boundaries on the
African
continent and recognition of an autonomous republic of Central Kongo, which
would
combine the parts of Angola, the Republic of the Congo and the DRC that belonged
to
the former kingdom of Kongo.
458. From 2001 onwards, the stabilisation of the front line and the MONUC
deployment all along it gradually restored calm to the province of Kasai
Occidental. The
FAC and soldiers from the ANC/APR, however, continued to commit atrocities
directed
at the civilian population in their respective areas. Several cases were
reported but the
land-locked nature of the region and lack of time meant it was not possible for
the
Mapping Team to confirm all of them. One confirmed case is mentioned below for
illustrative purposes.
459. Between January 2001 and June 2003, following the introduction of the
ceasefire
and the MONUC deployment along the front line, peace was gradually restored to
the
south and east of Kasai Oriental. In spite of this, civilians continued to live
in wretched
conditions and women were still raped in large numbers.
_______________
860 Interview with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009;
ASADHO, Annual Report, 2002;
SCEPDHO [Structure de culture, d’éducation populaire and des droits de l’homme],
Rapport sur les
événements survenus suite à la marche du Bundu Dia Kongo, 2002; Bundu Dia Kongo
newsletter, “Le
Ministre Mashako and les massacres de Luozi”, 2002.
861 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Western Kasai, April 2009.
460. In Mbuji-Mayi, hundreds of civilians, including very large numbers of
young
people, attempted to earn a living by clandestinely entering the Minière des
Bakwanga
(MIBA) mining concession, looking for any diamonds. In response, the MIBA and
the
provincial authority called on groups of security guards nicknamed Blondos to
support
the mine police.862 During the period under consideration, elements
of the FAC and, until
their withdrawal from the DRC in 2002, Zimbabwean army (ZDF) troops, were also
present at the MIBA concession. The situation at the mine quickly became
anarchic as a
result of the competition between the various armed groups who were supposed to
protect
the concession and the presence amongst the illegal diggers of certain so-called
“suicide”
armed elements.
461. During the period under consideration, the security situation in the
north of the
province (in the Katako-Kombe region) deteriorated significantly following the
appearance of numerous Mayi-Mayi groups hostile to the presence of ANC/APR/RDF
troops in the Sankuru region. Some groups were affiliated to Mayi-Mayi movements
in
neighbouring Maniema. Others, conversely, had remained more independent,
although all
were allied in practice with the Government in Kinshasa. Alongside the
confrontations
between ANC/APR/RDF soldiers and these Mayi-Mayi groups, civilians were
subjected
to numerous serious violations of their rights.
_______________
862 In the remainder of the text, the term “MIBA guards” will be
used to refer both to the armed police
officers at the mine and the “Blondos”. Officially, the Blondos were not armed
but in practice they opened
fire on the illegal diggers on numerous occasions.
863 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kasai Oriental, April-May 2009; Centre
d’étude et de formation
populaire pour les droits de l’homme (CEFOP), “Journal Le Facilitateur”,
April-June 2001; CEFOP,
Rapport sur les tueries au polygone minier de la MIBA, March 2003; Press release
by human rights NGOs
in the province of Kasai Oriental, 4 March 2003; RENADHOC, Panorama de la
situation des droits de
l’homme en RDC, rapport annuel 2003, March 2004, p. 15 and 16; AI, “The diamond
trade in governmentcontrolled
DRC”, 2002; IFHR, “Note de situation RDC: le far-west minier de Mbuji-Mayi n’a
pas besoin
d’un nouvel étouffement !”, March 2003.
_______________
864 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kasai Oriental, May 2009;
L’Éclaireur newspaper, “Tous
seront disqualifiés par la CPI aux élections de 2005”, 28 October 2004, p. 4.
865 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kasai Oriental, May 2009.
866 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kasai Oriental, May 2009.
867 Children associated with armed groups and forces.
868 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kasai Oriental, May 2009.
CHAPTER V. LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF ACTS OF VIOLENCE
462. Whilst the legal classification of the acts of violence identified
ultimately relies on
a judicial process, it is still necessary in order to establish the nature of
the violations
committed and to determine to what extent they are covered by international
humanitarian law and human rights, as required by the Terms of Reference of the
Mapping Exercise. Given the impossibility of classifying each of the hundreds of
incidents described in the preceding chapters, the legal framework applicable to
the main
waves of violence has been identified in order to draw conclusions on the
overall
classification of the incidents or groups of incidents reported.
463. Several violations of international human rights law and international
humanitarian law constitute crimes under international law as defined by the
Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, for which the perpetrators may be
held
criminally liable on an individual basis. The vast majority of the most serious
incidents
identified in this Exercise constitute crimes under international law, either
war crimes or
crimes against humanity, and often both at the same time. The question of the
concomitant existence of some acts that could be classified as genocide, which
is much
more difficult to resolve, can not ,nonetheless, be ignored.
464. Although the inventory set out in the preceding pages includes serious
violations
of both human rights and international humanitarian law, it should be noted that
the vast
majority of the crimes reported were committed in the context of an armed
conflict,
domestic or international, or a widespread or systematic attack directed against
a civilian
population, and can thus be classified as war crimes and crimes against humanity
respectively. In respect of the crime of genocide, it is important to define its
constituent
components carefully and question the extent to which it applies in the context
of some of
the incidents identified.
465. The term “war crimes” is generally used to refer to any serious
violations of
international humanitarian law directed at civilians or enemy combatants during
an
international or internal armed conflict, for which the perpetrators may be held
criminally
liable on an individual basis. Such crimes are derived primarily from the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols I and II of 1977,
and the
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Their most recent codification can be found
in
article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 1998, which
distinguishes four categories of war crime:
sexual slavery, and enlisting or using child soldiers (sect. b, para. 2 of article
8);
466. According to this definition, the commission of a war crime requires
evidence of
four main elements, in addition to the psychological element required for each
accused
person:
a) A prohibited act (such as murder, causing bodily injury and rape);
b) Committed against protected persons (such as those taking no direct part in the
hostilities);869
c) During an armed conflict, either internal or international;
d) And the existence of a nexus between the armed conflict and the act committed.
467. Among the many acts prohibited under the definition of war crimes are
those that
constitute the core of the most serious human rights violations, in particular
violations of
the right to life, personal physical and moral integrity and personal freedom
and security.
In international humanitarian law, violations are treated as serious – and
consequently as
war crimes – when they endanger protected persons or property, or when they
infringe
important values.870 The inventory set out in the previous chapters
pointed to the
commission of multiple prohibited acts, in particular:
_______________
869 Some war crimes can also be committed against combatants, in
particular those relating to the
prohibition of certain methods of waging war. However, this report will
concentrate on crimes directed at
“protected persons” in respect of serious violations of international
humanitarian law.
870 See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Droit international
468. The second element required for the classification of war crimes
concerns the
nature of the victims of the prohibited acts (or the property targeted), who
must be part of
a protected group as defined in the Geneva Conventions. The definition of these
groups
varies somewhat according to the different Conventions, the nature of the
conflict and the
prohibited acts directed against them. For the purposes of this Exercise, it has
been
assumed that it covers those not taking part in the hostilities,871 in
particular civilian
populations, and those no longer able to fight as a result of illness, injury,
detention or for
any other reasons, including combatants who have laid down their weapons. The
vast
majority of the victims of the most serious violations of international
humanitarian law
committed in the DRC between March 1993 and June 2003 identified in this report
belong to these protected groups, generally civilians who are not taking part in
the
hostilities. This applies in particular to people living in refugee camps, who
constitute a
civilian population that is not participating in the hostilities, in spite of
the presence of
military personnel among them in some cases.872
469. The prohibited acts directed against a protected group must be committed
during
an armed conflict. Armed conflict occurs when one or more States use armed force
against another State, when government armed forces are in conflict with
nongovernmental
armed groups or when there is an armed conflict between particular
groups.873
470. International humanitarian law distinguishes two types of armed
conflict:
international armed conflict, which generally involves two or more States, and
internal or
non-international armed conflict, which involves fighting between government
forces and
non-governmental armed groups, or just between armed groups. Finally, in order
to
distinguish internal (non-international) conflict from internal unrest, internal
tensions or
banditry, international humanitarian law requires that the armed conflict should
be
_______________
871 Under international humanitarian law, the notion of “direct
participation in the hostilities” refers to
individual behaviour which, if displayed by civilians, suspends the protection
they enjoy against the
dangers inherent in military operations. In addition, whilst they are directly
participating in the hostilities,
civilians can be directly attacked as if they were combatants.
872 See para. 3, art. 50 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949; ICTY Kordić
et Cerke, Appeals chamber, 17 December 2004, para. 50.
873 ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Judgment
prolonged, that it should be at a minimum level of intensity and that the
parties involved
should be organised to a minimum degree.874 As far as the parties to
the conflict
mentioned in this report are concerned, the vast majority of those involved were
certainly
organised to the minimum degree required by international humanitarian law,
insofar as
these were regular state-controlled troops or had been before the conflict (for
example,
the ex-FAR) and armed rebel groups or militias that were often supported,
trained and
armed by the armed forces of neighbouring countries or by the Government in
Kinshasa.
The few possible exceptions to this general observation are examined in context
below.
471. Although the distinction between an international armed conflict and an
internal
armed conflict is always essential in determining the legal regime applicable
under the
Rome Statute of the ICC, it is blurred in terms of the legal implications in
this case. The
distinction is still important in some respects, particularly as to the
obligation on States to
provide for universal jurisdiction on war crimes deemed to be “grave breaches”,875
the
inclusion or not of certain prohibited acts, and so on, in their national
legislation.
However, as the ICRC study on customary law confirms,almost all violations of
international humanitarian law and the war crimes associated with them are the
same,
whether the context is one of international or internal armed conflict. The most
serious
violations described in this report would thus be classified as war crimes under
either
system, to take attacks on civilians, sexual violence and looting as just a few
examples. In
fact, the vast majority of violent incidents listed in the preceding chapters
are the result of
armed conflict, whether this is internal or international, and point to the
commission of
war crimes as serious violations of international humanitarian law.876
472. Finally, there must be a nexus between the prohibited act and the armed
conflict.
There is thus a requirement that the perpetrator of the act should be aware of
the
existence of the armed conflict at the moment he/she commits the act, that the
act should
take place in the context of the armed conflict and that it should be
“associated” with
_______________
874 See sect. d and f, para. 2 of article 8 of the Rome Statute
of the ICC; see article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949; article 1 of Additional Protocol II adds that the
armed group must control
part of the territory; see also ICTY Fatmir Limaj, no. IT-03-66-T, 30 November
2005, para. 94 to 134, or D.
Schindler, The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to the Geneva
Conventions and Protocols,
RCADI [Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law], vol. 163,
1979-II, p. 147.
875 See for example art.146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. It is,
however, broadly accepted that
States can exercise their universal jurisdiction over other war crimes, in
particular those committed during a
non-international conflict.
875 See the Rome Statute of the ICC, Elements of Crimes, under article 8.
876 ”Violations are treated as serious – and consequently as war crimes – when
they endanger protected
persons or property, or when they infringe important values.” Jean-Marie
Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-
Beck, Droit international humanitaire coutumier, Tome 1, Les Règles, CICR,
éditions Bruylant, Brussels,
2006, p. 752.
it.877 In general terms, this nexus is clear in the incidents identified by
the Mapping Team.
Nonetheless, it will have to be demonstrated in respect of each individual
prosecuted for
war crimes before a judicial body to establish their personal criminal
liability.
5. Issues around the classification of armed conflicts in the DRC
473. It is difficult to classify all of the various armed conflicts that
affected the DRC
all over its territory between 1993 and 2003. Depending on the time and place,
the DRC
experienced internal and international armed conflicts and internal conflicts
that
subsequently became international. Whilst, at times, the presence of foreign
armed forces
fighting on DRC territory points to the international nature of the conflict, at
other times
certain acts of ethnic violence in several regions seem to point more towards
internal
conflict. Similarly, whilst the war that led to the Mobutu regime being
overturned by the
AFDL originally appeared to be an internal conflict, it subsequently became
apparent that
it was more international in nature, with the acknowledged participation of
foreign forces
on both sides. In respect of the armed conflict between Rwandan and Ugandan
forces in
Orientale Province, the peace agreements signed by the belligerents with the DRC,
in
which they agreed to withdraw their troops from Congolese territory, clearly
points to its
international character.878 Nonetheless, some time is required to determine the
nature of
certain conflicts reported in the previous pages and consequently, the legal
regime
applicable to them.
Persecution of the Kasaians in Shaba (Katanga)
474. The numerous acts of violence directed against the Kasaians from March
1993
onwards, during a campaign of persecution that resulted in large numbers of
victims, are
not war crimes but crimes against humanity, which will be dealt with in the next
section.
It is difficult to see this dramatic episode in Congolese history as a conflict
pitting two
armed groups against each other, insofar as the Kasaians were not organised into
an
armed group capable of carrying out military operations. It would therefore be
seen
instead as internal unrest which, though highly intense, cannot be characterized
as
internal armed conflict.
_______________
877 See the Rome Statute of the ICC, Elements of Crimes, under
article 8. See Kunarac et al., ICTY,
Appeals chamber, no. IT-96-23/1-A, 12 June 2002, para. 58: “A link between cause
and effect is not
required between the armed conflict and the perpetration of the crime but at the
very least, the existence of
the armed conflict must have had a significant influence on the capacity of the
perpetrator of the crime to
commit it, their decision to commit it, the manner in which they committed it or
the purpose for which they
committed it.
878 Peace agreements signed on 30 July 2002 in Pretoria (S/2002/914, appendix)
and on 6 September 2002
in Luanda (available at:
www.droitcongolais.info/files0426_accord_du_6_septembre_2002_rdcouganda_r.pdf
).
Ethnic war in the Masisi region (North Kivu)
475. The legal classification of the acts of violence that took place before
the arrival of
the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, in July 1994, depends on the nature and degree of
organisation
of the militias involved and the intensity of the violence. The report of the
Investigative
Team of the Secretary-General in the DRC in 1998 concluded that the intensity of
the
violence resulting from the inter-ethnic fighting over land between Hunde and
Banyarwanda in Masisi from 1993 onwards was “sufficiently serious to trigger the
application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, ratified by Zaire,
which
applies to non-international armed conflicts.”879 This statement is
supported by the
Mapping Exercise investigations, which revealed that several violent incidents
that
caused numerous victims took place between 14 February and 7 September 1993.
Although the Team is not able to confirm the figures on the losses of human life
and the
massive displacement of populations, the fact that such figures were reported by
reliable
humanitarian workers operating on the ground is undoubtedly an indication that
suggests
a level of intensity beyond the minimum threshold required for such acts of
violence to
be classified as internal armed conflict. Assessing the degree of organisation
of the
Hunde and Hutu militias in North Kivu at this time is more complicated. The key
questions on the existence within these militias of a clear command structure
and their
capacity to carry out real military operations would need to be examined in more
detail.
At first sight, the heavy toll of inter-ethnic violence which, according to some
reports,
resulted in the deaths of thousands of victims, caused hundreds of thousands of
people to
be displaced880 and prompted the creation of ethnic enclaves seems to
confirm that these
were organised attacks rather than spontaneous violence. The MAGRIVI [Mutuelle
des
agriculteurs du Virunga] and other militias involved in the violence also proved
their
ability to lead coordinated attacks on several occasions. Furthermore, the fact
that the
MAGRIVI existed as a simple agricultural cooperative with an organisational
structure
and figures of authority, before it was radicalised, seems to indicate that it
had the
minimum level of organisation necessary to satisfy the criteria set out in
international
humanitarian law in relation to internal conflict. In this respect, the numerous
intentional
killings directed at the civilian population during this period could be
classified as war
crimes.881
476. The arrival, in July 1994, of refugees and foreign forces (the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe) did not change the legal nature of the conflict or the acts of
violence
committed. An internal armed conflict cannot become an international armed
conflict
unless a a third-party State intervenes militarily in the conflict or if b some
of the parties
_______________
879 Report of the Investigative Team of the Secretary-General
(S/1998/581), appendix, para. 91.
880 MSF, for example, had reported in 1995 that these acts of violence had
caused the deaths of 6,000 to
15,000 people and the displacement of 250,000 people. See MSF, “Populations en
danger au Zaïre”, 1995.
881 Like most of the other crimes examined in this section, the widespread or
systematic nature of the
crimes committed during the ethnic war in North Kivu and the fact that they were
committed against
civilian populations in knowledge of the attack are elements that would also
classify them as crimes against
humanity. This category of crime is examined in further detail below.
to the conflict are acting in the name of said third-party State.882 It
cannot be argued that
the ex-FAR were at this stage the army of a third-party State nor that they were
acting in
its name or as its agent.
477. The arrival of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe did, however, contribute
dramatically
to exacerbating inter-ethnic tension, increasing the level of violence and
intensifying
armed conflict within the region. The exponential proliferation of arms in the
region
probably increased the toll of violent incidents in Mutobo (17 November 1995),
Bikenge
(9 December 1995), Osso (3 February 1996) and Mokoto (12 May 1996).883
The
existence of military training camps organised by the ex-FAR/Interahamwe for the
Hutu
militias in the Masisi region helped them to organise more effectively. The
numerous
murders committed by the Hutu and Hunde militias at the time, in particular
during the
attacks on Mutobo and Bikenge in 1995, and on Osso and Mokoto in 1996,884
could thus
be classified as war crimes. The multiple atrocities committed during this
period by the
FAZ, directed against civilian populations, in particular in December 1995 in
Masisi and
in May and June 1996 as part of Operation Mbata (in Vitshumbi, Kibirizi and
Kanyabayonga),885 could also be classified as war crimes committed as
part of an internal
armed conflict.
478. With all the information available today, the importance of the role of
third-party
States in the first war, which led to the overthrow of the Mobutu regime, cannot
be
dismissed. Although, in 1998, the Investigative Team of the Secretary-General in
the
DRC believed it was not in a position to classify the type of armed conflict
that took
place in the Congo during this period, whilst noting the active participation of
Rwanda in
the conflict,886 this is no longer the case. The involvement of
Rwanda and Uganda in the
conflict, from the outset, in setting up and organising the AFDL, operational
planning and
logistical support, such as providing weapons and training to some of the
combatants, is
_______________
882 Tadić, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, para. 84. See,
however, Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina
v. Serbia and
Montenegro)
ICJ, 26 February 2007.
883 See incident referred to in paragraphs 121 and 122.
884 Ibid.
885 See incidents referred to in paragraph 125.
886 It limited itself to the observation that “elements of the armed forces of
at least one neighbouring
country, Rwanda, participated actively in the conflict”, Report of the
Investigative Team of the Secretary-
General (S/1998/581), appendix, par. 16.
now recognised by the highest authorities in the countries concerned.887
The military
operations of the AFDL were placed under the command of Colonel James Kabarebe,
a
Rwandan officer who, by the end of the war, had become the ad interim Chief of
Staff of
the Congolese armed forces under the new Government.888 The
information gathered
both by the Investigative Team of the Secretary-General and by the Mapping Team
indicates that Rwandan officers were de facto commanders, particularly in
Shabunda
(South Kivu), Kisangani (Orientale Province) and Mbandaka (Équateur), even
though
Congolese officers from the AFDL were supposed to be senior in rank to them.889
The
active involvement of elements of the Ugandan armed forces (UPDF) was also
confirmed
in several places, such as Kitale, Kibumba and Mugunga, in North Kivu, Kiliba in
South
Kivu and in Orientale Province. All of this information serves to confirm the
international
nature of the armed conflict that took place in the DRC between 1996 and 1998,
i.e.
during what is commonly known as the first war.
479. It is fair to say that the exact timing of the start of the
international armed conflict
remains a moot point. Foreign troops were certainly operating in South Kivu at
the time
of the attack on Camp Runingu on 13 October 1996,890 and even
earlier, during the attack
in Lemera, which began on 6 October 1996 and which involved the Rwandan army.891
It
is sufficient here, in terms of the generic classification of crimes, to
conclude that from
mid-October 1996, the war crimes described above took place in the context of an
international armed conflict. During this period, the prohibited acts directed
against
civilian populations by all the warring groups could be classified as war crimes
even
though they were perpetrated far from the front line. The same applies to the
numerous
_______________
887 In an interview with the Washington Post on 9 July 1997, the
Rwandan President Paul Kagame
(Minister of Defence at the time) acknowledged that Rwandan troops had played a
key role in the AFDL
campaign. According to President Kagame, the battle plan consisted of three
elements: a dismantling the
refugee camps, b destroying the organisational straucture of the ex-FAR and
Interahamwe based in and
around the camps and c overthrowing the Mobutu regime. Rwanda had planned the
rebellion and had
participated in supplying weapons, munitions and training facilities for the
rebel Congolese forces.
Operations, particularly critical operations, were led, according to Kagame, by
mid-level Rwandan
commanders. Washington Post, “Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo”, 9 July 1997. See
also the interview
given by General James Kabarebe, the Rwandan officer who led the military
operations of the AFDL, to the
Observatoire de l’Afrique centrale: “Kigali, Rwanda. Plus jamais le Congo”,
Volume 6, number 10, 3 to 9
March 2003. See also the televised interviews with the President of Uganda, the
President of Rwanda and
General James Kaberere explaining in detail their respective roles in this first
war, in “L’Afrique en
morceaux”, a documentary directed by Jihan El Tahri, Peter Chappell and Hervé
Chabalier, 100 minutes,
produced by Canal Horizon, 2000.
888 General James Kaberebe is currently Chief of Staff of the Rwanda Defence
Forces.
889 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, South Kivu and Kisangani, 2008
and 2009; Report of the
Investigative Team of the Secretary-General (S/1998/581), apendix, para. 117.
890 See incident referred to in paragraph 155.
891 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February 2009; Evidence
gathered by the Investigative
Team of the Secretary-General in the DRC in 1997/1998; Report of the
Investigative Team of the Secretary-
General in the RDC in 1997/1998 (S/1998/581), p. 45; Report on the situation of
human rights in Zaire
(E/CN.4/1997/6), para. 198; Palermo Bukavu Committee, “Les morts de la rébellion”,
1997, p. 1; AI,
“Hidden from scrutiny: human rights abuses in eastern Zaire”, 1996, p. 5 and 6,
crimes committed by the FAZ as they withdrew to Kinshasa. Throughout the
withdrawal,
from the Uvira region to Kinshasa, the FAZ and ex-FAR/Interahamwe committed
multiple killings, rapes and looting, as described in this report, which could
be classified
as war crimes.
480. This period is characterised by the intervention on DRC territory of the
regular
armed forces of several States, fighting with or against the Congolese armed
forces, as
well as the involvement of numerous groups of militiamen. As the Special
Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights in the DRC observed: “The DRC is bedevilled by
various
armed conflicts. Some international, others internal and yet other internal
conflicts that
have been internationalised (see E/CN.4/2000/42, para. 20). Participants in
these conflicts
include at least eight national armies and 21 irregular armed groups.”892
In spite of the
signing of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement, in July 1999, by the DRC, Angola,
Namibia,
Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe and to which the RCD and MLC rebel groups
subsequently became party, providing for compliance with international
humanitarian
law by all parties and the definitive withdrawal of all foreign troops from the
national
territory of the DRC893, the fighting continued. On 16 June 2000, the Security
Council
asked all parties to put an end to the hostilities and demanded that Rwanda and
Uganda,
which had violated the sovereignty of the DRC, should withdraw their forces from
DRC
territory.894 It was not until 2002, following the signing of two new
agreements, the
Pretoria agreement with Rwanda and the Luanda agreement with Uganda, which
provided for the withdrawal of their respective troops from DRC territory, that
the
withdrawal of foreign troops from the country actually began.895
Thus, both the
participation of foreign armed forces on Congolese territory and the direct
support in
terms of equipment, weaponry and combatants provided to several rebel groups
throughout the period of the "second war" confirm that an international armed
conflict
was taking place in the DRC at the same time as internal conflicts between
different
groups of Congolese militiamen.
481. The numerous crimes committed by the RCD (and its various factions),
Mayi-
Mayi groups and the ex-FAR/Interahamwe against civilian populations, in
particular the
systematic murders, rapes and looting described in the preceding pages, could be
classified as war crimes. This period was also marked by large-scale massacres,
such as
_______________
892 Report of the Special Rapporteur (A/55/403), para. 15.
893 Art. III, para. 12 of the Ceasefire Agreement. The Agreement was signed in
Lusaka on 10 July 1999, by
Angola, Namibia, Uganda, the DRC, Rwanda and Zimbabwe. Il It was then signed by
Jean-Pierre Bemba,
from the MLC, on 1 August 1999, and by 50 founder members of the RCD on 31
August 1999. The
Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations and the Southern Africa
Development Community were
witnesses (see S/1999/815).
894 See Resolution 1304 (2000).
895 Art. 8, para. 3 of the Pretoria Peace Agreement of 31 July 2002 between the
DRC and Rwanda (see
S/2002/914), app.ix; art. 1 of the Luanda Peace Agreement of 6 Sept. 2002
between the DRC and Uganda.
those in Kasika896 and Makobola897, in South Kivu, as
well as by numerous other
massacres committed repeatedly in North and South Kivu, Maniema, Katanga and
Orientale Province. The same applies to the murders, rapes and looting carried
out by
Rwandan and Ugandan forces, in particularly during their advance from Kitona, in
the
Bas-Congo region, to Kinshasa in August 1998,898 and similar crimes
committed by the
Forces armées angolaises (FAA) all along the main Moanda-Boma-Matadi-Kisantu
road,899 in Bas-Congo. Stopping the turbines on the Inga dam, in the
same province,
which supplied electricity to a large part of the city of Kinshasa, by elements
of the
ANC/APR/UPDF, caused the deaths of numerous people.900 “Making
property essential
to the survival of the civilian population unusable” in this way could be
classified as a
war crime under the rules of international humanitarian law.901
482. The air bombardments of Kinshasa by the Zimbabwean defence forces (ZDF)
in
August 1998902 and of Businga and Gemena, in Équateur Province, by
the FAC in
December 1998903 were also carried out in violation of the rules of
international
humanitarian law and could be classified as war crimes, both in themselves and
taking
into account the disproportionate effect from the point of view of losses of
human life
amongst the civilian population compared with the military advantage expected.
Furthermore, the use on this occasion of highly imprecise home-made bombs, as in
Businga, would also appear to violate the rules of international humanitarian
law, which
prohibit “attacks which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be
directed
against a specific military target, or the effects of which cannot be limited”.904
483. During the confrontations between the Rwandan army and the Ugandan army
for
the control of the town of Kisangani, the use of heavy weapons in areas densely
populated by civilians caused the death of several hundred civilians and the
destruction of
a large amount of civilian property. The first confrontation, between 14 and 17
August
1999, is thought to have caused the deaths of at least 30 people in the civilian
population;
the second, in May 2000, is thought to have resulted in the deaths of at least
24 people;
the death toll of the third, in June 2000, varies between 244 and 760 depending
on the
source. These last two episodes have been categorically denounced by the
Security
Council, which has expressed its “outrage at renewed fighting… deploring the
loss of
_______________
896 See incidents referred to in paragraph 313.
897 Ibid.
898 See incidents referred to in paragraph 290.
899 See incidents referred to in paragraph 292.
900 See incidents referred to in paragraph 295.
901 See Rule 54 of customary international humanitarian law and sect. a iii),
para. 2 of article 8 of the Rome
Statute of the ICC: “Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body
or health”. See also the rules
on the principle of distinguishing civilian property from military property and
the principle of the
proportionality of the attack, Rules 7 to 10 and 14 (Customary international
humanitarian law, vol. I: Rules,
ICRC publication, 2006).
902 See incidents referred to in paragraph 294.
903 See incidents referred to in paragraph 341.
904 See Rule 12 of customary international humanitarian law.
civilian lives, the threat to the civilian population and the damage to
property inflicted by
the forces of Uganda and Rwanda on the Congolese population.”905 Some
of the acts
committed by the two belligerents could constitute violations of international
humanitarian law, in particular the obligation to respect the principle of
distinguishing
between civilians and combatants and between civilian property and military
targets, and
could thus be classified as war crimes. Whilst the UPDF forces made some effort
to limit
the loss of human lives, the International Court of Justice, in its decision on
DRC v.
Uganda, nonetheless considered that there was “credible evidence sufficient to
conclude
that the UPDF troops failed to distinguish between civilian and military targets
and to
protect the civilian population in fighting with other combatants”.906
This general
observation can also be applied to APR troops, according to the information
gathered by
the Mapping Team.907
2001-2003: Towards transition
484. The acts of violence that shook the province of Ituri, in particular the
ethnic
conflicts between the Lendu and Hema, clearly reached a sufficient level of
intensity to
be classified as armed conflict. The ICC908 and ICJ909
have confirmed the international
nature of the conflict. As a result, the crimes listed by the Mapping Team
committed in
_______________
905 See Resolution 1304 (2000) of 16 June 2000. See also the
third report of the Secretary-General on
MONUC (S/2000/566 and Corr.1), para. 79, which concludes that the Rwandan and
Ugandan armed forces
“should be held accountable for the loss of life and the property damage they
have inflicted on the civilian
population of Kisangani”.
906 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), ICJ. 19
December 2005, para. 211.
907 Ibid. Paragraph 208 of the ICJ decision cites a report of the
interinstitutional evaluation mission that
travelled to Kisangani under the terms of paragraph 14 of Security Council
Resolution 1304 (2000) (see
S/2000/1153), appendix, para. 15 and 16) and according to which, the fighting
between Ugandan and
Rwandan forces in Kisangani “reached the residential areas, which were bombarded
for six days… Over
760 civilians were killed and 1,700 wounded. Over 4,000 houses were damaged,
destroyed or rendered
uninhabitable. Sixty-nine schools and other public buildings were hit by shells.
The healthcare
infrastructure and the cathedral suffered significant damage and 65,000
inhabitants of the town were forced
to flee and take refuge in the neighbouring forests”.
908 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. Decision on the confirmation of
charges, 29 January 2007,
ICC-01/04-01/06: “sufficient evidence giving substantial reasons to believe that
as a result of the presence
of the Republic of Uganda as an occupying power, the armed conflict that took
place in Ituri can be
classified as an international conflict from July 2002 to 2 June 2003, the date
on which the Ugandan army
effectively withdrew.”
909 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda),, ICJ, 19
December 2005, para. 179
and 180. The Court, which did not see its competence limited by its jurisdiction
ratione temporis like the
ICC, deemed that it had “sufficient evidence that Uganda had established and was
exercising its authority
in Ituri (the new province created in June 1999) as an occupying power… It also
indicates that Uganda is
accountable for all the acts and omissions of its armed forces on the territory
of the DRC, which violate the
obligations incumbent upon it under the relevant
Ituri between June 1999 and 2 June 2003,910 directed against
Congolese civilian
populations, could be classified as war crimes committed in the context of an
international armed conflict.911 Similarly, the murder of two MONUC
military observers
in Mongbwalu, on 13 May 2003, by elements of the FNI could be classified as a
war
crime as an attack on personnel involved in a peacekeeping mission.912
As regards the
period after 2 June 2003, the date on which the Ugandan troops effectively
withdrew, the
continuing armed conflict met the criterion as to intensity and the level of
organisation of
the different armed groups involved.913
485. The period from the start of 2001 to the end of the time specified in
the Mapping
Team’s Terms of Reference was characterised by open conflict in the province of
Katanga between the FAC and Mayi-Mayi forces. The involvement of Rwanda in the
operations carried out by the RCD and the APR itself in the area, and that of
the ZDF
alongside the FAC, give the conflict its international character. After the
withdrawal of
Rwandan troops from the DRC, following the Peace Agreement signed in Pretoria on
30
July 2002, the intensity of the conflict remained high and the level of
organisation of the
groups involved in the region was such, that it is possible to confirm that it
was an
internal armed conflict. In fact, some of the most serious incidents that took
place during
this period, in particular the bombardments that the FAC carried out
indiscriminately in
Ankoro, in November 2002, which cost the lives of over 100 civilians and caused
the
destruction, most frequently by fire, of over 4,000 houses, including schools
and
_______________
910 Some doubt therefore remains as to the nature of the crimes
committed between 2 June 2003 (the date of
the effective withdrawal of the Ugandan army) and 30 June 2003 (the time limit
set out in the Mapping
Exercise Terms of Reference). It is fairly clear that the armed conflict
continued (and even intensified in
some areas, because of the power vacuum left by the occupying power), but its
international nature is more
uncertain.
911 Some of these crimes were committed against civilians on the basis of their
membership of an ethnic
group, which has given reason to believe that such crimes took place in the
context of genocide. Although
the Mapping Team does not exclude this possibility, it reserves judgement on
this question, not having been
able to gather sufficient information on the existence, or not, of a specific
intention to destroy a group on
the part of one or more of the actors involved in the conflict. The crime of
genocide is discussed in further
detail below.
912 See sect. b iii) and sect. e iii), para. 2 of article 8 of the Rome Statute
of the ICC, in respect of
international and internal conflict respectively. These killings were censured
by a military tribunal in Bunia
on 19 February 2007, which classified them as war crimes committed during an
internal armed conflict
according to the Congolese Military Criminal Code and article 8 of the Rome
Statute. See below: case of
MONUC military observers (Milobs), sect. III, chap. II.
913 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. Decision on the confirmation of
charges, 29 January 2007,
ICC-01/04-01/06, para. 227 to 237.
hospitals, could be classified as serious violations of international
humanitarian law and
war crimes.914
486. As a result, some intentional killings, rapes, destruction and looting
of property,
as well as other crimes committed by the FAC and Mayi-Mayi between January 2001
and
June 2003 could be classified as war crimes, whether it was deemed to be an
international
or internal conflict.
487. The definition of crimes against humanity has become much more specific
since it
was first formulated in international law in the Statute of the Nuremberg
Tribunal. Its
recent codification in Article 7, Paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute of the ICC
lists 11 acts
which, when they are committed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”, constitute
crimes against
humanity. It emerges from this definition that three main elements must coexist
for
classification as a crime against humanity, in addition to the element of
knowledge of the
attack, which serves to establish individual criminal liability:
a) A listed act (such as murder, rape or serious injury to body or physical
health);
b) Committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack;
c) Directed against any civilian population.
488. The 11 acts listed in the definition of crimes against humanity
essentially reflect
the most serious violations of human rights, in particular violations of the
right to life,
serious injury to personal physical and moral integrity and personal security.
The
inventory of serious violations set out in the preceding chapters revealed the
commission
of multiple acts listed in the definition of crimes against humanity, including:
· Murder;
· Extermination;
· Enslavement;
· Deportation or forcible transfer of the population;
· Torture;
_______________
914Under international humanitarian law, it is prohibited to
launch an attack which may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated,
Rule 14 of customary international humanitarian law. See also Rule 13 of
customary international
humanitarian law which prohibits: “Attacks by bombardment, by any methods or
means, which treats as a
single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military
objectives located in a city,
town, village or other area, containing a similar concentration of civilians or
civilian objects…”. See also,
in particular, sect. b iv) and b v) and sect. e i) and e iv), para. 2 of article
8 of the Rome Statute.
· Rape, sexual slavery or any other form of sexual violence of comparable
gravity;
· Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or gender grounds;
· Enforced disappearance of persons;
· Any other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
2. Widespread or systematic attack
489. For the acts listed previously to be classified as crimes against
humanity, they
must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack. An attack,
according to
the Rome Statute, consists of multiple acts of violence such as those listed in
the
definition. It does not necessarily have to consist of a military attack or
armed conflict.915
Nonetheless, a single act can constitute a crime against humanity if it is part
of a larger
attack. The widespread nature of the attack is based on its scale, the number of
people
targeted or “the cumulative effect of a series of inhumane acts or [through] the
specific
effect of a single, large-scale act”.916 Its systematic nature is
inferred from the “organised
character of the acts committed and [from] the improbability of their being
random in
nature”.917 The serious violations described in the preceding
chapters point to the
existence of multiple attacks launched by the various groups involved in the
conflicts
being widespread or systematic in nature.
3. Directed against any civilian population
490. The notion of crime against humanity is intended to protect civilian
populations,
hence the requirement that the widespread or systematic attack be directed
against them.
A civilian population is defined not only as people who are not in uniform and
have no
link to the public authorities, but all people who are “out of combat” and thus
are not, or
are no longer, taking part in the conflict.918 The expression
“civilian population” needs to
be understood in its broad sense and refers to a population that is primarily
made up of
civilians. A population may be classified as “civilian” even if it includes
non-civilians,
provided that civilians are in the majority.919 As a result, refugees
in camps constitute a
civilian population even if armed elements are also present. Again, it can be
stated that
the vast majority of victims in the cases listed were part of civilian
populations.
_______________
915 See Rome statute, Elements of Crimes, under article 7.
916 See Kordić and Cerkezs, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, no. IT-95-14/2-A, 17 December
2004, para. 94.
917 Ibid.
918 See Mrkšić and Šljivančanin , ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 5 May 2009, para. 32
and 33.
919 See Fatmir Limaj, ICTY, Trial chamber, no. IT-03-66-T, 30 November 2005,
para. 186.
491. The multiple incidents described in the preceding chapters show that the
vast
majority of the acts of violence perpetrated during these years were part of
waves of
retaliation and campaigns of persecution and hunting down refugees, which in
general
terms translated into a series of widespread and systematic attacks against
civilian
populations. A very large number of the crimes listed above were committed as
part of a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population and can therefore
be
classified as crime against humanity. Mention should be made at this point, by
way of
illustration only, of the crimes against humanity that formed part of a campaign
of
persecution directed against certain groups, primarily for political or ethnic
reasons. The
crime of persecution encompasses a large number of acts, including, amongst
others,
those of a physical, economic or judicial nature depriving an individual of the
exercise of
their fundamental rights.920 To be classified as a crime of
persecution, said act must be 1)
a manifest or flagrant denial, 2) for reasons of discrimination, 3) of a
fundamental right
protected by international customary or treaty law, 4) of the same degree of
seriousness
as the other acts listed in the definition of crimes against humanity.921
Directed against the Kasaians
492. The multiple acts of violence perpetrated against the Kasaians from
March 1993
onwards offer a typical example of crimes against humanity committed outside of
an
armed conflict.922 Several acts listed in the definition of crimes
against humanity were
perpetrated against the Kasaians, including murder, deportation or forcible
transfer of the
population and other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing
great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. They also
display the
essential elements of persecution as a crime against humanity: the Kasaians were
an
identifiable group whose members were persecuted for reasons of political and
ethnic
order, the victims of a virulent anti-Kasaian campaign started by the most
senior political
officials in the province at the time.
493. The attacks on the Kasaian civilian population were quite clearly
widespread and
systematic. Between 1992 and 1995, the violence spread throughout the province,
affecting thousands of victims, and was thus widespread in nature. The attacks
were also
systematic. They were orchestrated in a calculated manner by the military and
political
authorities. The extent of the violence, the organisation of trains for the
deportations of
the Kasaians, the anti-Kasaian campaign in Lubumbashi, during which some were
hunted
down in a context of “professional purification”, and the multitude of
individual attacks
tolerated or organised by the authorities are all factors showing the “organised
character
_______________
920 Tadić, ICTY, Trial chamber, Jugement, 7 May 1997, par. 697 to
710.
921 Kupreskić, ICTY, Trial chamber II, 14 January 2000, para. 621.
922 As has been seen, the Kasaians did not constitute an armed group capable of
carrying out military
operations but were a rather a civilian population subjected to a campaign of
persecution and violence.
of the acts committed and the improbability of their being random in nature.”923
Finally,
the perpetrators, the majority of whom were members of a militia derived from
the youth
wing of a political movement, namely the Union des fédéralistes et républicains
indépendants (UFERI), the JUFERI, were well aware that the acts committed were
part
of a wider context of an anti-Kasaian campaign launched by their political
leaders, which
was to be rapidly transformed into a widespread and systematic attack against
the
Kasaian population.
494. The Investigative Team of the Secretary-General in the DRC in 1997/1998
concluded that the systematic massacre of Hutu refugees by AFDL/APR forces was a
crime against humanity, but reserved judgement on the question of the intention
behind
this series of massacres.924 The information gathered to date makes
it possible to confirm
quite clearly that these were indeed crimes against humanity: the very high
number of
serious crimes listed, committed by the AFDL/APR against Hutu refugees,
indicates the
widespread nature of these attacks. The systematic, planned and widespread
nature of
these attacks is also demonstrated by the hunting-down of refugees that took
place from
east to west throughout the whole of the DRC, and the fact that these attacks
were carried
out against primarily civilian populations in spite of the presence of elements
of the ex-
FAR/Interahamwe being confirmed in several places.
495. The ethnic conflicts in North Kivu gave way during the first war to
numerous
attacks by the AFDL/APR against the Hutu populations established in the region
for
many years. The widespread and systematic nature of these attacks against Hutu
civilian
populations emerges clearly from the incidents described in the preceding pages,
which
could therefore be classified as crimes against humanity.
496. These crimes will be re-examined in the analysis of the specific
question of the
existence or not of an intention to partially destroy the group of Hutu
refugees, which is
the essential element in the crime of genocide as defined in international law.
497. As victims for many years of campaigns of discrimination and forcible
expulsion
in South Kivu and repeated attacks by elements of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe in
North
Kivu, the Tutsis were particularly targeted from the start of the first war
onwards,
accused of collaborating with “Banyamulenge/Tutsi armed elements” and later with
the
AFDL/APR/FAB. The authorities, at both a national and local level, called on the
_______________
923 See Kordić and Cerkezs, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, no.
IT-95-14/2-A, 17 December 2004, para. 94.
924 Having been seriously hampered in its work by the Zairian authorities, the
Team was not able to gather
sufficient information to reach a conclusion on this question, but it did not
exclude the possibility that the
massacres could be classified as genocide in law. See the Report of the
Investigative Team of the Secretary-
General (S/1998/581), appendix, para. 96.
population to hunt them down and asked the army to expel them by force. In
this climate,
the Tutsi population – an identifiable group according to the definition of
persecution in
the context of crimes against humanity – was the victim of murders, tortures,
rapes and
arbitrary detention, in particular in South Kivu and Kinshasa. Subsequently,
following the
breakdown of the relationship between President Kabila and his former Rwandan
allies
and the start of the second war, a new campaign against the Tutsis was launched
by
senior government officials, including the President himself, in Kinshasa and
the other
provinces under government control. The head of President Kabila’s cabinet even
called
for the extermination of the “Tutsi vermin”.925 The numerous acts of anti-Tutsi
violence
identified during these two periods, first from September 1996 and subsequently
from
August 1998, combined elements that would enable them to be classified as acts
of
persecution in the context of the definition of crimes against humanity.
498. The widespread and systematic nature of the attacks on the Tutsis is
demonstrated
by the high number of victims and crimes committed in several regions in the
country,
the type of violations committed by the security forces or in which they were
complicit,
the role played by the political authorities, in particular public incitement to
hatred and
even the commission of crimes against the Tutsis, and the fact that no effort
was made by
the authorities to prevent, arrest or punish the multiple violations of rights
committed
against the Tutsi population. Again, it can be inferred that the perpetrators
were clearly
aware that their acts were part of a wider an anti-Tutsi campaign, which was
translated on
the ground into widespread attacks authorised by the most senior political
leaders in the
country at the time.
499. Since it was initially formulated in 1948, in article 2 of the
Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the definition of the crime
has
remained substantially the same. It can be found in article 6 of the Rome
Statute of the
ICC, which defines the crime of genocide as “any of the following acts committed
with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as
such”. The definition is followed by a series of acts representing serious
violations of the
right to life and the physical or mental integrity of the members of the group.
The
Convention also provides that not only the acts themselves are punishable, but
also
conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide,
the
attempt to commit genocide and complicity in genocide.926 It is the specific
intention to
destroy an identified group, either in whole or in part, that distinguishes the
crime of
genocide from a crime against humanity.
500. Essentially, the crime of genocide requires evidence of three distinct
elements:
_______________
925 International arrest warrant issued by Examining Magistrate
Vandermeersch re. Mr Abdulaye Yerodia
Ndombasi, of 11 April 2000.
926 Article 3 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.
a) The commission of a listed act (such as murder or serious injury to body
or
physical health);
b) Directed against a national, ethnic, racial or religious group;
c) With the specific intention to destroy the protected group, as such, either
in
whole or in part.
501. Of the five listed acts included in the definition of the crime of
genocide, the
following three have been used based on the inventory of incidents in the
preceding
chapters:
· Murder of members of the group;
· Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
· Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
2. Directed against a national, ethnic, racial or religious group
502. The victims must belong to a national, ethnic, racial or religious
group.
“National groups” refer to people who have a distinct identity in terms of
nationality or
national origin. “Ethnic groups” would include people sharing the same language
and
with common traditions or a common cultural heritage.927 The actual
definition of groups
used by the courts, however, is one that takes more account of the sense of
belonging to a
specific group than to its actual existence, applying the subjective criterion
of the
perception of other people and an individual's own perception as regards
membership of
the group.928
3. With the specific intention to destroy the protected group, as such, either
in
whole or in part
503. The specific intention to destroy the protected group, as such, either
in whole
or in part, is the key element in the crime of genocide, which is often
described as a
crime of intent, requiring a specific aggravated criminal intent (dolus
specialis).929 This
second element can be split into three distinct parts: firstly, the intention to
destroy, then
in whole or in part, and finally, the group as such.
_______________
927 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
(see S/2005/60), para. 494.
928 Ibid., para. 498 to 501; see Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Trial chamber, 1 and 2
September 1998, para. 170 to
172; Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, Trial chamber, 2 and 21 May 1999,
para. 98; Musema,
ICTR-96-13-T, Trial chamber, 21 January 2000, para. 161; Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3-T,
Trial chamber, 6
December 1999, para. 56; and Jelisić, ICTY, Trial chamber, no. IT-95-10-T, 14
December 1999, para. 70
and 71; Krstić ICTY, Trial chamber, no. IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001, para. 556,
557, 559 and 560.
929 See in general the case on the application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), ICJ, 26
February 2007, para. 186 to 201, (hereafter ICJ,
decision on genocide).
504. The intention to destroy assumes that the perpetrator knowingly wanted
the
prohibited acts to cause the destruction, in whole or in part, of the group as
such and
knew that their acts would destroy the group as such either in whole or in part.930
It
implies that the perpetrator of the crime must have acted with the specific
intention of
destroying the protected group, either in whole or in part. Intention is not
synonymous
with motivation. The personal motive of the perpetrator of genocide, for
example, may be
the prospect of personal economic benefit, political advantages or a particular
form of
power. The existence of a personal motive does not mean that the perpetrator may
not
also have the specific intention of committing genocide.931
505. The intention to destroy a named group, even in part, is sufficient to
constitute a
crime of genocide provided that it is the group or “a distinct fraction of the
group” that is
targeted and not “a multitude of isolated individuals belonging to the group”.932
Furthermore, the section of the group targeted must be substantial and thus
reflect “both
the mass nature of the genocide and the concern expressed in the Convention as
to the
impact that the destruction of the section of the group targeted would have on
the survival
of the group as a whole.”933 Its substantial nature is established on
the basis “not only of
the numerical size of the fraction of the group targeted but also its position
within the
group as a whole.”934
506. Finally, the intention must be to destroy the group as such, either in
whole or in
part. As a result, victims “must be targeted as a result of their membership of
a group”;935
it is therefore the group itself that is targeted, through the victim.
507. Proof of the intention to destroy a group as such, either in whole or in
part, the
key element in genocide, is without doubt the element that causes most
difficulties.
Whilst, in general, in criminal law, intention is rarely subjected to direct
proof, but
instead relies on inferences drawn from the facts and circumstances of the
crime, proof of
a specific intention, a “dolus specialis” is even more stringent insofar as it
must establish
the existence of the specific aim the perpetrator had in mind in committing the
crime.
Clearly, in the case of genocide, which is seen as the “crime of crimes”, any
inference as
_______________
930 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
(see S/2005/60), para. 491.
931 Jelisić decision, ICTY, Appeals chamber, no. IT-95-10-A, 5 July 2001, para.
49; ICJ, decision on
genocide, para. 189: “It is also necessary to distinguish the specific intention
from the other reasons or
motives the perpetrator may have.”
932 Brdanin decision, ICTY, Trial chamber, no. IT-99-36-T, 1 September 2004,
para. 700.
933 Krstić arrest, ICTY, Appeals chamber, no. IT-98-33-A, 19 April 2004, para.
8; see also Krstić, ICTY,
Trial chamber, no. IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001, para. 590: The physical
destruction may only be targeted at a
geographically limited areas of a wider group, because the perpetrators of the
genocide considered that the
destruction envisaged was sufficient to annihilate the group as a distinct
entity in the geographical area in
question”; confirmed by the Appeals chamber, decision of 19 April 2004, para. 6
to 23; ICJ, decision on
genocide, para. 198 to 2001.
934 Ibid. para. 9. See in general ICJ, decision on justice, para. 198 to 201.
935 Krstić, ICTY, Trial chamber, no. IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001, para. 561
to an intention to destroy a group in whole or in part must be made very
prudently.936 As
the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has stated: “Genocide is one of the most
abhorrent of
all crimes, and the corollary of its gravity is the strict requirement to show a
specific
intention. A defendant can only be declared guilty of genocide if such an
intention is
clearly established.”937 In the same way, a similar inference or
deducing of the existence
of such an intention on the part of the defendant “must be the only reasonable
possibility
in light of the evidence gathered.”938
508. Amongst the factors, facts and circumstances used by the international
courts to
infer or deduce a genocidal intention are: the general context, the perpetration
of other
reprehensible acts systematically directed against the same group,939
the scale and
number of atrocities committed,940 the fact of targeting certain
victims systematically
because of their membership of a particular group, the fact that the victims had
been
massacred with no regard for their age or gender,941 the consistent
and methodical
manner in which acts were committed,942 the existence of a genocidal plan or
policy and
the recurrence of destructive and discriminatory acts.943
509. There has been extensive debate on the question of genocide directed at
the
Hutus, and to date it remains unresolved. It can only be decided by a court
decision based
on proof beyond all reasonable doubt. The Mapping Exercise is not a judicial
mechanism
and the evidence gathered is not sufficient to satisfy the high standard
required by the
courts. Nonetheless, as described previously, the Terms of Reference of the
Mapping
Exercise required it to carry out a general legal classification of the crimes
committed,
including genocide.
510. Two separate United Nations reports have examined the existence, or not,
of
crimes of genocide committed in respect of the Hutus in the DRC, whether
refugees or
others. In July 1997, a joint mission authorised by the Commission on Human
Rights,944
charged with investigating the allegations of massacres and other violations of
human
rights taking place in eastern Zaire since September 1996 reported to the
General
Assembly that:
_______________
936 ”The greatest possible care needs to be taken, based on the
facts, to conclude that there is sufficiently
clear evidence of this intention.” ICJ, decision on genocide, para. 189.
937 Krstić decision, ICTY, Appeals chamber, no. IT-98-33-A, 19 April 2004, p.
134.
938 Ibid, para. 41.
939 Jelisić decision, ICTY, Appeals chamber, no. IT-95-10-A, 5 July 2001, para.
47.
940 See Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Trial chamber, 1 and 2 September 1998, para. 730.
941 Kayishema and Ruzindanda, ICTR-95-1-T, Trial chamber, 2 and 21 May 1999,
para. 531 to 533.
942 Ibid.
943 Jelisić decision, ICTY, Appeals chamber, no. IT-95-10-A, 5 July 2001, para.
47 and 48.
944 Report of the joint mission charged with investigating the allegations of
massacres and other human
rights violations taking place in eastern Zaire (now the DRC) since September
1996 (A/51/942), para 1.
“There is no denying that ethnic massacres were committed and that the
victims were mostly Hutus from Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire. The joint
mission's preliminary opinion is that some of these alleged massacres could
constitute acts of genocide. However, the joint mission cannot issue a
precise, definitive opinion on the basis of the information currently available
to it. An in-depth investigation in the territory of the DRC would clarify this
situation.”945
511. Subsequently, the Secretary-General sent an investigative team, charged
with
“investigating grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law
allegedly committed in the DRC (former Zaire) since 1 March 1993”.946
Although limited
in its mandate, the Team concluded in its report that:
“the systematic massacre of the Hutus remaining in Zaire was an abhorrent
crime against humanity but the underlying rationale for the decisions is
material to whether these killings constituted genocide, that is, a decision to
eliminate, in part, the Hutu ethnic group. The underlying reason for the
massacres of Zairian Hutus in North Kivu is also material. This aspect is the
most momentous one included in the mandate given to the Team, and one
which requires further investigation.”947
512. The systematic attacks, in particular killings and massacres perpetrated
against
members of the Hutu ethnic group, are described extensively in section I of the
report.
These attacks resulted in a very large number of victims, probably tens of
thousands of
members of the Hutu ethnic group, all nationalities combined. In the vast
majority of
cases reported, it was not a question of people killed unintentionally in the
course of
combat, but people targeted primarily by AFDL/APR/FAB forces and executed in
their
hundreds, often with edged weapons. The majority of the victims were children,
women,
elderly people and the sick, who posed no threat to the attacking forces.
Numerous
serious attacks on the physical or pyschological integrity of members of the
group were
also committed, with a very high number of Hutus shot, raped, burnt or beaten.
Very
large numbers of victims were forced to flee and travel long distances to escape
their
pursuers, who were trying to kill them. The hunt lasted for months, resulting in
the deaths
of an unknown number of people subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading living
conditions, without access to food or medication. On several occasions, the
humanitarian
aid intended for them was deliberately blocked, in particular in Orientale
Province,
depriving them of assistance essential to their survival.948
_______________
945 Ibid, para. 80.
946 Report of the Investigative Team of the Secretary-General (S/1998/581),
appendix, para. 4.
947 Ibid., para. 96.
948 The Investigative Team of the Secretary-General concluded that blocking
humanitarian aid was
systematic in nature and constituted a crime against humanity; see Report of the
Investigative Team of the
Secretary-General (S/1998/581), appendix, para. 95.
513. At the time of the incidents covered by this report, the Hutu population
in Zaire,
including refugees from Rwanda, constituted an ethnic group as defined in the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Moreover,
as
shown previously, the intention to destroy a group in part is sufficient to be
classified as
a crime of genocide. Finally, the courts have also confirmed that the
destruction of a
group can be limited to a particular geographical area.949 It is
therefore possible to assert
that, even if only a part of the Hutu population in Zaire was targeted and
destroyed, it
could nonetheless constitute a crime of genocide, if this was the intention of
the
perpetrators. Finally, several incidents listed also seem to confirm that the
numerous
attacks were targeted at members of the Hutu ethnic group as such. Although, at
certain
times, the aggressors said they were looking for the criminals responsible for
the
genocide committed against the Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994, the majority of the
incidents
reported indicate that the Hutus were targeted as such, with no discrimination
between
them. The numerous attacks against the Hutus in Zaire, who were not part of the
refugees, seem to confirm that it was all Hutus, as such, who were targeted. The
crimes
committed in particular in Rutshuru (30 October 1996) and Mugogo (18 November
1996),950 in North Kivu, highlight the specific targeting of the
Hutus, since people who
were able to persuade the aggressors that they belonged to another ethnic group
were
released just before the massacres. The systematic use of barriers by the
AFDL/APR/FAB, particularly in South Kivu, enabled them to identify people of
Hutu
origin by their name or village of origin and thus to eliminate them. Hundreds
of people
of Hutu origin are thus thought to have been arrested at a barrier erected in
November
1996 in Ngwenda, in the Rutshuru territory, and subsequently executed by being
beaten
with sticks in a place called Kabaraza. In South Kivu, AFDL/APR/FAB soldiers
erected
numerous barriers on the Ruzizi plain to stop Rwandan and Burundian refugees who
had
been dispersed after their camps had been dismantled.
514. Several incidents listed in this report point to circumstances and facts
from which
a court could infer the intention to destroy the Hutu ethnic group in the DRC in
part, if
these were established beyond all reasonable doubt. Firstly, the scale of the
crimes and
_______________
949 Brdjanin, ICTY, Trial chamber, 1 September 2004, para. 703;
Krstić, ICTY, Trial chamber, 2 August
2001, para. 590 and Krstić, Appeals chamber, 19 April 2004, para. 13; Jelisić,
ICTY, Trial chamber, 14
December 1999, para. 8, which accepts that a geographical area can be limited
“to a region... or
municipality”.
950 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February and March 2009;
Interviews with the
Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and February and April 2009; Interviews
with the MONUC
Human Rights Division, North Kivu, October 2005; CREDDHO, “Appel urgent sur la
découverte des
fosses communes en territoire de Rutshuru”, October 2005; APREDECI, Mission of
inquiry on the situation
of human rights in the province of North Kivu, p. 11 and 12; Interviews with the
Mapping Team, January,
March and April 2009; Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November
2008 and February
2009; Situation report on human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2),7; Didier
Kamundu Batundi,
“Mémoire des crimes impunis, la tragêdie du Nord-Kivu”, 2006, p. 76; Luc de
l’Arbre, “Ils étaient tous
fidèles, martyrs et témoins de l’amour en République démocratique du Congo”,
November 2005, p. 177;
Interviews with the Mapping Team, December 2008 and February/April 2009;
Evidence gathered by the
Investigative Team of the Secretary-General in the DRC in 1997/1998; APREDECI,
Mission of inquiry on
the situation of human rights in the province of North Kivu, p. 13; CEREBA,
Mission report in the Ushuru
region, October 2005, p. 19; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des crimes impunis,
la tragédie du Nord-
Kivu, 2006, p. 101 and 102.77
the large number of victims are illustrated by the numerous incidents
described above.
The extensive use of edged weapons (primarily hammers) and the systematic
massacre of
survivors, including women and children, after the camps had been taken show
that the
numerous deaths cannot be attributed to the hazards of war or seen as equating
to
collateral damage.951 The systematic nature of the attacks listed
against the Hutus also
emerges: these attacks took place in each location where refugees had been
identified by
the AFDL/APR, over a vast area of the country. Particularly in North Kivu and
South
Kivu but also in other provinces, the massacres often began with a trick by
elements of
the AFDL/APR, who summoned the victims to meetings on the pretext either of
discussing their repatriation to Rwanda in the case of the refugees, or of
introducing them
to the new authorities in the case of Hutus settled in the region, or of
distributing food.
Afterwards, those present were systematically killed. Cases of this kind were
confirmed
in the province of North Kivu in Musekera, Rutshuru and Kiringa (October 1996),
Mugogo and Kabaraza (November 1996), Hombo, Katoyi, Kausa, Kifuruka, Kinigi,
Musenge, Mutiko and Nyakariba (December 1996), Kibumba and Kabizo (April
1997) and Mushangwe (around August 1997); in the province of South Kivu in
Rushima
and Luberizi (October 1996), Cotonco and Chimanga (November 1996) and Mpwe
(February 1997) and on the Shabunda-Kigulube road (February-April 1997); in
Orientale
Province in Kisangani and Bengamisa (May and June 1997); in Maniema in Kalima
(March 1997) and in Équateur in Boende (April 1997). Such acts certainly suggest
premeditation and a precise methodology. In the region south of the town of
Walikale, in
North Kivu (January 1997), Rwandan Hutus were subjected to daily killings in
areas
already under the control of the AFDL/APR as part of a campaign that seemed to
target
any Hutus living in the area in question.
515. Several of the massacres listed were committed regardless of the age or
gender of
the victims. This is particularly true of the crimes committed in Kibumba
(October 1996),
Mugunga and Osso (November 1996), Hombo and Biriko (December 1996) in the
province of North Kivu, Kashusha and Shanje (November 1996) in the province of
South
Kivu, Tingi-Tingi and Lubutu (March 1997) in Maniema Province, and Boende (April
1997) in Équateur Province, where the vast majority of victims were women and
children. Furthermore, no effort was made to make a distinction between Hutus
who were
members of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and Hutu civilians, whether or not they were
refugees. This tendency to put all Hutus together and “tar them with the same
brush” is
also illustrated by the declarations made during the “awareness-raising
speeches” made
by the AFDL/APR in certain places, according to which any Hutu still present in
Zaire
must necessarily be a perpetrator of genocide, since the “real” refugees had
already
returned to Rwanda. These “awareness-raising speeches” made in North Kivu also
incited
the population to look for, kill or help to kill Rwandan Hutu refugees, whom
they called
“pigs”. This type of language would have been in widespread use during the
operations in
this region.952
_______________
951 See incidents referred to in paragraph 233 et seq.
952 Information provided during a confidential interview with the Mapping Team
in North Kivu.
516. The massacres in Mbandaka and Wendji, committed on 13 May 1997953
in
Équateur Province, over 2,000 kilometres west of Rwanda, were the final stage in
the
hunt for Hutu refugees that had begun in eastern Zaire, in North and South Kivu,
in
October 1996. Among the refugees were elements of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, who
were disarmed by the local police force as soon as they arrived. In spite of
everything, the
AFDL/APR opened fire on hundreds of defenceless Hutu refugees, resulting in
large
numbers of victims.
517. The systematic and widespread attacks described in this report, which
targeted
very large numbers of Rwandan Hutu refugees and members of the Hutu civilian
population, resulting in their death, reveal a number of damning elements that,
if they
were proven before a competent court, could be classified as crimes of genocide.
The
behaviour of certain elements of the AFDL/APR in respect of the Hutu refugees
and Hutu
populations settled in Zaire at this time seems to equate to “a manifest pattern
of similar
conduct directed against that group”, from which a court could even deduce the
existence
of a genocidal plan.954 “Whilst the existence of such a plan may
contribute to establishing
the required genocidal intention, it is nonetheless only an element of proof
used to deduce
such an intention and not a legal element of genocide.”955 It should
be noted that certain
elements could cause a court to hesitate to decide on the existence of a
genocidal plan,
such as the fact that as of 15 November 1996, several tens of thousands of
Rwandan Hutu
refugees, many of whom had survived previous attacks, were repatriated to Rwanda
with
the help of the AFDL/APR authorities and that hundreds of thousands of Rwandan
Hutu
refugees were able to return to Rwanda with the consent of the Rwandan
authorities prior
to the start of the first war. Whilst, in general, the killings did not spare
women and
children, it should be noted that in some places, at the beginning of the first
war, Hutu
women and children were in fact separated from the men, and only the men were
subsequently killed.956
518. Nonetheless, neither the fact that only men were targeted during the
massacres,957
nor the fact that part of the group were allowed to leave the country or that
there
_______________
953 See incidents referred to in paragraph 222 et seq.
954 See Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court adopted by the
Conference of State Parties
at its first session, held in New York from 3 to 10 September 2002, Official
documents, ICC-ASP/1/3,
sect. a, para. 4 of article 6. Genocide by killing: The conduct is part of a
manifest pattern of similar conduct
directed against that group, or could produce such destruction in itself. On the
subject of the contextual
elements of the crime of genocide required by the Elements of Crime of the Rome
Statute of the ICC: The
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, “Decision on the Prosecution's
Application for a Warrant of
Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir”, 4 March 2009, ICC-02/05-01/09, para.
117 to 133.
955Krstić decision, ICTY, Appeals chamber, no. IT-98-33-A, 19 April 2004, para.
225; Jelisić decision,
ICTY, Appeals chamber, 5 July 2001, para. 48; Akayesu ICTR-96-4-T, Trials
chamber, 1 and 2 September
1998, para. 520 and 523. See also Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, ICC-02/05-01/09, para.
119: “The Majority
highlights that the case law of the ICTY and the ICTR has interpreted this
definition as excluding any type
of contextual element, such as a genocidal policy or plan”.
956 This was documented in Mugunga (November 1996), in the province of North
Kivu, and in Kisangani
(March 1997), in Orientale Province.
957 Krstić, ICTY, Appeals chamber, no. IT-98-33-A, 19 April 2004, para. 35, 37
and 38.
movement was facilitated for various reasons, are sufficient in themselves to
entirely
remove the intention of certain people to partially destroy an ethnic group as
such. In this
respect it seems possible to infer a specific intention on the part of certain
AFDL/APR
commanders to partially destroy the Hutus in the DRC, and therefore to commit a
crime
of genocide, based on their conduct, words958 and the damning
circumstances of the acts
of violence committed by the men under their command.959 It will be
for a court with
proper jurisdiction to rule on this question.
D. Serious human rights violations
519. As has been shown, almost all the crimes listed by the Mapping Team can
be
classified as “crimes under international law”, being war crimes, crimes against
humanity
and possibly crimes of genocide. Certain other crimes were not committed in the
context
of an armed conflict or were not of such a widespread or systematic nature that
they
could be classified as crimes against humanity. Some of these, however, can be
classified
as serious violations of human rights, committed by the government authorities
and their
agents. This is the case, for example, with the numerous serious violations of
human
rights on the part of the Zairian security forces until 1997 and subsequently by
the DRC
security forces until 2003.
520. Unfortunately, it was not possible for the Mapping Team to carry out
detailed
investigations to check the multitude of individual cases; certain cases are
therefore
documented in this report for illustrative purposes only. Nonetheless, it
remains the case
that there were hundreds or even thousands of individual incidents of serious
violations
perpetrated by the security forces, often with the consent of other State
authorities, or
even driven by them. These were serious violations of the rights recognised by
the
international human rights mechanisms ratified by Zaire/the DRC.
_______________
958 Particularly during various “awareness-raising speeches”.
959 It is important to emphasise that it is sufficient that the objective acts
of genocide should be perpetrated
with the assent of the authorities (and not necessarily by the authorities
themselves) with a destructive
intention: Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd edition, 2008, p. 144.
SECTION II. INVENTORY OF SPECIFIC ACTS OF VIOLENCE COMMITTED
DURING THE CONFLICTS IN THE DRC
521. The aim of this section of the report is to produce an inventory of the
specific acts
of violence that were committed during the conflicts in the DRC, namely acts of
violence
committed against women (Chap. I), acts of violence committed against children
(Chap.
II) and acts of violence related to the illegal exploitation of natural
resources (Chap. III).
Given that the methodology used in Section I of the report would not enable full
justice to
be done to the numerous victims of these specific acts of violence, and would
not
appropriately reflect the scale of the violence practised by all armed groups
involved in
the different conflicts in the DRC, it was decided from the outset to devote an
entire
section of the report to these issues and to spend time seeking out information
and
documents that would support the multiple aspects of these acts of violence
rather than
confirming individual acts perpetrated against countless victims. This approach
has
highlighted the widespread and systematic nature of these violations and enabled
a brief
analysis to be produced.
522. It is important to stress that women and children were the main victims
of the
most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law
committed
primarily against the civilian population of the DRC between 1993 and 2003 and
listed in
Section I of this report. Women and children were therefore the main victims of
violations of the right to life, to physical integrity and to safety. They were
also
particularly affected by forced deportations, slavery, looting and the
destruction of goods
and property. This over-exposure can be explained by their specific
vulnerability and also
by their demographic weight within the DRC’s population.960
523. Finally, it would have been unthinkable to produce an inventory of the
most
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed
within
the DRC between March 1993 and June 2003 without considering, however briefly,
the
role played by natural resource exploitation in the perpetration of these
crimes. In a
significant number of cases, the struggle between different armed groups for
access to,
and control over, the DRC’s resources served as a backdrop to the violations
perpetrated
against the civilian population.
524. The first two chapters will therefore analyse the fate of women and
children in the
DRC between 1993 and 2003 and focus particularly on the specific acts of
violence to
which they were subjected. The third chapter will be devoted to the link between
the
perpetration of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law
and natural
resource exploitation in the DRC.
_______________
960 According to the National Institute of Statistics (INS) of
the DRC’s Ministry of Planning (figures from
December 2006), young people under the age of 18 account for 48.5% and women 51%
of the population.
CHAPTER I. ACTS OF VIOLENCE COMMITTED AGAINST WOMEN AND
SEXUAL VIOLENCE
525. The acts of violence listed in the previous section clearly show that
women and
girls paid a particularly heavy price over the course of the decade. The
widespread
violence that took hold in Zaire, later the DRC, between 1993 and 2003 had
particularly
serious consequences for women because of their socio-economic and cultural
vulnerability. It was also reflected in specific forms of violence, such as
sexual violence,
the main victims of which were women961 and it is widely accepted that Congolese
women and girls have been the target of widespread acts of violence since 1993.962
526. Violence in the DRC was accompanied by the systematic use of rape and
sexual
assault by the combatant forces. Although primarily committed under cover of an
armed
conflict in both occupied and combat zones, acts of violence also occurred in
times of
peace and in areas far removed from the conflict.
527. The successive and concurrent wars in the DRC contributed to widespread
sexual
violence both during the fighting, during the withdrawal of combatants, after
the fighting,
in areas where troops were stationed, in occupied areas, during patrols, during
reprisals
against the civilian population and during raids conducted by isolated and
sometimes
unidentified armed groups. These acts of sexual violence can be mainly
attributed to
armed actors in the field, although civilians did sometimes also take part in
the abuse.
528. Impunity, a lack of discipline, ethnic hatred, the normalization of
violence,
mystical beliefs, mental coercion exercised over child soldiers, the passive or
active
encouragement of the institutional and rebel military hierarchies all help to
explain the
widespread sexual violence to which women of all ages, from girls sometimes as
young
as five to elderly women, were subjected. Men also suffered sexual violence,
albeit to a
lesser extent. The damage caused to the social fabric due to the collapse of
national
institutions and the repeated conflicts contributed to fostering an atmosphere
of impunity
and chaos.
529. The unequal place of women in society and the family also encouraged
sexual
violence in wartime. As stated by Yakin Ertürk, Special Rapporteur on violence
against
women, its causes and consequences, "Sexual violence in armed conflicts in the
DRC is
fuelled by gender-based discrimination in the society at large".963
Congolese law and
discriminatory customary practices with regard to women maintain them in a
social
_______________
961 Acts of sexual violence involving men and boys, whilst being
far less frequent in comparison to those
involving women, will also be mentioned in this chapter.
962 Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and
consequences
(A/HRC/7/6/Add.4), 27 February 2008.
963 Women face discrimination and suffer from oppression in virtually all areas.
The country is 130th (out of
136) in UNDP’s gender-related development index (GDI). Report of the Special
Rapporteur on violence
against women (A/HRC/7/6/Add.4), para. 96.
reality and mental pattern of domination.964 Prior to the adoption
of the new 2006 law on
sexual violence,965 the highly restrictive definition of rape thus
covered only a limited
number of the situations with which women might be confronted.
530. While cases of sexual violence have been more specifically and
systematically
documented for a number of years now, particularly those directly linked to the
armed
conflicts, the same cannot be said for cases that took place between 1993 and
2003. The
Mapping Exercise was, nonetheless, able to find information relating to sexual
violence
committed over this period in general reports concerning violations of human
rights and
in some reports specifically addressing the issue of sexual violence.966
531. The limited amount of time (six months) and resources (five teams)
available to
cover the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law
committed throughout the DRC over the course of 10 years of armed conflicts
meant that
most effort had to be focused on incidents involving the deaths of a large
number of
victims. Aware that such a methodology prevents full justice from being done to
the
numerous victims of sexual violence and fails to reflect appropriately the
widespread use
of this form of violence by all armed groups involved in the different conflicts
in the
DRC, it was decided from the outset to seek information and documents supporting
the
perpetration of sexual violence in certain contexts rather than seeking to
confirm each
individual case, the victims being unfortunately too numerous and dispersed
across the
whole country.967 This approach has enabled the recurrent, widespread
and systematic
nature of this phenomenon to be emphasised, as demonstrated in this chapter. It
has also
enabled some mass occurrences of sexual violence to be confirmed, such as the
rape of
women during the massacres of Hutu refugees by the AFDL/APR. Such events had
previously been little documented.
532. The fact that some major incidents are not mentioned in this chapter
certainly
does not imply that they were not accompanied by sexual violence. Similarly,
some
_______________
964 Ibid, para. 97. For example, the Congolese Family Code
considers married woman as legal minors.
965Law on sexual violence, which comprises Law No. 06/018 of 20 July 2006,
supplemented by Law
No. 06/019 of 20 July 2006 modifying and supplementing the Decree of 6 August
1959 on the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
966 Réseau des femmes pour un développement associatif (RFDA), Réseau des femmes
pour la défense des
droits et la paix (RFDP) and International Alert (IA), Women’s bodies as a
battleground. Sexual violence
against women and girls during the war in the DRC, 2004; Dignité des sans-voix (DSV),
“Femmes dans la
tourmente des guerres en RDC”, 2002; MSF, I Have no Joy, no Peace of Mind;
Medical, Psychosocial and
Socio-economic Consequences of Sexual Violence in Eastern DRC, 2004; AI,
Surviving Rape: voices from
the east, 2004; AI, Mass rape: time for remedies, 2004; HRW, The War within the
War: sexual violence
against women and girls in eastern Congo, 2002; HRW, Seeking justice. The
prosecution of sexual violence
in the Congo War, 2005.
967Most of the available documentation only covers cases of individual violence
based on anonymous
evidence, deliberately incomplete for reasons of security and confidentiality.
Because of this, it was often
difficult to identify the places and dates of the violations with any accuracy.
Each of the Mapping
Exercise’s teams of investigators was, however, asked to specifically question
witnesses to the main
incidents listed with regard to the use of sexual violence.
armed groups committed acts of sexual violence that have not been mentioned
here.
Finally, the figures given in this chapter only represent the tip of the
iceberg. Many
places still remain inaccessible, victims and witnesses have sometimes not
survived the
violations or are still too ashamed to talk about what happened. Finally, the
documentation of sexual violence was not always sufficiently specific or
systematic to be
used in this report.
533. Whilst most of the acts of sexual violence examined in this report
represent
offences and crimes in national law as well as in human rights and international
humanitarian law, the level of impunity is striking. Very few cases of sexual
violence
ever reach the justice system, few of those that do result in decisions, and
even fewer in
convictions. Finally, in the rare cases of convictions, the defendants almost
invariably
escape from prison.968
534. The first part of this chapter presents the national and international
legal
framework applicable to acts of sexual violence and briefly analyses the legal
practice in
this regard. Acts of sexual violence committed over the period 1993-2003 are
then
presented and analysed in the following sections and placed chronologically in
time,
according to the four periods used in the previous section.969
Finally, certain specific
features of the sexual violence in the DRC are studied in greater detail in
order to
highlight the indefensible, organised, widespread and systematic nature of the
innumerable acts of sexual violence perpetrated.
A. Legal framework applicable to acts of sexual violence
535. Although the 2006 Constitution guarantees equality of status between men
and
women, this equality is not yet reflected in terms of implementing measures
governing
women's status. In actual fact, women do not enjoy the same rights as men and
are legally
subordinate to them.970 In the particular area of sexual violence, the main
innovation of
_______________
968 Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women
(A/HRC/7/6/Add.4).
969 The first period, from March 1993 to September 1996, covers the violations
committed during the last
years of power of President Mobutu, marked by the failure of the democratisation
process and the
devastating consequences of the Rwandan genocide, particularly in the provinces
of North and South Kivu.
The second period, from July 1996 to July 1998, focuses on violations
perpetrated during the first war and
the first 14 months of the regime of President Laurent Désiré Kabila. The third
period lists the violations
committed between the start of the second war, in August 1998, and the death of
President Kabila, in
January 2001. Finally, the last period covers the violations perpetrated in a
context of gradual respect for
the ceasefire along the front line and the speeding up of the peace negotiations
with a view to launching the
transition period, on 30 June 2003.
970 See: Justice, Impunity, and Sexual Violence in Eastern DRC. Report of the
International parliamentaryexpert
mission, November 2008.
the Constitution can be found in Article 15, which classifies sexual violence
committed
against any person as a crime against humanity.971
536. This constitutional provision was supplemented in 2006 by revised
Congolese
criminal legislation on sexual violence, which introduces new crimes of sexual
violence,
notably rape with objects, something that had not been envisaged in the previous
legislation. It also criminalises mass rapes.972 This law does not,
however, apply to the
period 1993-2003.
537. Acts of sexual violence committed during this period are covered by the
provisions of the 1940 Congolese Criminal Code.973 This code contains
a restrictive
definition of rape that does not cover the full range of sex crimes. Other cases
of sexual
violence are covered by measures of "indecent assault" or "outrage against
public
dignity". The judge then has to cite aggravating circumstances where necessary.974
538. Rape and other forms of sexual violence constitute a breach of the rules
of
international humanitarian law975 and the international and regional
human rights
standards contained in a series of specific instruments adopted by the DRC.976
539. The recognition of rape and other acts of sexual violence as crimes
under
international law has been confirmed by their inclusion in the statutes of the
different
international courts and tribunals and in their legal interpretations. The
statutes governing
_______________
971 Art. 15 of the Constitution: “The public authorities shall
ensure the suppression of sexual violence.
Without prejudice to international treaties and agreements, any sexual violence
against any person, aimed at
destabilising, or breaking up a family and of causing the disappearance of a
whole people, is categorised as
a crime against humanity, punishable by law.”
972 Law No. 06/018 of 20 July 2006 modifying and supplementing Decree of 30
January 1940 on the
Congolese Criminal Code.
973 See Congolese Criminal Code, Decree of 30 January 1940, updated on 30
November 2004, in Official
Bulletin, Special Issue of 30 November 2004.
974 The age of the victim, the official status of the perpetrator, or the
threat, deceit or violence used to
perpetrate the act may all constitute aggravating circumstances. When these
aggravating circumstances are
established, the punishment applicable to the perpetrator will be increased.
975 The DRC has ratified the four Geneva Conventions and their Additional
Protocols. Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions, among other things, prohibits “a. violence to life and
person, in particular murder
of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; […]; c. outrages upon
personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment; […]”. The fourth Convention, relative to
the protection of civilian
persons in time of war, includes specific provisions on sexual violence and
states that “Women shall be
especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against
rape, enforced prostitution, or
any form of indecent assault.”
976 The DRC is, in particular, a party to the UN Convention against Torture and
Other Forms of Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women In 2006, the DRC also ratified the Protocol to the
African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, adopted in 2003. The
States party to this
Protocol are specifically required, under the terms of Article 11, to protect
women in armed conflicts
“against all forms of violence, rape and other forms of sexual exploitation, and
to ensure that such acts are
considered war crimes, genocide and/or crimes against humanity and that their
perpetrators are brought to
justice before a competent criminal jurisdiction”.
the ICTY977 and the ICTR,978 the Special Panels for Serious Crimes
in East Timor979, the
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL),980 the Special Tribunal for
Cambodia981 and the
Rome Statute of the ICC all list rape, and other expressly stated forms of
sexual violence,
as crimes under international law.
540. The DRC ratified the Rome Statute establishing the ICC on 11 April 2002.
According to the Rome Statute, depending on the wider context in which the
crimes are
committed, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced
sterilisation and any other form of sexual violence of a comparable severity can
constitute
a crime against humanity and a war crime.982
_______________
977 The ICTY, section g, art. 5, lists rape as a crime against
humanity.
978 Indent g of Article 3 lists rape as a crime against humanity, and Article 4
lists rape, enforced prostitution
and any indecent assault as a serious violation of Common Article 3 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol II of 1977.
979 Indents b wwii) and e vi) of paragraph 1, section 6 list rape, sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy….forced sterilisation and any other form of sexual violence as
constituting a serious violation of
Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions.
980 Indent g of Article 2 of the statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
lists rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and any other form of sexual violence
as constituting a crime
against humanity, and e of Article 3, outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and
degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent
assault as a serious violation of
Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II.
981 Article 9 of the statute of the Special Tribunal for Cambodia lists crimes
against humanity as defined in
the Rome Statute.
982 See indent g, para. 1 of Article 7 and indents b xxii) and e vi), para. 2 of
Article 8 of the Rome Statute.
541. Apart from these explicit references to rape and other forms of sexual
violence,
the legal interpretations of the ICTY and the ICTR, the Special Panels for
Serious Crimes
in East Timor, the SCSL and the Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute all
anticipate
that acts other than those expressly listed may also form the basis for
convictions.983 The
case law of the ICTY and the ICTR thus demonstrates that acts of sexual violence
may
also be considered as acts of genocide,984 of direct and public
incitement to commit
genocide,985 of torture,986 of persecution,987
of slavery,988 of inhuman acts,989 of cruel990
or inhuman991 treatment in the context of crimes against humanity,
and as outrages upon
personal dignity992 or slavery993 in the context of war
crimes. Moreover, even an
individual case of serious sexual violence may be prosecuted as a crime against
humanity
if it was committed as an integral part of a more widespread and systematic
attack on a
civilian population.994
542. International human rights law also establishes a prohibition on acts of
sexual
violence in armed conflicts. In 1992,995 the Committee on the
Elimination of
Discrimination against Women recognised that gender-based violence, which
impairs or
nullifies the enjoyment by women of individual rights and fundamental freedoms
under
general international law or under human rights conventions, was constitutes
discrimination within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention on the
Elimination of
_______________
983 Patricia Viseur Sellers, The Prosecution of Sexual Violence
in Conflict: The Importance of Human Rights
as Means of Interpretation, OHCHR, 2008.
984 Decision The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, (ICTR-96-4-T), 2 September 1998;
Decision The Prosecutor v.
Muhimana, (ICTR-95-1B-T), 25 April 2005.
985 Decision The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and
Hassan Ngeze, (ICTR-
99-52-T), December 2003.
986 Decision The Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al. (IT-98-30), November 2001; Decision
The Prosecutor v. Delić
et al. (IT-96-21-T), November 1998. In this case, commonly known as the Celebici
case, the rape was
considered to have formed an act of torture.
987 Decision The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and
Hassan Ngeze, (ICTR-
99-52-T), December 2003.
988 Decision The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran
Vuković, (IT-96-23-T and
IT-96-23/1-T), February 2000, which convicted Kunarac and Kovac of slavery as a
crime against humanity.
989 Decision The Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamera and Santigie
Borbor Kanu,
(SCSL-04-16-A), 22 February 2008, para 202.
990 In the ICTY’s first case, Decision The Prosecutor v. Tadić, (IT-94-1-T), 7
May 1997, it was decided that
acts of sexual aggression committed against men, including mutilation, fellation,
and indecent assault
constituted inhuman and cruel treatment as war crimes and inhuman acts as crimes
against humanity.
991 Decision The Prosecutor v. Tadić, (IT-94-1-T), 7 May 1997.
992 Decision The Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, (IT-95-17/1-T), 10 December
1998, in which the accused
was convicted of enforcing nudity and humiliation, in addition to acts of rape;
Decision The Prosecutor v.
Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamera and Santigie Borbor Kanu, (SCSL-04-16-A),
22 February 2008
para. 1068/1188.
993 Decision The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran
Vuković, (IT-96-23-T and
IT-96-23/1-T) February 2000.
994 According to the decision issued by the ICTY in the Kunarac case, it is
sufficient to show that the act
took place in the context of a series of acts of violence which, individually,
could vary enormously in their
nature and severity, para. 419.
995 See General Recommendation No. 19 of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against
Women, CEDAW on violence against women.
Discrimination against Women. These rights and freedoms include the right to
equal
protection, according to humanitarian standards, in time of international or
internal armed
conflict.996
543. In its Resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000, the Security Council
reaffirmed the need to fully implement international humanitarian and human
rights law
that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts and
called on all
parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls
from
gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse.997
544. Moreover, with the adoption of the Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and
Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, the definition of gender-based
violence now includes a prohibition of all violence against women, in any
political
dimension and at any time, including armed conflict or war.998
545. In its Resolution 61/143 of 19 December 2006, the General Assembly stressed
that States had to eliminate gender-based violence, particularly in order to
ensure
protection of the human rights of women and girls in situations of armed
conflict, postarmed
conflict settings and refugee and internally displaced person settings, where
they
are the main focus of violence.999 This process culminated in the
Security Council
recognising, in its Resolution 1820 (2008) of 19 June 2008, that sexual violence
was an
issue of national security. This resolution notes that women and girls are the
particular
focus of sexual violence, and emphasises that such violence may significantly
exacerbate
conflicts and impede peace processes.
Legal practice
546. The combined action of national and international, conventional and
customary
legal instruments should therefore enable the acts of sexual violence committed
in the
DRC between 1993 and 2003 to be punished. All the more so given that, in the
context of
the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region’s Protocol on the
Prevention and
Suppression of Sexual Violence against Women and Children,1000 the
DRC has
undertaken to punish the perpetrators of acts of sexual violence committed
during armed
conflict in particular. However, in practice, impunity is still the rule.
_______________
996 Indent c, para. 7 of General Recommendation no. 19.
997 See UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), sixth paragraph of the
preamble and para. 10.
998 See Art. 1 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights on the Rights of Women,
adopted at Maputo on 11 July 2003.
999 General Assembly Resolution 61/143, para. 8.
1000 Available at:
www.cirgl.org/documents_fr/humanitarian-social-issues/protocol.pdf
.
547. A case study in South Kivu Province undertaken by MONUC’s Human Rights
Division in 20071001 is enlightening and demonstrates the extent of
the impunity that
perpetrators of acts of sexual violence enjoy, along with the little importance
given to,
and delays in, the cases of sexual violence that do reach the courts. Between
2005 and
2007, 287 cases were recorded by the judicial authorities which, according to
statistics
obtained from hospitals, clinics and other medical centres in the province for
2005 alone,
represented less than 1% of the cases of rape. Of those 287 cases that were
referred to the
justice system, investigations were underway in around 56% of them. In 60% of
these
cases, the investigations had been ongoing for more than one year. In the 60
cases that
were ready to be tried by the courts in 2007, 80% of the alleged perpetrators
were on
conditional release and had failed to present themselves to the courts since
their release.
Only 64 cases had been tried, of which 58 resulted in convictions. Even in these
cases,
many of the perpetrators subsequently escaped and the victims never received the
damages that the courts had awarded them by way of redress.1002
548. It should, however, be noted that, since the Rome Statute was ratified,
some
military courts have referred to its provisions in order to classify sexual
violence as a
crime under international law, as in the 2006 decisions relating to the cases of
Songo
Mboyo, and the Mbandaka and Lifumba-Waka mutinies.1003
549. In Orientale Province, despite the multitude of acts of sexual violence
committed
by all parties to the conflict, it would seem that the Gety and Bavi case in
2006 was the
only one in which soldiers were convicted of rape as a war crime. In North Kivu,
the
2009 Walikale trial was also a rare exception in the prevailing climate of
impunity. In
that case, the 11 FARDC defendants, six of whom were on the run, were convicted
on 24
April 2009 by the Goma garrison Military Court of crimes against humanity for
the rape
of some 20 Pygmy women, in application of the Rome Statute. The judge referred
to the
case law of the international courts to define the principles of rape according
to
international criminal law.1004 Importantly, the judge applied the
provisions of the Rome
Statute to hold the perpetrators’ senior officers responsible, considering that
"they
tolerated the criminal actions of their subordinates when these latter were in
violation of
international law".
_______________
1001 Human Rights Division of MONUC and OHCHR, The human rights
situation in DRC, 2007. See also
the Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women (A/HRC/7/6/Add.4).
1002 ”The disastrous state of the prison system, perhaps the weakest link in the
justice chain, facilitates
escapes of suspects and convicts, including high profile offenders who sometimes
‘escape’ with the
connivance of the authorities”. Combined report of seven thematic special
procedures on technical
assistance to the Government of the DRC and urgent examination of the situation
in the east of the country
(see A/HRC/10/59), para. 63
1003 For a fuller analysis of court practice in the DRC with regard to serious
violations of international
humanitarian law, see Sect. III, Chap. II.
1004 The judge referred in particular to the Furundzija (ICTY) and Akayesu
(ICTR) cases.
550. However, despite some progress and as with cases of sexual violence in
general,
most of these cases continue to suffer from a lack of impartiality and
independence.1005
551. The fact that there are few or no charges relating to acts of sexual
violence in the
arrest warrants issued by the ICC only contributes to minimising the importance
of these
crimes and to confirming a culture of impunity that the Court was intended to
overcome.
It is therefore surprising that the cases being brought against Thomas Lubanga
and Bosco
Ntaganda include no charges for sex crimes and that, whilst those against
Germain
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui do include such charges, they do not reflect
the
widespread nature of this kind of violation beyond the Bogoro attack for which
they are
being prosecuted. In fact, as demonstrated by transcripts of the hearings from
the
Lubanga trial, the women conscripted into the armed groups were repeatedly raped
and
reduced to the position of sex slaves by their commanders.1006
B. March 1993 - September 1996: failure of the democratisation process and
regional crisis
552. Whilst not reaching the levels experienced during periods of war, acts
of sexual
violence were not unknown during the regime of former President of Zaire, Mobutu
Sese
Seko, and were primarily perpetrated by Zairian State agents, including the
Forces
armées zaïroises (FAZ).
553. Senior civil servants and army officers enjoyed absolute power over
civilians in
their respective spheres of influence. In Bas-Congo, Kinshasa and Katanga, for
example,
senior officers frequently committed rape.1007
554. A number of sources report the existence of rape and enforced
prostitution in
prisons, such as, for example, in 1995 and 1996 in the Kisangani and Kinshasa
detention
centres,1008 and in 1997 at Maniema, where a majority of the women
detained were
subjected to sexual, and often physical, abuse on the part of State agents.1009
555. Opposition party activists, along with the sisters, wives or daughters
of political
opponents, primarily from the Parti lumumbiste unifié (PALU) or the Union pour
la
_______________
1005 For a fuller analysis of the capacity of the legal system,
see Sect. III, Chap. III.
1006 Transcripts of hearings in the case The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,
No. ICC-01/04-01/06
from 3, 23 and 27 February and 6 and 19 March 2009.
1007Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009; Serge M'Boukou,
“Mobutu, roi du Zaïre.
Essai de socio-anthropologie politique à partir d’une figure dictatoriale”, Le
Portique, 2007; see also
Decision of the Rotterdam District Court (Netherlands) on 7 April 2004 against
Col. Sébastien Nzapali,
known as the “King of Beasts”. During the trial, the rape allegations could not
be confirmed.
1008 Report on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6); OMCT
[World Organisation against
Torture], “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women - Republic of
Zaire – Comments of the OMCT”; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women,
Sixteenth session, 13-31 January 1997.
1009 Haki Za Binadamu, “Maniema SOS: les femmes en proie aux instincts sexuels
des soudards”, 1997.
démocratie et le progrès social (UDPS) were kidnapped, raped or tortured by
the security
forces, particularly the Brigade spéciale de recherche et de surveillance (BSRS)
from the
Gendarmerie headquarters (Circo), the Civil Guard or President Mobutu’s Division
spéciale presidentielle (DSP).1010 In 1996, when the Mobutu regime
was beginning to
come under threat, the armed forces and the police came down hard on people
suspected
of being involved in the rebellion. It is reported that several women were
arrested in
Kinshasa, Goma and Uvira either by the SARM1011 or the SNIP1012
intelligence services,
or by the police force, and raped and beaten.1013
556. The frequency of the sexual violence committed by the FAZ clearly
illustrates the
tolerance of the military hierarchy towards these crimes. Over the course of two
“pacification campaigns” conducted by the FAZ in North Kivu in 1995 and 1996,
women
suspected of being members of the Nande self-defence militia, the Ngilima, were
reportedly arrested at roadblocks put up by the army in Rutshuru. Transferred to
Goma, a
44-year-old mother was allegedly raped by several SARM soldiers using the
barrels of
guns and sticks of wood before being executed.1014 In South Kivu, the
FAZ reportedly
established roadblocks near areas of mineral extraction and raped a number of
women
passing by on the pretext of searching their genitals for minerals.1015
Sexual exploitation
on the part of the FAZ was so widespread that the "Zairian contingent for camp
security",
tasked by the international community with disarming and maintaining peace in
the
Rwandan refugee camps in North and South Kivu, became known as "the Zairian
contingent for camp sexuality".1016
557. In Maniema, elements of the police force, the Civil Guard and the FAZ
committed dozens of rapes during the course of searches, looting and roadblock
checks.
In rural communities, gang rapes were reported.1017
558. Between 1993 and 1996, tribal militia also committed rapes. During the
ethnic
conflict between the Banyarwanda1018 and the Ngilima, which shook
North Kivu in 1993,
acts of sexual violence were reported. This included, for example, rapes of
school
children in Masisi in April 1993, although it was not possible to identify the
perpetrators
_______________
1010 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009;
Prison Fellowship, “Rapport circonstancié
sur les cas de violations de droits de l’homme au Zaïre”, 1997.
1011 Service d’actions et de renseignements militaires (Military Intelligence
and Action Service).
1012 Service national d’intelligence et de protection (National Intelligence and
Protection Service).
1013AI, Violent Persecution by State and Armed Groups, 1996; AI, Lawlessness and
Insecurity in North and
South Kivu, 1996.
1014 HRW, Forced to Flee, Violence against the Tutsi in Zaire, 1996; AI, Zaire:
Lawlessness and Insecurity
in North and South Kivu, 1996
1015 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009
1016 Jean-Paul Mari, “Ici, on extermine les réfugiés”, in Le Nouvel observateur,
29 May 1997.
1017 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009; Haki Za Binadamu,
“Monitoring: cas types
des violations des droits de l’homme au Maniema”, 1995; Politique africaine, “Le
Maniema, de la guerre
de l'AFDL à la guerre du RCD”, No. 84, December 2001.
1018 All the names of the ethnic groups have been used invariably.
or ascertain the extent of the atrocity.1019 In the same region
and over the same period,
during the Binza massacre in 1993, groups of armed Hutu, supported by the FAZ,
mutilated and disembowelled a pregnant woman, probably a Hunde.1020
Moreover,
isolated cases of rapes committed by Hutu refugees were reported by witnesses.1021
In
May 1996, men calling themselves Ngilima were reported to have raped women in
Vichumbi village, near Lake Albert in retaliation for the death of one of their
members.1022 In September 1996, with the support of the FAZ, "armed
Bembe elements"
raped – and often gang raped - Banyamulenge women after murdering the men in the
villages of Kabela1023 and Lueba,1024 in Fizi territory.
C. September 1996 - July 1998: first war and the AFDL/APR regime
559. This period was marked by acts of sexual violence by AFDL/APR1025
troops
during a war that ended in the seizure of power by the advancing ADFL/APR and
the
retreat of the FAZ. The first years of the AFDL regime were marked by numerous
cases
of rape as a result of abuses of power on the part of soldiers and the ensuing
political
repression.
560. With the arrival en masse of Burundian and Rwandan refugees in Kivu in
1993
and 1994, anti-Tutsi propaganda became widespread, particularly targeting the
Banyamulenge living in South Kivu. When the authorities incited the population
to chase
out the Banyamulenge from Fizi territory in September 1996, a number of women
and
young girls were raped - sometimes by dozens of soldiers - and then killed along
with
their families during the violence instigated by the FAZ and "armed Bembe
_______________
1019 ”Mémorandum des communautés hutu et tutsi du Nord-Kivu à la
Commission d’enquête sur les
massacres de Walikale, Masisi et Bwito en mars et avril 1993”, 25 April 1993.
1020 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, November 2008 and April 2009.
1021 Confidential document of the Secretary-Generals’ Investigative Team charged
with investigating
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the DRC,
1998.
1022 AI, “Lawlessness and Insecurity in North and South Kivu”, 1996.
1023 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, June 2009.
1024 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, November 2008 and February
2009; Report on the
human rights situation in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6), para. 191; AI, Hidden from
scrutiny: human rights abuses
in eastern Zaire, 1996, p. 3.
1025 As noted in Section I, given the heavy presence of APR soldiers among the
troops and AFDL command
posts – a reality later recognised by the Rwandan authorities - and the great
difficulty experienced by the
witnesses questioned by the Mapping Team in distinguishing between the members
of the AFDL and the
APR on the ground, reference will be made to armed elements of the AFDL and the
soldiers of the APR
engaged in operations in Zaire between October 1996 and June 1997 using the
abbreviation AFDL/APR.
When, in some regions, several sources witness the heavy presence, under cover
of the AFDL, of Ugandan
soldiers of the UPDF (as in some districts of Orientale Province) or of the FAB
(as in some territories of
South Kivu), the abbreviations AFDL/APR/UPDF, AFDL/APR/FAB or AFDL/UPDF and AFDL/FAB
may
also be used.
elements".1026 In North Kivu, the armed forces also raped Tutsi
women and permitted
civilians to do the same.1027
561. The violations of international humanitarian law were so massive during
the first
war and cost the lives of so many victims, most of them women and children, that
published reports covering this period have given little space to, or at least
made little
distinction between, crimes of sexual violence and other serious crimes
committed at this
time. This is a concrete example of a general trend towards the under-reporting
of this
kind of violence. For example, the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team
charged with
investigating serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law in the
DRC notes, without giving any details, that rapes were likely to have been
committed by
the AFDL/APR during attacks on the five large refugee camps in North Kivu in
October
and November 1996.1028 The Mapping Team was able to document the fact
that women
were sometimes raped before being killed, as in the refugee massacres at Hombo,
a
village on the border between North and South Kivu, in December 1996;1029
at Kausa
near Nyamitaba in North Kivu in December 1996;1030 at Humule, 50
kilometres from
Goma, in April 1997;1031 and at Kilungutwe, Kalama and Kasika, in
Mwenga territory of
South Kivu, in August 1998. Women were also tortured and subjected to
mutilation,
particularly sexual, during these massacres.1032
562. Moreover, during their advance, the AFDL/APR soldiers also raped
numerous
Zairian women, particularly in North Kivu during October and November 1996, and
in
Oriental Province, in Équateur and in Bandundu in May 1997.1033
_______________
1026 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, June 2009: A
young 17-year-old Munyamulenge who
was raped by 15 soldiers while she was being held in a house with a group of
Banyamulenge, died
following this gang rape; HRW, Attacked by all sides, Civilians and the War in
eastern Zaire, 1997; AI,
Zaire: Lawlessness and Insecurity in North and South Kivu, 1996.
1027 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Goma, March 2009.
1028 Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team charged with
investigating serious violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law in the DRC (S/1998/581),
appendix.
1029 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Goma, March 2009; Confidential document
given to the Secretary-
General’s Investigative Team in the DRC in 1997/1998.
1030 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, December 2008 and January
2009; Report of the
Secretary-General’s Investigative Team (S/1998/581), annex, p. 48; Report on the
situation of human rights
in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2), p. 7; Didier Kamundu Batundi, Mémoire des crimes
impunis, la tragédie
du Nord-Kivu, 2006, p. 96; APREDECI, GVP, CRE, L’Apocalypse au Nord-Kivu, 1997,
p. 34; La Grande
Vision, Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme dans la zone
agropastorale de Masisi, 1997, p. 4.
1031 Statements gathered by the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team in the
DRC in 1997/1998;
Peacelink, Rapport sur la situation qui prévaut actuellement dans les provinces
du Nord et du Sud-Kivu,
1997.
1032 Interviews with the Mapping Team, October-December 2008, February-March
2009; DRC’s Ministry
of Human Rights, Livre Blanc: La guerre d’agression en RDC. Trois ans de
massacres et de génocide à
huis clos, October 2001; Jean Migabo Kalere, Génocide au Congo? Analyse des
massacres des populations
civiles, Broederlijk Delen, 2002; CADDHOM Massacres de Kasika au Sud-Kivu, 1998;
AI, DRC: War
against unarmed civilians, 1998.
1033 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January and February
2009; Report of the
Secretary-General's Investigative Team (S/1998/581), appendix; LINELIT, Jungle
ou état de droit, 1997.
563. As they fled in the face of the advancing AFDL/APR soldiers, the FAZ
also
engaged in multiple rapes, sometimes also of men, and abducted women and young
girls.1034 Numerous rapes committed by the FAZ, often gang rapes, can
thus be noted
along the whole length of the route they took during their retreat: mid-November
1996 in
Butembo and Béni (North Kivu);1035 November and December 1996 in
Bunia, at
Kisangani,1036 in Opala,1037 in the south-west of
Orientale Province, on the border with
Kasai Oriental and at Komanda, in Ituri district;1038 between
December 1996 and the end
of February 1997 at Buta and Bondo, in Bas-Uélé in Orientale Province;1039
from the end
of February to early march 1997 in Kailo territory in Maniema;1040
and, finally, in May
1997 in Équateur1041 and Bandundu.1042 Innumerable women
were abducted, used as sex
slaves and forced by the FAZ to act as bearers of looted goods. At Bunia, the
FAZ
allegedly raped the girls of Likovi secondary school so savagely and so
systematically
that seven of them died. They also reportedly raped women in the maternity unit
of the
town's hospital and raped and battered nuns in the town’s convent.1043
564. A number of rapes committed by Rwandan Hutu refugees fleeing from the
advancing AFDL/APR were reported, particularly in Mbandaka region, Équateur, in
May
1997.1044
565. The installation of the new AFDL/APR regime in Kinshasa was marked by
numerous abuses of power, and tolerance regarding the use of sexual violence by
AFDL/APR soldiers and security forces, who enjoyed total impunity.
566. Once the new authorities were in place, the AFDL/APR soldiers besieged
the
military camps that had been deserted by the ex-FAZ. Many wives and female
children of
the ex-FAZ were still living in these camps and they were raped and forced to
carry out
domestic chores for the soldiers of the new government army, particularly in
Kinshasa
_______________
1034 Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team
(S/1998/581), appendix.
1035 AI, Zaire. Rape, killings and other human rights violations by the security
forces, 1997.
1036 Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team (S/1998/581),
appendix; AI, Zaire. Rape, killings
and other human rights violations by the security forces, 1997.
1037 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January and February
2009; Groupe Lotus,
Violation des droits de l’homme à Opala, 1998
1038 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January and February
2009; AI, Zaire. Rape,
killings and other human rights violations by the security forces, 1997.
1039 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, 2008.
1040 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009; Haki Za Binadamu,
Violence sexuelle au
Maniema, 1997.
1041 Father Herman Van Dijck, Rapport sur les violations des droits de l’homme
dans le Sud-Équateur,
15 mars-15 septembre 1997; AI, Deadly Alliances in the Congolese Forests, 1997.
1042 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bandundu, February 2009; IRIN, 5 May
1997; Odon Bakumba, La
bataille de Kenge, pamphlet produced in Kenge, no date.
1043AI, Zaire. Rape, killings and other human rights violations by the security
forces, 1997.
1044 Report of the Secretary-General’s Investigative Team (S/1998/581), annex.
and Bas-Congo.1045 Some of them were gang raped: one woman, for
example, accused of
having been the mistress of one of the FAZ soldiers, was reportedly raped by 17
AFDL/APR soldiers.1046
567. Following an AFDL decree banning women from wearing trousers, leggings
or
mini-skirts, some who flouted this ban were publicly humiliated, stripped,
manhandled
and even severely beaten with nail-studded pieces of wood. One female student in
Lubumbashi was allegedly undressed, whipped and threatened with death by AFDL/APR
soldiers for having worn trousers.1047
568. Once established in the different provinces, the FAC/APR1048
soldiers reportedly
engaged in sexual violence against women, young girls and even primary
schoolgirls, as
in North and South Kivu, for example.1049 Around the military camps, at
roadblocks or
during routine patrols, numerous women were reportedly subjected to gang rapes
and
torture by the FAC/APR soldiers, particularly in Kinshasa, Goma and Lubumbashi.1050
In
one case, soldiers apparently poured burning wax on the genitals and body of a
young
woman they had gang raped at the Kokolo military camp in Kinshasa.1051
569. These situations were clearly the result of an abuse of power on the
part of the
new regime’s security forces, particularly when an arrest or arbitrary detention
for minor
reasons was followed by rape. Some women were reportedly taken back to hotels by
members of the security forces to rape them there.1052 FAC/APR
soldiers apparently
abducted young girls from their families and raped them during operations in
Mont-
Ngafula commune of Kinshasa. Some women were also reportedly forced to work as
domestic servants for FAC/APR officers.1053 In 1997, in South Kivu,
accusations of
witchcraft were reportedly made against at least four women and two girls aged
six and
_______________
1045 Interviews of the Mapping Team with the wives of ex-FAZ,
Bas-Congo, March 2009; Colonel Kisukula
Abeli Meitho, La désintégration de l’armée congolaise de Mobutu à Kabila, 2001.
1046Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March 2009; Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in Zaire (now the DRC) [A/52/496], 1997.
1047 Report of the Special Rapporteur (A/52/496); ASADHO, Appel urgent. SOS au
Congo-Zaïre: les
espaces démocratiques menacés, 1997; ACPC, 30 jours de violation des droits de
l’homme sous le pouvoir
AFDL - Un véritable cauchemar, June 1997; AI, Deadly Alliances in the Congolese
Forests, 1997;
UDPS/Belgium, L’UDPS/Belgique accuse M. Kabila pour crimes contre l'humanité,
November 1998;
available at: www.congoline.com/Forum1/Forum02/Kashala03.htm
1048 From June 1997 onwards, the national army of the DRC took the name Forces
armées congolaises
(FAC). Until the start of the second war, in addition to AFDL and ex-FAZ
soldiers, the FAC included
numerous Rwandan and, to a lesser extent, Ugandan, soldiers. Given the
difficulty in clearly distinguishing
between Congolese and Rwandan soldiers at this time, the abbreviation FAC/APR
has been used for the
period covering June 1997 to August 1998.
1049 Comité Palermo Bukavu, Les morts de la libération, June 1997.
1050 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March 2009; Report of the
Special Rapporteur
(A/52/496); AI, Deadly Alliances in the Congolese Forests, 1997.
1051 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March 2009.
1052 Report of the Special Rapporteur (A/52/496); ACPC, 30 jours de violation
des droits de l’homme sous
le pouvoir AFDL - Un véritable cauchemar, June 1997.
1053 Report of the Special Rapporteur (E/CN.4/1999/31), February 1999.
seven. Arrested, they were severely tortured, mutilated, raped and stoned by
FAC/APR
soldiers. One of them did not survive.1054
570. Rape was also used to subdue civilian populations suspected of
supporting the
Mayi-Mayi. During brutal search-and-sweep operations in North Kivu in April
1998, the
FAC/APR reportedly raped dozens of women and young girls and, on several
occasions,
forced men to sleep with their sisters and daughters.1055
571. Finally, the clampdown on any form of opposition led to the arrest of
numerous
women within, or perceived as being within, the immediate entourage of their
opponents.
Several of them were subsequently raped by the security forces. For example, in
Kinshasa in December 1997, a group of soldiers spent the whole night physically
beating
and gang raping two sisters of a political dissident they had gone to arrest but
had not
found at home.1056 Rape of women and electric shocks to the genitals
of men were used
as a means of torture in different detention centres, particularly in Kinshasa.1057
D. August 1998 - January 2001: Second war
572. This period was marked by numerous conflicts between government forces,
rebel
groups and foreign armies in a country divided in two with, in the west, a
governmentcontrolled
zone and, in the east, a rebel-controlled zone.1058 These successive
and
concurrent wars in the DRC contributed to the widespread sexual violence, which
was
primarily attributable to four main causes: the armed confrontations,
persecutions of
certain ethnic groups, the suppression of all forms of opposition and, finally,
almost total
impunity in the face of abuses of power and a lack of discipline on the part of
the security
forces, police and military intelligence services.
573. During the different armed confrontations, the government forces and
their allies
committed acts of sexual violence when capturing towns, when stationed in
certain
regions or when retreating in the face of the enemy. Rapes, often gang rapes,
frequently
involved very young girls, sometimes even infants.
_______________
1054 CADDHOM, “Répression: mode de gouvernance du régime L. D.
Kabila, cas de la province du Sud-
Kivu, est de la RDC”, 1997.
1055 Interviews with the Mapping Team, North Kivu, February 2009; ASADHO, Annual
Report, 1998;
Groupe des chercheurs libres du Graben, Report on the massacres perpetrated at
the Kikyo military camp;
AI, A year of dashed hopes, 1998.
1056 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009; Report of the
Special Rapporteur
(E/CN.4/1998/65 and Corr.1).
1057 Report of the Special Rapporteur (E/CN.4/1999/31); AI, A year of dashed
hopes, 1998.
1058 For more information on the political background, see Sec. I, Chap. III.
574. In Bas-Congo, during their brief incursion at the start of August 1998,
members
of the ANC (the armed branch of the RCD)1059 politico-military movement and the
APR
committed rapes in the main towns of the province. In Boma, they requisitioned a
hotel
where they raped innumerable women and young girls for three days.1060
During the
recapture of towns in Bas-Congo, at the end of August 1998, the Kinshasa
Government’s
allies, the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), in turn committed systematic and
widespread
rapes against the civilian population.1061 In Orientale Province, the
FAC carried out
numerous rapes of women and young under-age girls in the regions in which they
were
stationed, such as Bondo,1062 and took some of them with them when
they fled from
Dingila.1063 In Équateur, FAC soldiers abducted 36 women from
Bolima-Likote village
and raped them in the forest.1064 At Mange, the FAC raped some 20
women that they had
taken prisoner, one of them subsequently dying from injuries she sustained
during the
rape.1065 Other victims were abducted by the soldiers during their
retreat from Équateur
and were used for several months as sex slaves. One of the victims, aged 15, was
taken
by the soldiers to Kitona (Bas-Congo), then to Kalemie (Katanga).1066
In Kasai
Occidental, the FAC raped at least 20 women in the area around their base in
Demba
territory.1067
575. At this time, the government security forces were also persecuting
anyone bearing
physical resemblance to a Tutsi or was suspected of supporting the rebellion.
Women
suspects were harassed, stripped of their belongings, arrested and detained.
Several of
them were raped during their detention, particularly in Kinshasa1068 and
Lubumbashi.1069
576. Repression against the opposition led to the arbitrary arrest of a
number of women
opposed to, or critical of, the regime and they were, on occasion, subjected to
sexual
violence. Women suspected of sympathising with the rebellion were reportedly
arrested,
paraded naked through the streets to the police station and held alongside the
men.1070
One of them was apparently raped and whipped in detention and then taken to a
Kinshasa
_______________
1059 Officially created on 16 August 1998, the RCD had as its
objective ending Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s
presidency.
1060 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Bas-Congo, March 2009; HRW, Casualties of
War, 1999.
1061 Ibid.
1062 AI, DRC: Killing Human Decency, 30 May 2000.
1063 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January 2009.
1064 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April and May 2009.
1065 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur and Kinshasa, April 2009.
1066 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur and Kinshasa, April 2009; HRW,
Casualties of War, 1999;
AI, DRC: Killing Human Decency, 2000; MSF, Quiet, we’re dying. Witness accounts,
2002.
1067 Interviews with the Mapping Team,, Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental,
April 2009
1068 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, March 2009; HRW, Casualties of
War, 1999.
1069 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, October 2008 and March 2009;
ASADHO, RDC: Le
pouvoir à tout prix. Répression systématique et impunité, 1998; AI, War against
unarmed civilians, 1999;
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “Massacres of Tutsis Reported as more DRC Peace Talks
Tabled”, 3 September
1998 and “Congo Rebels Bury Remains of Massacre Victims”, 10 December 1998.
1070 Report of the Special Rapporteur (E/CN.4/1999/31), annex VI; AI,
“Government Terrorizes Critics”,
2000.
hotel where she was raped for several days by a senior officer and soldiers
of the
DEMIAP (Détection Militaire des Activités Anti-Patrie) intelligence service.1071
Sexual
violence was reportedly also used against men as a means of torture and cruel or
degrading treatment.1072
577. In the government prisons in Kinshasa, the warders abused their position
of power
over the women prisoners, who were frequently held alongside the men. The
warders
reportedly raped them regularly and forced them to perform domestic duties.1073
Within
the army, particularly among new recruits, there was a widespread lack of
discipline.
During arrests for questioning, arbitrary arrests or checks at roadblocks,
soldiers would
thus rape, hold to ransom and even demand young girls by way of payment. They
would
sometimes force their victims to undress in public. Rape was also used as a
punishment
when the victim or her husband refused to hand over money or as a way of
suppressing
popular demonstrations.1074 Young street children, abandoned or
separated because of the
war, were also victims of sexual exploitation at the hands of members of the FAC,
who
took advantage of the extreme vulnerability of these victims.1075
578. The multiple armed confrontations between different groups in the rebel
controlled
zone targeted the civilian population indiscriminately, a population made up
primarily of women and children who were always suspected of supporting one side
or
the other. The soldiers of the ANC and APR and their allies engaged in massacres
and
reprisals against the civilian population along with search-and-sweep operations
aimed at
seeking out the enemy in the towns they had just conquered or defended. Many
women
and young girls were raped during these different operations and then,
sometimes,
killed.1076
579. In August 1999, and then again in May and June 2000, the latent crisis
between
Rwanda and Uganda for control of the political party RCD degenerated into open
_______________
1071 AI, DRC: Killing Human Decency, 30 May 2000.
1072 AI, DRC: A Year of Dashed Hopes, 15 May 1998.
1073 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State,
Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, 1999.
1074 ASADHO, “RDC. Une guerre prétexte au pillage des ressources et aux
violations des droits de
l’homme”, Annual Report 2000; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S.
Department of
State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 1999.
1075 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State,
Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, 2000.
1076 Particularly in Kabalo territory in Katanga (Interviews with the Mapping
Team, Katanga, November
2008), in Kasongo territory in Maniema (Interviews with the Mapping Team,
Maniema, March 2009;
Politique africaine, “Le Maniema, de la guerre de l'AFDL à la guerre du RCD”,
No. 84, December 2001)
and at Lubutu and Opala in Orientale Province (Interviews with the Mapping Team,
Orientale Province,
January 2009; Memorandum from the FOCDP to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, 2001;
Report by Groupe Justice et Libération, 1999; Report produced by the President
of Wanie Rukula civil
society, 2009).
conflict,1077 and this led to a series of clashes for control of Kisangani
during the course
of which elements of both armies committed rapes. On 17 July 1999, before the
first war
broke out, five girls trapped in the Maranatha church, Kabondo commune, were
allegedly
raped by elements of the ANC/APR.1078 Rapes were also reportedly committed by
Rwandan, Ugandan and Congolese soldiers during the two ensuing wars, in
2000.1079
580. During the course of the conflict between the ANC/APR and the Mayi-Mayi,
and
in some regions controlled by the CNDD-FDD,1080 women paid a heavy price, with
each
group attempting to outdo the other in terms of the cruelty of the sexual
violence to which
they subjected their victims in retaliation for their alleged support of their
opponents.
581. For example, in South Kivu, in August 1998, elements of the ANC/APR
raped
women in the villages of Kilungutwe, Kalama and Kasika, in Mwenga territory.
Brutal
rapes, disembowelling and rape with sticks of wood were suffered by an unknown
number of victims.1081 At Bitale, in Kalehe territory, in February
1999, elements of the
ANC/APR raped women and young girls whom they accused of supporting the Mayi-
Mayi operating in the region.1082 In Mwenga town centre, in November
1999, elements of
the ANC/APR buried 15 women alive. Before burying them, the victims were
tortured,
raped, some with wooden sticks, and subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment consisting particularly of inserting hot pepper into their genitals.
Some victims
were paraded naked through the village.1083 During the counter-attack
led by the
ANC/APR against the Mayi-Mayi and CNDD-FDD in Baraka region, in June 2000,
soldiers from the ANC/APR reportedly raped and killed several women and burned
houses.1084 Other cases of rape committed by elements of the ANC/APR
during attacks
_______________
1077 In March 1999, against a backdrop of increasing disagreement
between Rwanda and Uganda as to the
strategy to follow in relation to President L. D. Kabila, the RCD broke into a
pro-Rwandan wing (RCDGoma)
and a pro-Ugandan wing (RCD-ML).
1078 Groupe Lotus, Les conséquences de la contradiction des alliances et des
factions rebelles au nord-est
de la RDC – La guerre de Kisangani, 1999.
1079 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State,
Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, 2000 and 2001; François Zoka, Pierre Kibaka, Jean-Pierre
Badidike, La guerre des alliés
à Kisangani et le droit de la paix, 2000.
1080 The Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (FDD) were the armed branch of
the Burundian Hutu
movement of the Centre national pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD).
1081Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, October, November and December
2008 – February
and March 2009; CADDHOM, Massacres de Kasika au Sud-Kivu, 1998; Migabo, Génocide
au Congo?
Analyse des massacres des populations civiles, 2002; AI, War against unarmed
civilians, 1998.
1082 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and March 2009; HRW,
Eastern Congo
ravaged, May 2000, p.10.
1083 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, November 2008 and March 2009;
Jean Migabo
Kalere, Génocide au Congo? Analyse des massacres des populations civiles, 2002;
Ambroise Bulambo,
Mourir au Kivu, du génocide tutsi aux massacres dans l’est du Congo RCD, 2001;
Application instituting
proceedings at the International Court of Justice by the DRC against Rwanda on
28 May 2002.
1084 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February 2009; Report of the
Special Rapporteur
(A/55/403), 2000; AI, Rwandese-controlled eastern DRC: Devastating human toll,
2001; Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on
Human Rights
Practices, 2000.
and containment activities are likely to have taken place in Kalehe territory
in 1999 and
in territories in the regions of Baraka1085 and Fizi1086
in 2000.
582. Elements of the ANC/APR are reported to have raped women in front of
their
husbands, their families and their communities during attacks on villages such
as
Kilambo, in Walikale territory (North Kivu).1087 The women of North
and South Kivu
were not, however, alone in suffering this violence: a large number of women
were also
raped in Maniema, particularly by elements of the ANC/APR.1088
583. For their part, the Mayi-Mayi committed atrocities during attacks
against villages
and in the context of reprisals. Rapes were thus committed in Uvira, in Kalehe,
Walungu
and Mwenga territories in South Kivu and in Maniema.1089 These rapes
were
accompanied by unimaginable cruelty. In Kamituga and Walungu (South Kivu), the
militia cut off women’s breasts and forced them to eat them before executing
them as
punishment for their alleged support of the RCD-G or their refusal to undertake
forced
labour.1090
584. The Mayi-Mayi also engaged in rapes during patrols, during movements,
when
putting up fences or when they were near national parks, including the
Kahuzi-Biega
National Park (South Kivu and North Kivu), and the Virunga National Park (North
Kivu).1091 Women working in the fields or on their way to them were
frequently targeted.
The Mayi-Mayi also committed abuses (murder, rape and torture) against women
accused
of witchcraft such as, for example, in Mwenga and Kitutu (South Kivu) in 1999;1092
at
Musenge, in Walikale territory (North Kivu) in 1999;1093 and at
Wabikwa, in Pangi
territory (Maniema) in March 1999.1094
_______________
1085 Interview with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February and
March 2009; HRW, “DRC, Eastern
Congo ravaged”, 2000.
1086 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, February 2009; Report of the
Special Rapporteur
(A/55/403); AI, Rwandese-controlled eastern DRC: Devastating human toll, 2001;
Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, 2000.
1087 HRW, Eastern Congo ravaged, 2000; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor, U.S.
Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2000.
1088 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March 2009; Haki Za Binadamu,
Situation des droits de
l’homme au Maniema, RDC Congo, Monitoring d’octobre 1998 à juin 2000, 2000.
1089 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, April 2009; Documents from
October 2002 provided
to the Mapping Team in South Kivu by local NGOs, April 2009.
1090 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State,
Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, 1999; AI, DRC: Killing human decency, 2000.
1091 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State,
Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, 1999.
1092 COJESKI, Les violations caractérisées des droits de l’homme dans le Kivu -
Rapport narratif des
forfaits pour la période allant du 1er octobre 1999 au 29 février 2000, 2000;
CADDHOM, Les atrocités
commises en province du Kivu de 1996 à 1998, July 1998.
1093 AI, DRC: Killing Human Decency, 30 May 2000.
1094 Haki Za Binadamu, Situation des droits de l’homme au Maniema, RDC, 2000.
585. From the end of 1999 to mid-2000, acts of sexual violence in the
conflict between
the RCD-G and the Mayi-Mayi in South Kivu were such that it is estimated that at
least
2,500 to 3,000 women were raped – often brutally gang-raped - over this period.1095
586. The Hutu militia, both Rwandan (AliR/FDLR)1096 and Burundian (FDD/CNDD),
also committed widespread and systematic rapes of a bestial brutality. Many
women,
mainly young girls, were abducted to act as sex slaves.1097 Between
1998 and 2001, for
example, the Rwandan Hutu militia attacked and plundered several villages in
Kalehe
and Mwenga territories (South Kivu) and Masisi territory (North Kivu) from the
forests
in which they were hiding. During the course of these attacks, they raped and
abducted
women and young girls, some of whom were forced to carry the spoils of their
pillaging.1098 In some cases, such as at Mabingu, Kabamba and Mantu (South Kivu)
in
1999, the women were raped with such brutality that some of them died. In July
2000,
Burundian militia (FDD) reportedly raped a number of women in Lusenda village
(South
Kivu) and abducted girls in North Kivu.1099
587. In a vicious spiral, whenever they recaptured a territory, the Rwandan
Hutu
militia as well as the ANC/APR, would engage in reprisals, including rapes,
against the
population. Always suspected of hiding or supporting one group or the other, the
population was subjected to alternating attacks from the different sides, such
as for
example in 1998 at Chivanga; in Kabara territory (South Kivu);1100 in
1999 in Mwitwa, in
Walikale territory (North Kivu); and in 2000 near Kilambo, in Masisi territory.
In
Kilambo, for example, ANC/APR soldiers reportedly tied up the men and raped
their
wives in front of them before killing them.1101
_______________
1095 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
Shabunda Mission Report, June 2001; HRW, DRC
– The War Within the War, 2002.
1096 With the start of the second war, in 1998, the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and
“armed Hutu elements”
reorganised within the Armée de libération du Rwanda (ALiR), which was absorbed
into the FDLR at the
end of 2000.
1097 Interviews with the Mapping Team, South Kivu, March 2009; CDJP, “Flash
spécial - Les Interahamwe
massacrent la population de Bushwira dans le territoire de Kabare”, 29 November
2002; IRIN, “Central and
Eastern Africa Weekly Round-Up 26”, 30 June 2000; AI, DRC: Killing Human
Decency, 30 May 2000.
1098 HRW, Eastern Congo ravaged, May 2000.
1099 HJ, “Une population désespérée, délaissée et prise en otage”, archives,
2001, available at
www.heritiers.org/ (consulted in March 2009).
1100 HRW, DRC – The War Within the War, June 2002.
1101 Report of the Special Rapporteur (E/CN.4/1999/31), annex XIII; DSV, “Femmes
dans la tourmente des
guerres en RDC”, March 2003; SOPROP, “La situation des droits de l’homme dans la
ville de Goma et ses
environs depuis l’éclatement de la rébellion”, October 1998; HRW, Eastern Congo
ravaged, 2000; AI,
“Torture as weapon of war”, 2001; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor,
U.S. Department of
State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 1999; AI, DRC: Killing Human
Decency, 30 May
2000.
588. In North Kivu, the Ugandan rebels of the ADF/NALU [Allied Democratic
Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda]1102 attacked and
looted several
villages in Beni territory, abducting children, young girls and women whom they
used as
slaves, including sex slaves.1103
589. On returning to their lands in Fizi and Uvira territories in South Kivu
in 1999,
Banyamulenge soldiers also engaged in abductions and rapes of women as they were
on
the way to their fields.1104
590. In all regions under the control of the RCD-G, opponents were brutally
and
arbitrarily suppressed. Hundreds of women accused of helping the militia and
rebel
movements, suspected of providing intelligence to the FAC or who had simply
criticised
the RCD-G were subjected to sexual violence in their own homes, sometimes in
front of
their children and husbands, and were frequently arrested. The wives or female
relatives
of men being sought were sometimes arrested instead of their partner or brother.
Held in
prisons or in containers, they were systematically raped, beaten and then some
of them
murdered.1105 Whilst this repression affected above all women in
North and South Kivu,
women in other regions under RCD-G control were also affected, such as in
Oriental
Province and in Maniema.1106 The use of torture in RCD-G detention
centres involved
sexual elements of the crimes committed during some massacres of civilian
populations,
such as rape, the insertion of hot pepper into the sexual organs and genital
mutilation.1107
591. In zones under the control of the ANC/APR and their allies, the
behaviour of
armed elements stationed in towns, during transfers or during operations was
characterised by a lack of discipline, an abuse of power and brutality. Women
and girls
who were in or walking to their fields, to market, to fetch water, in the forest
collecting
wood or walking to school were victims of rape and abduction and frequently
forced into
_______________
1102 The result of a regrouping of former rebellions, the
ADF-NALU appeared in the second half of the
1980s after President Yoweri Museveni took power in Uganda. During the 1990s,
the ADF-NALU
benefited from the support of President Mobutu and used North Kivu as a refuge.
1103 Interview with Mapping Team, North Kivu, March 2009; ASADHO, “L’Ouganda
sacrifie la population
civile congolaise”, February 2001.
1104 HJ, archives 1999. Available at: www.heritiers.org/ (consulted in March
2009).
1105 Numerous sources document these particular cases: interviews with the
Mapping Team, South Kivu,
March and May 2009; Report of the Special Rapporteur (E/CN.4/1999/31), annex
XIII; ASADHO, “RDC:
le pouvoir à tout prix. Répression systématique et impunité”, 1998; DSV, “Femmes
dans la tourmente des
guerres en RDC”, March 2003; COJESKI, Vue synoptique sur les violations massives
des droits de
l’homme pendant les trois premiers mois d’agression du Sud-Kivu/RD, 1998;
COJESKI, Cinq mois
d’invasion de la RDC: Les droits de l’homme en péril dans les provinces occupées
de l’est du Congo, 1999;
SOPROP, “La situation des droits de l’homme dans la ville de Goma et ses
environs depuis l’éclatement de
la rébellion”, October 1998; HRW, Casualties of War, February 1999; HRW, Eastern
Congo ravaged, May
2000; AI, War against unarmed civilians, 1998; AI, DRC: Killing Human Decency,
30 May 2000.
1106 Report of the Special Rapporteur (E/CN.4/1999/31), annex XIII; DSV, Femmes
dans la tourmente des
guerres en RDC, 2003; Haki Za Binadamu, Situation des droits de l’homme au
Maniema, 2000; Groupe
Lotus, RDC – D’un régime autoritaire à une rébellion, October 1998.
1107 SOPROP, La situation des droits de l’homme dans la ville de Goma et ses
environs depuis l’éclatement
de la rébellion jusqu’au 21 septembre 1998, 1998; COJESKI, Cinq mois d’invasion
de la RDC: Les droits
de l’homme en péril dans les provinces occupées de l’est du Congo, 1999.
sexual slavery. Cases of rapes of young girls, often gang rapes, were
widespread in the
towns and close to military camps, such as, for example, around the camps of
Saïo and
Bagira at Bukavu, Kabare and Kitshanga in Masisi.1108
592. Soldiers, particularly from Mutwanga camp (North Kivu), reportedly
abducted
women into slavery.1109 Even the wives of soldiers on the frontline
were allegedly raped
by those remaining back at base.1110 The rare women brave enough to
dare to refuse these
advances were often murdered, along with other family members, to set an
example.1111
Congolese employees of international organisations were not spared: women
working for
HCR and WHO were also raped.1112
593. Gang rape was widespread everywhere. It is reported that in Maniema, at
Kayuyu
in Pangi territory, most of the rapes reported between October 1999 and January
2000
were gang rapes.1113 The brutality knew no bounds. In October 1999,
in Kasai Oriental, at
Musangie, 22 kilometres from Kabinda, 10 women were whipped then raped by a
number of soldiers from the ANC/APR.1114 In 2000 at Tshalu, in the
same region, while
raping four women, elements of the ANC/APR reportedly subjected their partners,
friends and parents to cruel and inhuman treatment. In South Kivu, women were
regularly raped by dozens of soldiers.1115 At Baraka, in Fizi
territory, a young 17-year-old
girl was apparently raped by some 40 soldiers.1116
594. During this period, the situation in the zones controlled by the RCD-G
and its
allies was so volatile, with so many and changing armed groups and alliances,
that it was
in some cases difficult to identify the perpetrators of the rapes. Sexual
violence took on
unbearable proportions and cruelty and the many abuses seemed merely to increase
in
number exponentially. The soldiers frequently engaged in gang rapes and some
women
and young girls were also raped with sticks, stakes and guns. In some cases, the
perpetrators of the rapes wrapped the barrel of their gun in cloth and inserted
it into their
_______________
1108Report of the Special Rapporteur (E/CN.4/1999/31), annex
XIII; COJESKI, Vue synoptique sur les
violations massives des droits de l’homme pendant les trois premiers mois
d’agression du Sud–Kivu, 1998;
DSV, “Femmes dans la tourmente des guerres en RDC”, March 2003; CADDHOM,
“Rapport sur la
situation des droits de l’homme au Congo-Kinshasa: Une année d’occupation et de
rébellion au Kivu”,
August 1999; HRW DRC – The War Within the War, 2002.
1109 ASADHO, RDC: le pouvoir à tout prix. Répression systématique et impunité,
1998.
1110 COJESKI, Cinq mois d’invasion de la RDC: Les droits de l’homme en péril
dans les provinces
occupées de l’est du Congo, 1999; SOPROP, La situation des droits de l’homme
dans la ville de Goma et
ses environs depuis l’éclatement de la rébellion jusqu’au 21 septembre 1998,
1998.
1111 Report of the Special Rapporteur (E/CN.4/1999/31), annex XIII; DSV, “Femmes
dans la tourmente des
guerres en RDC”, March 2003.
1112 AI, War against unarmed civilians, 1998.
1113 Haki Za Binadamu, Situation des droits de l’homme au Maniema, 2000.
1114 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental,
April and May 2009; DSV,
“Femmes dans la tourmente des guerres en RDC”, March 2003.
1115 Ibid.
1116 DSV, “Femmes dans la tourmente des guerres en RDC”, March 2003; HJ,
archives 1999. Available at:
www.heritiers.org/ (consulted in March 2009); AI, DRC: Killing Human Decency, 30
May 2000.
victim's vagina to clean it before passing her onto the next rapist.1117
Armed men
sometimes fired into the genitals of their victims, causing damage to both
internal and
external sex organs. In 2000, at Ngweshe, in Walungu territory (South Kivu), a
pregnant
woman was trampled on by soldiers in order to bring about a premature labour.1118
E. January 2001-June 2003: Towards the transition
595. As in the previous period, members of the army, FAC recruits, the police
and
prison staff continued to perpetrate acts of sexual violence, more often than
not
expressions of an abuse of power and lack of discipline, committed in complete
impunity.
During the suppression of student demonstrations in Kinshasa, for example, FAC
members raped some female students.1119
596. In the areas under government control, the behaviour of the FAC
stationed in the
towns, during movements or on operations was characterised by indiscipline,
sexual
violence and brutality. In Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental,1120
Maniema1121 and in
Katanga,1122 for example, the FAC committed rapes in the areas in
which they were
stationed and during reprisals against armed opposition groups, almost always
targeting
the civilian population.
597. Although numerous cease-fire agreements were signed over this period
between
the different warring factions, the people of Maniema, Katanga, Orientale
Province and,
above all, North and South Kivu continued to suffer the consequences of the
conflicts.
Violence intensified in Ituri in particular, in the context of the conflict
between the Hema
and the Lendu, and in South Kivu. Armed groups proliferated and alliances
between them
were constantly made and unmade, amplifying the chaos and confusion and creating
an
environment conducive to increasingly brutal acts of sexual violence.
_______________
1117 RFDA, RFDP and IA, Le corps des femmes comme champ de
bataille, 2004.
1118 DSV, “Femmes dans la tourmente des guerres en RDC”, March 2003.
1119 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kinshasa, April 2009; Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,
1999; AI, DRC: Killing
human decency, 2001.
1120 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental,
April 2009.
1121 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Maniema, March-April 2009; CDJP-Kasongo,
“Des graves
violations des droits de l'homme consécutives aux affrontements Mai Mai and
militaires du RCD”, August
2002.
1122 Interview with the Mapping Team, Katanga, November 2008; document provided
to the Mapping Team
on 24 February 2009: “Les faits saillants des incidents du territoire de Kabalo”.
Orientale Province
598. In Orientale Province, women were the victims of widespread sexual
violence
following the occupation of the south of the province by the RCD-G, in the
context of the
conflict in Ituri and during military operations undertaken by the ALC (the
MLC’s armed
wing) and its allies against the RCD-ML and its army, the Armée du peuple
congolais
(APC).1123
599. Elements of the ANC/APR engaged in numerous rapes, particularly in the
context
of attacks on the civilian population of several villages near to Masimango,
Ubundu
territory, aimed at punishing them for their supposed support of Mayi-Mayi
groups,1124 or
during isolated incidents, particularly in Opala territory.1125
During the brutal suppression
of the Kisangani mutiny on 14 May 2002, APR elements defending the RCD-G
committed numerous rapes in Mangobo commune and in the area around the airport,
abducted women and raped them at the airport and subjected men to sexual
mutilation.1126
600. The inter-community violence that erupted in Ituri in 1999 affected
women in
particular, and there was renewed violence caused by the over-armament of the
politicomilitary
groups that arose out of the Hema and Lendu militias and self-defence groups in
2001 and 2002. During this destructive conflict, sexual violence was a
significant
component of the attacks waged by these ethnic and political rivals.1127
601. Numerous rapes were thus committed by the Lendu militia, which
subsequently
became the FNI and the FRPI, and by the Hema of the UPC, over the course of
successive battles to capture Bunia. Women and girls were abducted and taken to
military
quarters or private houses to be raped by elements of the UPC. At Songolo and at
_______________
1123 For more information on the political background, see
Section I, Chapter II.
1124 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008 and
January 2009; Groupe
justice et libération, Massacres des populations civiles dans les villages de
Masimango, Kababali et Abali,
2001; Memorandum from the FOCDP to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
2001.
1125 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January 2009.
1126 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, December 2008;
Eleventh report of the
Secretary-General on MONUC (S/2002/621); Report of the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary
or arbitrary executions on her mission to the DRC (E/CN.4/2003/3/Add.3);
François Zoka, Pierre Kibaka,
Jean-Pierre Badidike, Vraie ou fausse mutinerie de Kisangani et le massacre des
populations civiles, 2002;
FIDH–ASADHO–Ligue des électeurs–Groupe Lotus, État des libertés et des droits de
l’homme en RDC à
l’aube de la transition, 2003; HRW, “War Crimes in Kisangani”, August 2002.
1127 Everything that follows has been taken from the following sources:
Interviews with the Mapping Team,
Ituri, March to May 2009; Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in the
DRC (A/58/534); Special Report of the United Nations Organization Mission in the
DRC on the events in
Ituri (January 2002 - December 2003) [S/2004/573]; Transcription of the hearings
in The Prosecutor v.
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 3 February 2009; HRW, Covered in
blood, 2003; HRW, The
Curse of Gold, 2005; AI, “On the precipice: the deepening human rights and
humanitarian crisis in Ituri”,
2003; AI, “Ituri: A need for protection, a thirst for justice”, 2003; FIDH,
Persévérance de la haine ethnique
et des violations massives et systématiques des droits de l’homme à Bunia, 2003;
Lisette Banza Mbombo,
Christian Hemedi Bayolo and Colette Braeckman, Violences sexuelles contre les
femmes, crimes sans
châtiment, 2004; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices, 2003.
Nyakunde, women and girls were systematically raped and hundreds more forced
into
slavery by the assailants during violent attacks conducted by the UPC and the
Ngiti and
Lendu militias respectively in these areas. In May 2003, Lendu militia,
supported by the
APC (the RCD-ML’s army) engaged in mutilation and sexual torture during their
offensive against the UPC for control of Bunia. Cases of female mutilation were
common
during attacks carried out by both camps. At Fataki in March 2000, for example,
Hema
corpses were found in the streets with their arms tied, a stick inserted into
their anus and
certain parts of their bodies, such as their ears, cut off. After the attack on
the Mambisa
community in Nizi by the FNI and the FAPC in June 2003, 22 bodies, mainly women
and
children, were found in Nizi. The bodies had been mutilated, disembowelled and
their
organs, including genitalia, removed.1128
602. During the many offensives conducted against civilian populations by
elements of
the FNI and UPC, numerous woman and young girls, sometimes no more than ten
years
of age, were forced into sexual slavery. In fact, rapes were encouraged, if not
directly
ordered, by the UPC’s commanding officers.1129 In March 2003, in the mining
region of
Kilo and Mongbawbu, members of the FNI raped and forced Hema women into slavery.
They apparently cut off the breasts and genitalia of Hema and Nyali women who
were
too exhausted to carry their loads any further.1130 Between May and December
2003, the
Médecins sans frontières health post in Bunia treated 822 rape victims aged
between 13
and 25.1131
603. In the context of the "Erasing the Board" operation that took place from
Orientale
Province through to North Kivu, ALC/MLC troops committed systematic and
widespread
rapes and sexual violence, particularly during violent clashes with the APC/RCD-ML.
Rapes and sexual mutilation were thus committed by the ALC/MLC in the area
around
Madesi and Masebu (Rungu territory) in the context of clashes between the MLC
and
RCD-N armies and those of the RCD-ML in July-August 2004.1132 Pygmy
women in the
region paid a heavy price during the advance of the MLC, RCD-N and UPC towards
Beni
and Butembo, and again during their retreat. Some 70 rapes were committed during
the
capture and occupation of Mambasa town and surrounding villages. Superstition
and
abject ritual beliefs led to Pygmy women being raped, murdered, disembowelled,
and
_______________
1128 Ibid.
1129 See transcription of the hearings in the Lubanga case (ICC-01/04-01/06), 27
February 2009.
1130 Everything that follows has been taken from the following sources:
Interviews with the Mapping Team,
Ituri, March to May 2009; Report of the Special Rapporteur (A/58/534); Special
report on the events in
Ituri (S/2004/573); Transcription of hearings in The Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-
01/06, 3 February 2009; HRW, Covered in blood, 2003; HRW, The Curse of Gold,
2005; AI, On the
precipice: the deepening human rights and humanitarian crisis in Ituri, 2003;
AI, Ituri: A Need for
Protection, a Thirst for Justice, 2003; FIDH, Persévérance de la haine ethnique
et des violations massives
et systématiques des droits de l’homme à Bunia, 2003; Lisette Banza Mbombo,
Christian Hemedi Bayolo
and Colette Braeckman, Violences sexuelles contre les femmes, crimes sans
châtiment, 2004; U.S.
Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2003.
1131 MSF, Enough is enough, sexual violence as a weapon of war, 2004.
1132 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January and February
2009; Voix des
Opprimés, Rapport sur les événements du Haut-Zaïre entre 1993 et 2003, 2008.
sometimes even eaten.1133 Other rapes were committed by soldiers
from the ALC/MLC
and the APC/RCD-ML during the course of 2002, for example in Watsa territory, in
the
area around the lines separating the zones controlled by the RCD-N and MLC from
those
of the APC/RCD-ML and the FAPC,1134 by soldiers from these camps.1135
North Kivu Province
604. In North Kivu, the RCD-Goma was still fighting the Mayi-Mayi and the
FDLR
and, from 2003 on, also the RCD-ML in Lubero in an attempt to establish its
control over
the northern part of North Kivu. During these offensives, numerous rapes were
perpetrated by all parties to the conflict and women were forced into sexual
slavery. In
the RCD-Goma’s military camp at Mushaki,1136 west of Goma, girl
soldiers reportedly
"served as the wives" of adult soldiers. They were also reportedly raped several
times a
night by a number of men and it was reported that a senior officer abducted a
school girl
in order to imprison and rape her.1137
605. As in the previous period, the Mayi-Mayi militias and the FDLR also
continued to
rape and abduct women. At Kitchanga in Masisi, women were reportedly abducted,
used
to carry looted goods to market, then repeatedly raped by elements of the FDLR.1138
In
some cases, the rapes were apparently aimed at causing forced pregnancies in
order to
increase the proportion of Kinyarwandan speakers in the region.1139
606. During the Mambasa events of 31 December 2002 to 20 January 2003, women
from the Nande and Pygmy communities were particularly targeted and at least 95
rapes
were committed in the towns of Beni, Butembo, Mangina, Oicha and Erengeti.1140
South Kivu Province
607. Over the 2001-2003 period, although South Kivu was officially under the
control
_______________
1133 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province,
November 2008; Report of the Special
Investigation Team on the events in Mambasa (S/2003/674); Special report of
MONUC on the events in
Ituri (January 2002-December 2003), [S/2004/573]; Minority Rights Group
International, Erasing the
Board: Report of the international research mission into crimes under
international law committed against
the Bambuti Pygmies in the eastern DRC, 2004; HRW, Covered in blood, 2003;
Lisette Banza Mbombo,
Christian Hemedi Bayolo and Colette Braeckman, Violences sexuelles contre les
femmes, crimes sans
châtiment, March 2004; J. P. Remy, Actes de cannibalisme au Congo, 2002.
1134 The “Force armée populaire du Congo” was an armed group active in the
territories of Aru and Mahagi
in Ituri district.
1135 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January and February
2009.
1136 Special report of MONUC on the events in Ituri (January 2002-December
2003), [S/2004/573].
1137 ACPD, Violations des droits de l’homme et du droit humanitaire: état des
contradictions des parties
armées au regard du processus de paix en RDC, 2003; HRW, The War Within the War,
2002; U.S.
Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2001.
1138 HRW, The War Within the War, 2002.
1139 AI, DRC – Mass rape: time for remedies, 2004.
1140 Report of the Special Investigation Team on the events in Mambasa
(S/2003/674), annex I; HRW,
Covered in blood, 2003; J. P. Remy, Actes de cannibalisme au Congo, 2002.