OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
No. 91-1057V
http://www.law.gwu.edu/cofc-data/specmast/hastings/may.rul.htm
(Filed: June 27, 1997)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * |
* | |
* | ||
* | ||
VERNA MAY, | * | |
* | ||
* | ||
Petitioner, | * | TO BE PUBLISHED |
* | ||
v. | * | |
* | ||
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND | * | |
HUMAN SERVICES, | * | |
* | ||
Respondent. | * | |
* | ||
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * |
* |
Thomas C. Knowles, Oakland, California, appeared for petitioner.
Michael Milmoe, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., appeared for
respondent.
RULING CONCERNING "$1000 ISSUE"
HASTINGS, Special Master.
This is an action seeking an award under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program (hereinafter "the Program"). See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 et seq.(1) In this case, the petitioner alleges that her ongoing
problem with pain in her joints was caused by a rubella vaccination. With respect to that
claim, a chief issue has been whether petitioner has successfully demonstrated that she
incurred more than $1000 in unreimbursed out-of-pocket expenses due to her joint symptoms,
within three years of the onset of those symptoms. See § 300aa-11(c)(1)(D)(i). Having
carefully considered both parties' arguments concerning this issue, I hereby rule that
petitioner has in fact demonstrated compliance with that requirement for a Program award.
I
BACKGROUND
A. The relevant statutory provision
Section 300aa-13(a)(1) provides that Program compensation will be awarded if the
special master finds that the petitioner has demonstrated "the matters required in
the petition by section 300aa-11(c)(1) of this title." Section 300aa-11(c)(1)(D)(i),
in turn, provides that a Program petitioner must demonstrate (2)
that he or she "incurred unreimbursable expenses due in whole or part to [the
vaccine-related injury] in an amount greater than $1,000 * * *." Such expenses must
be incurred within the statutory limitations period for filing the Program petition, which
in this case means the three-year period from the onset of petitioner's symptoms in April
of 1990. See Black v. Secretary of HHS, 93 F. 3d 781, 790 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
B. Relevant facts
Petitioner received her vaccination at issue, a rubella vaccination, on April 5, 1990.
Within a few days thereafter, petitioner experienced the onset of chronic pain in multiple
joints. (For reasons set forth elsewhere, I have concluded that these symptoms were caused
by that vaccination.) These symptoms resulted in extensive medical treatment for
petitioner. Because the symptoms were considered to be the result of petitioner's
vaccination, and the vaccination was received as a condition of petitioner's employment as
a nurse, petitioner's medical expenses relating to her joint symptoms, for approximately
the first 13 months of her ailment, were completely paid by her employer, pursuant to her
state's "worker's compensation" system.(3) And
even after that "worker's compensation" coverage expired, most of her related
medical expenses were covered by her general health insurance policy. Therefore, while
petitioner received much medical attention for her chronic joint ailment, the amounts that
actually went from petitioner's own pocket directly to medical personnel for treatment of
her joint symptoms during the three-year period after the onset of her joint symptoms were
limited.(4)
Petitioner's joint symptoms, however, also made it impossible for her to return to her
employment, so that petitioner eventually lost her job as a result of this disability.(5) In approximately December of 1990, petitioner lost the
health insurance coverage that had formerly been provided by her employer, and was forced
thereafter to pay for her health insurance directly out of her own pocket. From December
of 1990 through March of 1993, petitioner's payments for these health insurance premiums
totalled at least $4,700. (See petitioner's Ex. J-3, filed as part of her
"Supplemental Rubella Filing" on September 10, 1993.)
II
DISCUSSION
Respondent does not seem to contest the key facts set forth above--i.e., that
petitioner lost her job because of her joint symptoms; that her job had provided her with
health insurance coverage; and that during the relevant three-year period, after losing
her job, petitioner made payments for health insurance coverage far exceeding $1,000.
Rather, the issue here is a legal one. That is, given the above facts, do
petitioner's out-of-pocket payments for health insurance in the period after she lost her
job qualify toward the "$1000 requirement" of § 300aa-11(c)(1)(D)(i)?
Petitioner argues that they do, respondent that they do not.
I find the petitioner's view to be the correct one. In my view, the appropriate test is
a simple "but for" test. That is, "but for" for the injury in
question, would the expenditure have been necessary? If the answer is "no," then
the expenditure qualifies toward the "$1000 requirement" of
§ 300aa-11(c)(1)(D)(i). Or, to put the same test in other words, did the need to
make the expenditure arise as a result of the injury in question? If so, then the
expenditure qualifies toward the "$1000 requirement."(6)
Application of that test to this case is straight-forward. Prior to the onset of her
joint condition, petitioner was employed and received health insurance coverage that was
paid by her employer. Petitioner lost her job, and thus lost her health insurance
coverage, as a result of her joint condition. Thereafter, she had to make payments out of
her own pocket to obtain health insurance. Therefore, those health insurance payments were
unreimbursable expenses incurred by the petitioner, which she would not have
incurred "but for" her joint condition. Accordingly, these payments
qualify toward the "$1000 requirement" of § 300aa-11(c)(1)(D)(i).
Respondent's arguments to the contrary (see respondent's "Response" filed on
December 30, 1996 (hereinafter "R. Response")) are not persuasive. While
respondent's brief was less than completely clear, respondent's position seems to be that
the payments in question should not be considered applicable toward the "$1000
requirement" because those payments obtained for petitioner health care far beyond
that necessary for her vaccine-related injury itself. Respondent's brief seems to take the
position that only if the primary reason for buying the health insurance was to
supply health care directly relating to petitioner's vaccine-related condition
would the health insurance premiums be applicable toward the "$1000
requirement." Of course, respondent is correct that if that were the case, the
premiums would qualify. But as a matter of law, I find that respondent simply takes too
narrow a view of the type of expenses that may be counted toward the $1000 requirement.
Respondent, it would appear, simply disagrees that the "but for" test is
appropriate. Rather, respondent, in effect, seems to be clinging to the argument, raised
unsuccessfully by respondent in many past Program cases, that only direct "medical
expenses"--i.e., amounts paid for medical treatment of the
vaccine-related injury itself--are allowable toward the $1000 requirement.
This "medical expenses only" argument of respondent has been addressed and
rejected in a number of prior Program cases. See, e.g., Hutchings v. Secretary of HHS,
No. 94-388V, 1994 WL 808593 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 20, 1994); Olascoaga v.
Secretary of HHS, No. 93-616V, 1994 WL 100687 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. March 14, 1994); Ferguson
v. Secretary of HHS, No. 93-376V, 1995 WL 642693 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 19,
1995); Williams v. Secretary of HHS, No. 90-1737, 1997 WL 266964 (Fed. Cl. Spec.
Mstr. Apr. 30, 1997); Ashe-Robinson v. Secretary of HHS, No. 94-1096V, 1997 WL
53450 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 23, 1997). The "but for" test that I have
adopted has also been explicitly endorsed. See Hutchings, supra; Ferguson,
supra; Ashe-Robinson, supra. Further, a number of other decisions have also
counted non-medical expenses toward the $1000 requirement, in rulings that seem
analytically to suggest a test substantially similar to the "but for" test. See,
e.g., Jamieson v. Secretary of HHS, No. 90-1019V, 1992 WL 229390 (Cl. Ct. Spec.
Mstr. Aug. 31, 1992) (counting meal expenses incurred by parents in visiting ill child); Mathisen
v. Secretary of HHS, No. 92-703V, 1994 WL 808593 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 2, 1994)
(allowing mileage expenses); Lenander v. Secretary of HHS, No. 92-659V, 1996 WL
614802 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 25, 1996) (allowing expenditures for shoes and boots for
person with a polio injury).
In short, I find that, contrary to respondent's view, the statute and the case law
support the use of a simple "but for" test, and that the expenditures here in
question pass that test.
I will also address two other issues raised by respondent's brief. First, respondent
has pointed (R. Response at 5) to the cases in which special masters have ruled that to
lose the opportunity for earnings as a result of a vaccine-caused injury is not to
"incur an expense" within the meaning of § 300aa-11(c)(1)(D)(i). See Warner
v. Secretary of HHS, No. 92-201V, 1992 WL 405286 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 29,
1992); Robinson v. Secretary of HHS, No. 93-530V, 1994 WL 879449 (Fed. Cl. Spec.
Mstr. Feb. 23, 1994). But, in my view, my ruling here is not inconsistent with those
cases. The difference is that in the cited cases, there was no actual expense incurred--i.e.,
the injured party did not actually pay out any money or incur a debt. Here, in
contrast, the petitioner actually did pay out specific amounts for health
insurance.
Second, I note that respondent's brief included numerous requests for records allegedly
relevant to this "$1000 issue." These requests were discussed at the status
conference held on February 6, 1997. As noted at that status conference and in my
Order dated February 10, 1997, I found reasonable respondent's request for
petitioner's employment personnel records, to verify the fact that she lost her job as a
result of her vaccine-related condition. Later, in my order filed on May 22, 1997, I
also responded to two more of respondent's concerns, by requesting that petitioner file a
declaration and documentation relevant to two points. (That documentation was subsequently
filed on June 16, 1997.) As to the other documents requested by respondent, I denied
respondent's request. The explanation is that those other requests related to documents
which would be relevant only to respondent's much narrower theory (discussed above at p.
4) as to how the health insurance payments might qualify. Because I have accepted
petitioner's broader legal theory, the respondent's additional record requests seem to be
irrelevant.(7)
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I hereby conclude that petitioner has adequately satisfied the
"$1000 requirement" of § 300aa-11(c)(1)(D)(i).
____________________________________
George L. Hastings, Jr.
Special Master
1. The applicable provisions defining the Program are found at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 et seq. (1994 ed.). Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all "§" references will be to 42 U.S.C. (1994 ed.).
2. Petitioner has the burden of demonstrating the facts necessary for entitlement to an award by a "preponderance of the evidence." § 300aa-13(a)(1)(A). Under that standard, the existence of a fact must be shown to be "more probable than not." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
3. See petitioner's filing of November 26, 1996, Ex. 3, p. 3, in which petitioner indicates that her "worker's compensation" coverage ended as of May 20, 1991.
4. Note that in her documents filed on November 26, 1996 (see Ex. 3, pp. 3-4), petitioner set forth only about $300 in actual out-of-pocket costs paid directly for joint-related medical care during the applicable three-year period. Later, in her reply brief filed on January 31, 1997, petitioner indicated (p. 3, fn. 1) that she had additional out-of-pocket costs, without specifying what those might be. At the status conference held on February 6, 1997, however, petitioner's counsel clarified that petitioner at this time does not wish to offer any other expenses toward the "$1000 requirement," but instead desires to proceed on the health insurance premium theory. And since I find merit in that theory, there is no need to consider at this time whether petitioner might have other qualifying unreimbursed expenses.
5. See petitioner's Declaration filed on November 26, 1996 (Ex. 4), and also her documentation filed on March 24, 1997.
6. Of course, there is also an implicit requirement that the need for the expenditure be a "reasonable" one, and that the expenditure be a "reasonable" method of meeting that need. For example, if an injured party needed a knee brace, and one made from aluminum costing $500 would suffice, an expenditure of $1000 for a brace made of gold instead of aluminum would fail the "reasonableness" test. Only $500 of such expenditure would count toward the "$1000 requirement."
7. It may also be noted that among respondent's requests was a request for "a copy of the petition for worker's compensation and a copy of the decision ordering it to be paid." (See R. Response, attached letter.) But, as petitioner replied, the "worker's compensation" file had already been filed, as petitioner's Ex. I, on September 10, 1993.