The Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) was one of a series of
crises during an era of upheaval in the Middle East:
revolution in Iran, occupation of the U.S. embassy in Tehran
by militant students, invasion of the Great Mosque in Mecca
by anti-royalist Islamicists, the Soviet Union's occupation
of Afghanistan, and internecine fighting among Syrians,
Israelis, and Palestinians in Lebanon. The war followed
months of rising tension between the Iranian Islamic
republic and secular nationalist Iraq. In mid-September 1980
Iraq attacked, in the mistaken belief that Iranian political
disarray would guarantee a quick victory.
The international community responded with U.N. Security
Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire and for all
member states to refrain from actions contributing in any
way to the conflict's continuation. The Soviets, opposing
the war, cut off arms exports to Iran and to Iraq, its ally
under a 1972 treaty (arms deliveries resumed in 1982). The
U.S. had already ended, when the shah fell, previously
massive military sales to Iran. In 1980 the U.S. broke off
diplomatic relations with Iran because of the Tehran embassy
hostage crisis; Iraq had broken off ties with the U.S.
during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
The U.S. was officially neutral regarding the Iran-Iraq
war, and claimed that it armed neither side. Iran depended
on U.S.-origin weapons, however, and sought them from
Israel, Europe, Asia, and South America. Iraq started the
war with a large Soviet-supplied arsenal, but needed
additional weaponry as the conflict wore on.
Initially, Iraq advanced far into Iranian territory, but
was driven back within months. By mid-1982, Iraq was on the
defensive against Iranian human-wave attacks. The U.S.,
having decided that an Iranian victory would not serve its
interests, began supporting Iraq: measures already underway
to upgrade U.S.-Iraq relations were accelerated, high-level
officials exchanged visits, and in February 1982 the State
Department removed Iraq from its list of states supporting
international terrorism. (It had been included several years
earlier because of ties with several Palestinian nationalist
groups, not Islamicists sharing the worldview of al-Qaeda.
Activism by Iraq's main Shiite Islamicist opposition group,
al-Dawa, was a major factor precipitating the war -- stirred
by Iran's Islamic revolution, its endeavors included the
attempted assassination of Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz.)
Prolonging the war was phenomenally expensive. Iraq
received massive external financial support from the Gulf
states, and assistance through loan programs from the U.S.
The White House and State Department pressured the
Export-Import Bank to provide Iraq with financing, to
enhance its credit standing and enable it to obtain loans
from other international financial institutions. The U.S.
Agriculture Department provided taxpayer-guaranteed loans
for purchases of American commodities, to the satisfaction
of U.S. grain exporters.
The U.S. restored formal relations with Iraq in November
1984, but the U.S. had begun, several years earlier, to
provide it with intelligence and military support (in secret
and contrary to this country's official neutrality) in
accordance with policy directives from President Ronald
Reagan. These were prepared pursuant to his March 1982
National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM 4-82) asking for a
review of U.S. policy toward the Middle East.
One of these directives from Reagan, National Security
Decision Directive (NSDD) 99, signed on July 12, 1983, is
available only in a highly redacted version
[Document 21]. It reviews U.S.
regional interests in the Middle East and South Asia, and
U.S. objectives, including peace between Israel and the
Arabs, resolution of other regional conflicts, and economic
and military improvements, "to strengthen regional
stability." It deals with threats to the U.S., strategic
planning, cooperation with other countries, including the
Arab states, and plans for action. An interdepartmental
review of the implications of shifting policy in favor of
Iraq was conducted following promulgation of the directive.
By the summer of 1983 Iran had been reporting Iraqi use
of using chemical weapons for some time. The Geneva protocol
requires that the international community respond to
chemical warfare, but a diplomatically isolated Iran
received only a muted response to its complaints
[Note 1]. It intensified its
accusations in October 1983, however, and in November asked
for a United Nations Security Council investigation.
The U.S., which followed developments in the Iran-Iraq
war with extraordinary intensity, had intelligence
confirming Iran's accusations, and describing Iraq's "almost
daily" use of chemical weapons, concurrent with its policy
review and decision to support Iraq in the war
[Document 24]. The intelligence
indicated that Iraq used chemical weapons against Iranian
forces, and, according to a November 1983 memo, against
"Kurdish insurgents" as well
[Document 25].
What was the Reagan administration's response? A State
Department account indicates that the administration had
decided to limit its "efforts against the Iraqi CW program
to close monitoring because of our strict neutrality in the
Gulf war, the sensitivity of sources, and the low
probability of achieving desired results." But the
department noted in late November 1983 that "with the
essential assistance of foreign firms, Iraq ha[d] become
able to deploy and use CW and probably has built up large
reserves of CW for further use. Given its desperation to end
the war, Iraq may again use lethal or incapacitating CW,
particularly if Iran threatens to break through Iraqi lines
in a large-scale attack" [Document
25]. The State Department argued that the U.S.
needed to respond in some way to maintain the credibility of
its official opposition to chemical warfare, and recommended
that the National Security Council discuss the issue.
Following further high-level policy review, Ronald Reagan
issued National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 114,
dated November 26, 1983, concerned specifically with U.S.
policy toward the Iran-Iraq war. The directive reflects the
administration's priorities: it calls for heightened
regional military cooperation to defend oil facilities, and
measures to improve U.S. military capabilities in the
Persian Gulf, and directs the secretaries of state and
defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
take appropriate measures to respond to tensions in the
area. It states, "Because of the real and psychological
impact of a curtailment in the flow of oil from the Persian
Gulf on the international economic system, we must assure
our readiness to deal promptly with actions aimed at
disrupting that traffic." It does not mention chemical
weapons [Document 26].
Soon thereafter, Donald Rumsfeld (who had served in
various positions in the Nixon and Ford administrations,
including as President Ford's defense secretary, and at this
time headed the multinational pharmaceutical company G.D.
Searle & Co.) was dispatched to the Middle East as a
presidential envoy. His December 1983 tour of regional
capitals included Baghdad, where he was to establish "direct
contact between an envoy of President Reagan and President
Saddam Hussein," while emphasizing "his close relationship"
with the president [Document 28].
Rumsfeld met with Saddam, and the two discussed regional
issues of mutual interest, shared enmity toward Iran and
Syria, and the U.S.'s efforts to find alternative routes to
transport Iraq's oil; its facilities in the Persian Gulf had
been shut down by Iran, and Iran's ally, Syria, had cut off
a pipeline that transported Iraqi oil through its territory.
Rumsfeld made no reference to chemical weapons, according to
detailed notes on the meeting
[Document 31].
Rumsfeld also met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz,
and the two agreed, "the U.S. and Iraq shared many common
interests." Rumsfeld affirmed the Reagan administration's
"willingness to do more" regarding the Iran-Iraq war, but
"made clear that our efforts to assist were inhibited by
certain things that made it difficult for us, citing the use
of chemical weapons, possible escalation in the Gulf, and
human rights." He then moved on to other U.S. concerns
[Document 32]. Later, Rumsfeld
was assured by the U.S. interests section that Iraq's
leadership had been "extremely pleased" with the visit, and
that "Tariq Aziz had gone out of his way to praise Rumsfeld
as a person" [Document 36
and Document 37].
Rumsfeld returned to Baghdad in late March 1984. By this
time, the U.S. had publicly condemned Iraq's chemical
weapons use, stating, "The United States has concluded that
the available evidence substantiates Iran's charges that
Iraq used chemical weapons"
[Document 47]. Briefings for Rumsfeld's meetings
noted that atmospherics in Iraq had deteriorated since his
December visit because of Iraqi military reverses and
because "bilateral relations were sharply set back by our
March 5 condemnation of Iraq for CW use, despite our
repeated warnings that this issue would emerge sooner or
later" [Document 48].
Rumsfeld was to discuss with Iraqi officials the Reagan
administration's hope that it could obtain Export-Import
Bank credits for Iraq, the Aqaba pipeline, and its vigorous
efforts to cut off arms exports to Iran. According to an
affidavit prepared by one of Rumsfeld's companions during
his Mideast travels, former NSC staff member Howard Teicher,
Rumsfeld also conveyed to Iraq an offer from Israel to
provide assistance, which was rejected
[Document 61].
Although official U.S. policy still barred the export of
U.S. military equipment to Iraq, some was evidently provided
on a "don't ask - don't tell" basis. In April 1984, the
Baghdad interests section asked to be kept apprised of Bell
Helicopter Textron's negotiations to sell helicopters to
Iraq, which were not to be "in any way configured for
military use" [Document 55].
The purchaser was the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. In December
1982, Bell Textron's Italian subsidiary had informed the
U.S. embassy in Rome that it turned down a request from Iraq
to militarize recently purchased Hughes helicopters. An
allied government, South Korea, informed the State
Department that it had received a similar request in June
1983 (when a congressional aide asked in March 1983 whether
heavy trucks recently sold to Iraq were intended for
military purposes, a State Department official replied "we
presumed that this was Iraq's intention, and had not
asked.") [Document 44]
During the spring of 1984 the U.S. reconsidered policy
for the sale of dual-use equipment to Iraq's nuclear
program, and its "preliminary results favor[ed] expanding
such trade to include Iraqi nuclear entities"
[Document 57]. Several months
later, a Defense Intelligence Agency analysis said that even
after the war ended, Iraq was likely to "continue to develop
its formidable conventional and chemical capability, and
probably pursue nuclear weapons"
[Document 58]. (Iraq is situated in a dangerous
neighborhood, and Israel had stockpiled a large nuclear
weapons arsenal without international censure. Nuclear
nonproliferation was not a high priority of the Reagan
administration - throughout the 1980s it downplayed
Pakistan's nuclear program, though its intelligence
indicated that a weapons capability was being pursued, in
order to avert congressionally mandated sanctions. Sanctions
would have impeded the administration's massive military
assistance to Pakistan provided in return for its support of
the mujahideen fighting the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan.)
In February 1984, Iraq's military, expecting a major
Iranian attack, issued a warning that "the invaders should
know that for every harmful insect there is an insecticide
capable of annihilating it whatever the number and Iraq
possesses this annihilation insecticide"
[Document 41]. On March 3, the
State Department intervened to prevent a U.S. company from
shipping 22,000 pounds of phosphorous fluoride, a chemical
weapons precursor, to Iraq. Washington instructed the U.S.
interests section to protest to the Iraqi government, and to
inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that "we anticipate
making a public condemnation of Iraqi use of chemical
weapons in the near future," and that "we are adamantly
opposed to Iraq's attempting to acquire the raw materials,
equipment, or expertise to manufacture chemical weapons from
the United States. When we become aware of attempts to do
so, we will act to prevent their export to Iraq"
[Document 42].
The public condemnation was issued on March 5. It said,
"While condemning Iraq's chemical weapons use . . . The
United States finds the present Iranian regime's
intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed objective of
eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq to
be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among
nations and the moral and religious basis which it claims"
[Document 43].
Later in the month, the State Department briefed the
press on its decision to strengthen controls on the export
of chemical weapons precursors to Iran and Iraq, in response
to intelligence and media reports that precursors supplied
to Iraq originated in Western countries. When asked whether
the U.S.'s conclusion that Iraq had used chemical weapons
would have "any effect on U.S. recent initiatives to expand
commercial relationships with Iraq across a broad range, and
also a willingness to open diplomatic relations," the
department's spokesperson said "No. I'm not aware of any
change in our position. We're interested in being involved
in a closer dialogue with Iraq"
[Document 52].
Iran had submitted a draft resolution asking the U.N. to
condemn Iraq's chemical weapons use. The U.S. delegate to
the U.N. was instructed to lobby friendly delegations in
order to obtain a general motion of "no decision" on the
resolution. If this was not achievable, the U.S. delegate
was to abstain on the issue. Iraq's ambassador met with the
U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Jeane Kirkpatrick, and asked
for "restraint" in responding to the issue - as did the
representatives of both France and Britain.
A senior U.N. official who had participated in a
fact-finding mission to investigate Iran's complaint
commented "Iranians may well decide to manufacture and use
chemical weapons themselves if [the] international community
does not condemn Iraq. He said Iranian assembly speaker
Rafsanjani [had] made public statements to this effect"
[Document 50].
Iraqi interests section head Nizar Hamdoon met with
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Placke on March
29. Hamdoon said that Iraq strongly preferred a Security
Council presidential statement to a resolution, and wanted
the response to refer to former resolutions on the war,
progress toward ending the conflict, but to not identify any
specific country as responsible for chemical weapons use.
Placke said the U.S. could accept Iraqi proposals if the
Security Council went along. He asked for the Iraqi
government's help "in avoiding . . . embarrassing
situation[s]" but also noted that the U.S. did "not want
this issue to dominate our bilateral relationship"
[Document 54].
On March 30, 1984, the Security Council issued a
presidential statement condemning the use of chemical
weapons, without naming Iraq as the offending party. A State
Department memo circulating the draft text observed that,
"The statement, by the way contains all three elements
Hamdoon wanted" [Document 51].
On April 5, 1984, Ronald Reagan issued another
presidential directive (NSDD 139), emphasizing the U.S.
objective of ensuring access to military facilities in the
Gulf region, and instructing the director of central
intelligence and the secretary of defense to upgrade U.S.
intelligence gathering capabilities. It codified U.S.
determination to develop plans "to avert an Iraqi collapse."
Reagan's directive said that U.S. policy required
"unambiguous" condemnation of chemical warfare (without
naming Iraq), while including the caveat that the U.S.
should "place equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade
Iran from continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which
have characterized recent offensives." The directive does
not suggest that "condemning" chemical warfare required any
hesitation about or modification of U.S. support for Iraq
[Document 53].
A State Department background paper dated November 16,
1984 said that Iraq had stopped using chemical weapons after
a November 1983 demarche from the U.S., but had resumed
their use in February 1984. On November 26, 1984, Iraq and
the U.S. restored diplomatic relations. Deputy Prime
Minister Tariq Aziz, in Washington for the formal resumption
of ties, met with Secretary of State George Shultz. When
their discussion turned to the Iran-Iraq war, Aziz said that
his country was satisfied that "the U.S. analysis of the
war's threat to regional stability is 'in agreement in
principle' with Iraq's," and expressed thanks for U.S.
efforts to cut off international arms sales to Iran. He said
that "Iraq's superiority in weaponry" assured Iraq's
defense. Shultz, with presumed sardonic intent, "remarked
that superior intelligence must also be an important factor
in Iraq's defense;" Tariq Aziz had to agree
[Document 60].
Conclusion
The current Bush administration discusses Iraq in starkly
moralistic terms to further its goal of persuading a
skeptical world that a preemptive and premeditated attack on
Iraq could and should be supported as a "just war." The
documents included in this briefing book reflect the
realpolitik that determined this country's policies
during the years when Iraq was actually employing chemical
weapons. Actual rather than rhetorical opposition to such
use was evidently not perceived to serve U.S. interests;
instead, the Reagan administration did not deviate from its
determination that Iraq was to serve as the instrument to
prevent an Iranian victory. Chemical warfare was viewed as a
potentially embarrassing public relations problem that
complicated efforts to provide assistance. The Iraqi
government's repressive internal policies, though well known
to the U.S. government at the time, did not figure at all in
the presidential directives that established U.S. policy
toward the Iran-Iraq war. The U.S. was concerned with its
ability to project military force in the Middle East, and to
keep the oil flowing.
Most of the information in this briefing book, in its
broad outlines, has been available for years. Some of it was
recorded in contemporaneous news reports; a few
investigative reporters uncovered much more - especially
after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. A particular debt is owed
to the late representative Henry Gonzales (1916-2000),
Democrat of Texas, whose staff extensively investigated U.S.
policy toward Iraq during the 1980s and who would not be
deterred from making information available to the public
[Note 2]. Almost all of the
primary documents included in this briefing book were
obtained by the National Security Archive through the
Freedom of Information Act and were published in 1995
[Note 3].
Note: The following documents are
in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the
free
Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Document 1: United States
Embassy in Turkey Cable from Richard W. Boehm to the
Department of State. "Back Up of Transshipment Cargos for
Iraq," November 21, 1980.
Shortly after the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, the
U.S. embassy in Ankara reports that Turkish ports have a
backlog of goods awaiting transshipment to Iraq, and that a
substantial amount of Israeli goods transit Turkey for
"Islamic belligerents," including Israeli chemical products
for Iran. It remarks on "Israeli acumen" in selling to both
Iran and Iraq.
The Iran-Iraq war was a tragedy for Iraqis and Iranians,
resulting in hundreds of thousands of casualties and immense
material damage. It was sustained by an arms bazaar made up
of a broad spectrum of foreign governments and corporations:
British, Spanish, Italian, French, German, Brazilian,
Argentinean, Chilean, North Korean, Chinese, South African,
Eastern European, Israeli, American, etc., who found both
combatants eager consumers of weapons, ammunition, and
military technology. Iran needed U.S.-origin weapons
compatible with the military infrastructure created by the
U.S. during the shah's reign, could not buy them directly,
and had to rely on third-party suppliers like Israel.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 2: United States
Embassy in Israel Cable from Samuel W. Lewis to the
Department of State. "Conversation with [Excised]," December
12, 1980.
A source says Israel will refrain from selling arms to
Iran while Americans are held hostage in Tehran, but that
European arms dealers were providing it with weapons with or
without government approval.
(Iranian demonstrators seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran
in September 1979 to protest the admission of the exiled
shah to the U.S. for medical treatment, and held 52
Americans hostage. In response, the Carter administration
froze Iranian assets and imposed other sanctions. The
hostages were not released until January 20, 1981, the
inauguration day of newly elected President Ronald Reagan.)
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 3: Department of
State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to All Near Eastern
and South Asian Diplomatic Posts. "Military Equipment for
Iran and Iraq," February 16, 1981.
A State Department cable delineates official U.S. arms
export policy for Iran and Iraq as it stood in early 1981:
the "U.S. position has been to avoid taking sides in an
effort to prevent widening the conflict, bring an end to the
fighting and restore stability to the area."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 4: United States
Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr.
to the Department of State. "Prospects for DAS [Deputy
Assistant Secretary] Draper's Visit To Baghdad," April 4,
1981.
The U.S. interests section (since the U.S. and Iraq did
not have formal diplomatic relations at this time - they
were restored in November 1984 - they were represented in
each other's capitol by interests sections) says that the
U.S. now has "a greater convergence of interests with Iraq
than at any time since the revolution of 1958" (when Iraqis
overthrew the conservative Hashemite monarchy that had been
imposed under British colonialism.) Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Morris Draper is to visit Baghdad, "the
first visit by a senior department official since Phil Habib
stopped by in 1977."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 5: Department of
State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the United States
Interests Section in Iraq. "Secretary's Message To Iraqi
Foreign Minister," April 8, 1981.
Secretary of State Alexander Haig sends a personal
message to Iraqi Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi, noting
that it is important that "our two countries be able to
exchange views, freely and on a systematic basis," paving
the way for Deputy Assistant Secretary Morris Draper's
meetings in Baghdad.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 6: United States
Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr.
to the Department of State. "Meetings in Baghdad with
Foreign Minister Hammadi," April 12, 1981.
As the Reagan administration continues efforts to improve
relations with Iraq, the U.S. interests section in Baghdad
asks for more information from Washington "so as to be able
to take up with the Iraqis on suitable occasions a wide
array of issues of mutual interest."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 7: Iraq Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Letter from Saadoun Hammadi to Alexander M.
Haig, Jr. [Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs Praise for
Visit of Under Secretary Draper], April 15, 1981.
Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs Saadoun Hammadi thanks
Secretary of State Alexander Haig for Under Secretary
Draper's visit, supports discussion of strengthened trade
relations, and welcomes assurances that the U.S. will not
sell arms to Iran.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 8: United States
Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr.
to the Department of State. "Letter to the Secretary from
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi," April 20, 1981.
After reading a "friendly and non-contentious letter"
from Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi to Secretary of State
Haig, the head of the U.S. interests section agrees with
foreign ministry official Mohammed al-Sahhaf that a useful
two-way correspondence had been established between the U.S.
and Iraq.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 9: Department of State Cable from Alexander
M. Haig, Jr. to the Iraqi Interests Section in the United
States. "Meeting with Iraqint Chief al-Omar" [For Eagleton
from Draper], April 22, 1981.
Upon returning to Washington, Under Secretary Draper
assures the head of the Iraqi interests section that he was
extremely pleased with his visit to Baghdad and prospects
for improved relations and increased trade. He takes the
opportunity to make a "strong pitch" for a U.S. company
bidding on an Iraqi Metro project.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 10: United States
Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr.
to Department of State. "Meeting with Tariq Aziz," May 28,
1981.
Following consultations in Washington, the head of the
U.S. interests section in Baghdad, William Eagleton, meets
with Revolutionary Command Council representative Tariq Aziz,
the "highest level in the Iraqi government our Baghdad
mission has met with since the 1967 break in relations."
Eagleton informs Aziz of "the U.S. government's satisfaction
with the positive trend in U.S.-Iraqi relations." After the
meeting, he tells Washington that "we are in a position to
communicate directly with the leadership should we have any
sensitive or particularly important message to convey."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 11: Department of
State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the United States
Interests Section in Iraq. "U.S. Policy on Arms Sales and
Transfers to Iraq and Iran," June 3, 1981.
Washington tells the U.S. interests section in Baghdad
that it "has no specific information" regarding Iran's
reported acquisitions of U.S. arms and spare parts, and asks
the interests section head to assure Iraqi officials that
"the U.S. has not approved nor condoned any military sales
to Iraq or Iran."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 12: United States
Interests Section in Iraq Cable to the Department of State.
"Staffdel [Staff Delegation] Pillsbury's Visit to Baghdad,"
September 27, 1981.
A member of a staff delegation touring the Middle East on
behalf of Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) visits Iraq's
parliament, and has discussions during which "the atmosphere
was pleasant and friendly," reflected in expressions of
support for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 13: Department of
State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the United States
Interests Section in Iraq. "De-designation of Iraq as
Supporter of International Terrorism," February 27, 1982.
The State Department provides press guidance to regional
missions regarding removal of Iraq from its list of
countries that support international terrorism. The guidance
says that the decision has no implications for U.S. policy
toward the Iran-Iraq war.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 14: National
Security Study Directive (NSSD 4-82) from Ronald W. Reagan.
"U.S. Strategy for the Near East and Southwest Asia," March
19, 1982.
President Reagan calls for a review of policy for the
Middle East and South Asia, to prepare for decisions
regarding procurement, arms transfers, and intelligence
planning. Revised guidelines are needed because of regional
diplomatic and global oil market developments.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 15: United States
Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr.
to the Department of Commerce. "Helicopters and Airplanes
for Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform,"
September 20, 1982.
Iraq's director of agricultural aviation invites U.S.
crop-spraying aircraft manufacturers to provide information
about helicopters and pilot training, noting problems with
its existing equipment because pilots have been inhaling
insecticide fumes.
Iran was reporting chemical weapons use against its
forces by this time. According to a 1991 article in the Los
Angeles Times, American-built helicopters were used by Iraq
for some of its chemical weapons attacks; according to the
Central Intelligence Agency, Iraq experimented with using
commercial crop sprayers for biological warfare.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 16: Department of
State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States
Interests Section in Iraq. "Visit of Iraqi Foreign
Minister," January 15, 1983.
The State Department asks the U.S. interests section in
Baghdad to inform Iraqi officials that Secretary of State
George Shultz would welcome a visit by Foreign Minister
Saadoun Hammadi, but notes congressional criticism of Iraq
and the "sensitivity of the terrorism issue" (Iraq supported
several Palestinian nationalist factions.) The department
suggests Iraq "contribute to the positive atmosphere of the
visit" by curtailing its support for terrorism, mentioning
specifically the Palestinian groups Black June and May 15.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 17: Department of
State, Office of the Secretary Delegation Cable from George
P. Shultz to the Department of State. "Secretary's May 10
Meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz," May 11,
1983.
Secretary of State Shultz tells Iraqi Foreign Minister
Tariq Aziz that the U.S. wants the Iran-Iraq war to end. He
says that the U.S. is neutral toward the war but observes
that Aziz knows that "we had been helpful to Iraq in various
ways."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 18: Department of State Cable from
George P. Shultz to the United States Interests Section in
Iraq. "Message from the Secretary for FON MIN Tariq Aziz:
Iraqi Support for Terrorism," May 23, 1983.
Secretary of State George Shultz writes to Iraqi Foreign
Minister Tariq Aziz, commenting on the "very important
common interests" between Iraq and the U.S. Shultz obliquely
encourages Iraq to disassociate itself from the Palestinian
groups it supports by evoking conservative Shiite militants
opposed to both the U.S. and to Iraq's secular government:
it "appears that at least the inspiration for certain
terrorist acts against Iraq and against the U.S. emanates at
times from the same sources. By working together to combat
terrorism, our efforts should be more effective. In
observing Iraqi policy, it had begun to appear to me that
Iraq was approaching the conclusion that its national
interests are never served by international terrorists."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 19: Central
Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence Appraisal.
"The Iraqi Nuclear Program: Progress Despite Setbacks," June
1983.
In its assessment of Iraq's nuclear program, the Central
Intelligence Agency indicates that Iraq probably plans to
eventually obtain nuclear weapons. The CIA says it has not
identified such a program, but remarks that Iraq "has made a
few moves that could take it in that direction," while
noting the difficulty of clandestine research and
development and procurement of the necessary technology and
fissile materials.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 20: United States
Interests Section in Iraq Cable from Barbara K. Bodine to
the Department of State. "Militarization of Hughes
Helicopters," June 8, 1983.
Tells the State Department that a government official
from (presumably) South Korea reported that Iraq asked his
government to militarize Hughes helicopters that were sold
and delivered earlier in 1983. The request was turned down.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 21: National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD 99) from Ronald W. Reagan.
"United States Security Strategy for the Near East and South
Asia" [Attached to Cover Memorandum; Heavily Excised], July
12, 1983.
Outlines U.S. regional objectives, strategies, and action
plans for the Middle East (most content is excised).
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 22: Department of State, Bureau of Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs Information Memorandum from
Jonathan T. Howe to Lawrence S. Eagleburger. "Iran-Iraq War:
Analysis of Possible U.S. Shift from Position of Strict
Neutrality," October 7, 1983.
Discusses the feasibility of a U.S. "tilt" toward Iraq in
the Iran-Iraq war and related practical concerns. The
analysis notes that the U.S. "policy of strict neutrality
has already been modified, except for arms sales, since
Iran's forces crossed into Iraq in the summer of 1982. (We
assume that other actions not discussed here, such as
providing tactical intelligence, would continue as
necessary.)"
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 23: Foreign Broadcast Information
Service Transcription. "IRNA Reports Iraqi Regime Using
Chemical Weapons to Stop Val-Fajr IV," October 22, 1983.
Iran says that Iraq has been using chemical weapons
against Iranian troops.
Document 24: Department of
State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Information
Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe to George P. Shultz. "Iraq
Use of Chemical Weapons," November 1, 1983.
Officials from the State Department's Bureau of
Politico-Military Affairs tell Secretary Shultz that the
department has additional information confirming Iraq's
"almost daily" use of chemical weapons. They note, "We also
know that Iraq has acquired a CW production capability,
presumably from Western firms, including possibly a U.S.
foreign subsidiary." The issue is to be added to the agenda
for an upcoming National Security Council meeting, at which
measures to assist Iraq are to be considered. The officials
note that a response is important in order to maintain the
credibility of U.S. policy on chemical warfare.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 25: Department of
State, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs Action Memorandum from Jonathan T.
Howe to Lawrence S. Eagleburger. "Iraqi Use of Chemical
Weapons" [Includes Cables Entitled "Deterring Iraqi Use of
Chemical Weapons" and "Background of Iraqi Use of Chemical
Weapons"], November 21, 1983.
State Department officials recommend discussing the use
of chemical weapons with Iraqi officials soon, in order to
deter further use and "to avoid unpleasantly surprising Iraq
through public positions we may have to take on this issue."
A background cable says that Iraq used lethal chemical
weapons in October 1982 and, reportedly, against Iranian
forces July and August 1983 "and more recently against
Kurdish insurgents."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 26: National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD 114) from Ronald W.
Reagan. "U.S. Policy toward the Iran-Iraq War," November 26,
1983.
President Ronald Reagan directs that consultations begin
with regional states willing to cooperate with the U.S. on
measures to protect Persian Gulf oil production and its
transshipment infrastructure. The U.S. will give the highest
priority to the establishment of military facilities
allowing for the positioning of rapid deployment forces in
the region to guard oil facilities.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 27: Department of
State Cable from Kenneth W. Dam to the United States
Interests Section in Iraq. "Rumsfeld Visit to Iraq,"
December 7, 1983.
Reports that Donald Rumsfeld wants to visit Iraq during
his tour of Middle Eastern countries as an envoy for
President Reagan, but notes that he does not think his visit
will be worthwhile unless he meets directly with Saddam
Hussein.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 28: United States
Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr.
to the Department of State [et al.]. "Rumsfeld Visit to
Iraq," December 10, 1983.
The head of the U.S. interests section in Baghdad tells
Iraqi Under Secretary Mohammed al-Sahhaf that "perhaps the
greatest benefit" of Donald Rumsfeld's upcoming visit to
Baghdad "will be the establishment of direct contact between
an envoy of President Reagan and President Saddam Hussein."
The planned topics of discussion are the Iran-Iraq war, the
Arab-Israeli conflict, Lebanon, Syria, and any other issues
that the Iraqis might want to raise.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 29: United States Interests Section in
Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the United
States Embassy in Jordan. "Talking Points for Amb.
[Ambassador] Rumsfeld's Meeting with Tariq Aziz and Saddam
Hussein," December 14, 1983.
A U.S. interests section cable notes that presidential
envoy Donald Rumsfeld's upcoming meeting will be Saddam
Hussein's first with a representative of the U.S. executive
branch; therefore, a major goal will be "to initiate a
dialogue and establish personal rapport." In the meeting,
"Rumsfeld will want to emphasize his close relationship with
President Reagan . . ." Talking points for the meeting
include the Iran-Iraq war (the U.S. "would regard any major
reversal of Iraq's fortunes as a strategic defeat for the
West"), expansion of Iraqi pipeline facilities, Lebanon,
Syria, strengthening of Egyptian and Iraqi ties, and the
threat of terrorism, which targets both countries.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 30: United States Embassy in Italy Cable
from Maxwell M. Rabb to the Department of State. "Rumsfeld's
Larger Meeting with Iraqi Deputy PM [Prime Minister] and FM
[Foreign Minister] Tariz [Tariq] Aziz, December 19,"
December 20, 1983.
During a meeting with Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and
other Iraqi officials, Donald Rumsfeld notes that the U.S.
and Iraq have both differences and "a number of areas of
common interest." Aziz says that he was heartened by a line
in President Reagan's letter to Saddam Hussein stating, "The
Iran-Iraq war could post serious problems for the economic
and security interests of the U.S., its friends in the
region and in the free world."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 31: United States Embassy in United Kingdom
Cable from Charles H. Price II to the Department of State.
"Rumsfeld Mission: December 20 Meeting with Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein," December 21, 1983.
At a 90-minute meeting with Donald Rumsfeld, Saddam
Hussein evinces "obvious pleasure" at a letter Rumsfeld
brought from President Ronald Reagan. The two discuss common
U.S.-Iraqi interests, including Lebanon, Palestine,
opposition to an outcome of the Iran-Iraq war that "weakened
Iraq's role or enhanced interests and ambitions of Iran,"
and U.S. efforts to cut off arms sales to Iran. Rumsfeld
says that the U.S. feels extremely strongly about terrorism
and says that it has a home - in Iran, Syria, and Libya, and
that it is supported by the Soviet Union. He encourages
arrangements that might provide alternative transshipment
routes for Iraq's oil, including pipelines through Saudi
Arabia or to the Gulf of Aqaba in Jordan. The State
Department calls the meeting a "positive milestone."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 32: United States
Embassy in the United Kingdom Cable from Charles H. Price II
to the Department of State. "Rumsfeld One-on-One Meeting
with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister," December 21, 1983.
Presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld and Tariq Aziz meet
for two and one-half hours and agree that "the U.S. and Iraq
shared many common interests," including peace in the
Persian Gulf, the desire to diminish the influence of Iran
and Syria, and support for reintegrating Egypt, isolated
since its unilateral peace with Israel, into the Arab world.
Rumsfeld comments on Iraq's oil exports, suggests
alternative pipeline facilities, and discusses opposition to
international terrorism and support for a fair Arab-Israeli
peace. He and Aziz discuss the Iran-Iraq war "in detail."
Rumsfeld says that the administration wants an end to the
war, and offers "our willingness to do more." He mentions
chemical weapons, possible escalation of fighting in the
Gulf, and human rights as impediments to the U.S.
government's desire to do more to help Iraq, then shifts the
conversation to U.S. opposition to Syria's role in Lebanon.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 33: Department of State, Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Action Memorandum from Richard W. Murphy to Lawrence S.
Eagleburger. "EXIM [Export-Import] Bank Financing for Iraq"
[Includes Letter From Lawrence S. Eagleburger to William
Draper, Dated December 24, 1983], December 22, 1983.
Pursuant to the Reagan administration's policy of
increasing support for Iraq, the State Department advises
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence
Eagleburger to urge the U.S. Export-Import Bank to provide
Iraq with financial credits. Eagleburger signs a letter to
Eximbank saying that since Saddam Hussein had complied with
U.S. requests, and announced the end of all aid to the
principal terrorist group of concern to the U.S., and
expelled its leader (Abu Nidal), "The terrorism issue,
therefore, should no longer be an impediment to EXIM
financing for U.S. sales to Iraq." The financing is to
signal U.S. belief in Iraq's future economic viability,
secure a foothold in the potentially large Iraqi market, and
"go far to show our support for Iraq in a practical, neutral
context."
Source: Declassified
through Congressional investigation
Document 34: Department of State Cable from
Kenneth W. Dam to United States Embassy in Jordan. "Rumsfeld
Mission: Meeting with King Hussein in London," December 23,
1983.
Ambassador-at-large and presidential emissary Donald
Rumsfeld discusses prospects for improving U.S.-Iraqi
relations with King Hussein of Jordan. Rumsfeld reports on
his talks with Saddam Hussein and Tariq Aziz and says they
had "more areas of agreement than disagreement." He also
reviews the status of a proposed pipeline to Aqaba for
Iraq's oil.
The U.S. promoted the Aqaba pipeline project strenuously
for several years during the early to mid 1980s. It would
have carried oil from northern Iraq to the Gulf of Aqaba in
Jordan, alleviating the disruptive effect on Iraq's oil
output that resulted from Iran's attacks on oil
transshipment facilities in the Persian Gulf and from
Syria's closing of a pipeline that had transported Iraqi
oil. The proposed project reflected the U.S.'s extreme
nervousness about threats to the world oil supply resulting
from the Iran-Iraq war.
The U.S. involved several U.S.-based multinational
corporations in planning the project. International
financier Bruce Rappaport, a friend of CIA director William
Casey, was also a central figure in the proposed deal. (The
final report of the independent counsel for the Iran-Contra
"arms for hostages" scandal cites reports indicating that
Rappaport's bank in Geneva was the recipient of a mysterious
$10 million payment from the Sultan of Brunei to fund the
Nicaraguan contras that subsequently disappeared. Rappaport
denied this; the final report says that the issue remained
unresolved. He was invited to testify in 1999 at a House
Banking committee hearing on corruption in Russian financial
transactions, but declined.) The project was complicated by
demands that the U.S. arrange for ironclad security
guarantees from the Israelis, since the pipeline would have
been vulnerable to their attack. The Israelis, for their
part, demanded guarantees that pipeline facilities would not
cause environmental damage.
All involved had their reasons for at least hypothetical
interest in the project. For Iraq, it would have been a
manifestation of improved U.S.-Iraq relations - they wanted
as much U.S. financial and other involvement in the proposed
deal as possible. For the U.S., it would have provided an
alternative, theoretically secure outlet for oil and created
a nexus for entangling Iraqi interests with those of Jordan
and Israel, consistent with U.S. plans to create a wider
consortium of Arab countries that would cooperate with the
U.S. and would be willing to resolve the Palestine-Israel
dispute on U.S. terms. Israel would have benefited from new
oil facilities in its vicinity, and won points with the
Reagan administration. Also, according to internal documents
from a friend of Reagan administration Attorney General
Edmund Meese, brought in as an intermediary because of his
Israeli ties, payoffs would have been skimmed from complex
financial guarantee arrangements for the Israeli government
and Labor Party.
Attempts to agree on arrangements that would satisfy all
parties dragged on, until the several private companies that
had been brought in to plan the project backed out,
questioning the motives of all involved. Iraq, however,
revived the concept in 2000, presumably for its own
strategic interests.
Source: Court exhibit
Document 35: United States Interests Section in
Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department
of State. "Follow-up on Rumsfeld Visit to Baghdad," December
26, 1983.
William Eagleton meets with Iraqi Under Secretary
Mohammed al-Sahhaf to follow up on Donald Rumsfeld's visit.
Eagleton discusses U.S. efforts to coordinate policy toward
the Iran-Iraq war among Persian Gulf states, its campaign to
stop arms sales to Iran, and its wish to see Iraq's oil
exports increase. He informs the Iraqi official of the
degree of U.S. interest in Iraq's economic situation,
mentioning the "high level policy review which had
established the environment and policy positions that had
been conveyed to the Iraqi leadership by Ambassador
Rumsfeld."
Eagleton comments, "Ambassador Rumsfeld's visit has
elevated U.S.-Iraqi relations to a new level. This is both
symbolically important and practically helpful."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 36: United States
Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr.
to the Department of State. "Meeting With Tariq Aziz:
Expanding Iraq's Oil Export Facilities," January 3, 1984.
During a meeting following Donald Rumsfeld's talks, Tariq
Aziz tells William Eagleton that President Saddam Hussein
was pleased with the visit and with the positive atmosphere
it created.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 37: United States Interests Section in Iraq
Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of
State. "[Excised] Iraqi Pipeline through Jordan," January
10, 1984.
The head of the U.S. interests section tells Washington,
"the Iraqi leadership was extremely pleased with Amb.
Rumsfeld's visit. Tariq Aziz had gone out of his way to
praise Rumsfeld as a person . . ."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 38: Department of
State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States
Consulate General, Jerusalem. "Follow-up Steps on Iraq-Iran"
[Includes Transmittal Sheet], January 14, 1984.
The U.S. intensifies its diplomatic efforts to curtail
arms sales to Iran and imposes anti-terrorism export
controls on that country. However, it does not plan to
prohibit U.S. imports of Iranian oil.
The U.S. was developing plans to liberalize its export
policy for Iraq. The revised rules would permit the export
of U.S.-origin armored ambulances, communications gear, and
electronic equipment for the protection of Saddam Hussein's
personal aircraft. The Reagan administration was continuing
efforts to persuade the Export-Import Bank to provide
financing for Iraq -- a positive Eximbank determination
would improve Iraq's credit rating and make it easier for it
to obtain loans from international financial institutions.
Source: Declassified
through Congressional investigation
Document 39: Department of
State, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs Action Memorandum from David T.
Schneider to George P. Shultz. "Easing Restrictions on
Exports to Iraq," January 30, 1984.
The State Department presents the case for relaxing
controls on exports to Iraq of militarily useful items. The
department is concerned specifically with an application to
export dual-use heavy trucks, the sale of which to either
Iran or Iraq has been banned under the Export Administration
Act. Secretary of State Shultz approves the proposed sale.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 40: Export-Import
Bank of the United States, Country Risk Analysis Division
Memorandum to the Export-Import Bank of the United States,
Africa and Middle East Division, Board of Directors.
"Country Review and Recommendations for Eximbank's Programs"
[Extract; Includes Document Entitled "Appendix I: Iraq"],
February 21, 1984.
The Export-Import Bank considers Iraq a bad credit risk
because of its very high level of indebtedness and the
uncertainty created by the Iran-Iraq war. An appendix lists
U.S. companies that would be potential exporters to Iraq if
credits were available, including Westinghouse, General
Electric, Bechtel, and Halliburton.
Source: Declassified
through Congressional investigation
Document 41: United States
Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr.
to the Department of State. "Iraqi Warning re Iranian
Offensive," February 22, 1984.
Between presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld's two visits
to Iraq to seek ways to improve U.S.-Iraq relations and to
identify measures to assist Iraq's war efforts, the Iraqi
military issues a statement declaring that "the invaders
should know that for every harmful insect there is an
insecticide capable of annihilating it whatever their number
and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 42: Department of
State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States
Interests Section in Iraq. "U.S. Chemical Shipment to Iraq,"
March 4, 1984.
Indicates that a shipment of 22,000 pounds of phosphorous
fluoride to Iraq was held back at JFK airport because of
"concern over Iraq's possible intention to use the chemical
in the manufacture of chemical weapons." Washington asks the
U.S. interests section in Baghdad to remind Iraq's Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.'s grave concern about
chemical weapons, and to inform it that the U.S. will
publicly condemn their use in the near future. The interests
section is to reiterate the request that Iraq not use
chemical warfare, and to say that the U.S. opposes Iraq's
attempts to acquire chemical weapons related material from
the U.S.: "When we become aware of attempts to do so, we
will act to prevent their export to Iraq."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 43: Department of
State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Memorandum from James A. Placke to James M. Ealum [et al.].
[U.S. Condemnation of Iraqi Chemical Weapons Use], March 4,
1984.
The State Department circulates for review a draft press
statement and guidance for a U.S. condemnation of Iraq's use
of chemical weapons. The statement says that "While
condemning Iraq's chemical weapons use . . . . The United
States finds the present Iranian regime's intransigent
refusal to deviate from its avowed objective of eliminating
the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq to be
inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among
nations and the moral and religious basis which it claims."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 44: Department of
State Memorandum. "Notifying Congress of [Excised] Truck
Sale," March 5, 1984.
The State Department informs a House Committee on Foreign
Affairs staff member that the department has not objected to
the sale of 2,000 heavy trucks to Iraq, noting that they
were built in part in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
New York, and Michigan. The official policy of the U.S. is
that it does not export military related items to Iraq or
Iran. When asked if the trucks were intended for military
purposes, the official responds, "we presumed that this was
Iraq's intention, and had not asked."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 45: United States
Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr.
to the Department of State. "Iraq Reacts Angrily to U.S.
Condemnation of CW [Chemical Weapons] Use," March 7, 1984.
Reports that Iraq's defense minister denounced the State
Department's condemnation of Iraq's chemical weapons use.
The U.S. interests section comments that "The Iraqis
apparently have been stunned by our public condemnation."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 46: United States Embassy in Austria
Cable from Helene A. von Damm to the Department of State.
"Iranian War Wounded in Vienna," March 13, 1984.
The U.S. embassy in Austria tells the State Department
that a Belgian laboratory found residual amounts of mustard
gas and mycotoxin in the blood of Iranian war casualties
brought to Vienna for medical treatment.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 47: Department of
State Cable from George P. Shultz to the Mission to the
European Office of the United Nations and Other
International Organizations. "U.N. Human Rights Commission:
Item 12: Iranian Resolution on Use of Chemical Weapons by
Iraq," March 14, 1984.
The State Department instructs the U.S. delegate to the
United Nations to get the support of other Western missions
for a motion of "no decision" regarding Iran's draft
resolution condemning Iraq's use of chemical weapons.
Failing that, the U.S. is to abstain on the resolution.
The U.S. is to emphasize points made in a recent State
Department press conference, including the assertion that
"The USG evenhandedly condemns the prohibited use of
chemical weapons whenever it occurs."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 48: Department of
State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States
Embassy in Sudan. "Briefing Notes for Rumsfeld Visit to
Baghdad [Page Missing]," March 24, 1984.
A State Department background cable for Donald Rumsfeld's
March 1984 visit to Baghdad notes the distress caused to
Iraqi officials by the U.S.'s public condemnation of Iraq's
use of chemical weapons "despite our repeated warnings that
this issue would emerge sooner or later." Most of the cable
is concerned with the Reagan administration's interest in
reassuring Iraqi officials that U.S. financing might be
available for the proposed pipeline to deliver Iraqi oil to
Aqaba, and other U.S. regional interests. The cable notes
that Iraqi officials are "confused" by the administration's
"means of pursuing our stated objectives in the region."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 49: United States Embassy in Bahrain
Cable from Donald Charles Seidel to the Department of State.
"Middle East Mission: U.S. Efforts to Stop Arms Transfers to
Iran," March 24, 1984.
In preparation for his second round of meetings with
officials in Baghdad, Donald Rumsfeld asks for a list of the
countries that the U.S. has approached in order to persuade
them to cut off arms sales to Iran.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 50: Mission to the United
Nations Cable from Jeane J. Kirkpatrick to the Department of
State. "U.N. Report on Chemical Weapons Use in Iran/Iraq
War: Consideration in Security Council," March 28, 1984.
Reports British and Dutch efforts to draft a quick United
Nations resolution condemning the use of chemical weapons in
the Iran-Iraq war, describes evidence regarding Iraqi
chemical weapons use, and passes on the observation by a
U.N. official that "Iranians may well decide to manufacture
and use chemical weapons themselves if international
community does not condemn Iraq."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 51: Department of State,
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Cover
Memorandum from Allen Overmyer to James A. Placke. [United
Nations Security Council Response to Iranian Chemical
Weapons Complaint; Includes Revised Working Paper], March
30, 1984.
Reports that the U.N. Security Council decided to adopt
the text of a draft Dutch resolution on chemical weapons and
issue it as a presidential statement. "The statement, by the
way, contains all three elements Hamdoon wanted."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 52: Department of
State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States
Embassy in Lebanon [et al.]. "Department Press Briefing,
March 30, 1984," March 31, 1984.
The State Department announces it has imposed foreign
policy controls on Iran and Iraq for exports of chemical
weapons precursors. It responds to questions from the press
about U.S. policy regarding the Iran-Iraq war, and a
department spokesperson says Iraq's chemical weapons use
will not change U.S. interest in pursuing closer U.S.-Iraq
relations.
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 53: National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD 139) from Ronald W.
Reagan. "Measures to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness to
Respond to Developments in the Iran-Iraq War," April 5,
1984.
Ronald Reagan says that action must be taken to increase
U.S. military capabilities and "intelligence collection
posture" in the Persian Gulf. Secretary of State Shultz,
Secretary of Defense Weinberger, and Director of Central
Intelligence William J. Casey are to prepare a plan to
prevent Iraq's defeat in the Iran-Iraq war. Reagan directs
Shultz to ensure that the U.S. government's condemnation of
the use of chemical weapons is unambiguous, while placing
"equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran from
continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have
characterized recent offensives."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 54: Department of State Cable from George
P. Shultz to United States Embassy in Jordan. "Chemical
Weapons: Meeting With Iraqi Charge," April 6, 1984.
Reports that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James
Placke discussed a draft United Nations' resolution on
chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq war with Iraqi
interests section representative Nizar Hamdoon on March 29.
Hamdoon said that Iraq would prefer a Security Council
presidential statement to a resolution. Placke indicated
that the U.S. could accept Iraqi proposals regarding points
that should be included in the resolution if the Security
Council approves them. He said that the U.S. would like the
Iraqi government's cooperation "in avoiding situations that
would lead to difficult and possibly embarrassing
situation[s]" regarding chemical weapons use, but noted that
the U.S. did "not want this issue to dominate our bilateral
relationship nor to detract from our common interest to see
war brought to [an] early end."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 55: United States
Interests Section. Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr.
to the Department of State. "Bell Discusses Possible
Helicopter Sale to Iraq," April 12, 1984.
The U.S. interests section in Baghdad asks to be kept
apprised of developments in ongoing talks between Iraq and
Bell Helicopter Textron about its sale of helicopters to
Iraq's Ministry of Defense that "can not be in any way
configured for military use."
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 56: Letter from Richard M. Nixon to
Nicolae Ceausescu. [Regarding U.S.-Romanian Venture to Sell
Uniforms to Iraq], May 3, 1984.
Former president Richard Nixon sends a letter to Romanian
President Nicolae Ceausescu in support of a deal made by
Colonel John Brennan, his former aide and chief of staff,
and former attorney general John Mitchell, to buy
Romanian-manufactured military uniforms for export to Iraq.
Media and criminal investigations of U.S. companies that
had exported weapons-related or dual-use items to Iraq were
conducted after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Many of these
companies seemed to have connections with former U.S.
government officials.
Source: Court exhibit
Document 57: Department of
State, Special Adviser to the Secretary on Nonproliferation
Policy and Nuclear Energy Affairs Memorandum from Dick
Gronet to Richard T. Kennedy. "U.S. Dual-Use Exports to
Iraq: Specific Actions" [Includes Document Entitled "Dual
Use Exports to Iraq" Dated April 27, 1984], May 9, 1984.
An internal State Department paper indicates that the
government is reviewing policy for "the sale of certain
categories of dual-use items to Iraqi nuclear entities," and
the review's "preliminary results favor expanding such trade
to include Iraqi nuclear entities."
Source: Declassified
through Congressional investigation
Document 58: Defense
Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. "Defense Estimative
Brief: Prospects for Iraq," September 25, 1984.
The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses political,
economic, and military conditions in Iraq, predicts that it
will continue to develop its conventional and "formidable"
chemical capabilities, and will "probably pursue nuclear
weapons." It says that Iraq is unlikely to use chemical
weapons against Israel because of certain Israeli
retaliation, and that U.S.-Iraqi relations will hinge on
U.S. policy toward the Middle East, including its aid for
Iraq.
Source: Declassified
through Congressional investigation
Document 59: Department of State, Bureau of
Politico-Military Affairs Briefing Paper. "Iraqi Illegal Use
of Chemical Weapons," November 16, 1984.
Indicates that the U.S. concluded some time ago that Iraq
had used "domestically produced lethal CW" in the Iran-Iraq
war, developed in part through "the unwitting and, in some
cases, we believe witting assistance" of numerous Western
firms. The State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military
Affairs thinks that Iraq stopped using chemical weapons in
response to a U.S. demarche in November 1983, and resumed
their use in February 1984.
Source: Declassified
through Congressional investigation
Document 60: Department of
State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States
Embassy in Iraq. "Memcon [Memorandum of Conversation]:
Secretary's Meeting with Iraqi DepPrimMin [Deputy Prime
Minister] Tariq Aziz, November 26, 1984, 10:00 a.m.,"
November 29, 1984.
Following the restoration of formal diplomatic relations
between the U.S. and Iraq, George Shultz meets with Tariq
Aziz and emphasizes "the U.S. desire to base these relations
on the presumption of equality, mutual respect, and
reciprocity." After Aziz says that Iraq's advantage in
weaponry was enabling it to defend itself against Iran,
Secretary Shultz comments "that superior intelligence also
must be an important factor in Iraq's defense. Aziz
acknowledged that this may be true." (The U.S. had been
secretly providing Iraq with extensive intelligence support
for several years.) Secretary Shultz concludes by welcoming
the candor of the ongoing U.S.-Iraq dialogue, and remarks
that "Iraq can expect the U.S. to maintain its opposition to
both the use and production of chemical weapons. This
position is not directed specifically at Iraq . . . "
Source: Declassified under
the Freedom of Information Act
Document 61: United States District Court (Florida:
Southern District) Affidavit. "United States of America,
Plaintiff, v. Carlos Cardoen [et al.]" [Charge that Teledyne
Wah Chang Albany Illegally Provided a Proscribed Substance,
Zirconium, to Cardoen Industries and to Iraq], January 31,
1995.
Former Reagan administration National Security Council
staff member Howard Teicher says that after Ronald Reagan
signed a national security decision directive calling for
the U.S. to do whatever was necessary to prevent Iraq's
defeat in the Iran-Iraq war, Director of Central
Intelligence William Casey personally led efforts to ensure
that Iraq had sufficient weapons, including cluster bombs,
and that the U.S. provided Iraq with financial credits,
intelligence, and strategic military advice. The CIA also
provided Iraq, through third parties that included Israel
and Egypt, with military hardware compatible with its
Soviet-origin weaponry.
This affidavit was submitted in the course of one of a
number of prosecutions, following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait,
of U.S. companies charged with illegally delivering
military, dual-use, or nuclear-related items to Iraq. (In
this case, a Teledyne affiliate was charged will illegally
selling zirconium, used in the manufacture of explosives, to
the Chilean arms manufacturer Carlos Industries, which used
the material to manufacture cluster bombs sold to Iraq.)
Many of these firms tried to defend themselves by
establishing that providing military materiel to Iraq had
been the actual, if covert, policy of the U.S. government.
This was a difficult case to make, especially considering
the rules of evidence governing investigations involving
national security matters.
Source: Court case
Notes
1. <http://web.archive.org/web/20030601132558/http://ednet.rvc.cc.il.us/~PeterR/IR/docs/Geneva.htm>
2. <http://web.archive.org/web/20030601132558/http://www.cjr.org/year/93/2/iraqgate.asp>
3. <http://web.archive.org/web/20030601132558/http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/iraqgate/iraqgate.html>;
<http://web.archive.org/web/20030601132558/http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/introx.htm>
